What F-102 units were called up for Viet Nam

Juvat wrote:

Ed Rasimus posted:

Fair enough, and fairly close in the details, I believe that F-102s
were gone from SEA by Jul 1970. Yes? No?



I should have posited that had the NVAF threat been deem
greater...there would have been a greater force than four Dets of
roughly 6 jets each. Mea Culpa.

No one thought the Beagles were coming, but there was a lot of
apprehension about a singleton MiG-17 or 21 making a penetration over
Laos into the Thai bases or across the DMZ to Danang. An alert
interceptor force was always deployed.

I'd be willing to speculate that "somebody" in 13th/7th AF thought
IL-28s were a threat. The reason for my statement is simply that I've
read about the Beagle threat perception in CHECO reports, inferred on
my part becasue the reports mention the Beagle being able to reach
Saigon.

Juvat

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

Juvat wrote:

Ed Rasimus posted:

The continual deployment (despite the fairly dismal combat
effectiveness) of the F-102 during SEA seems to disagree with your
last statement here.

Fair enough, and fairly close in the details, I believe that F-102s
were gone from SEA by Jul 1970. Yes? No?

No. At least as I recall, and posted. There were still F-102s deployed
in '72 when I was back at Korat in the F-4. Danang and Udorn I
believe. But, I've been wrong in the past....there was, after all, the
fateful decision to marry my first wife.

I should have posited that had the NVAF threat been deem
greater...there would have been a greater force than four Dets of
roughly 6 jets each. Mea Culpa.

Realistically, the NVAF threat was small, yet, the need for an air
defense response existed and it made more sense to deploy those
specialized aircraft and retain the mission flexibility of other
tactical jets that could also carry iron up N.


No one thought the Beagles were coming, but there was a lot of
apprehension about a singleton MiG-17 or 21 making a penetration over
Laos into the Thai bases or across the DMZ to Danang. An alert
interceptor force was always deployed.

I'd be willing to speculate that "somebody" in 13th/7th AF thought
IL-28s were a threat. The reason for my statement is simply that I've
read about the Beagle threat perception in CHECO reports, inferred on
my part becasue the reports mention the Beagle being able to reach
Saigon.

I'm always bothered by the "historians" and "statisticians" who quote
from CHECO and Red Baron reports. In a few years this crap will go
unrefuted, but while a few crusty *******s are still alive, we'll
throw a bull-**** flag occasionally.

If the IL-28s, parked at Gia Lam were a threat, we should have taken
them off the ramp. We could have done it on any given day. We all knew
where they were and had the wherewithal to do it. The ROE prevented it
until '72 when we were finally allowed to jettison on the airfields.

The air attack threat was more realistically from a MiG 17 or 21 with
a pair of bombs making a quick dash in-country. During several years
of the bombing pause, the MiGs operated further south than the main
bases in Pack VI, including Vinh and Dong Hoi. It would have been well
within the capabiltiy of the little jets to make a run at NKP, Udorn,
Ubon or Danang.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

Ed Rasimus posted:


No. At least as I recall, and posted. There were still F-102s deployed
in '72 when I was back at Korat in the F-4. Danang and Udorn I
believe. But, I've been wrong in the past....

I think you are mistaken, from reading Michel referencing the F-4s
sitting alert at Udorn and flying CAPs on Laos/NVN border. Perhaps he
missed this detail.

According to Pete Stickney's post...
The 64th FIS was inactivated in November '69,
with the 509th FIS once again picking up the Don Muang det. Operations
at Da Nang ended in ealy '70, and the Don Muang det was closed in late
May. On 24 July, 1970, the 509th FIS was inactivated. The 82nd FIS,
which had been at Naha AB, and had been supplying alert dets in Korea,
inactivated in May, 71.

So my question would be...what unit in 1972 since all the PACAF F-102s
were history (so to speak). I suspect that you honestly don't know,
but that may not alter your recollection (right or wrong).

Realistically, the NVAF threat was small, yet, the need for an air
defense response existed and it made more sense to deploy those
specialized aircraft and retain the mission flexibility of other
tactical jets that could also carry iron up N.

Apparently only until Jul 70 for the 509th, and May of 71 for the 82d.

Regarding my reference to CHECO reports...

I'm always bothered by the "historians" and "statisticians" who quote
from CHECO and Red Baron reports.

Hmmm, imagine folks like myself actually believing the contemporaneous
reporting of tactics, trends, and analysis by the likes of Robert
Futrell and Warren Thompson.

I am certainly a skeptical asshole, looking for mutiple sources.

In a few years this crap will go
unrefuted, but while a few crusty *******s are still alive, we'll
throw a bull-**** flag occasionally.

Fair enough...you tossed out the F-102s still in SEA in 1972. That may
well proved to be a bull-**** flag *or* simply bull-****. Does that
mean we ignore you if you prove to be incorrect on this matter of
fact? Not at all. The problem I found with oral history is the lack of
contemporaneous documentation.

If the IL-28s, parked at Gia Lam were a threat,...

Which would support the reason for having F-102s at TSN and Don
Muang..

The air attack threat was more realistically from a MiG 17 or 21 with
a pair of bombs making a quick dash in-country...

Which explains the Det at Da Nang however long that lasted (1970
according to Stickney's research), and certainly not past Jul 72 when
the 366th TFW moved to Thailand...and Udorn Det whenever it closed.

Juvat

"Juvat" wrote in message
...
Kevin Brooks blurted out:


I wonder if you'd have the temerity to utter such a thing to, say, the
personnel from the ANG units like those in CO and NM that were
activated and flew in Vietnam,

Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO. The
original question you will recall had to do with ANG F-102 units
called up. He posited none due to the mission. He was correct on that
score. Yes? No?

or to those "champagne unit" (your
description) members who pulled their voluntary rotations in Vietnam?
Methinks not...

Okay, but that's an entirely different issue from the "entitled"
gentlemen that used their position to get an officer slot in the TX
ANG...in an airplane that had next to ZERO chance of getting activated
and sent into harm's way. So I'd be willing to bet Scott would have no
problem acknowledging the excellent service of the SEA volunteers.

Is the military dedication, professionalism, or 'influence' of any other
officer who served in the Texas ANG at that time in question?
Or indeed any other non-draftee, who incidentially did not see combat during
the Vietnam years?

Or is it only some guy, who 30 years later, would become president?

Hindsight is a wonderful thing.

15 years ago, a B-52 crew performing close air support over a battlefield
was a laughable concept. They had basically a ZERO chance of 'being
activated'. Times change. Tactics and A/C roles change.

They could just as easily have changed for the -102 crews.

Pete

Juvat wrote in message . ..
Kevin Brooks blurted out:


I wonder if you'd have the temerity to utter such a thing to, say, the
personnel from the ANG units like those in CO and NM that were
activated and flew in Vietnam,

Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO.

No, I am not reading anything "into it". His words are quite clear in
their meaning and intent.

The
original question you will recall had to do with ANG F-102 units
called up. He posited none due to the mission. He was correct on that
score. Yes? No?

No, he was incorrect. He said none were deployed (which was wrong)
because there was no need for interceptors (wrong again, as in fact an
interceptor force was maintained in Vietnam, and in Thailand
(including some RAAF folks with F-86's at one point, IIRC) throughout
the period of major US involvement).


or to those "champagne unit" (your
description) members who pulled their voluntary rotations in Vietnam?
Methinks not...

Okay, but that's an entirely different issue from the "entitled"
gentlemen that used their position to get an officer slot in the TX
ANG...in an airplane that had next to ZERO chance of getting activated
and sent into harm's way.

Zero chance? That's probably what the F-100 jockeys from CO thought,
too, right up until they deployed to the RVN. An airplane that had
ZERO percent chanc??? Odd, since that very same aircraft served in SEA
throughout most of the war, with ANG pilots forming part of the
manning that supported them.


So I'd be willing to bet Scott would have no
problem acknowledging the excellent service of the SEA volunteers.

Well, since he is so willing to brush the entire 111th FIS, a unit
that did contribute pilots to fly F-102's in Vietnam, with his "I hate
GWB" brush, I would disagree that he demonstrates such willingness.


Was no longer a "first line aircraft"? Uhmmm...care to guess when the
last F-102's left active duty?

When?

The last F-102's left active duty service (as interceptors, that
is--they would later return in the guise of the QF-102) in 73, after
the US had concluded the treaty with Hanoi (source:
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/Hi...468/ch11-4.htm). They continued
in ANG service for only a few more years (77 IIRC). So, throughout
this period of the Vietnam conflict, the Dagger remained in "front
line" service. It was the *first* US combat aircraft deployed to the
RVN after the Tonking Gulf incident, and remained in theater throught
the time of US major involvement. Not bad for Scott's "second echelon"
fighter, as he would call it, no?


Since you did not even have a ghostly
idea that they had served in Vietnam, how the heck are we supposed to
believe your assessment of their operational status?

Again...simply from a comprehension stand point the question was ANG
F-102 sqdns recalled for SEA...NOT, I repeat NOT if any AD squadrons
served.

No, that was NOT the question. The question was about F-102 service in
Vietnam, period. Which Scott managed to fumble--but hey, that's
excusable, we all make mistakes, and he admitted as much (which is
better than a lot of folks hereabouts...). But he left the ballpark
when he tried to go political and engaged in wholesale libel with his
"the Guard was a haven for draftdodgers" crap. My brother served in
the Guard at the very end of the Vietnam conflict--AFTER serving on
active duty and pulling a year flying DUSTOFF missions out of Danang
and Phu Bai...but hey, that tarbrush Scott was wielding casts a broad
stroke, does it not? ANG and ARNG units were serving in Vietnam as
well, along with a few thousand former ARNG "individual replacements"
(see what happened to the HIARNG infantry brigade that was
activated....). Then we get the attempt to tar the entire 111th FIS
because Scott does not like GWB; again, uncalled for.

Scott was correct on this score even if he simply guessed.

Not really. The F-102's went in when the curtain went up, and returned
only when it went down. ANG F-102 folks played in the same sandbox as
their AC counterparts.


As to even the
definition of 'first line", have you ever looked at what the breakdown
in the old ADC force was during that period? Take a gander at how many
of those forces you call "second echelon", I presume, were standing
alert on a routine basis.

Fair point...then read Charles J Gross book published by the Office of
Air Force History "Prelude to Total Force" The Air National Guard
1943-1969." Apparently the USAF AD Corona (generals) held the notion
the ANG was second echelon for quite awhile, highlighted by the
deployment of ANG forces to Korea for the Pueblo Crisis. The highly
successful F-100 deployment to SEA was quite the eye-opener for AD
commanders.

I believe you, or the author maybe, forgot another earlier
example--the activation and deployment to Europe of various ANG
fighter units as a result of the Berlin crisis earlier that same
decade.


Not really. The degree of state control has always been exaggerated by
those who have never served in a Guard unit, which number I am
guessing from your sneering tone you would be a part of.

OK your AD and ANG service and my AD and ANG service differed greatly.

My AD and ARNG service, you mean.

I agree with Scott's POV on state control in the past (only from
asking the question of career ANG guys). YMMV

OK. Just how did the states leverage this control? Appointing
officers? Not really--they had to be vetted by a federal rec board
before the appointments were effective. Training plans? Nope--that was
controlled by the federal side. IET? Nope, because this was after it
was decided that all NG personnel would attend AC IET. Money,
organization, and/or equipment? Heck no--that was firmly the purview
of the feds. So, where was all of this state control really
manifested?


Too little, too late (in terms of backpeddling, that is). Go up and
read your first paragraph in *this* post and then come back and tell
me you were not "attacking".

OK...I don't think he was attacking.

Then you apparently share his view of the Guard as a whole during that
period. Too bad.

And I think it is fairly accurate
to postulate that the USAF didn't think the F-102 was essential in
SEA, short legs and an adversary with a token number of IL-28s.

Gee, then why did they keep them in service over there throughout the
war? Do you think if your opponent has a weak, but existant, air
strike capability, then it is OK to ignore air defense? Good way to
get a bloody nose (see what happened when we had B-29's caught on
Saipan during WWII by that "remote" threat).

Brooks


Juvat

I posted:
Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO.

Kevin Brooks posted:
No, I am not reading anything "into it". His words are quite clear in
their meaning and intent.

Kevin cool your jets pardner...the title of this thread is what?

"What F-102 units were called up for Viet Nam"

What does "called up" mean to you? To me it means what non-active duty
units, Guard or Reserve were activated for duty. How do you "call up"
an active duty unit?

It does NOT mean which Acitve Duty squadrons deployed. But I'd bet
that's how you're reading this thread.

No, he was incorrect. He said none were deployed (which was wrong)

Actually he said "I don't think any were. This plane was strictly an
interceptor for shooting down bombers. No guns, no ground attack
capability."

I'm pretty sure history will confirm that F-102s were indeed
interceptors lacking a surface attack mission. I acknowledge the
kludged attempts to use it's IRST in a surface attack role, but that
was NOT it's mission (Air Defense as you acknowledge). And history
will confirm that no ANG unit was called up for active duty in SEA.

because there was no need for interceptors (wrong again, as in fact an
interceptor force was maintained in Vietnam, and in Thailand
throughout the period of major US involvement).

Okay...you're absolutely right. He was incorrect WRT to the presence
of ANY F-102s.

Zero chance? That's probably what the F-100 jockeys from CO thought,
too, right up until they deployed to the RVN. An airplane that had
ZERO percent chanc??? Odd, since that very same aircraft served in SEA
throughout most of the war, with ANG pilots forming part of the
manning that supported them.

Come on Kevin...I'm sincerely trying to keep this on topic about ANG
F-102 sqdns and Scott's post.

ZERO chance of an ANG F-102 pilot flying combat unless he volunteered.
The issue regarding the four ANG F-100 units that deployed, it's a
great display of what the citizen airman has been willing to do for
our country from the gitgo. The USAF was very pleased with that
deployment. (Not back pedaling...before you suggest that I am)

The last F-102's left active duty service (as interceptors, that
is--they would later return in the guise of the QF-102) in 73, ... They continued
in ANG service for only a few more years (77 IIRC).

I guess you won't be surprised when I was hoping for a little more
detail, like last AD sqdn date and last ANG date. Guess I'll do the
reasearch [sigh].

It was the *first* US combat aircraft deployed to the
RVN after the Tonking Gulf incident,

You'd be hard pressed to make a case of "first" deployed after the
Gulf of Tonkin. Afterall, the 1st Air Commando (Farm Gate) guys were
already flying combat sorties from Bien Hoa before GoT, as were RF-101
guys (Able Mable) from Misawa (45th TRS) and Kadena (15th TRS). You
get the picture.

No, that was NOT the question. The question was about F-102 service in
Vietnam, period.

Kevin, re-read the title of this thread. "What F-102 units were called
up for Viet Nam," not what F-102 units served in SEA. Sir you are in
error...but I bet you disagree with me.

Scott was correct on this score even if he simply guessed.

Not really.

OK...I say tomato...you say cantalope.

I believe you, or the author maybe, forgot another earlier
example--the activation and deployment to Europe of various ANG
fighter units as a result of the Berlin crisis earlier that same
decade.

Phew...uhhh my bad, I was trying to keep the discussion close to
topic, sorta, hoping to keep it on SEA deployments of ANG F-102s. I
mentioned the only activations during SEA.

If you wish I can cite every ANG squadron activated for Berlin and the
deployment location, but I don't think it is germaine to F-102s in
SEA.

Gee, then why did they keep them in service over there throughout the
war? Do you think if your opponent has a weak, but existant, air
strike capability, then it is OK to ignore air defense?

Fair question, one I cannot answer. If the threat were that great,
then why not bring the superior interceptor (the F-106) in to replace
the F-102, I cannot answer that one either. I guess the F-102 was so
good at it's mission the AF only needed 24 or so in SEA (four 6 plane
Dets) and that might be proof of its effectiveness as an Interceptor.

Truly sorry for the bad blood. You have misconstrued my intent. That
being Scott was correct that no ANG F-102 unit was called up for Viet
Nam, and he was mistaken that no F-102 units served in SEA.

Juvat

Kevin cool your jets pardner...the title of this thread is what?

Now you're being ridiculous. The title of the thread has nothing to do
with the discussion, and it was Scott's post that moved it into its
present territory. If he didn't mean to do that, he can always
apologize and set the record straight.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

Cub Driver posted:

Now you're being ridiculous.

Geez Dan, thanks for the breath of fresh air. I'm honestly not trying
to escalate the signal to noise ratio here...honestly trying to post
details

The title of the thread has nothing to do
with the discussion,

And here I was trying to keep it within near earth orbit of the title
of the thread. Mea Culpa, mea culpa.

and it was Scott's post that moved it into its
present territory. If he didn't mean to do that, he can always
apologize and set the record straight.

Your concerns are noted.

Juvat

Juvat wrote:


Fair question, one I cannot answer. If the threat were that great,
then why not bring the superior interceptor (the F-106) in to replace
the F-102, I cannot answer that one either. I guess the F-102 was so
good at it's mission the AF only needed 24 or so in SEA (four 6 plane
Dets) and that might be proof of its effectiveness as an Interceptor.

Juvat

Simple answer to your question regarding why 106's weren't deployed
instead of 102's. During '66 to '69, there was a chronic shortage of
J-75s. Since the Deuce used the much more common J-57, it was more
readily deployable.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

Juvat wrote in message . ..
I posted:
Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO.

Kevin Brooks posted:
No, I am not reading anything "into it". His words are quite clear in
their meaning and intent.

Kevin cool your jets pardner...the title of this thread is what?

"What F-102 units were called up for Viet Nam"

What does "called up" mean to you? To me it means what non-active duty
units, Guard or Reserve were activated for duty. How do you "call up"
an active duty unit?

By deploying them into the theater of operations from their current
station would be one manner of "calling up" an AC unit. I note that
the other posters who anwered the initial question also did not take
the "this solely deals with the RC" approach--are all of us wrong?


It does NOT mean which Acitve Duty squadrons deployed. But I'd bet
that's how you're reading this thread.

I took it as a total force question.


No, he was incorrect. He said none were deployed (which was wrong)

Actually he said "I don't think any were. This plane was strictly an
interceptor for shooting down bombers. No guns, no ground attack
capability."

I'm pretty sure history will confirm that F-102s were indeed
interceptors lacking a surface attack mission. I acknowledge the
kludged attempts to use it's IRST in a surface attack role, but that
was NOT it's mission (Air Defense as you acknowledge).

Take away the "strictly"; as it was indeed used in ground attack
missions, albeit not very effectively (I do believe a couple of their
three total losses occurred when performing this mission that they
supposedly could not even undertake). The Fairey Battle was by all
accounts a rather lousy ground attack aircraft, but it was indeed used
in that role; the F-104 was never originally intended to serve in the
CAS/BAI role, but that is the role it later found itself serving with
many NATO nations. Why put blinders on only in regards to the F-102's
history?


And history will confirm that no ANG unit was called up for active duty in SEA.

No ANG unit was called up for active duty in SEA?! I thought you
already acknowledged the fact that ANG units were indeed called up?


because there was no need for interceptors (wrong again, as in fact an
interceptor force was maintained in Vietnam, and in Thailand
throughout the period of major US involvement).

Okay...you're absolutely right. He was incorrect WRT to the presence
of ANY F-102s.

Zero chance? That's probably what the F-100 jockeys from CO thought,
too, right up until they deployed to the RVN. An airplane that had
ZERO percent chanc??? Odd, since that very same aircraft served in SEA
throughout most of the war, with ANG pilots forming part of the
manning that supported them.

Come on Kevin...I'm sincerely trying to keep this on topic about ANG
F-102 sqdns and Scott's post.

Sorry to inform you of this, but this thread began to meander
(something that is rather common in Usenet) after Scott made his post
and tried to link it to an anti-GWB thrust. As others have commented,
the only folks who seem restricted to the ANG-only approach appear to
be you and Scott.


ZERO chance of an ANG F-102 pilot flying combat unless he volunteered.

Uhmmm...like when Bush reportedly volunteered for Palace Alert (but
did not meet the experience requirement, which according to one
responsible individual was a minimum of one thousand hours)?

The issue regarding the four ANG F-100 units that deployed, it's a
great display of what the citizen airman has been willing to do for
our country from the gitgo. The USAF was very pleased with that
deployment. (Not back pedaling...before you suggest that I am)

OK. So your earlier statement that no ANG units were deployed was
apparently misworded--I would assume that you mean no F-102 units were
activated? Which would be true enough--but that leaves one wondering
whether F-102 units would indeed have been activated if sufficient
*volunteers* had not stepped forward?


The last F-102's left active duty service (as interceptors, that
is--they would later return in the guise of the QF-102) in 73, ... They continued
in ANG service for only a few more years (77 IIRC).

I guess you won't be surprised when I was hoping for a little more
detail, like last AD sqdn date and last ANG date. Guess I'll do the
reasearch [sigh].

Gee, I was unaware you were so picky, when the issue had meandered to
whether the F-102 was a viable go-to-war/get-activated asset while GWB
was boring holes in the sky during his training and with the 111th FIS
(which question has already been answered, as they were still serving
with AC units while he was flying). But...the 57th FIS ceased Deuce
operations out of Iceland in July 73, and the HIARNG unit reportedly
flew its last Deuce operational sortie in October 76. Good enough?


It was the *first* US combat aircraft deployed to the
RVN after the Tonking Gulf incident,

You'd be hard pressed to make a case of "first" deployed after the
Gulf of Tonkin. Afterall, the 1st Air Commando (Farm Gate) guys were
already flying combat sorties from Bien Hoa before GoT, as were RF-101
guys (Able Mable) from Misawa (45th TRS) and Kadena (15th TRS). You
get the picture.

Well, the folks in Bien Hoa did not have to deploy into the theater of
operations after the Gulf resolution, now did they (see, this playing
with finite word definitions can work both ways)? Actually, I believe
I read where the first F-102's to enter the area preceeded this by a
few years (1962, when they apparently started running a det out of the
RVN). I did read where the 509th FIS claims to have been the first
unit to deploy into the RVN after the GT incident--is that wrong?


No, that was NOT the question. The question was about F-102 service in
Vietnam, period.

Kevin, re-read the title of this thread. "What F-102 units were called
up for Viet Nam," not what F-102 units served in SEA. Sir you are in
error...but I bet you disagree with me.

As apparently do the other folks who took exception with Scott's post,
not to mention those who answered the original post with the data on
the AC F-102 units that did indeed find themselves flying combat
missions.


Scott was correct on this score even if he simply guessed.

Not really.

OK...I say tomato...you say cantalope.

I believe you, or the author maybe, forgot another earlier
example--the activation and deployment to Europe of various ANG
fighter units as a result of the Berlin crisis earlier that same
decade.

Phew...uhhh my bad, I was trying to keep the discussion close to
topic, sorta, hoping to keep it on SEA deployments of ANG F-102s. I
mentioned the only activations during SEA.

If you wish I can cite every ANG squadron activated for Berlin and the
deployment location, but I don't think it is germaine to F-102s in
SEA.

But it is germane to the fact that the USAF already regarded the ANG
as a real, honest to goodness go-to-war asset well before the entry of
GWB into ANG service.


Gee, then why did they keep them in service over there throughout the
war? Do you think if your opponent has a weak, but existant, air
strike capability, then it is OK to ignore air defense?

Fair question, one I cannot answer. If the threat were that great,
then why not bring the superior interceptor (the F-106) in to replace
the F-102, I cannot answer that one either. I guess the F-102 was so
good at it's mission the AF only needed 24 or so in SEA (four 6 plane
Dets) and that might be proof of its effectiveness as an Interceptor.

I would suspect that, like happened during the Korean conflict, the
USAF was examining the degree of threat (admittedly not great in SEA,
but then again it could not be completely discounted, either) and
decided that the F-106's were better deployed against the more serious
threat and the F-102's could handle the threat posed by the North
Vietnamese.


Truly sorry for the bad blood. You have misconstrued my intent. That
being Scott was correct that no ANG F-102 unit was called up for Viet
Nam, and he was mistaken that no F-102 units served in SEA.

No bad blood. But I get a bit tired when folks like Scott traipse out
the old "the Guard was a bunch of draftdodgers" mantra, not to mention
why he had to even enter into the "bash GWB" mode in the first place.
The first is a gross exaggeration born of enough folks making the
claim in the past, so it must be true, right? The second was just
another attempt at a backhanded swipe at a guy who performed military
service and flew combat aircraft in the defense of this nation-- a
much better alternative to refusing to serve at all, and then
attacking those who did, as many of his then-compatriots did, and none
of which he should be ashamed of, IMO.

Brooks


Juvat