OK, what the hell has happened to the Brits?

"G.R. Patterson III" wrote in message
...


Paul Sengupta wrote:

Just playing Devil's wotsit here, "the penalty for guessing wrong is
death".
Right. So. They grab someone randomly. The air marshal draws his gun
for issuing said penalty. He's identified. The other 3 terrorists then
get
the gun off the air marshal.

And while they're trying to do that, the second air marshall shoots all
three of
them.

manifest: 250 air marshals, 20 pax, 4 terrorists

In article , "Paul Sengupta"
writes:


Just playing Devil's wotsit here, "the penalty for guessing wrong is death".
Right. So. They grab someone randomly. The air marshal draws his gun
for issuing said penalty. He's identified. The other 3 terrorists then get
the gun off the air marshal.

I don't have an opinion on this, just thought I'd throw that in! In reality
I
would guess that the air marshal wouldn't draw his weapon if the attackers
were unarmed, and the penalty wouldn't be death.


Agreed, that is why I prefer simply letting passengers with Concealed Carry
Permits carry anywhere, including airplanes. Thatg way there is no way for a
terrorist to know how many are on board, who they are, and if all have revealed
themsleves in response to a provocation.

Don

--
Wm. Donald (Don) Tabor Jr., DDS
PP-ASEL
Chesapeake, VA - CPK, PVG

On Thu, 8 Jan 2004 at 20:11:09 in message
, Wdtabor
wrote:

Agreed, that is why I prefer simply letting passengers with Concealed Carry
Permits carry anywhere, including airplanes. Thatg way there is no way for a
terrorist to know how many are on board, who they are, and if all have revealed
themsleves in response to a provocation.

How is that going to help with aircraft flying to the USA? Marshals
might be one thing but private citizens are very unlikely to be able to
carry their weapons out of many (if any) countries.
--
David CL Francis

Agreed, that is why I prefer simply letting passengers with Concealed Carry
Permits carry anywhere, including airplanes. Thatg way there is no way for a
terrorist to know how many are on board, who they are, and if all have
revealed
themsleves in response to a provocation.

How is that going to help with aircraft flying to the USA? Marshals
might be one thing but private citizens are very unlikely to be able to
carry their weapons out of many (if any) countries.
--

True, but by empowering the passengers to defend the cabin, professional
resources can then be redirected to international flights.

If the French and Brits can't find anyone who remembers which end of a handgun
the fire comes out of, to train as air amrshalls, we can loan them some on
flights coming into the US.

Don

--
Wm. Donald (Don) Tabor Jr., DDS
PP-ASEL
Chesapeake, VA - CPK, PVG

"Andrew Gideon" wrote in message
online.com...

Picture two terrorists, one walking to the restroom and one walking back
from. They meet where the marshal is seated. One grabs the guy around
the
throat while the other goes for the weapon.


While they're doing that the other marshal shoots and kills them.

How did the terrorists identify the marshal?

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:


While they're doing that the other marshal shoots and kills them.

You're assuming secrets staying secret, again.

How did the terrorists identify the marshal?

The usual ways: security leak, observation, information intercept, etc.
These are all the usual ways that generic secrets may be compromised. I'm
sure that someone with knowledge of how the program works would have more
specific ideas.

But *my* knowing how to do this isn't important. What's important is that
nobody with security experience would assume that the secret would stay
secret. They don't.

You keep trusting the secrecy of the secret for your security. Worse, you
ask questions which indicate that someone needs to prove to you that the
secret can be compromised. Security starts by assuming a "failure" (ie.
the secret is out, someone smuggles a weapon aboard, etc.) and addressing
it.

After all, that's precisely the point of the air marshal program: to handle
the case where the perimeter security fails. So what handles the case
where the air marshal program fails?

- Andrew

"Andrew Gideon" wrote in message
online.com...

You're assuming secrets staying secret, again.


You're assuming they don't.



But *my* knowing how to do this isn't important.


It is if you want your messages to be taken seriously.



What's important is that
nobody with security experience would assume that the secret would stay
secret. They don't.


How do you know?



You keep trusting the secrecy of the secret for your security. Worse, you
ask questions which indicate that someone needs to prove to you that the
secret can be compromised.


Well, if nobody can explain how the secret can be compromised, and nobody
has, then the secret appears to be pretty safe.



After all, that's precisely the point of the air marshal program: to
handle
the case where the perimeter security fails. So what handles the case
where the air marshal program fails?


Well, if all programs fail, there's nothing we can do.

But you're not saying the marshal program MIGHT fail, you're saying the
,arshal program WILL fail. It's clear you're against armed marshals on
airplanes, but it appears to be just an emotional issue with you. You have
not presented a cogent argument against them.

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:


"Andrew Gideon" wrote in message
online.com...

You're assuming secrets staying secret, again.


You're assuming they don't.

Yes. Welcome to the world of security.

[...]


Well, if nobody can explain how the secret can be compromised, and nobody
has, then the secret appears to be pretty safe.

That is a silly assertion. It assumes because nobody has done something
before, or has described how it can be done, that it will never be done.

It's akin to someone having said "man has never flown, and nobody can
describe how many will fly, so man will never fly." (just to stay on topic
{8^).

[...]
Well, if all programs fail, there's nothing we can do.

That is true. But each time you add a layer - and assuming that the layers
have independent failure modes, which is a simplification - you decrease
the likelyhood of *all* layers failing concurrently.

That's precisely the point: we make the case were "all programs fail" less
likely by increasing the universe of programs.


But you're not saying the marshal program MIGHT fail, you're saying the
,arshal program WILL fail.

Correct. If I'm wrong, then there's no problem. If I'm right, then we'd
better have something else ready to handle that case.

It's clear you're against armed marshals on
airplanes,

That reflects your reading skills; not my beliefs. As I wrote, it is a
balancing act. If we assume that it is less than P likely that someone can
smuggle a weapon on board, then putting an armed marshal on the aircraft
increases risk. If we assume that it is more than P likely, then putting
an armed marshal on board decreases risk.

The choice of P reflects the chances of the identity of the marshal(s)
getting out.

Personally, I believe that the chances of smuggling a weapon on board are
high, but that the chances of the identity of the marshal being released
are also high. This reflects not the nature of the problem, but my low
opinion of the people working to solve these problems...or perhaps their
paymasters.

In other words, I'd have more faith if the TSA weren't cutting budgets for
security staff and wasting time on ineffective ideas like flight
restrictions which effect only GA.

but it appears to be just an emotional issue with you. You
have not presented a cogent argument against them.

That's not true, but it is apparent I've not presented an argument that you
can follow. I'd be sorry for that were it not apparent that you've no
interest in following any argument which disagrees with your opinion.

- Andrew

On Wed, 31 Dec 2003 18:37:56 -0500, Andrew Gideon wrote:

You're assuming secrets staying secret, again.


You're assuming they don't.

Yes. Welcome to the world of security.

You have to state that you are a computer nerd. This explains very much. At
least to me. :-)

All (at least most) of your statements are portable to almost any other
security concept - be it networking or airline security.

#m

--
harsh regulations in North Korea (read below link after reading the story):
http://www.laweekly.com/ink/04/04/open-mikulan.php
oooops ... sorry ... it happened in the USA, ya know: the land of the free.

On Wed, 31 Dec 2003 18:37:56 -0500, Andrew Gideon
wrote:

Correct. If I'm wrong, then there's no problem. If I'm right, then we'd
better have something else ready to handle that case.

We do, in the form of armed pilots flying our passenger aircraft.

-J

Jack Davis
B-737


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