asymetric warfare

Fred J. McCall wrote:
(phil hunt) wrote:
:On Sun, 21 Dec 2003 23:41:35 GMT, Fred J. McCall
::co-ordination = radio
:In which case we're going to KNOW when you're spooling up to shoot and
:you'll be dead before everybody gets rolled out and ready.
:
:Hasve you never heard of encryption, or are you trolling?

Hasve [sic] you never heard of traffic analysis, or are you trolling?

Done properly, especially with one time pad encryption,
one can handle this sort of situation.

Consider... the use of CD-R's for pads. They give you 650
megabytes of storage. Assume one message of 1k contents
per minute is sent; that works out to a bit over 43 megabytes
of pad per month, or about 518 megabytes per year. Each receiving
station can have its own pad and its own recipient keying.

The messages are sent, every minute, every hour, every day.
Most of the time they decrypt to "Nothing is happening,
the wind is west at ten kilometers per hour in central
Bagwabadad, the temperature is twenty three celsius,
our fearless leader wishes you good will guarding our
important sacred borders, have a nice day. [spaces padding
out to 1k total chars]"

Which the computer at the launch site merely notes in a log
and ignores (or, prints out a receipt note on a dot matrix
printer or something, so that people can see that messages
are coming in and being decoded).

There's no traffic analysis to do: there's always a message
of 1k contents going out to each recipient station every
minute, and it's under a one time pad key so you can't tell
what it is unless you bust into the station and copy its
CD-ROM.

And then, you invade, and instead of the weather report
all the stations get code "ZERO ZERO ZERO FIRE WHEN READY GRIDLI"

This is all pretty easy to jam, since the frequencies are
all known beforehand, but that general *approach* is very
hard to penetrate with traffic analysis.


-george william herbert