Co-pilot error caused AA 587 crash

Dave wrote:

Sorry Sylvia,

My bad, I apologise, it was not my intent... I quoted the
article pattern incorrectly.

The actual author of the words was "nobody" (as near as I can
determine). My server is missing a couple of posts in this thread, but
I do not offer that as an excuse..

Sorry...

(Dave hangs head and is shuffling feet)

No worries.

I've done it myself too, to my shame.

Sylvia.

"Dave" wrote in message
...
Sorry Sylvia,

My bad, I apologise, it was not my intent... I quoted the
article pattern incorrectly.

The actual author of the words was "nobody" (as near as I can
determine). My server is missing a couple of posts in this thread, but
I do not offer that as an excuse..

Sorry...

(Dave hangs head and is shuffling feet)

Please reply so I will know you have seen this....

Dave




On Thu, 28 Oct 2004 09:57:21 +1000, Sylvia Else
wrote:

Dave, please take a bit more care not to make it look as if I said
something that someone else said.

Following the normally accepted practice of bottom posting will limit the
chances of such confusion.
Ralph Nesbitt
Professional FD/CFR/ARFF Type

Dave wrote:
Coming out of a very low (legal) ceiling, the rny was not
directly under the a/c, and the crew tried to correct laterally and
doing so, the decent rate increased. They started the go around to
late, the AC slammed down on the rny hard, the nose gear ripping the
control functions as it rammed vertically up through the floor
above.

The TSB report clearly stated that the pilots initiated a go around WITHOUT
LANDING, with airspeed that would have required landing before speed was high
enough to climb again. Upon starting to climb again, the skidoo did regain
some altitude before stalling, after which it fell to the ground where its
recessive skidoo genes became dominant again.

One problem is that the flight director had not been programmed to handle such
a situation, neither had Bombardier foreseen/simulated situations such as
those. While the FO (PIC) was trying to climb according to normal climb rates
provided by the flight director, the captain did not realise that the newbie
co-pilot wasn't aware of the very low airspeed.








The throttles were stuck at high power, directional control
was lost, and everybody was along for the ride into the trees WAY off
to the right of rny 15 way past the intersection. One engine was
STILL producing substantial power as the equipment arrived.

The A/C was ON THE SURFACE, engines pushing it along for the
entire trip, impact point to the pucker brush. (the damage from the
nose gear severed the the throttle controls so the crew were unable
to retard the thrust). It DID NOT "stall into the trees"...and it
did not "travel through the forest". - It was stopped cold by the 1st
tree (a rather large and very strong tree), at the edge of the
cleared area, the tree still standing in the middle of the fwd cabin
where the (severe) injuries occurred.

Hence the "skidoo " story, - the track of the A/C was
continuous along the snow...

Add to this some really bonehead PR work by Air Canada..

Oh... thats another story... sorry...

Dave

On Wed, 27 Oct 2004 00:46:30 -0400, nobody wrote:

Sylvia Else wrote:


That accident actually has a lot of commonality with the Air Canada flying
skidoo accident at Fredericton.

Plane put at low altutude with engines at low speed. In both cases, pilots
decide to rev up engines to regain altutude (for the airbus, pilot was just
showing off, for the skidoos, the pilot aborted landing). In both cases,
engines took some time to spin up and produce necessary thrust (nature of
turbine engines).

In the case of the flying skidoo, because of no FBW, the pilot stalled the
aircraft as he tried to climb above trees, and it fell in the snow and
traveled in the forest until it hit a tree. In the case of the 320, the
computer didn't allow the pilot to raise the nose, avoiding a deadly stall.
But the computer didn't know trees were ahead, so plane traveled into the trees.

Had the pilot increased thrust earlier, the plane might have regained
suffiencty speed to be able to start climbing without stalling and nobody
would have noticed anything.

"nobody" wrote in message
...
Dave wrote:
Coming out of a very low (legal) ceiling, the rny was not
directly under the a/c, and the crew tried to correct laterally and
doing so, the decent rate increased. They started the go around to
late, the AC slammed down on the rny hard, the nose gear ripping the
control functions as it rammed vertically up through the floor
above.

The TSB report clearly stated that the pilots initiated a go around
WITHOUT
LANDING, with airspeed that would have required landing before speed was
high
enough to climb again. Upon starting to climb again, the skidoo did regain
some altitude before stalling, after which it fell to the ground where its
recessive skidoo genes became dominant again.

One problem is that the flight director had not been programmed to handle
such
a situation, neither had Bombardier foreseen/simulated situations such as
those. While the FO (PIC) was trying to climb according to normal climb
rates
provided by the flight director, the captain did not realise that the
newbie
co-pilot wasn't aware of the very low airspeed.

FBY is a great concept, but in practice not every conceivable situation/set
of circumstances, with all potential variables/responses can be foreseen &
programmed into the computer. The only "Computer" I know of that even comes
close to dealing with UNK/UNK (unknown/unknown) has 1 mouth, 2 legs, 2 arms,
2 eyes, 2 ears, & when it gets into allows A/C tog get into situations that
can't be recovered from is known to emphasize the impossibility of
recovering from the situation with a emphatic"OH ****".
Ralph Nesbitt
Professional FD/CFR/ARFF Type

Ralph Nesbitt wrote:
programmed into the computer. The only "Computer" I know of that even comes
close to dealing with UNK/UNK (unknown/unknown) has 1 mouth, 2 legs, 2 arms,
2 eyes, 2 ears, & when it gets into allows A/C tog get into situations that
can't be recovered from is known to emphasize the impossibility of
recovering from the situation with a emphatic"OH ****".

However, the flying skidoo accident at Fredericton was purely pilot induced.
It is in fact one perfect example of FBW's advantages.

Pilot's workload was too much for him to handle, and he didn't have the time
to monitor airspeed as well as climb angle at same time. Stalled the aircraft
as a result.

Had there been FBW, with the computer limiting climb rate until engines were
producing sufficient thrust, would the plane still have been able to climb
sufficiently to avoid trees ? Maybe, maybe not. But the odds would have been better.

"Ralph Nesbitt" wrote in message m...
"nobody" wrote in message
...
Dave wrote:
Coming out of a very low (legal) ceiling, the rny was not
directly under the a/c, and the crew tried to correct laterally and
doing so, the decent rate increased. They started the go around to
late, the AC slammed down on the rny hard, the nose gear ripping the
control functions as it rammed vertically up through the floor
above.

The TSB report clearly stated that the pilots initiated a go around
WITHOUT
LANDING, with airspeed that would have required landing before speed was
high
enough to climb again. Upon starting to climb again, the skidoo did regain
some altitude before stalling, after which it fell to the ground where its
recessive skidoo genes became dominant again.

One problem is that the flight director had not been programmed to handle
such
a situation, neither had Bombardier foreseen/simulated situations such as
those. While the FO (PIC) was trying to climb according to normal climb
rates
provided by the flight director, the captain did not realise that the
newbie
co-pilot wasn't aware of the very low airspeed.

FBY is a great concept, but in practice not every conceivable situation/set
of circumstances, with all potential variables/responses can be foreseen &
programmed into the computer. The only "Computer" I know of that even comes
close to dealing with UNK/UNK (unknown/unknown) has 1 mouth, 2 legs, 2 arms,
2 eyes, 2 ears, & when it gets into allows A/C tog get into situations that
can't be recovered from is known to emphasize the impossibility of
recovering from the situation with a emphatic"OH ****".
Ralph Nesbitt
Professional FD/CFR/ARFF Type


except paul nixon of course

OK...

So according to the TSB report, did the stall occour before
the 1st impact (on the rny and the nose gear failing) or before the
2nd impact after climbing again?

The Emergency crews indicated the next day, and it was still
visible) , the skidoo track was continuous from the rny to the
trees... although the engine thrust could have made the track as
well, it was not as well defined the following day, in daylight....

Although I can stand corrected, as my info is from the guys
on the response crew (known to me) the following day, I have not seen
the whole report...

(Fredericton is my home base airport)

Thanks!


Dave


On Wed, 27 Oct 2004 21:00:13 -0400, nobody wrote:

Dave wrote:
Coming out of a very low (legal) ceiling, the rny was not
directly under the a/c, and the crew tried to correct laterally and
doing so, the decent rate increased. They started the go around to
late, the AC slammed down on the rny hard, the nose gear ripping the
control functions as it rammed vertically up through the floor
above.

The TSB report clearly stated that the pilots initiated a go around WITHOUT
LANDING, with airspeed that would have required landing before speed was high
enough to climb again. Upon starting to climb again, the skidoo did regain
some altitude before stalling, after which it fell to the ground where its
recessive skidoo genes became dominant again.

One problem is that the flight director had not been programmed to handle such
a situation, neither had Bombardier foreseen/simulated situations such as
those. While the FO (PIC) was trying to climb according to normal climb rates
provided by the flight director, the captain did not realise that the newbie
co-pilot wasn't aware of the very low airspeed.

Dave wrote:
So according to the TSB report, did the stall occour before
the 1st impact (on the rny and the nose gear failing) or before the
2nd impact after climbing again?

The aircraft did not touch gound before stall. The pilots decided to go around
prior to touching ground, but were already going too slow to start climbing
right away, but they started to climb right away and stalled. Once plane
touched ground, its energy dropped below sustainable flight. It may have
bounced during its snow excursion.Don't remainer that detail. But the TSB
specifically stated that the plane had begun to climb and gained a tiny bit of
altitude before stalling after which, that was it.

On Tue, 26 Oct 2004 18:12:20 -0700, Jay Beckman wrote:


Is that due to the crash at the Paris Airshow several years back?

IIRC, the pilot commanded a flight attitude in the landing config that the
software wouldn't allow and that led to the aircraft settling into the
trees.

Only crash at a Paris airshow that I know of was of a Tu144. No Airbus
ever crashed in Paris.

devil wrote:

On Tue, 26 Oct 2004 18:12:20 -0700, Jay Beckman wrote:



Is that due to the crash at the Paris Airshow several years back?

IIRC, the pilot commanded a flight attitude in the landing config that the
software wouldn't allow and that led to the aircraft settling into the
trees.


Only crash at a Paris airshow that I know of was of a Tu144. No Airbus
ever crashed in Paris.



I remember the incident though. An A320 full of passengers doing
something it shouldn't have at an air show, and ending up descending
into trees at the end of the runway.

Aircraft destroyed, but incredibly, only one fatality.

Sylvia.