Co-pilot error caused AA 587 crash

Stefan wrote:

accordingly and overlooked that this runway was significantly shorter
(i.e. 765 instead of 1120 ft) and there was forest at both ends of the

Ooops, this should be meters, of course!

Stefan

Stefan wrote:

Pooh Bear wrote:
...
Hence they thought they were flying at 100ft when it was actually 30 ft.
...
They were indeed unaware
of the trees due to the poor briefing material.
...

Being a hard core "look out the window and fly by horizon and feel"
pilot, I have some difficulties to understand this. I'm aware that you
can't fly an airliner by merely looking out the window, but still....


I hear what you're saying here. It was claimed by the flight crew that since they were used to
flying in and out of large airports, the visual references of a small airfield gave them a false
impression.


Besides, the briefing material itself wasn't poor. The VAC clearly shows
the forest:

http://www.sia.aviation-civile.gouv....D%202.LFGB.pdf

I hear that they received only a faxed ( hence black and white ) copy of the relevant map.


The "problem" was that the pilot expected to do his show-off over the
runway 20, which has no trees at the far end. When he recognized that
the public was lined up along the glider strip 16, he changed his plans
accordingly and overlooked that this runway was significantly shorter
(i.e. 765 instead of 1120 ft) and there was forest at both ends of the
strip.

That too. There is literally one factor after another that contributed to this accident.


Which, as I said, I don't understand.

Sorry, which bit don't you understand ? Overlooking the shorter runway length ?


Graham

Pooh Bear wrote:

I hear what you're saying here. It was claimed by the flight crew that since they were used to
flying in and out of large airports, the visual references of a small airfield gave them a false
impression.

I must admit that this makes some sense.

Sorry, which bit don't you understand ? Overlooking the shorter runway length ?

No, the forest, of course. I think a pilot should be able to recognize a
forest when seeing it, even if it should happen not to be on the VAC...
Can't remember why I even mentioned runway length.

Stefan

Stefan wrote:

Pooh Bear wrote:

I hear what you're saying here. It was claimed by the flight crew that since they were used to
flying in and out of large airports, the visual references of a small airfield gave them a false
impression.

I must admit that this makes some sense.

Sorry, which bit don't you understand ? Overlooking the shorter runway length ?

No, the forest, of course. I think a pilot should be able to recognize a
forest when seeing it, even if it should happen not to be on the VAC...
Can't remember why I even mentioned runway length.

Pre-occupation with the current task might be the reason ? Think about the Tristar that descended into
the Everglades 'cos the flight crew were trying to see if they had a broken indicator lamp for
example.


Graham

Pooh Bear wrote in message ...
David CL Francis wrote:

On Tue, 26 Oct 2004 at 18:12:20 in message
TBCfd.18911$SW3.16862@fed1read01, Jay Beckman
wrote:

Is that due to the crash at the Paris Airshow several years back?

Many people say Paris - it wasn't Paris it was Mulhouse, in the upper
Rhine Valley near the junction of the Swiss and German borders.

It was only a local air show and the aircraft was an almost new A320 (it
had been in service for 2 days). The Airport (if you could call it that)
has one main paved runway only 1000m long plus some grass strips for
gliders. Air France were invited to display an A320. It could not land
there.

Not only that but it was a charter flight with 130 passengers aboard -
how often does that happen at the Paris Air Show I wonder?

The crew were probably given an inadequate briefing on the airport.

Indeed they were.



The
idea was to do a low slow pass in landing configuration at about 100ft.
(Often done in France although the air show regulations said 170 ft.)
They intended to reach the maximum allowable angle of attack in the low
pass. They meant they would inhibit the 'alpha floor' limit which would
automatically increase power at that point. The co-pilot was supposed to
control the power.

When they identified the airport they were close but they saw that the
crowd seemed to be along a grass strip and not along the chosen paved
runway 02. They realigned and at 100 ft deactivated the alpha floor
function. They sank to only 30 ft above the strip.

Nope - they were using the analogue readout barometric altimeter not the more
accurate digital readout radalt ( for reasons of being easier to read whilst
rapidly changing in this instance ).

During the take off phase the radalt and baro altimeter somehow got
'misaligned' by 70 odd feet.

Hence they thought they were flying at 100ft when it was actually 30 ft.


They then suddenly
realised there were trees ahead at the same height or higher than the
aircraft. They then called for TO power but it was too late. Speed had
reduced to 122k and the engines now at flight idle responded as they
should. There was then nothing anyone or the aircraft could do. 4.5
seconds after power started increasing it began hitting the trees.

Actually, increased power was called for as planned. They were indeed unaware
of the trees due to the poor briefing material.

Exactly how and why the engines responded as they did has been a matter of
considerable debate.

That version of the CFM 56 ? was subsequently altered and units in service
'upgraded' following a compressor stall incident on another early A320 at
Geneva ? IIRC.


That is a very much abbreviated version but I believe substantially
correct.

IIRC, the pilot commanded a flight attitude in the landing config that the
software wouldn't allow and that led to the aircraft settling into the
trees.

Sorry that is wrong. And it did not settle into the trees; it flew
horizontally into them at an altitude of 24 ft and then sank!

This accident is very often badly reported. Although the system would
not permit main flight restrictions to be exceeded the performance at
those low limits was as limited as any conventional aircraft would have
been. It could not climb at flight idle at 122 knots and 15 degrees nose
up. That is not a surprise.

The response of the engines was a surprise to the pilots.


What afjukwit.

Netkkkoping ******.


Bertie

On Fri, 29 Oct 2004 at 04:07:47 in message
, Pooh Bear
wrote:
Nope - they were using the analogue readout barometric altimeter not the more
accurate digital readout radalt ( for reasons of being easier to read whilst
rapidly changing in this instance ).

During the take off phase the radalt and baro altimeter somehow got
'misaligned' by 70 odd feet.

Hence they thought they were flying at 100ft when it was actually 30 ft.

The report I quoted from clearly states:

"A fluctuation in the radio altimeter height was evident during this
manoeuvre, corresponding to the aircraft passing over a clump of trees
on the approach path. Before and after this fluctuation there was
perfect agreement between the readings of the radio altimeter and the
barometric altimeter."

They then suddenly
realised there were trees ahead at the same height or higher than the
aircraft. They then called for TO power but it was too late. Speed had
reduced to 122k and the engines now at flight idle responded as they
should. There was then nothing anyone or the aircraft could do. 4.5
seconds after power started increasing it began hitting the trees.

Actually, increased power was called for as planned. They were indeed unaware
of the trees due to the poor briefing material.

Here is an extract from the report I used as a basis. I think it answers
both of your points. The trees were not the same hazard on rny 02.

CAPT: There's the airfield! It's there ... you've got it, have you?
COPILOT [Selecting 125.25 on VHF and calling Habsheim Tower]: Habsheim,
hello - we're coming into view of the airfield for the flyover.

(HABSHEIM) TWR: Yes - I can see you. You're cleared - sky is clear.
CAPT: Gear down!
COPILOT [to Habsheim Tower as the captain reduces power to flight idle
and the Airbus continues its descent at about 600fpm]: OK - we're going
in for the low altitude flyover.
TWR: Roger.
CAPT: Flaps 2!
TWR: QNH Habsheim 1012. QFE 984.
CAPT: 984 - put in 984.
COPILOT: 984 - QFE selected!
CAPT: Flaps 3! - That's the airfield, you confirm?
COPILOT: Affirmative!
(With the airfield now clearly in view and the aircraft at a height of
only 450 feet, the captain saw from the alignment of the airshow crowd
that the axis of the flying display was not along Runway 02 as he had
expected, but along a grass airstrip aligned northwest. As the aircraft
neared the airfield therefore, he gently banked it to the right to
re-align its ground track accordingly.)
COPILOT: OK, you're at 100 feet - watch it!
At this stage, the crew deactivated the Alpha Floor function, to prevent
the computerised control system from automatically applying power as the
angle of attack increased.
COPILOT [18 seconds later with the aircraft now only 40 feet above the
grass airstrip and still sinking slowly]: Watch out for the pylons ahead
- see them?(')
CAPT [finally levelling off at about 30 feet above the strip]: Yes -
don't worry.
(But as the aircraft continued over the strip at this height in its
steep noseup attitude, the pilots suddenly realised that the trees in a
forested area beyond the northwestern boundary of the airfield were at
least as high as, if not higher than, the aircraft itself.)
COPILOT [with alarm]: TOGA power! Go around track!
(The crew rapidly applied power, but as the engines began to spool up in
response, and the aircraft passed beyond the airstrip, the hundreds of
spectators watching the extremely low fly past were horrified to see the
underside of the aircraft's tail begin striking the treetops. Slowly the
Air-bus sank from sight into the trees. Moments later, an orange
fireball, engulfed in a column of black oily smoke mushroomed swiftly
above the trees as the aircraft, unseen, exploded in flames.)"

Exactly how and why the engines responded as they did has been a matter of
considerable debate.

Debate yes, no doubt, but the analysis showed that the engines spooled
up as they should.

That version of the CFM 56 ? was subsequently altered and units in service
'upgraded' following a compressor stall incident on another early A320 at
Geneva ? IIRC.

I have no information about that - I accept what you say.
--
David CL Francis