Senators still demand user fees

"TheSmokingGnu" wrote in message
...

Ridiculous, it is.

http://www.avgroup.com/propilot_atc.pdf

http://www.reason.org/ps358.pdf

http://www.reason.org/ps332.pdf

http://www.reason.org/ps347_business_jets_atc.pdf

It's certainly more fun, though, to listen to all the alphabet groups with a
vested interest.

It's certainly more fun, though, to listen to all the alphabet groups with
a vested interest.

You don't think those links are written by someone with a vested interest
or bias of some sort? Why else would the first article start with citing
the problem of congested airports but call that an ATC issue? That's
misdirection; simple literary dishonesty.

The second simply says essentially "there's evidence that we're right" w/o
citing any.

The third speaks to a funding problem. Yet the GAO disagrees, according
to testimony by Gerald Dillingham. Calvin Scovel of the DOT agrees with
that testimony.

The forth, in part 3, commits the same act (though admittedly it is merely
citing FAA staffers with their own biases and vested interests).

More, the fact that the airlines are apparently able to exploit this
process to try to achieve yet another tax break (despite the claimed
issue being an FAA cash shortfall) makes it clear that the process is
biased and therefore flawed (and pretty much congressional business as
usual).

- Andrew

"Andrew Gideon" wrote in message
news

It's certainly more fun, though, to listen to all the alphabet groups
with
a vested interest.

You don't think those links are written by someone with a vested interest
or bias of some sort?

What in\terest would that be?


Why else would the first article start with citing
the problem of congested airports but call that an ATC issue? That's
misdirection; simple literary dishonesty.

Maybe the fact there's no fees for landing during peak timeslots has
something to do with that? Maybe if you dig a bit you find that's a mjor
tenent of his proposal?


The second simply says essentially "there's evidence that we're right" w/o
citing any.

Could you poin that one out?


The third speaks to a funding problem. Yet the GAO disagrees, according
to testimony by Gerald Dillingham. Calvin Scovel of the DOT agrees with
that testimony.


The FAA Funding Crunch--One More Time

Is there or isn't there a looming budget shortfall that could impede timely
implementation of the $20 billion NextGen system? Advocates of the status
quo-both in Congress and among the general aviation alphabet groups-say
there isn't. The FAA and others, such as your editor, maintain that there
is. The most recent round in this back and forth was a letter from the
Government Accountability Office, in response to a question from the House
Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee (www.gao.gov/new.items/d07918r.pdf).
GAO's Gerald Dillingham told the members that "the current FAA funding
structure can provide sufficient funding for NextGen-with some caveats."
Dillingham relied mostly on a projection made last fall by the Congressional
Budget Office, which projected future aviation excise tax revenues through
2016.



That, unfortunately, is an incomplete and misleading picture. I wrote about
that CBO projection last fall (issue #38), after talking with the CBO
analysts who prepared it. As I'd suspected, they did a simple projection of
the aviation tax revenues, assuming that they grow slightly faster than
inflation and GDP, based on historic relations between air travel and
economic growth. What that ignores is structural changes in air
transportation, discussed in last fall's GAO report on the same subject
(GAO-06-1114T) and in FAA's justification for its funding reform proposal. A
fundamental disconnect exists between the drivers of aviation tax revenue
(the number of passengers carried and the average ticket price) and the ATC
system's annual cost (driven by workload, based on the growth in air
traffic). As the same total number of people gets carried in more, smaller
units (RJs instead of 737s, air taxis and fractionals instead of airliners,
etc.), traffic grows faster than passengers, and therefore costs grow faster
than revenue. It is this structural disconnect that threatens the ability to
afford NextGen.



The Congressional Research Service pointed this out last fall in their
background report, "Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration:
Background and Issues for Congress," Oct. 18, 2006. In the section on
Airport and Airway Trust Fund Issues (p. 13), CRS points out that the "FAA
sees little prospect of a major increase in revenue from the trust fund's
existing tax and fee system," and that "The FAA position is supported by the
Department of Treasury estimates that suggest that annual revenue increases
to the trust fund in the years ahead will be modest." (U.S. Treasury, Office
of Tax Analysis, "Airport and Airway Trust Fund: FY2007 Mid-Session Review,
Current Law Baseline," Summer 2006).



Status-quo defenders also like to claim that the existing aviation excise
tax structure has provided stable and predictable funding. Guess again.
What's most relevant in looking at NextGen funding is FAA's capital budget,
called "Facilities and Equipment." I went back and got F&E figures from
FY1992 through 2006 and adjusted them for inflation. Over that time period,
the real value has bounced around from a low of $2.4 billion (1998) to a
high of $3.5 billion (1992). We're also told not to worry because Congress
can always supplement FAA's budget by adding general funding. CRS looked at
that, over the period FY1997-FY2006, finding that the general fund
contribution varied enormously, from as high as 38% (1997) to as low as 0%
(2000) and 8% (2002)-not exactly stable and predictable. The DOT Office of
Inspector General has seconded this point. In a report last fall on FAA
management questions, it said that it's "extremely difficult, if not
impossible" to predict future government appropriations and general fund
contributions.



Unfortunately, although both GAO and FAA have done a good job of explaining
the "fundamental disconnect" between revenues and costs, neither has
produced a budget projection based on that disconnect. That leaves the naïve
CBO projection as the baseline for discussion-and a handy rack for defenders
of the status quo to hang their hats on.



The forth, in part 3, commits the same act (though admittedly it is merely
citing FAA staffers with their own biases and vested interests).

More, the fact that the airlines are apparently able to exploit this
process to try to achieve yet another tax break (despite the claimed
issue being an FAA cash shortfall) makes it clear that the process is
biased and therefore flawed (and pretty much congressional business as
usual).

It's the airlines funding model that he explicitly rejects.

Try again.

Matt Barrow wrote:
links
It's certainly more fun, though, to listen to all the alphabet groups with a
vested interest.

I read the articles, and here's what I could glean from them:

Modernization has three issues:

1. No one will give us the money to do it.
2. The FAA isn't the giant, faceless soul-eating bureaucratic monster we
thought it was.
3. No one wants our system.

That said, the ideas about delays and system capacity were interesting.
They seem to predict a nearly quadratic expansion of delay times if we
throw in just a few more planes.

The proposals need about 16 hours a year in time savings for the light
category jets to break even, of approx. 450 hours a year. That equates
to about 2.5 minutes of time savings per day. We could achieve this kind
of time saving by simply whipping the controllers vigorously until they
begin to issue clearances faster, or perhaps just at a faster vocal clip.

The 'best-case' solution (Dist-Wt, as I saw it) means an approximate
doubling of flight costs per year for a corporate operator. What this
proposal fails to factor, I think, is that much of the corporate traffic
is not fundamental, but incidental to business; corporations choose to
own and maintain their own jet because it's convenient and
cost-effective over the airlines. What kinds of contingencies are
planned when corporate traffic drops to practically nothing, and the
airlines are sitting fat and happy on their tax-less fuel?

This proposal would seem to advocate throwing wads of cash at a problem
that doesn't yet exist, while simultaneously making it nearly impossible
for an individual or entity to own or operate a private aircraft. Is the
solution to the problem of capacity simply to make all the pilots
carpool, or trust a subsidized government pocket-boy to take up the
slack? Is the solution simply to drive private citizens back to the
airlines by making GA impossible to support?

The "let's be like Canada et al." argument is used for another popular
hot-button topic: NHS. There's a reason why "if it works for them, it'll
work for us" doesn't ring true to many people: it's a crap way of doing
things. Even in spite of ourselves, practically no-one in the US doesn't
have some kind of access to health insurance, and we maintain one of the
world's best healthcare systems anyway, without yet another public
private oversight sub-committee on the Committee for Sub-Oversight of
Administration. Now, why did we want to use a foreign nation's system as
a template, again?

TheSmokingGnu

On Fri, 13 Jul 2007 15:19:34 -0700, TheSmokingGnu wrote:

The proposals need about 16 hours a year in time savings for the light
category jets to break even, of approx. 450 hours a year. That equates
to about 2.5 minutes of time savings per day. We could achieve this kind
of time saving by simply whipping the controllers vigorously until they
begin to issue clearances faster, or perhaps just at a faster vocal
clip.

Can you cite where in there you found this type of math; I've missed it.
I'm esp. curious whether the delays in question really are the result of
ATC throughput or if they're runway throughput.

[...]
What kinds of contingencies are
planned when corporate traffic drops to practically nothing, and the
airlines are sitting fat and happy on their tax-less fuel?

They can't plan for that. It would show the folly/dishonesty of charging
GA the "cost of services provided". The costs would remain fixed, or
perhaps drop trivially w/o GA, while the airlines - with their new tax
breaks some Senators are trying to grant - kept the system in high use.

It would be useful, though, to show what it would take to reduce ATC
service costs. For example, how low would traffic have to drop before
(for example) NY TRACON would be able to reduce staff by merging sectors?

Admittedly, this could fall out to either side of the argument. For
example, around KCDW I rarely hear KEWR traffic (that I can recall); it's
usually just KTEB, KMMU, and the smaller fields. If GA disappeared, could
a few sectors be merged and seats be removed?

I'm not sure of my recollection, mind you. I may simply recall the KTEB
and KMMU traffic because their approaches are close to KCDW so I tend to
pay more attention to those flights on the frequency. I'd not really know
the source of a departure.

Immediately south of KCDW, come to think on it, I know I've been mixed in
with KEWR departures. So that seat/sector would remain unchanged.

I'll pay more attention next time I'm up. But this is the sort of study
that *someone* should do.


This proposal would seem to advocate throwing wads of cash at a problem
that doesn't yet exist, while simultaneously making it nearly impossible
for an individual or entity to own or operate a private aircraft.

I continue to wonder if this isn't someone's goal. After all, all those
corporate flights are seats not sold by the airlines. I've difficulty
taking this seriously, though, as the number of GA seats just isn't
significant compared to the cattle cars currently run by the airlines.

Heh Perhaps this is not caused by the airlines, but by the telecoms
companies. Each GA flight is a teleconference not had laugh.

- Andrew

On Thu, 12 Jul 2007 17:49:15 -0700, in rec.aviation.piloting, TheSmokingGnu
wrote:

Larry Dighera wrote:
Bloody hypocrites:
"The general aviation community is not unreceptive to an increase
in the gas tax," said Roberts. "They're for modernization as
well."

If by "modernization" they mean "pay more and fly less", then ****
modernization. The system works now. Just because the big airlines find
themselves consistently outpaced by smaller and newer competitors
doesn't make the best solution taxation of a community admittedly unable
or unwilling to pay.

I've been thinking that user fees might not be a bad idea, just make sure
that those who are paying for the system are the ones who get the most
benefit from it. A flat per-gallon fuel tax that everybody pays the same
regardless of flight intent. Add an ATC/IFR fee based on souls onboard
times miles flown[1]. And all non-commercial flights are exempt.

Or have I got it all wrong again?

-Scott

[1] Any spin doctor should be able to make a hell of a case in support of
this...after all, if the airlines *really* wanted to keep their passengers
safe from harm, why wouldn't they be willing to pay for use of the system
that keeps them from crashing into each other in the air?