Best dogfight gun?

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
...

"Kevin Brooks" wrote
"Paul F Austin" wrote

"Chad Irby" wrote
"Paul F Austin" wrote:

Now, here's a question: for the 200Kg or so weight budget (I have
no
idea
about volume) of an internal gun and ammo tank, would you rather
have
1,
2
or 3 more AIM-9Xs/ASRAAMs?

It's not a question of "just weight," or we'd just build C-5s with a
big
automated missile launcher in them.

Nope, I just used weight as an example of the "cost" paid for a gun.
And
my
question stands: At the initial design stage of an aircraft when
you're
making choices, is a gun worth more than a couple of SRAAMs? Or some
of
the
other goods that you snipped. Those are real choices and a gun has to
earn
its place on the airframe just like every other piece of gear. You
(the
customer and systems designers) make choices that affect the aircraft
thoughout its life.

Yes, the "no-guns" fighter was 'way premature in 1955, the year the
F4H
configuration was frozen. It's_really_not clear that's still the case
now.
Minimum range engagement? ASRAAM claim 300m minimum range and with
"looks
can kill" helmet sights, it's really not clear that a gun brings much
to
the
table.. Strafing? Having 6 SDBs tucked away seems more useful.

Minimum safe distance (to friendly troops) for surface targets using the
20mm is 25 meters (according to a USAF chart included in the 1996
edition
of
CGSC ST 100-3). The same chart indicates minimum distance for bombs
under
500 pounds is 145 meters (for protected friendlies, ie., bunkers,
trenches,
fighting positions) or 500 meters (if friendlies are in the open). Even
given a significant reduction in the latter figures for the smaller SDB,
it
is going to be substantially more than 25 meters. So what do you use to
engage bad guys located in the 25 meter to something-under-500 meter gap
if
you have no gun? This is not a purely hypothetical--it happened during
Anaconda.

That's a good point and one I can't answer. If it was me though, I'd
expect
that the answer would lie with more organic fires available at the
battalion
level rather than depending on CAS for "men in the wire".

There is not a soldier around who would disagree with your objective, since
groundpounders generally prefer having "their own" support completely
in-pocket. But that does not change the fact that there will be situations,
like during Anaconda, where the organic support assets are either not
available (i.e., no arty tubes were within range) or unable to handle the
scope of the mission (i.e., the mortars that the Anaconda troops did have
were over-tasked due to the unexpected number of concurrent targets, and
ammo resupply was problematic being fully dependent upon helos in what had
already become a less-than-helo-friendly environment). That is where the
internal gun on the CAS aircraft becomes a means for the commander to remain
flexible in how he responds to these "knife fight" situations.

Brooks