#1 Jet of World War II

"John Halliwell" wrote in message
...
In article , Guy Alcala
writes
No, I'm saying that _if_ you followed US practises etc., the Lanc's
performance
would be within a few % either way of the B-17's.

But why drag the performance of an aircraft down by using it in a way
that is clearly inefficient? All this discussion has confirmed to me is
how inefficient the big box formations actually were. Dragging the
performance of a heavy bomber down to the point where it is carrying a
similar load to a Mossie, whilst remaining considerably vulnerable (and
with a crew of ten), doesn't make much sense to me.


Its a good job they didnt do that then isnt it ?

A couple of Mossies with a light load, perhaps 2,000lbs each start to
sound more and more promising. Small, fast formations may have been very
effective.


In daylight they would have suffered excessive losses. The Mosquitoes
of Bomber Command were excellent night bombers but unless
you have long range fighter escorts they would not have survived
over Germany in 1943.

The Mosquito's that were used in daylight raids were mostly
the FB variety typically carrying 1000lb bomb loads and
making relatively shallow penetration raids into France
and the low countries


Nowhere did I say that you
had
to do so, but that is the variable that is always left out of the Lanc
vs. B-17
threads, so that they wind up comparing apples and oranges.

The B-17 bomb bay was not the best arrangement for carrying large loads.
As such had it been used in night ops, the range/payload may not have
been able to be improved to compensate for lighter fuel (or fewer
guns/crew) loads. On that basis, it's easier to drag the Lanc down by
hampering it with US practises than boost the B-17 by using RAF
practises.


Not really. Discarding the waist gunners and fairing over the positions
would have saved several hundred pounds and cruising at 30,000 ft
the B-17 would have been a tough target for German nightfighters.

Indeed bomber command used Fortress III's (B-17G) in 214
squadron in the Radio countermeasures role. Their operational loss
rate was 1.1%

Keith