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AC-130 Replacement Contemplated



 
 
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Old February 8th 04, 05:08 AM
Kevin Brooks
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"sid" wrote in message
m...
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
Not nearly as big a gulf as you characterize. ISR assets are now
enmeshed in tactical operations.


Yes, but again, their exposure is an order of magnitude less than that
experienced by MC-130's and AC-130's.


Sure. In the last few conflicts as the Lexington institue piece made
clear, but what about a few years down the road?


At least two of your Lexington Institute "pieces" have endorsed the ACS and
E-10, with their commercial aircraft platforms--what does this say about
your theory that using commercial derivitive platforms is unacceptable?

http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/031218.asp

http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/031211.asp


SOF platforms like the Combat Talon and Spectre operate in airspace that

is
much more dangerous than that experienced by the E-8 or ARL-M's.


With long range SAM and AAW systems readily available for export its
not something that can be counted on. You may have missed this little
article in a December issue of AW&ST:
"Russian guided-weapons builder Novator is continuing to work, albeit
slowly, on an ultralong-range air-to-air missile, with a version on
offer for export to a select customer set.
Designated article 172, the weapon was included on a model of the
Su-35 derivative of the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker, on display during the
Dubai air show. The export version, known as the 172S1, has a 300-km.
(186-mi.) range, compared with 400 km. for the original version
specified by the Russian air force. The missile, which is also
referred to (perhaps erroneously) as the KS-172, is intended to engage
specific high-value targets such as airborne warning and control
aircraft, air-to-ground surveillance and tanker platforms."


What was there to miss? The acknowlegement that the pace of development on
this rather strange weapon is "slow"? How would it be targeted? 300 to 400
km is an awful long way for a fighter radar to "see", much less target.


- Aerial refueling tankers penetrated to support ISR


I know of one report of a KC-135 going *towards* Baghdad at one point,

but
did it enter within range of the surviving Iraqi AD assets? Doubt it.

There were public reports of tanker assets going "downtown". The
commanding general flew one mission purportedly to allay tanker crews'
fears.


Sure--going "downtown" after the IADS, or what was left of it pre-war, was
further destroyed. We lost *one* aircraft over Baghdad--an A-10 to an
SA-7/SA-18, IIRC. How much of a threat do you think that SA-18 was to any
KC-135's orbiting at 25K or so feet?



To illustrate further, here are some comments on the expected use the
of the ACS:
http://www.defensenews.com/conferenc...3/2409450.html
...As one of the first systems to the fight, ACS will provide early
intelligence that could help shape the first stages of battle,[LtCol]
Hinsdale said Nov. 18 during a Defense News Media Group conference,
ISR Integration 2003: The Net-Centric Vision, in Arlington, Va.
For instance, it could warn forces if their port of entry has been
compromised "before we put our sons and daughters in harm's way." ...


Obviously to be done using oblique imaging or UAV's reporting to the
aircraft--you don't think they intend to conduct overflights of an enemy
possessing an decent IADS, do you?


And against an S-300(or equivalent) capapble opponent?


Then you use your UAV's--that is what they are for, to go where manned
platforms shouldn't/can't.

They may have
to be risked to get the job done.


I don't see the USAF placing its RC-135's at great immediate risk, nor do I
see the EP-3's doing that. As to ACS, remember that it is intended to
replace ARL-M (and the remaining RC-12's)--that "L" means low, as in "low
intensity". Nobody is going to be sortying them into an IADS environment.
Period.

"UAV Wrangling" from aircraft is still in the early stages. Given
budget realities its likely going to be a capapbility somewhere up the
"spiral". Until then the standoff ranges will be measured for the
aircraft.


Let's get this straight--you see a strong potential of AAM's that can engage
our E-10's at 300-400 km, but you think managing an existing UAV from an
airborne operator's station is too tough to handle? I find that a bit hard
to digest.


As I mentioned in previous posts, the aircraft in question make fine
civil transports, but shoot at them and you have death traps.


No, you have to *hit* them in order to make them a "deathtrap". How many
KC-135's, KC-10's, E-8's, EP-3's, or ARL-M's have been hit during combat
operations to date? None. How many have even been shot *at*? Again,

AFAIK,
none.

As improtant as these aircraft are bcoming to our operational
doctrine, and as few of them as there are or will be, these vulnerable
aircraft will offer a rich target for an opponent with a big payback
no matter the cost to neutralize them. Looks like Novator for one is
already moving in on the business.


I would not be buying too much stock in that enterprise just yet.


Since they are not going into the hot part of the bad guy's threat

envelope,
why do they need to be survivable in terms of enemy weapons effects?

Because it appears the threats will be reaching out to them.


Your argument that this is the case is less than convincing so far.


Later attempts to back engineer vulnerability improvements into former
transports have proven less than sucessful and expensive. The P-3
comes to mind.


None of which have been lost due to combat operations, IIRC.

Two P-3s were lost in 1968 to ground fire actually. Likely because of
vulenrability to hydrodynamic ram after a small caliber round hit
them. Same vulnerabilty that turned the DHL 'bus into a roman candle
after a small shrapnel hit. Same vulnerability that all civil
transports share.


Checking around, there was one confirmed shoot-down of a P-3 in SEA (both
following incidents VP-26 Orions). One was an "unknown" (may have very well
gone down due to accident), the other took a burst of .50 cal while doing a
*low level* pass over a suspect LCM, which set set no. 4 engine on fire. The
crew apparently tried to put as much distance between them and the bad guys
as possible before attempting to ditch, and the wing snapped in the vicinity
of the aforementioned fire. Note that these guys were doing visual recon
from low level--they did not have the super synthetic aperture radars we
have today. The EP-3 does not conduct low level missions, nor do the
ARL-M/RC-12. So what is the applicability of the loss of one P-3 that got
hammered by .50 cal (which can be tough on any airframe, even those designed
to military specs--my brother lost a UH-1 Dustoff bird during Lam Son 719 to
a .50 cal, and more than a couple of A-1's, etc., were allegedly brought
down by 12.7mm and *below* calibers) to current programs like the E-10 and
ACS?



Since the SOF platforms operate in an entirely different threat

environment,
I fail to see the connection to programs like ACS. Remember that the ACS
platform will be one of the current flock of business jets (Gulfstream

and
Bombadier being major competititors for that role right now). The E-10

is
going to use a 767 platform. Now why do you think you know something

about
the unsuitability of these systems that the combined brain power of the
USAF, USN, and US Army don't?

Read through this selection of links and you will see that
vulnerabilty is a perennial back burner issue...Until losses bring it
front an center.


Great--for aircraft going into the thick of the combat. E-10 and ACS won't
be.

Brooks

http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/aircraft/
This one in particular discusses historical lapses in this regard:
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/aircraft/8.pdf



 




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