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Buzzer wrote:
On Fri, 08 Aug 2003 21:09:57 GMT, Guy Alcala wrote: "The Air Force also conducted a quick look evaluation of a potential APR-26 replacement in April [1966]. An HRB-Singer 934-1B missile warning receiver was installed in 62-4416 and test flown at the Sanders facility, which had a Fan Song missile guidance simulator not available at Eglin. And there we were in June 1966 sitting on the ground at Eglin with the F-4C WWIV waiting for range time on the SADS and cancelling for rain when another site was available. Here I thought and was led to believe the Eglin SADS was the only one available.. The 934-1B differed from the APR-26 in that it analyzed the modulation characteristics of the C-band [i.e. radar L-band] guidance signal to differentiate between SA-2 missile activity and missile launch modes, while the APR-26 simply looked for an abrupt amplitude increase. The HRB-Singer set performed well, but the Air Force was already committed to a large APR-26 procurement and saw no compelling reason to buy another system to perform the same function. Shame they didn't have to stand up before a couple hundred pilots and say we see no compelling reason to give you a better system that would give you more confidence and might save your life! Welcome to the realities of the Vietnam War.. At the time I'm sure the APR-26 seemed adequate, and they didn't realize its shortcomings. If the APR-26 was already in low-rate production, it was probably figured that getting something into action soonest was better than waiting for something potentially better later. Jenkins describes a whole bunch of concurrent programs and fits which they were experimenting with, and just getting some F-105F Weasels completed and functional so they could test them was very difficult. There were a lot of systems that were better on paper, but which proved difficult if not impossible to make work in the time required. He also covers the APS-107 which was rejected for the Wild Weasel II (F-100F) program and later considered as a potential system (APS-107B internal for the F-105D along with the navy's ALQ-51 jammer (which later were installed in RF-101s), as well as the Bendix DPN-61 DF/homing system (the Az-el antennas) and various competing systems. Only after the Wild Weasel III F-105s were in combat was it learned that the APR-26's design was based on possibly faulty intelligence regarding the amplitude increase. This led to numerous incidents of flase lower threat-level 'activity' indications when 'missile launch' should have been displayed. The APR-26 was later modified to analyze the guidance signal and the improved sets redesignated APR-37." The original story I heard in June 1966 at the APR-25/26 class at Keesler and later from the tech reps was the missile guidance signal was feed into a dummy load. That caused the Activity Light to come on. Then when they launched and switched to active guidance at a higher power the Launch Light came on. Another variation on that was they interrogated the missiles at low power before launch that gave the Activity and then went high power to guide giving Launch light. The latter would seem to make more sense assuming that the VPADF were really 'playing the L-band' to make us think they'd launched when they hadn't. I wonder if our receivers would be sensitive enough to detect a dummy load at the time -- after all, the whole point was to warm everything up without warning everyone in the area that they were ready to go (like a radar in standby). No mention at all of how the missile was quided until I took the APR-36/37 factory course in 1968 at ATI/ITEK in Palo Alto, CA. Here they went into the guidance pulse train and what the APR-37 looked at. They talked like this was recent intel and here the info had been around for years. snip It may well have been recent. They only got the missile prox. fuse and some guidance data in Feb. 1966, from a Firebee drone that they flew around trolling for SAMs, relaying the data to an RB-47 just before the drone was destroyed. And then we got our hands on complete SA-2 systems after the Six Day War. Guy |
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