Widower stabbed Air Traffic Controller?

Brian Whatcott wrote:

On Sat, 29 Oct 2005 15:22:04 GMT, Gord Beaman
wrote:
/// I don't think
that controllers are making enough money to compensate them
properly for their responsibility.
///

Let's see, what does a center controller make currently?
A hundred grand? More?
About as much as a (US) pharmaceutical dispenser
I guess? A third as much as a physician?
A fifth as much as an anesthesiologist?

Brian Whatcott Altusa OK

Hell no, it'd shake you Brian...here's a site for California.

http://www.calmis.ca.gov/file/occguide/AIRCONTR.HTM

....and a snippet from that site...

WAGES, HOURS, AND FRINGE BENEFITS

Entry-level Air Traffic Controllers start at $24,734 per year at
the General Schedule-7 (GS-7). Journey-level wages for
controllers depend on the size and complexity of the facility
where they work. For example, for smaller towns in California
like Chico and Modesto, the rate at the journey-level is $33,320,
(GS-10); while, at the Sacramento airport, the journey-level pay
is $39,406 (GS-11). In busier airports, the pay can go as high
as $86,275 (GS-14). Top pay for journey-level Flight Service
Station Controllers is $61,401 (GS-12). Many controllers receive
additional pay to compensate for higher living costs in expensive
areas.

This is disgusting, when one thinks of their
responsibility...God! I make more than some of these guys and I'm
retired military...
--

-Gord.
(use gordon in email)

"Stefan" wrote in message
...
Thomas Borchert wrote:

Hmm. I don't quite get it either. What DO you mean?

Sigh, ok. Replace "mistake" by "is to blame" and then you might understand
what I've meant.

If somebody is given a task which is impossible to accomplish, then who is
to blame? The one who failed or the one who gave him the task?

The one who ACCEPTED the impossible task. No one forced the controller to
work under those conditions. He could have closed his station and walked
out, forcing all traffic to be either delayed or rerouted. You know that as
well as I do.

Juan Jimenez wrote:

The one who ACCEPTED the impossible task. No one forced the controller to
work under those conditions. He could have closed his station and walked
out, forcing all traffic to be either delayed or rerouted. You know that as
well as I do.

I don't know this. in fact, I know quite the opposite.

I know that the whole idea of the hierarchic structure involved was that
the controller should trust that the established and approved workflow
was reasonable.

I also know that the controller was unaware of what systems didn't work
and so was't aware that the safety mechanisms he relied on were inop.

And last I know that if he refused the work he would have risked to be
fired that very evening. Not really an option with a family.

But then, why am I replying since you've plonked me anyway.

Stefan

"Stefan" wrote in message
...

I also know that the controller was unaware of what systems didn't work
and so was't aware that the safety mechanisms he relied on were inop.


What inoperable safety mechamisms led to this collision?

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:

What inoperable safety mechamisms led to this collision?

If you had read and understood the report as you claim, you wouldn't ask
this.

Stefan

"Stefan" wrote in message
...

If you had read and understood the report as you claim, you wouldn't ask
this.


If you were aware of any inoperable safety mechanisms that led to this
collision you would have answered it.

"Stefan" wrote in message
...
Juan Jimenez wrote:

The one who ACCEPTED the impossible task. No one forced the controller to
work under those conditions. He could have closed his station and walked
out, forcing all traffic to be either delayed or rerouted. You know that
as well as I do.

I don't know this. in fact, I know quite the opposite.

I know that the whole idea of the hierarchic structure involved was that
the controller should trust that the established and approved workflow was
reasonable.

I also know that the controller was unaware of what systems didn't work
and so was't aware that the safety mechanisms he relied on were inop.

And last I know that if he refused the work he would have risked to be
fired that very evening. Not really an option with a family.

But then, why am I replying since you've plonked me anyway.

Oh, so if the pilot doesn't preflight, and therefore doesn't know his
aircraft has broken systems, doesn't perform checks and just does the flight
so he won't lose his job and winds up killing everyone, it's the company's
fault. Hmm. That sure is an interesting bit of logic. You wouldn't be
related to this controller, a friend of his or perhaps a member of his labor
union? Nah, couldn't be. I'll plonk you anyway. I can see where this is
coming from...

Juan Jimenez wrote:

Oh, so if the pilot doesn't preflight, and therefore doesn't know his
aircraft has broken systems, doesn't perform checks and just does the flight
so he won't lose his job and winds up killing everyone, it's the company's
fault. Hmm. That sure is an interesting bit of logic. You wouldn't be

I can see the 747 captain not believing his mechanics but instead
creeping in every hole of his aircraft, checking every nut, measuring
tolerances, measuruing hydraulic pressures, X-ray the wings for cracks,
etc.etc. before every flight...

related to this controller, a friend of his or perhaps a member of his labor
union? Nah, couldn't be. I'll plonk you anyway. I can see where this is
coming from...

You've already claimed once to plonk me and haven't done so, so why
would you do it now? Do you even know how to plonk somebody?

Stefan

"Stefan" wrote in message
...
I know that the whole idea of the hierarchic structure involved was that
the controller should trust that the established and approved workflow was
reasonable.

The person doing the job who must have the final say as to whether they feel
they can do the job satisfactorily.

In this situation, some of the equipment in the ATC facility was out of
action. Not enough, by all accounts, necessarily to make it dangerous to
work the facility, but some. It would be perfectly reasonable for someone
who was comfortable working a fully staffed facility with normal levels of
functioning equipment to say, in the event of staffing/equipment shortages:
"Sorry, I just don't feel I can provide a safe service in this set of
circumstances".

The hierarchic structure is not there to allow the guy on the ground to
trust that everything will be OK. In this case it's there to solve the
problem of someone saying: "Sorry guys, I can't operate this as I don't
think I can do so safely".

D.

David Cartwright wrote:

The hierarchic structure is not there to allow the guy on the ground to
trust that everything will be OK. In this case it's there to solve the
problem of someone saying: "Sorry guys, I can't operate this as I don't
think I can do so safely".

You're absolutely correct. But then, there's such a thing which we call
in German "corporate culture" (translated, I don't know if this is the
correct term in English). You grow up and live in a certain corporate
culture and it's very difficult if not impossible to resist. It's the
responsibility of the managers to create a safe corporate culture. In
this case, one man operations at two workstations at night were SOP.
It's asking very much to second guess the SOP.

Stefan