NW_Pilot's Trans-Atlantic Flight -- All the scary details...

Recently, NW_Pilot posted:

Well, this is Usenet and I think that if it was really a garmin
rep/engineer why would they hide themselves with a hotmail account!

It will take a lot for Garmin to win my opinion and respect of them
and their products/systems if ever. Due to maybe a software flaw in
their system it could have taken my life or someone else's and
probably will take a someones in the future lets hope it's not mine.

Your experience sounds to me more like a hardware problem than software.
For example, the continuous rebooting may be caused by an intermittent
ground connection to the G1000, causing its power to switch on and off.
Given that the panel was "hacked" by the same outfit that made the poorly
kludged aux tank system (a system that clearly does have a major design
flaw) and gave you the bogus operating instructions, I am far more
suspicious of them than Garmin. The G1000 was only the most obvious
indicator of a major problem somewhere in the aircraft.

I have also been in contacted by an aviation publication about my
experience on the G1000 not sure if I want to do the interview or
not? I know I should just to expose that there maybe a potential
fatal bug/flaw in the system!

If it were me, I wouldn't do such an interview, as there is no conclusion
about the real cause of the problems you experienced. To point the finger
on the basis of pure speculation would leave you vulnerable. As can be
seen from the discussion that this has generated, inuendo can go a long
way toward creating a lasting negative impression that has no basis in
fact -- yet.

Neil

On Fri, 06 Oct 2006 09:17:52 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
:

Given that the panel was "hacked" by the same outfit that made the poorly
kludged aux tank system (a system that clearly does have a major design
flaw) and gave you the bogus operating instructions, I am far more
suspicious of them than Garmin.

That is reasonable. With the fact that Mr. Rhine was operating
portable equipment on the flight, there is potential for some
interaction there too. And it's reasonable that a small metal shaving
produced during the Garmin installation may have been dancing on a
circuit board someplace.

Clearly we don't have enough facts to reliably diagnose the cause of
the infinite reboot, but I am thankful to be made aware by Mr. Rhine's
experience of the utterly unacceptable situation that is caused when
the Garmin system becomes inoperative.

Neil Gould writes:

Your experience sounds to me more like a hardware problem than software.
For example, the continuous rebooting may be caused by an intermittent
ground connection to the G1000, causing its power to switch on and off.
Given that the panel was "hacked" by the same outfit that made the poorly
kludged aux tank system (a system that clearly does have a major design
flaw) and gave you the bogus operating instructions, I am far more
suspicious of them than Garmin. The G1000 was only the most obvious
indicator of a major problem somewhere in the aircraft.

Most reboots are caused by software. If the power were being switched
on and off, it would not be synchronized with the boot process.

If it were me, I wouldn't do such an interview, as there is no conclusion
about the real cause of the problems you experienced. To point the finger
on the basis of pure speculation would leave you vulnerable. As can be
seen from the discussion that this has generated, inuendo can go a long
way toward creating a lasting negative impression that has no basis in
fact -- yet.

On the other hand, it's hard to be too cautious, and publicity has a
way of giving the corporate world more of a conscience.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

NW_Pilot writes:

I have also been in contacted by an aviation publication about my experience
on the G1000 not sure if I want to do the interview or not? I know I should
just to expose that there maybe a potential fatal bug/flaw in the system!

Go for it. There's no better way to keep vendors conscientious than
bad press. And it's the sort of thing that pilots need to know before
they fly with the equipment themselves.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

The computer in cockpit is not foolproof. I can tell that there is at
least one Citation X where the computer simply shut down one engine
and left no trail of diagnostic data behnind, just empty memory.
Obviously you don't normally expect that sort of behavior from a
corporate jet...

They landed with one engine (no pilot overide) and the Cessna engineers
came out and did a lot of head scratching. I do not know what the final
diagnosis was on that one.

g1000_eng writes:

1) All avionics software implements internal isolation to prevent one
part of the system from taking down another part.

Except the G1000, apparently.

2) A faulty fuel reading cannot cause the system to reboot. In addition
to testing every possible faulty fuel value, I've tested every
combination of faulty sensor readings related to this thread and am
unable to get anything out of the ordinary to happen.

Since the system did reboot, there is obviously a combination of
circumstances that will cause it to reboot. It should never reboot.

3) When the system reboots due to a software error, a very obvious
message with a very obvious color is displayed on the screen prior to
the reboot. Was this seen? I have seen no mention of it.

How does an obvious message help?

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

If indeed you are knowledgeable about Garmin software internals, I
appreciate your courage and your input on this topic.

On 5 Oct 2006 17:57:21 -0700, "g1000_eng"
wrote in . com:

I won't delve into the actual debate issues of whether to go glass,
realtime reliability vs. features demanded, benefits vs. risk of
various situational awareness methods, or anything like that.

Of course, the real issue is whether it's rational to rely on an
electronic system with a failure mode that is capable of leaving the
pilot with little else than three steam gages (AI, AS, Alt) and
magnetic compass, and taking out all communications, navigation,
engine instrumentation, and autopilot when it goes.

Perhaps you can confirm the loss of autopilot functionality when the
Garmin system goes off-line. If so, perhaps you can explain why the
autopilot is incapable of switching to being driven by the steam-gage
AI, and functioning as a wing leveler in that event. After all, if
the pilot is able to use the autopilot to keep the aircraft right side
up in the event of the Garmin system failure, he will be able to focus
much more of his attention on diagnosing the cause of the failure.