Air buss loss at Paris Airshow?

In article .com,
says...


In the Boeing model, if you shove the throttle handles forward, the
engines respond to the throttle setting.

In an Airbus model, if you shove the throttle handles foward, the
engines do not respond to the throttle setting

In the meantime, it
can take a while for the pilot to realize what is going on and the push
the TOGA button to disengage the landing mode and get the computer to
respond to the throttle handle position. This is what happened to the
pilot involved in this accident. By the time he realized what was
going on and pushed the TOGA button, there wasn't time for the engines
to spool up enough to miss the trees.




In Boeing planes you also use the TOGA switch to execute a go-around.
So there goes that argument. . .


To fly any plane safely, you have to know which buttons to push for each set
of circumstances. Even in a small trainer, flown low and slow, if you do not
execute the recovery properly you will go down. If you retract the flaps first
- or even at the same time - you can shove the throttle forward and you will
still go down. Nothing intuitive about it - you have to LEARN to do it, then
in a real situation, you must apply what you learned.

I do not for a second insinuate that the pilot of that plane was untrained or
unaware, but there was incontestably something incomplete in the application
of his training, and he did not execute a successful recovery from a low pass.
That's why he was held responsible for it - NOT because of some deep, dark
international conspiracy - NOT because the aircraft "has its own mind" and
cannot be controlled by the pilot.

It is surprising how willing some people are to reject plausible, rational
explanations, in favor of wild and totally unreasonable speculation.

Certainly the aircraft's systems were revisited after this incident, as is
often the case after aviation accidents (is this the cue to get into the
Boeing runaway rudder discussion?) - but even as planes are always being
improved, pilots must fly the plane they have in hand. In the crash in
question there is nothing to suggest systems failure of the aircraft, and
everything to suggest pilot error . . .

The suggestion that Airbus engineers did not consider the event of a
go-around, and made no provision for it, because they do not know enough about
airplane operations is, well simply ridiculous.

Mxsmanic,

No, I'm simply not willing and/or able to provide it.

I'm not surprised.

You haven't provided anything to support your point of view,

I haven't provided a point of view to start with. You didn't either.
You made a factual statement. I asked you to provide the facts to back
it up. You can't. That pretty much says it all. You're a liar. I'll
keep saying it until you prove me wrong.


--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

Lets see, I worked for Boeing for 8 years, mostly on the 777 Flight
Deck Displays (AIMS), and while there, I was privy to a lot of
competitive analysis of Airbus products.

Yep, you are right, I am just an ignoramus.


Three points for consideration:

1. "intelligent design" might be an unlucky choice of words by you.
Theses two are kind of loaded.

2. Your background makes you, well, kind of biased, wouldn't you agree?

3. Argument by authority isn't really a good way to try to convince
intelligent people.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

In article . com,
wrote:

Lets see, I worked for Boeing for 8 years, mostly on the 777 Flight
Deck Displays (AIMS), and while there, I was privy to a lot of
competitive analysis of Airbus products.

Yep, you are right, I am just an ignoramus.

Information on Airbus products information regarding Airbus engineers'
knowledge and abilities.

--
Bob Noel
Looking for a sig the
lawyers will hate

Bob Noel wrote:
In article . com,
wrote:

Lets see, I worked for Boeing for 8 years, mostly on the 777 Flight
Deck Displays (AIMS), and while there, I was privy to a lot of
competitive analysis of Airbus products.

Yep, you are right, I am just an ignoramus.

Information on Airbus products information regarding Airbus engineers'
knowledge and abilities.

--
Bob Noel
Looking for a sig the
lawyers will hate

So, designing an airplane that does not respond to pilot throttle
inputs reflects well on their abilities? When a pilot pushes the
throttle handles forward, he wants more power NOW. Not when some
software algorithm decides that he is allowed to have it...

And if it is anything like the way the side sticks work, if both pilots
frantically push on the power levers, you will eventually get twice the
thrust. :-))

wrote:

Bob Noel wrote:


In article . com,
wrote:



Lets see, I worked for Boeing for 8 years, mostly on the 777 Flight
Deck Displays (AIMS), and while there, I was privy to a lot of
competitive analysis of Airbus products.

Yep, you are right, I am just an ignoramus.


Information on Airbus products information regarding Airbus engineers'
knowledge and abilities.

--
Bob Noel
Looking for a sig the
lawyers will hate



So, designing an airplane that does not respond to pilot throttle
inputs reflects well on their abilities? When a pilot pushes the
throttle handles forward, he wants more power NOW. Not when some
software algorithm decides that he is allowed to have it...

john smith wrote:
And if it is anything like the way the side sticks work, if both pilots
frantically push on the power levers, you will eventually get twice the
thrust. :-))

Heh. Even Bus pilots mention that one as a major dislike. Below is
one report about an Airbus that had to go around while landing. The
captain pulled back his stick, but the copilot forgetfully had his hand
pushing slightly forward on his. The resulting input is the sum of the
sticks, but fortunately the captain pulled hard enough. The report
cites CRM and FBW design issues.

Mxsmanic once asked how pilots knew what the others' pitch input was.
Someone snidely answered that "the yokes are in front of both of them
dummy!". That's true for yokes and coupled sidesticks, but not true
for FBW sidesticks with no coupled force feedback such as the Airbus
has. It's entirely possible for one pilot to hold his stick hard
left, and the other hard right, and neither can tell what the other is
doing... except that the plane will continue to stay level.

http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publ...yA320DC10.html

Kev

Interesting that the solution is to improve CRM not fix the flight
controls so both pilots know what the control inputs are. Politics and
economics, which kills more people?

Kev wrote:

john smith wrote:


And if it is anything like the way the side sticks work, if both pilots
frantically push on the power levers, you will eventually get twice the
thrust. :-))



Heh. Even Bus pilots mention that one as a major dislike. Below is
one report about an Airbus that had to go around while landing. The
captain pulled back his stick, but the copilot forgetfully had his hand
pushing slightly forward on his. The resulting input is the sum of the
sticks, but fortunately the captain pulled hard enough. The report
cites CRM and FBW design issues.

Mxsmanic once asked how pilots knew what the others' pitch input was.
Someone snidely answered that "the yokes are in front of both of them
dummy!". That's true for yokes and coupled sidesticks, but not true
for FBW sidesticks with no coupled force feedback such as the Airbus
has. It's entirely possible for one pilot to hold his stick hard
left, and the other hard right, and neither can tell what the other is
doing... except that the plane will continue to stay level.

http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publ...yA320DC10.html

Kev

Kev writes:

Mxsmanic once asked how pilots knew what the others' pitch input was.
Someone snidely answered that "the yokes are in front of both of them
dummy!". That's true for yokes and coupled sidesticks, but not true
for FBW sidesticks with no coupled force feedback such as the Airbus
has. It's entirely possible for one pilot to hold his stick hard
left, and the other hard right, and neither can tell what the other is
doing... except that the plane will continue to stay level.

Brilliant.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

john smith writes:

Interesting that the solution is to improve CRM not fix the flight
controls so both pilots know what the control inputs are. Politics and
economics, which kills more people?

What would be wrong with just installing feedback so that each pilot
can feel what the other pilot is doing? That's the way it has worked
for the past century.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.