Air buss loss at Paris Airshow?

In article .com,
says...


In the Boeing model, if you shove the throttle handles forward, the
engines respond to the throttle setting.

In an Airbus model, if you shove the throttle handles foward, the
engines do not respond to the throttle setting

In the meantime, it
can take a while for the pilot to realize what is going on and the push
the TOGA button to disengage the landing mode and get the computer to
respond to the throttle handle position. This is what happened to the
pilot involved in this accident. By the time he realized what was
going on and pushed the TOGA button, there wasn't time for the engines
to spool up enough to miss the trees.




In Boeing planes you also use the TOGA switch to execute a go-around.
So there goes that argument. . .


To fly any plane safely, you have to know which buttons to push for each set
of circumstances. Even in a small trainer, flown low and slow, if you do not
execute the recovery properly you will go down. If you retract the flaps first
- or even at the same time - you can shove the throttle forward and you will
still go down. Nothing intuitive about it - you have to LEARN to do it, then
in a real situation, you must apply what you learned.

I do not for a second insinuate that the pilot of that plane was untrained or
unaware, but there was incontestably something incomplete in the application
of his training, and he did not execute a successful recovery from a low pass.
That's why he was held responsible for it - NOT because of some deep, dark
international conspiracy - NOT because the aircraft "has its own mind" and
cannot be controlled by the pilot.

It is surprising how willing some people are to reject plausible, rational
explanations, in favor of wild and totally unreasonable speculation.

Certainly the aircraft's systems were revisited after this incident, as is
often the case after aviation accidents (is this the cue to get into the
Boeing runaway rudder discussion?) - but even as planes are always being
improved, pilots must fly the plane they have in hand. In the crash in
question there is nothing to suggest systems failure of the aircraft, and
everything to suggest pilot error . . .

The suggestion that Airbus engineers did not consider the event of a
go-around, and made no provision for it, because they do not know enough about
airplane operations is, well simply ridiculous.