Why was the Fokker D VII A Good Plane?

I wrote:
I don't see anything he posted that refutes Galland.

Mr. Willshaw writes:
Translation:

I propose to ignore any and all evidence that disagrees with
my pre-conceived notions.


I am sure glad you posted that. Sometimes it feels like it's just me and
Sinclair.


My pre-conceived notions don't show me that the USAAF had only @ 100 heavy
bombers available for day to day operations prior to mid-May, 1943.

My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that these aircraft bombed using only
the "mark I eyeball."


So far we are back in the motherhood area, the exaggerations are
simply deleted for the moment.

It's not a motherhood statement to say that all the bombing in this period was
visual. It's what happened.

My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that the Germans began bringing the
day
fighters home in April, 1943.


Now the first attempt to slip in misleading information...

I've certainly said it before. I guess you mean that stating that the bombing
was all visual wasn't false, it was just a "motherhood statement." It's still
true.

please supply
the units and dates of their arrival,

"Thus, despite the mounting production, the number of serviceable dayfighters
available for the defence of Germany rose only slowly: from 120 in March and
April to 162 in early May, 255 in early June and 300 in July.

By the end of August, under pressure of the American daylight offensive, the
home defence force reached its all-time "high" in first-line aircraft: 405 Me
109s and Fw 190s, plus one twin-engined Geschwaderwith about eighty Me 1l0s and
Me 410s.
Though some were newly formed units, most of them had had to be withdrawn from
other fronts. From southern Italy Il/JG 27 under Captain Schroer moved to
Wiesbaden-Erbenheim, II/JG 51 under Captain Rammelt to Neubiberg near Munich,
while. a single Gruppe of the renowned "Greenheart" Geschwader, IIl/JG 54 under
Major Reinhard Seiler, was posted from northern Russia to Oldenburg and
Nordholtz on HeIigoland Bight. .
Two complete Geschwader were also brought home: JG 3 ("Udet") under
Lieutenant-Colonel Wilcke from the southern sector of the eastern front;
JG 26 ("Schlageter") under Major Priller from the English Channel, where its
experience of combat with the British and Americans was perhaps un.rivalled.
Both now were stationed on the lower Rhine and in Holland, right on the enemy
approach routes.

Even the Me 1 I Os, long obsolete in daylight and lately relegated to a host of
inconsequential tasks, were given a new lease of life. Provided they could
evade combat with enemy fighters, their firepower could still make dents in the
heavy bombers."

-- "Luftwaffe War Diaries, p. 319

So the day defense force rose from April to May by 1/3, at a time when the
USAAF had no more than 100 heavy bombers available day to day, and was only
bombing by visual means.

As a hint, ignore JG 11,
it was formed in April 1943, and be aware of the rotation of fighter
units to the Reich for refitting, and note JG1 on 17 May 1943 was
around half strength compared with 27 July 1943, since it was used
to form JG11.

Thanks for making my points for me.

But let's look at something else, the effect of the first year of Harris in
charge of BC, also from the LWD:

"The success of Bomber Command's offensive was however, questionable. Although
many German cities lay in ruins, had the objective been acheived? Had German
industry been destroyed, or the morale of the population undermined? Nothing
of the sort had taken place."

LWD, p. 309

So we see that the first year of bombing by Bomber Command under Harris had no
apreciable effect.

But the first year of USAAF operations -- 8/17/42 -- 8/17/43, we see the Reich
day fighter force brought to it's 'all time 'high'", to fight against the Day
Bombers. This is pretty much what Galland said -- the USAAF received higher
priority even though still numerically inferior.

Then the key point, tell us how this means the Luftwaffe
was "denuding" the other fronts of fighters which was the original claim.

LWD does indicate that at Hitler's insistence, and against the advice of Milch,
Jeschonek and Goring, that many aircraft were sent both to the Med and the
Eastern Front in this time frame:

"But the most striking evidence of Jeschonek's failure emerges from the last
months of his life. The Luftwaffe staff was fully informed about the American
aircraft construction programme, and at last Jeschonek recognized the mortal
danger that such swarms of four-engined bombers represented for Germany. "A
danger of such magnitude, that by comparision the disaster of Stalingrad was
trifling.

His volte-face in favor of defense put him on the side of Generals Galland and
Kammhuber who, while the Luftwaffe was bled to death on the eastern and
southern fronts, had for long tried to draw attention to the threat from the
west."

-- LWD p. 316

This at a time, when the USAAF had only @ 100 heavy bombers available, and was
bombing only by visual means.

It wasn't all "area bombing", as one poster suggested.

My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that the Germans felt the need to
disperse the aircraft production in May, 1943.

Now the a bigger attempt at fiction, a "request" is turned into action

That's pathetic.

A request that was brought on by operations of the the 8th AF with @ 100 heavy
bombers on any given raid, bombing exclusively by visual means.

My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that this reinforces what Galland
said
-- the day bombers received more attention than the night bombers as 1943
wore
on, even though the night bombers were more numerous.

The largest 8th Air Force raid on Germany in December 1943 was
722 bombers on 24 December, the largest Bomber Command raid
was 712 bombers on the 29th (there were larger night raids in November)

Hello? Anyone home?

We're talking about the operation of @ 100 B-17's and B-24's and their
operations through mid-May, 1943.

snip a lot of really strange and pedantic stuff

It is clear the day defence in the west became the priority over the
day defences in the south and east in the July/August 1943 period.


It's also clear per Freeman and LWD that this build-up started in April, and
per LWD increased the Day fighters by 1/3 between "April and early May". This
at a time when the USAAF had @ 100 bombers available on any given day and was
bombing entirely by visual means.

Galland may claim there was some sort of priority day versus night
but the numbers say it was day over the west versus day over the
other fronts.

After 1 year of BC operations under Harris, the RAF failed to achieve its
objectives.

After 1 year of USAAF operations, the day fighters were quadrupled. And all the
US raids were done solely by visual means.

It wasn't all "area bombing."

As of 1 April:

100 US heavies

120 German day fighters.

As of 17 August:

300 US heavies

500 German day fighters.

Did the night fighters quadruple in strength?

After the raid on Hamburg which produced the firestorm, things changed. But
that was over three years after the war began.

After 1 year of RAF operations against Germany, the effect was negligible. Not
even you can say -- honestly-- that the effect of the first year of USAAF
operations was negligible. In fact, the first year of USAAF operations scared
the Germans very badly, and defnitely impacted the number of aircraft they
planned to produce.

My pre-conceived notions don't show me, but the data above does -- that it
was
not all "area bombing" as one RAF apologist -- maybe it was you --
suggested.


Somebody with "uk" in their e-mail address indicated it was all "area bombing."
But that is not true. That's how this particular iteration started.

When stuck answer another question, not the one being asked, and
throw an accusation without any supporting evidence.

You have no answer. But then, you never do.

Walt