Revised IGC-approvals for some types of legacy recorder

Bruce Hoult wrote:
And I'll ammend my earlier remarks. In 1994 when I was recommending RSA
to them I never imagined that they'd get to nearly 2004 before it became
an issue. So they may have made the correct commercial decision.

I'd make the simple point that if RSA was required when the first flight
recorder specification was issued in 1995, there were no existing flight
recorder designs which could have been approved. RSA (or equivalent
asymmetric algorithm) has been required for "all flights" approval since
1997, I believe...

Marc

On Tue, 18 Nov 2003 05:39:03 GMT, Marc Ramsey wrote:

Bruce Hoult wrote:
And I'll ammend my earlier remarks. In 1994 when I was recommending RSA
to them I never imagined that they'd get to nearly 2004 before it became
an issue. So they may have made the correct commercial decision.

I'd make the simple point that if RSA was required when the first flight
recorder specification was issued in 1995, there were no existing flight
recorder designs which could have been approved.

So what? If RSA had been required at that time there soon would have
been.



RSA (or equivalent
asymmetric algorithm) has been required for "all flights" approval since
1997, I believe...

So it has been perfectly acceptable to fly world records for the last
5 to 6 years without RSA security with loggers approved before 1997.

If lack of RSA security was an issue why weren't legacy loggers given
say 12 months to comply or lose "all flights" approval back in 1997?

Why the change now?

Would someone tell us why this is suddenly an issue?

Which world record flights are suspect?

Isn't it a remarkable coincidence that this action is being taken
right after CAI Model 20 and 25 loggers are no longer in production?

So a would a new design without RSA security would be acceptable for
all but World Records?

If not, why not?

Mike Borgelt
Borgelt Instruments

Mike Borgelt wrote:
On Tue, 18 Nov 2003 05:39:03 GMT, Marc Ramsey wrote:
I'd make the simple point that if RSA was required when the first flight
recorder specification was issued in 1995, there were no existing flight
recorder designs which could have been approved.


So what? If RSA had been required at that time there soon would have
been.

I wasn't involved at the time, but the reason appears fairly obvious to
me, it's called "jump-starting a market" over here.

RSA (or equivalent
asymmetric algorithm) has been required for "all flights" approval since
1997, I believe...

So it has been perfectly acceptable to fly world records for the last
5 to 6 years without RSA security with loggers approved before 1997.

Yes.

If lack of RSA security was an issue why weren't legacy loggers given
say 12 months to comply or lose "all flights" approval back in 1997?

The only alternative available at the time was the Diamond-level
approval. I can imagine the outrage of the early adopters when told
they would need to spend more money to upgrade their already expensive
boxes a couple of years after they bought them. Mike, you know as well
as I do that most of those early designs would need a board swap to be
able to adequately handle RSA and the like.

Why the change now?

Would someone tell us why this is suddenly an issue?

The gap between what is needed to be approved now, and what was needed
back then, is just too large. Among other things, it is unfair to those
who are trying to get new designs approved to have to compete against
'grandfathered' designs.

Which world record flights are suspect?

None that I am aware of. Would you prefer to wait until there were some
before an effort is made to shift the flight recorder requirements
toward those currently required for approval?

Isn't it a remarkable coincidence that this action is being taken
right after CAI Model 20 and 25 loggers are no longer in production?

As far as I know, they are still considered to be "in production".

So a would a new design without RSA security would be acceptable for
all but World Records?

If not, why not?

The whole point behind adding the all badges/diplomas approval was to
allow more sensible security requirements for flight recorders used to
document flights other than world records. If you have something
specific to propose, you are welcome to contact GFAC for a formal answer.

Marc

On Tue, 18 Nov 2003 08:38:21 GMT, Marc Ramsey wrote:

The gap between what is needed to be approved now, and what was needed
back then, is just too large. Among other things, it is unfair to those
who are trying to get new designs approved to have to compete against
'grandfathered' designs.

And it has been since the RSA security requirements were introduced in
1997. Why is it suddenly so unfair now after 6 years ?


The whole point behind adding the all badges/diplomas approval was to
allow more sensible security requirements for flight recorders used to
document flights other than world records. If you have something
specific to propose, you are welcome to contact GFAC for a formal answer.

Marc

I think you need to read the r.a.s. archives before making statements
like this. All of the above was done by myself and others when the F.R
proposals were first mooted but all were ignored
You are either ignorant of what really happened or being deliberately
obtuse. I suggest you do a google search for r.a.s. for IGC flight
recorders.

You had better privately ask Mr Strachan about the meeting at Lasham
at which reasons were invented not to approve loggers which met the
rules as written and approved by the IGC at the time. Ask him who most
of the participants had business associations with either before, at
the time or subsequently. Also ask where the principal of that
business was at the time.

The history of F.R.s on the FAI site is inaccurate as it omits these
details and others.

How about a straight answer in public to - is it the intention of GFAC
to approve new designs for "all but World records category"?

I'm sure GFAC have a policy, it may just not be the written down
official one based on past history.


p.s.

"jump starting the market" in that way as you put it would most
likely contravene the Trade Practices Act (1974) in Australia and land
you with a large fine. Ask the freight companies who were fined after
the ACCC(Australian Consumer and Competition Commission) used an
electronic barograph to prove that goods being sent by "airfreight"
were in fact going by truck between Brisbane- Sydney- Melbourne.

Mike Borgelt

Borgelt Instruments

In article gJfub.230766$Fm2.231960@attbi_s04, Paul Remde
writes

snip

What is the plan to get the approval back in place?

That is up to the manufacturer, of course.

Cambridge already makes the 302 series that use the DSA public/private
key system that is assessed as equivalent in security strength to the
original Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) system. The 302 is therefore,
together with many other types of recorder, IGC-approved for "all
flights" including of course world records.

What must CAI do to
make it meet your new requirements?

If they think it worthwhile, offer an "RSA or equivalent" upgrade for
their legacy recorder designs. The requirements are not new but go back
to 1997, see below.

-------------------------------------

For new recorder designs, "RSA or equivalent" level of security has been
in the Technical Specification for IGC-approved GNSS Flight Recorders
for many years. Here is an extract from the first edition of the IGC
Specification, effective 1 October 1997: "FRs approved for world record
flights must have an asymmetric algorithm (such as RSA) or have a system
providing equivalent security".

What we are talking about here is an adjustment to the "Grandfather
rights" provisions for recorder designs that were IGC-approved a long
time ago and do not comply with the current IGC Specification.

Incidentally, you may recall that one of the non-RSA security systems
for a GNSS recorder was successfully hacked by the Wedekinds in Germany.
This was all in the public domain and was extensively publicised at the
time. This was done as an exercise rather than for malpractice, but
shows what can be done. The manufacturer concerned immediately changed
to an RSA-based system without any prompting from IGC. The non-RSA
recorder concerned is on the list recently announced, together with
recorders with similar types of security.

It was felt that we should be even-handed to all recorder designs rather
than just adjust the IGC-approval for the Wedekind-hacked design and
leave the rest. That is what has been done, perhaps a bit late, but
first we had to get the IGC Plenary to agree to the new "all IGC badges
and distance diploma" level first, to have somewhere to put legacy
recorders that had lower levels of security without affecting the vast
majority of owners and pilots. As it is, only world record aspirants
will be affected and there are plenty of other recorder designs that are
available for this type of flight.

--
Ian Strachan
Chairman IGC GFA Committee

I agree with Paul.

So, all the world records that have been set with a CAI mod 10/20/25 may
perhaps not be secure enough???? The reason for increasing the security
should, if you using rational arguments, be a result of attempts to
cheat. I wonder which records that can be....

Of course all this is pure nonsense. Is this the way IGC is using its
resources to increase world wide gliding membership?

Yes, the decision was taken at the IGC plenary meeting, but lots of
delegates did not understand what was really happening as the
presentation was, if I may you use the word, very clever. I did not
realize at the meeting that the result was to degrade existant recorders.



Robert



Paul Remde wrote:
Yes, but doesn't the CAI system work? It is my impression that it is
perfectly secure and has never been compromised. So why suddenly call it
"insecure".

What is the plan to get the approval back in place? What must CAI do to
make it meet your new requirements?

Paul Remde

"Bruce Hoult" wrote in message
...

In article ,
"tango4" wrote:


After going to all of the time designing the hardware security along

came

the idea of public key cryptography so the IGC spec was 'upgraded' to
incorporate this additional security layer. The Cambridges and others

got

caught between the two specs.

Public key cryptography was well known in 1994 when the Cambridge 10's
were used at the NZ pre-worlds, and in fact I *told* them at the time
that they should be using something like RSA instead of something
home-grown.

Oh well.

-- Bruce