A-10 gear fairing

After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Kevin
Brooks blurted out:

You really need to cool your jets a bit.

(ouch)

Getting your panties in a wad is not gonna help, now is it?

Some times it's almost a requirement to point out the obvious...if it
takes a 2" x 4" sorry...some folks are slow, and some keep moving the
target. I may have to use a Louisville Slugger with you.

Now...any evidence of this great tide of opposition available?

Ummm, have you actually been reading what I'm typing? Now you want
Congressional testimony...okay you win. There was never any opposition
to the F-4 or the F-16. Trest was fabricating about the F-15
supporters (above the rank Internet of aviation expert) trying to
scuttle the F-16. I have no proof of institutional opposition to
either the F-4 or the F-16...and can find no institutional opposition
to the A-10 (but I'm aware of anecdotal opposition, snide remarks and
limited roles).

"How many of those opponents to the F-4, or even the F-16, were in the
USAF, though?"

Note that the point here was that there was no tremendous
institutional opposition that approached the level that was apparent
in the case of the A-10--

Fair enough, I missed the part where you explained you meant
"tremendous institutional opposition approaching the level" vis-a-vis
the A-10. I'm pretty sure you would characterize any other poster's
alibi like this as "back pedaling."

Keep reading, I'll get to what you describe as INSTITUTIONAL
opposition. Since you didn't specify which institution, I'm going with
USAF.

Did I say there was "no opposition"? Nope. That would be you
trying to insert words into my mouth, I believe.

Considering your rapier wit, the question,__"How many of those
opponents to the F-4, or even the F-16, were in the USAF, though?" __
carries a certain amount of ambiguity, leaving you ample wiggle room
to either clarify or back pedal. But I digress.

Here's some "facts" for you Buckwheat, regarding USAF institutional
opposition to the A-10.

"In addition to the F-X air superiority, the Air Force laid plans for
the A-X close-air support aircraft. In June 1966 General McConnell [
CSAF] directed the Air Staff to make analyses of what areas of close
air support were not being filled to the Army's satisfaction....There
was a need of a follow-on Air Force close-air-support aircraft since
it was already evident that the A-7 was too costly and lacked desired
CAS performance capabilites. In September 1966 General McConnell
directed immediate and positive action to obtain a specialized A-X
air-support aircraft for the 1970s."

So the proposal gets rolling in 1966...in 1971 Secretary Seamans [Sec
AF] tells the Senate Appropriations Commitee,

"We are going through an important aircraft development phase in the
Air Force with the A-X [A-9 vs A-10 competition], the B-1, with the
F-15, and with AWACS, and feel it is not a time to procure large
numbers of additional aircraft."

In 1971, outgoing Commander of Tactical Air Command, "General [William
W] Momyer had earlier opposed specialized aircraft, but in 1971 he
conceived that military requirements must be rationally developed
from the future threat toward Europe...The promised intensity of
conflict in Europe, Momyer concluded, established 'a requirement for a
large number of airframes and tend[ed] to emphasize specialization."

17 Jan 1973 Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council selected the
A-10 in the A-X prototype competition.

Also 1973 the Yom Kippur War began to change the viability of the A-X
as planned, at least in some minds.

"A Joint Chiefs of Staff [note Kev, not just USAF] survey team agreed
that a lesson to be learned from the Yom Kippur War was that a
close-support airplane needed to attack at high speed, needed excess
thrust for maneuverability to avoid SAMs and sustain high speed, and
needed a computer-aided bombing system for an accurate first-pass
delivery. Another point raised by the JCS team was that airborne FACs
in slow-moving planes could not have survived in such an intense
air-defense environment "

Guess what the INSTITUTIONAL Air Force response was to the JCS
conclusions? Glad you asked...

"The Air Force's response to these assertions was that there was a
trade-off between speed and relative invulnerability (ability to take
hits) in an aircraft. Speed made it more difficult for a pilot to
acquire a target. Thus this trade-off was being reflected in the A-X
(now the A-10) close-air-support plane. The finding on the
survivability of an airborne FAC was additional support for the A-10,
since it could --unlike a faster aircraft-- find its own targets."

"General Robert J Dixon, Commander of the Tactical Air Command,
expressed his insight in to the Yom Kippur War in a rebuttal to the
generalization that missile defenses brought an era where tactical
aircraft could no longer survive over a battlefield. His judgment was
'less startling but more credible.' Tactical air power would need to
'control the air-space, suppress the defenses, operate as combined
arms team."

[please nod your cranium if you understand "operate as combined arms
team" implies support of the Army]

In November 1975, former CinC USAFE General David C Jones said, "In a
war in Central Europe, the intial and principal task of Allied Air
Forces must be to assist friendly forces in halting the Pact ground
offensive. This requires that NATO air power become immediately and
heavily engaged in close air support operations, while attaining local
air superiority as necessary. Less immediate critical objectives, such
as achieving theater-wide air superiority, must await a REDUCED NEED
FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT."

I could go on regarding the USAF A-X versus the USA Cheyenne versus
the Harrier debate, or the 1977 proposal for a FAC-X (two seat A-10)
proposed by the USAF. In none of these can you find your so-called
USAF institutional opposition to the A-10.

I can also point to quotes by USAF Leadership flat out saying the
Light Weight Fighter should not even make it to the prototype phase.
And I can quote CinC USAFE saying CAS is a vital mission, but a
swing-LWF vice single mission jet would be a better option based upon
force structure costs. This applies equally to the single purpose
RF-4. I'm also ignoring the disparity between NATO's the US concept of
how to stop WP armor. (Hint: We included the A-10).

Of course none of this applies because I'm certain you will re-define
what exactly institutional opposition is, or specify some time twenty
years after the A-10 entered the inventrory as proof of "institutional
opposition."