B Nice war - here's the bill

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ...
In message , Kevin
Brooks writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
Resolution 660 was passed on August 2 1990, demanding an immediate Iraqi
withdrawal. Resolution 661, imposing a trade and financial embargo in
Iraq, passed on 6th August.

You call that "action"?

They were used to cover US actions thereafter.

Be careful. You want to claim that we really used the UN umbrella in
this case by citing dates of UN "actions"? How about the fact that
Bush Sr authorized further US deployments on 8 Nov to allow for
"offensive action", while the UN did not get around to sanctioning
such action until 29 Nov? Or the fact that while your previously noted
resolutions did indeed pass on 2 and 6 Aug, it was not until 25 August
that the UN "authorized" military interdiction to enforce what the USN
(and RN, IIRC) were already doing (in the case of the USN, as of 12
August)?


The UN, lacking troops, can't put boots on the ground.

Nor apparently can it (collectively) pour pee out of same boots with
the proverbial instructions printed on the heels... g


How many resolutions did the UN subsequently
pass over the next twelve years in regards to Iraq, and what was the
sum result of all of that "action"?

Well, they were used to justify an invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Not by your illustrious UN they weren't. Face it, we were going in
with or without UN "authorization" or "action". We would have done the
same in 91 had we had to (as evidenced by the fact that our
deployments and enforcement actions predated UN "action").


How many times has the UN passed
its resolutions only to see no real "action" to enforce them?

Frequently. That's the nature of the beast, and why it's acceptable.
(Including to the US).

It is increasingly irrelevant.


The US announced the imminent arrival of leading elements of the 82nd
Airborne in Saudi Arabia on the 8th August.

Actually, my source (Brasseys) indicates 7 August, but whatever--if
they were "immenent" even on 8 August, it is obvious that movement
began even earlier than 6 August, right?

Airlift, and this is first arrivals.

Uhmmm...you do realize that they just don't shuffle over to the Green
Ramp at Pope and hop on the aircraft, right? This was not a deployment
of the ready company of the ready battalion of the ready brigade--it
was a full division deployment. Two squadrons of the 1st TFW made the
deployment trip on the 7th as well (not something you just go out and
kick the tires, hop in, and fly off for).


And the UN did not declare
Saddam's "annexation" invalid until 9 August.

They demanded Iraqi withdrawal a week before that.

Ooooh! Another toothless demand from the UN; I note that Saddam did
not comply. Fact is, the UN would not get around to even authorizing
use of force until the end of November, after first having declared
that embargo without bothering to authorize any interception of Iraqi
traffic. In each case, US action predates UN action--we began the
deployment cycle before the UN ever began to think in that direction,
we began stopping shipping before the UN got around to authorizing
that, and we began beefing up the force for offensive operations
before the UN even got around to authorizing the use of force to
secure Kuwait. I don't think any of this bodes well for your "the UN
worked well in 90-91" theory.


If driving to Baghdad was such a good idea in 1991, why was it not done?

It wasn't a good idea in 91. METT-T.

We agree, but many others do not.

(With hindsight, 1998 was perhaps the best time for such action)

By then we had a severe leadership problem--the only actions that were
undertaken were those that afforded zero-percent chance of friendly
casualties, and which afforded maximum *appearance* of "doing
something" (witness the laughable SLCM attacks against OBL in
Afghanistan and against that asprin factory in Sudan). It was not a
particularly proud period of time for a lot of us who were serving.

I can't help wondering how much of it is chicken-and-egg. Clinton was
not a great friend of the military; but the military gave the impression
of being actively hostile to their commander at the same time. (Or at
least the members posting to Usenet, writing to Proceedings and AFJI,
and so on) This tends to lead to paralysis.

OFCS, when McCafferty showed up at the White House he got the cold
shoulder from a "senior advisor" in a none too respectful manner; not
a good start. Respect generally has to be a two way street; we had
none from Clinton and his crowd, and we knew it. That we accorded him
the respect due to a C-in-C was just an example of the professionalism
of the US military; it may have been grudging, but he got it. His
fandango in Smalia, where he took a humanitarian mission that had gone
rather smoothly from Bush Sr and succeeded in turning it into a
ridiculous "Get Aidid" mission (at the behest of the UN Sec General,
IIRC) from which he divorced himself and turned tail when things got a
bit nasty, was merely icing on the cake.


If he felt that he couldn't trust his military in any action that might
involve cost, he'd opt for safe standoff tactics. (What would the
reaction be to "Failed Raid Costs US Troops Their Lives" if Clinton had
used manned platforms or ground forces to go after bin-Laden? Would you
have respected him for using the best tool for the job, or despised him
for considering his troops expendable assets to be spent for political
gain? I'm thinking Desert One as an example here)

That is utter bull**** Paul, and you know it. "Couldn't trust his
military"?! For gosh sakes, the US military did everything he ever
asked of them. The only lack of trust was in the other direction--he
said we had to go after Aidid and stabilize Somalia, and we did; then
he cut and ran and threw a nasty temper tantrum when things went to
hell in a handbasket during the Mog raid (for which his own cabinet,
and his closest advisor at the time, Shrimpboy Stephanopolous, was
responsible for not providing the very modest support in the form of
armor and AC-130's that the military chain had asked for) and ran away
like a scalded dog.

As to OBL, I seem to recall that there was a *real* opportunity to
nail him, and Clinton's NS advisor, Berger, refused to authorize
it--wonder how history would have turned out if that had not been the
case? No, much better to pop SLCMs at empty Afghani tents and a
Sudanese aspirin factory.


Which doesn't answer the question - if they were so much trouble, why
bother? Tell them that they can go back to France and the Coalition will
get the job done without them.

Political appearances, apparently. In hindsight, we probably should
have told them to shove off.

So why were political appearances so important?

You'd have to ask a politician. Bush Sr apparently had some of the old
school diplomat in him, and was trying to husband a coalition effort.
Even then, the French proved to be difficult allies, with their last
minute "maybe we should give him more time" crap.


Sounds like there was a perceived need to keep the French on-side.

But the fact is that the French were not exactly a key part of ODS,

Never said they were. (They were more use than many realise in OIF too,
mind you; French ships were among those covering the several risky
chokepoints on the way to the top of the Persian Gulf, as shipping laden
with military supplies trudged to their destinations. Not a point that
got much publicity then or notice now.)

Maybe because the USN also covered that same area? I doubt many US
commanders would have trusted the French last spring to actually stop
any attack against that shipping; they would just as likely have sat
aside and waited to rush to the survivors' aid. If you are getting the
impression that a fair number of Americans have not forgiven the
French for their pro-Saddam stance (and the protection of those oil
and gas contracts they had recently secured--gee, wonder what happened
to them?), then you would be correct, and I imagine it will be some
time before these sentiments recede.

Brooks