Angry

Flyingmonk opined

Receipts can be easily faked also. Even with the bat codes on them, if
let's say 6 million were faked, are we going to try to recertify 6
million receipts by hand?

The big problem with receipts is that they can be used for selling votes.


-ash
Cthulhu in 2005!
Why wait for nature?

"Tom Conner" wrote in message
nk.net...
Additionally, just because a receipt is printed it does not mean that the
vote recorded is the same as printed on the receipt

True. That's why a hand-recount is needed of some percentage of the paper
ballots, as an audit of the machine-counted votes.

[...] It appears
there is no way to insure fraud is not a part of the voting process.

As long as human beings are involved at any part of the process, there will
be the potential for fraud. The problem is that currently, the potential
for fraud is VASTLY higher than it should be.

The only thing that can be done is try and minimize the fraud.

Indeed. So, let's do that thing.

Pete

Hand counting a sample proves nothing as you can't assume the identical
distribution of votes in the uncounted votes.

"Peter Duniho" wrote in message

True. That's why a hand-recount is needed of some percentage of the
paper ballots, as an audit of the machine-counted votes.

On Thu, 29 Dec 2005 18:10:26 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
: :

Why couldn't receipts be counted by hand? As a method of verification, the
task isn't all that large. Still, if the receipts followed a standard
layout, they could be counted by machine quite easily.

What method would you employ to assure that the receipts are not
forgeries?

Recently, Larry Dighera posted:

On Thu, 29 Dec 2005 18:10:26 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
: :

Why couldn't receipts be counted by hand? As a method of
verification, the task isn't all that large. Still, if the receipts
followed a standard layout, they could be counted by machine quite
easily.

What method would you employ to assure that the receipts are not
forgeries?

The same method that assures that paper ballots aren't forgeries. If you
go back a few messages, I suggested that *two* receipts would be printed &
verified by the voter; one would be given to the polling official, just as
paper ballots are handled now. Then, at least one machine selected at
random from each precinct would have its electronic tally audited against
the receipt. In the case of a discrepancy, a 100% audit would be performed
at that precinct.

Neil

On Fri, 30 Dec 2005 11:35:36 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
::

Recently, Larry Dighera posted:

On Thu, 29 Dec 2005 18:10:26 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
: :

Why couldn't receipts be counted by hand? As a method of
verification, the task isn't all that large. Still, if the receipts
followed a standard layout, they could be counted by machine quite
easily.

What method would you employ to assure that the receipts are not
forgeries?

The same method that assures that paper ballots aren't forgeries. If you
go back a few messages, I suggested that *two* receipts would be printed &
verified by the voter; one would be given to the polling official, just as
paper ballots are handled now. Then, at least one machine selected at
random from each precinct would have its electronic tally audited against
the receipt. In the case of a discrepancy, a 100% audit would be performed
at that precinct.

Neil


That's a reasoned solution. Why do you feel it necessary to *add* a
receipt to be given to the voter? What would be the advantage of
electronic voting over the current *one* ballot system?

Personally, I think it's going to be nearly impossible to insure an
accurate electronic vote tally much as it was in the
paper-vote/voting-machine era. But here's an idea:

Provide a real-time running total of each ballot choice on the
voter's display screen, so that s/he can confirm their vote
incremented accurately. The real-time vote tally could be
continuously monitored by representatives of each party/candidate?
If a dispute should arise, the sealed camera that monitored the
running tally could be consulted. Under no circumstances should
anyone other than the voter be able to modify the running tally;
their must be no way for administrator intervention to modify the
running tally.

Everything occurs in real-time. The voter confirms his own vote.
There is no necessity to print anything. Of course, there's the issue
of how to Handel the situation when/if the voter sees his vote affect
the tally erroneously.

If the rationalize is the computer program makes mistakes then you must
accept that either the electronic vote or the paper receipt could be
wrong. There is no guarantee that the paper receipt is correct since the
very same computer program that drives the electronic totals is printing
the paper receipt.

Anytime the screen vote and the paper receipt do not agree, you have to
give the voter a chance to fix it or call for an election judge. If you
don't, then which vote is valid.

Counting by hand is impossible. The three re-count counties in Florida
in 2000 cast 1.6 million votes. All you need is one hand counter to
sneeze and you start all over.

"Neil Gould" wrote in message
...
Recently, sfb posted:

It isn't a simple as just print a receipt. If you print before the
voter presses the final button and the voter changes their mind, the
receipt and the machine do not agree. If you print a second receipt
then you have two receipts for one voter. If the receipt and the
machine disagree and the voter presses the final button anyway, which
one is the true vote?

Why would a receipt *ever* be printed before the "final" button is
pressed? At that point, printing them in duplicate is not a problem.

There is no way to count the receipts by hand so now you need a
entire
new set of machines to count receipts which brings you back to many
of
the problems with punch cards.

Why couldn't receipts be counted by hand? As a method of verification,
the
task isn't all that large. Still, if the receipts followed a standard
layout, they could be counted by machine quite easily.

Regards,

Neil

If the rationalize is the computer program makes mistakes

The rationale is that the computer program is suspect of being
deliberately programmed to misrepresent the voting.

Jose
--
You can choose whom to befriend, but you cannot choose whom to love.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

So?? How do distinguish deliberate fraud from stuff happens? The problem
is you have two votes - electronic and paper - that do not agree. How do
you know which is correct?

Heading back on topic, the altimeter says 5,000 feet and the GPS 6,000.
Which is correct?

"Jose" wrote in message
t...
If the rationalize is the computer program makes mistakes

The rationale is that the computer program is suspect of being
deliberately programmed to misrepresent the voting.

Jose
--
You can choose whom to befriend, but you cannot choose whom to love.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

"sfb" wrote in message news:GLXsf.9909$Q73.913@trnddc03...
If the rationalize is the computer program makes mistakes then you must
accept that either the electronic vote or the paper receipt could be
wrong. There is no guarantee that the paper receipt is correct since the
very same computer program that drives the electronic totals is printing
the paper receipt.

Anytime the screen vote and the paper receipt do not agree, you have to
give the voter a chance to fix it or call for an election judge. If you
don't, then which vote is valid.

Counting by hand is impossible. The three re-count counties in Florida in
2000 cast 1.6 million votes. All you need is one hand counter to sneeze
and you start all over.

Counting by hand is possible, it just requires some good organisation and
competence.
The UK votes with paper ballots and by about 4am Friday after the polls have
closed at 10m Thursday most of the seats in parliament have been declared.
The outlying constituencies in the Scottish Islands declare by lunch time on
the Friday. By 3pm Friday the outgoing government has resigned and the new
government is appointed. The ballot involves 26 million votes across 650
constitutencies in the general election and as many again in the various
local elections that take place on the same day. Recounts are common when
the margin is down to a few hundred votes.

There has been stiff competition amongst constituencies to be first to
declare. Sunderland South has repeated its performance in the last three
elections and in 2005 declared the incumbent re-elected as MP with a
majority of 11,059 at approximately 10.45pm