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We're beginning to get really convoluted here. Now, your statement
regarding 100 trucks is caveated with some as yet undisclosed location within the country criteria. From my original post I had explained the "hundred or so trucks" were dealing with vehicles stationed and operated on the Ho Chi Mihn Trail. I have never wavered on that criteria and have know reiterated it once more. A truck delivering war material in the PRC buffer isn't a truck? No, it's a truck. Or it isn't war material? I'm sure it was hauling war material, most likely to Hanoi. Or they had to unload it and then put it on a different truck for the rest of the trip? BINGO. The trucks that operated on the Ho Chi Mihn Trail were stationed, maintained and operated on the trail. Many had major modifications to increase their clearence capability and nearly all had suffered some kind of battle damage. Were some trucks brought down from Hanoi to work the trail? I'm sure on occasion they were, but the Ho Chi Mihn trail didn't operate like the US Highway system where a truck loads up at point A and delivers goods to point B. In the case of supplies moving into SVN, typically the final destination was point AA and delivered via bicycle. When you made the initial comment Ed about the NVN supply system, I thought you were specifically talking about the Ho Chi Mihn trail. Didn't you refer to supplies into SVN? If so, and there were only a 100 or so going down the trail, there there should have been massive storage areas and trans-shipment points. Define "massive". There were trans-shipment points and troop rest areas every 9 miles. According to Lt. Gen. Harold Moore; "Each camp, which could shelter a company of troops, consisted of a series of crude bamboo huts dispersed along a half-mile of trail to make a smaller target for warplanes." So, the "hundred or so trucks" hauled supplies to VC Yes. And their NVA cohorts operating south of the DMZ. and the three division offensive had thousands of other trucks? Yes. Or, they three divisions carried their logistic goodies in their rice bags? They did a lot of that as well, but not nearly as much as the guys/gals moving down the Ho Chi Mihn trail. And, I just Googled Freedom Porch, since I'd never heard of it. No hits. I then checked Hobson's "Vietnam Air Losses" where he has a list of names of operations. No hit. Then I pulled Thompson's "To Hanoi and Back". No hit.Got Freedom Train, but no Porch. There were actually two Freedom Porch Operations, with Freedom Porch Bravo being the bigger one. Bravo was the first time B-52s struck targets in NVN. Check out this web site: http://www.hdart.com/powmia.html It gives a very good synopsis, here's just one part; "During the North Vietnamese spring offensive in 1972, Allied air power was called on to turn the tide. The U.S. Air Force response to the invasion was immediate as B-52 Arc Light missions and tactical air attacks intensified during brief respites in the weather. The invasion was checked, but the lessons learned lead to Operation Freedom Train against targets south of the 20th Parallel, and later to Freedom Porch Bravo against targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area. The first wave of Freedom Porch Bravo strikes began on April 16,1972, and achieved respectable success over the highest threat areas within North Vietnam. The first wave consisted of B-52 strikes supported by Navy and Air Force tactical air." What was that you were saying about us guys from the "back of the library"? I believe Clodfelter also discusses, in pretty good detail, Freedom Porch Alpha and Bravo in his book. They were JCS directed. Don't know where you got the idea that "the military took the order and turned it into as sound a military operation as they could." Uhh, the Joint Chiefs of Staff *are* military or am I misunderstanding you here? Since SAC wasn't chopped to 7th AF, where below the JCS did this selection of critical targets get done? Both SAC and 7th AF nominated targets to the JCS targeting board, the JCS put them through the "White House filter" during the Johnson years and pretty much rubber stamped them during Nixon's years. The problem is, by DEC 72, there were very little "critical targets" left and by Day #6 there were nearly zero. The only critical targets remaining were SAMs, radars On day #6, I orbited Bullseye for 25 minutes at six thousand feet over a solid undercast. Not a single defensive reaction was observed. Both the standing order on SAM engagements and the undercast made that possible. I'm confused are you trying to say that we had destroyed *all* "critical" targets after night #5? If so, you would be helping make my point. Ahh, at last, grounds for agreement. All military operations have political strategic objectives. They also have military tactical objectives. They sure do, and sometimes the two don't depend on each other. That was true for LBII and at least two raids I flew during OAF. It was accomplished from 1965 through the end of the war with remarkably little visibility. Not according to Chuck Horner who points out several times in "Every Man a Tiger" that the construction of SAM sites was nearly always detected, but off limits to bombing till it was complete. I've heard that dozens of times from F-105 crews on nearly every documentary on the Vietnam War. SAM battalions relocated regularly and were resupplied consistently. They seemed to be well supplied with missiles throughout. I'd imagine resupplying Guideline Missiles in the middle of the jungle is much easier than in more suburban areas. In Michel's book the SA-2 commander spelled it out pretty clearly. I guess you don't believe him. What reason would he have to lie? If, as Steve and I contend, the NVN ran out of missiles or was constrained in their reaction by day 6 of LB II, it was because of the destruction of roads, bridges, railroads, marshalling areas, etc. Not according to the guys commanding and operating the SAM sites. Michel's account of the night 11 attack on Trai Ca is different than you list here. He mentions the target and states that the A/C reported eight SAMs fired, but doesn't indicate damage. I got that from my thesis, unfortunately, it was not a direct quote and not "foot noteable" (at least to my prof it wasn't, he didn't "ding" me for failing to document sourcing for that paragraph) so I'm not sure which one of my sources I used. Sorry, but I'll have to take your word on it about Michel, I lent my copy out. And, what is the distinction between a "Guideline and tactical varients (sic)"? Guideline would be a Strategic SAM, so would a Goa or a Gammon. A Gainful or Gecco would be tactical SAMs. Was this not common lexicon in the 70s and 80s? Let's keep in mind that the tactical crews (and after the first three nights with 9 BUFFs lost the SAC crews as well) had several hundred associates on the ground in captivity. Locations of damage wasn't random I have never said it was, that's Steve putting words in my mouth. and precise targeting was essential if we weren't going to kill the POWs as well. As well as civilians, Nixon was adamant that we not supply congress a reason to cut short their holiday break. This concern for collateral damage was the reason the B-52s (at least the Guam based B-52s) had the ridiculous, "no maneuvering on the bomb run" order. BUFDRVR "Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips everyone on Bear Creek" |
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