Is there a place for Traditional CAS in the 21st century?

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 10:50:56 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote:



I see UAVs under the direct control of the men on the ground as the
replacement for the A-10. Some sort of game boy type interface to
designate
targets would be all the human interface required. In that manner the
tendancy of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions might be eliminated.

That would take a quantum leap in sensor technology as well as an
incredible level of logistic support. What you suggest would require
some sort of UAV platoon attached to a maneuver element with
pre-packaged UAV rounds, a launch/recovery capability, a cadre of
trained operators, reload munitions, etc. etc. etc. Not a low-tech,
mud-reliable sort of weapon.

I fail to see how it is any different from an A-10, without the operator and
operator support requirements. UAVs are already flying in US airspace using
existing comercially available sensors. My vehicle in atonomous mode could
come to the battle and then go home when exhasted. Such UAVs are already
envisioned as loiterers, where a battle may occur in the future, or along a
transportation link.

Then there is the question of battle-field view. While the guy on the
ground may be able to see the enemy immediately in front of him, he
seldom knows what else is out there and threatening. That takes a
detached, at altitude, observer. Hunkering in a foxhole or a tracked
vehicle buttoned-up, looking at a 12.1 inch LCD display that reports
what the eye in the nose of the UAV happens to be looking at is a
difficult perspective from which to manipulate CAS.

CAS is now done with a JDAM from a B-one at thousands of feet. The only
thing that was holding back the technology was the moral issue of having a
flying machine kill without an operator, but that was answered by CIA years
ago.

You proposal also doesn't address the complexities of airspace
coordination for employment of a CAS system within the mix of
aviation, indirect fire assets and direct fire from supporting or
flanking units. Letting "game-boy" operators fly armed UAVs to deliver
ordinance at the engagement level is not a trivial problem.

Atonomous UAVs are the future, reguardless of the screeching of the fighter
mafia.

And, the "tendency of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions" is an
unsupported cheap shot. The A-10 (and any other CAS system) has made
few friendly fire mistakes. They happen, but it isn't epidemic.

The A-10's record vs the rotary wing equivalents for blue on blue incidents
is poor. I would rather blame the machine than the inter-service reality in
this forum.