Friendly Fire Notebook

On 18 Apr 2004 22:07:46 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

So, how did it get into the country and to the point of application if
as BUFFDRVR contends there was no critical infrastructre left for LB
II to attack? Can you say harbors, marshalling areas, roads, rail,
bridges, cranes, etc?

The mining of Haiphong harbor was a great move, and had the plan been to
re-seed the minefield weekly (which is required to keep a minefield useful) and
keep Haiphong shutdown, perhaps in a month or two, frontline units would have
really felt a pinch. In fact, many frontline NVA units were already feeling a
pinch because the supply network, designed to supply VC and NVA regulars in SVN
with 34 tons of supplies/day (7 x 2 1/2 ton trucks worth) was unable to
adequately supply a 3 division force, even if it wasn't being hit from the air.
Linebacker I and the Freedom Porch missions "ended the war" (if we have to use
that term) by hitting those critical supply nodes. LB II simply hit them
again..and again..and again, but even before they were hit the first time
during LB II, most were already unsuitable for their designed task or able to
perform 25% or less of their designed task.

That logistic analysis sounds real good at the micro-fiche machine,
but if you'll talk to some Marines who were at Khe Sanh and Hue in MR
I and some ARVN and US troops at An Loc in MR III, you'll find that
the bad guys seemed to be doing just fine regarding supplies.

While Linebacker was ongoing throughout the summer of '72 we were also
operating round-the-clock against the trail with Spectre and F-4s with
M-36 and with USAF/USN/Marine tacair in those beseiged hot spots.

In March of '73 we were about to muster a full scale roll-back on Khe
Sanh because in addition to the three SA-2 sites we had confirmed
there we also had intel on a pair of SA-3 sites being on the verge of
operational. That's after we "moved the rubble around" and there was
no infrastructure to move such stone age equipment three hundred miles
south.

And you haven't explained to me when Phuc Yen, Kep, Cat Bi, Hoa Lo and
Yen Bai airfields were struck during LB. It seems to this observer
that the first dedicated airfield strikes were by the F-111s on Dec.
18 PM. And, you might note, that if the archives told you that SAM
sites were specifically targeted during LB II, they fibbed. SAM sites
were too mobile for specific targeting and were always response
targets for the Hunter/Killer flights.

----Ed: Hunter/Killer specialist and WW #2488.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8