Best dogfight gun?

In article ,
"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

In message , Chad Irby
writes

It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]

Sounds abstract? The services were using the same aircraft,
near-identical missiles (Sparrows and different models of Sidewinder),
but the USAF's F-4Ds and F-4Es had guns (pods for the Ds, internal for
the Es) supposedly as a solution to the problems encountered during
Rolling Thunder. Yet they were twice as likely to be shot down and
barely half as likely to kill, as the gunless Navy fighters. (Only seven
of the forty-eight USAF Linebacker kills were achieved with guns,
despite the efforts made to fit them)

Yep, McNamara is still influencing military thought. I was sure we'd
gotten over that, but what goes around, comes around.

....and you're quoting the same sort of logic they used back then.
You're comparing planes and equipment, but not *missions*.

For example, the Navy planes flew sorties against coastal areas, which
meant that they were flying over relatively undefended airspace on the
run in, as compared to the large number of SAMs that the Air Force
fighters and bombers went over.

One other note: of the 21 MiG kills by the F-4E during Vietnam, five
were gun kills... pretty good for something so useless.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

In message , Chad Irby
writes
In article ,
"Paul J. Adam" wrote:
...and you're quoting the same sort of logic they used back then.
You're comparing planes and equipment, but not *missions*.

Okay, so let's get to the bottom line: how many F-4 sorties were *not*
intended to kill the enemy and break his stuff or directly support that
aim?

(Or to photograph it before and after being broken, or to keep fighters
off the breakers, or to stop his SAMs and AAA interfering, or...)

If your chosen tactic hauls sixty aircraft in rigid formation along a
predictable course and is vulnerable to a slashing attack by one or two
MiGs on a vulnerable element, then that's bad... unless it gets two
dozen strikers on-target and stops you losing half-a-dozen aircraft to
SAMs.

Trouble is, all the guns you like won't stop #4 of one of the escort
sections getting an unseen Atoll up the tailpipe and won't help you
chase that MiG-21 down and kill him.

For example, the Navy planes flew sorties against coastal areas, which
meant that they were flying over relatively undefended airspace on the
run in, as compared to the large number of SAMs that the Air Force
fighters and bombers went over.

So produce some numbers. Relative SAM losses per sortie, for instance?
I'm open to data, I just get wary about assertion and anecdote.

One other note: of the 21 MiG kills by the F-4E during Vietnam, five
were gun kills... pretty good for something so useless.

This aircraft has Sparrow and Sidewinder, and by the time the F-4E is
flying they're demonstrating performance (the Sidewinder was up to 50%
Pk in its AIM-9G form). Yet it's making a quarter of its kills with
guns? Where did that battery of AAMs go in those engagements?

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 22:36:54 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:

If your chosen tactic hauls sixty aircraft in rigid formation along a
predictable course and is vulnerable to a slashing attack by one or two
MiGs on a vulnerable element, then that's bad... unless it gets two
dozen strikers on-target and stops you losing half-a-dozen aircraft to
SAMs.

Break the image of B-17 "box" out of Linebacker stories. Pod roll-ins
were a tactic in late '67, but totally abandoned in Linebacker. Bomb
droppers flew in flights of four with independent target area tactics
and roll-ins.

Trouble is, all the guns you like won't stop #4 of one of the escort
sections getting an unseen Atoll up the tailpipe and won't help you
chase that MiG-21 down and kill him.

Think integrated force (albeit first modern generation). Escort
sections are supposed to be counter-air. We didn't have AWACS, but we
got situation update from a lot of outside-the-flight sources.


One other note: of the 21 MiG kills by the F-4E during Vietnam, five
were gun kills... pretty good for something so useless.

This aircraft has Sparrow and Sidewinder, and by the time the F-4E is
flying they're demonstrating performance (the Sidewinder was up to 50%
Pk in its AIM-9G form). Yet it's making a quarter of its kills with
guns? Where did that battery of AAMs go in those engagements?

In Linebacker the USAF was carrying AIM-9E and J. Never encountered a
"G". The F-4E only carried heaters when specifically tasked A/A. (We
did not yet have the shoulder mount for AIM-9 on inboard pylons.)
Given an A/A load in an E, the first weapon employed for most of us
would be AIM-9.

"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

Okay, so let's get to the bottom line: how many F-4 sorties were *not*
intended to kill the enemy and break his stuff or directly support that
aim?

Very few, which is why they needed weapons of different types. Like
missiles and guns.

Trouble is, all the guns you like won't stop #4 of one of the escort
sections getting an unseen Atoll up the tailpipe

And all the missiles won't help much in this case, either.

and won't help you chase that MiG-21 down and kill him.

Actually, that's *exactly* what it would do, if you're out of missiles.

For example, the Navy planes flew sorties against coastal areas, which
meant that they were flying over relatively undefended airspace on the
run in, as compared to the large number of SAMs that the Air Force
fighters and bombers went over.

So produce some numbers. Relative SAM losses per sortie, for instance?
I'm open to data, I just get wary about assertion and anecdote.

If you want to find that out, find it yourself. *You're* the one who
wants that data. Let us know how it goes. Until you do, that other
comparison is still pretty useless.

One other note: of the 21 MiG kills by the F-4E during Vietnam, five
were gun kills... pretty good for something so useless.

This aircraft has Sparrow and Sidewinder, and by the time the F-4E is
flying they're demonstrating performance (the Sidewinder was up to 50%
Pk in its AIM-9G form). Yet it's making a quarter of its kills with
guns? Where did that battery of AAMs go in those engagements?

They got used up. You see, there's no magic formula that makes a
missile magically 100% reliable or accurate. And if the other guy
discovers a weakness in your missile systems, you're screwed.

Even carrying four and four (on the Phantom), that gives you only four
long range shots and four short range shots. In Vietnam, it was a
fairly sharp distinction, since the Sparrow kinda sucked at short range.

Once those are gone, you're done. No more shots, go home or fly around
and hope nobody shows up.

And what do you do if something goes wrong with your radar, or if you're
in the middle of a dogfight with a bunch of your guys and a bunch of
other guys (we still lose fighters to fratricide from radar and IR
missiles, you know)?

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

This aircraft has Sparrow and Sidewinder, and by the time the F-4E is
flying they're demonstrating performance (the Sidewinder was up to 50%
Pk in its AIM-9G form). Yet it's making a quarter of its kills with
guns? Where did that battery of AAMs go in those engagements?

They got used up. You see, there's no magic formula that makes a
missile magically 100% reliable or accurate. And if the other guy
discovers a weakness in your missile systems, you're screwed.

Especially when over 50 sparrows in a row once did not achieve a hit during
Vietnam..

Granted probably some of those shots were not in the right parameters....but
still...


Ron
Pilot/Wildland Firefighter

In message , Chad Irby
writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote:
Trouble is, all the guns you like won't stop #4 of one of the escort
sections getting an unseen Atoll up the tailpipe

And all the missiles won't help much in this case, either.

Why not? An aircraft diving away in afterburner is an excellent missile
target.

Now, AIM-9B lacked the range and clutter rejection for that scenario,
but it was a 1950s design; and the AIM-7D likewise wasn't useful but was
also a 1950s design.

Try that same attack against modern aircraft, and you'll still avoid the
guns shot: but you'll get a late-model Sidewinder for your pains, or an
AIM-120 as you extend.

On the other hand, the M61 cannon isn't effective in either scenario.

and won't help you chase that MiG-21 down and kill him.

Actually, that's *exactly* what it would do, if you're out of missiles.

There seems to be this romantical view that fighter pilots, out of
ordnance and committed to their mission, will drop everything for a
fangs-out pursuit of a fleeing foe.

Do you have the fuel for the prolonged tailchase required to get into
guns range, manoeuvre for the kill, then get home? Remember, the enemy
aircraft is ahead of you, out of range, with a substantial speed
advantage.

Where is he leading you, as you try to accelerate and overtake? Are you
being lured into a SAMtrap, or is his another MiG lining up for a shot
as you fixate on that target? You'll cover a lot of ground before you
get him into 20mm range, and he's most unlikely to be leading you
towards _your_ friends.

Didn't you have somewhere else you needed to be, such as dropping chaff
or dropping bombs?

What happens when some of his friends join the party, you being down to
guns only?

So produce some numbers. Relative SAM losses per sortie, for instance?
I'm open to data, I just get wary about assertion and anecdote.

If you want to find that out, find it yourself. *You're* the one who
wants that data. Let us know how it goes. Until you do, that other
comparison is still pretty useless.

In other words, "don't confuse me with facts, my mind is made up".

This aircraft has Sparrow and Sidewinder, and by the time the F-4E is
flying they're demonstrating performance (the Sidewinder was up to 50%
Pk in its AIM-9G form). Yet it's making a quarter of its kills with
guns? Where did that battery of AAMs go in those engagements?

They got used up. You see, there's no magic formula that makes a
missile magically 100% reliable or accurate. And if the other guy
discovers a weakness in your missile systems, you're screwed.

Especially when your tactic dictates firing "all available weapons" in a
salvo of whatever you had selected.

Even carrying four and four (on the Phantom), that gives you only four
long range shots and four short range shots. In Vietnam, it was a
fairly sharp distinction, since the Sparrow kinda sucked at short range.

Once those are gone, you're done. No more shots, go home or fly around
and hope nobody shows up.

Given that Sidewinder was achieving nearly 50% kills-per-shot by war's
end (AIM-9G, fifty fired for 23 kills) and the actual number of firing
opportunities, that's less of a problem than you'd think: the number of
times an enemy aircraft dances temptingly in front of one's own is much
less than most flight-sim games would have you believe.

And what do you do if something goes wrong with your radar,

Then your gun is in a lot of trouble, since it depends heavily on the
radar to generate its fire-control solution.

or if you're
in the middle of a dogfight with a bunch of your guys and a bunch of
other guys (we still lose fighters to fratricide from radar and IR
missiles, you know)?

When was the last air-to-air combat fratricide (by which I mean a shot
taken at an enemy aircraft diverted and destroyed a friendly)?

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

In article ,
"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

In message , Chad Irby
writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote:
Trouble is, all the guns you like won't stop #4 of one of the escort
sections getting an unseen Atoll up the tailpipe

And all the missiles won't help much in this case, either.

Why not? An aircraft diving away in afterburner is an excellent missile
target.

Not that the "unseen Atoll up the tailpipe" is the *other* guy, and
won't help you defensively. You followed up your comment with:

Try that same attack against modern aircraft, and you'll still avoid the
guns shot: but you'll get a late-model Sidewinder for your pains, or an
AIM-120 as you extend.

Not if it's an "unseen Atoll up the tailpipe." Tis scneario means
"you're dead." What you just described is a "*seen* Atoll up the
tailpipe."

There seems to be this romantical view that fighter pilots, out of
ordnance and committed to their mission, will drop everything for a
fangs-out pursuit of a fleeing foe.

No, they're soldiers, and they'll use what they have available, like
they have for the last century.

Do you have the fuel for the prolonged tailchase required to get into
guns range, manoeuvre for the kill, then get home? Remember, the enemy
aircraft is ahead of you, out of range, with a substantial speed
advantage.

Really? How do you know? Maybe they ran out of missiles, have *no*
speed advantage at the monent, and are in a decent spot to get nailed.

It's funny how you took a fairly standard scenario, and suddenly started
changing it...

What happens when some of his friends join the party, you being down to
guns only?

Then you run. You see, in *my* scenario, pilots can think, and in
yours, they're overamped morons who are only in it for the blood.

So produce some numbers. Relative SAM losses per sortie, for instance?
I'm open to data, I just get wary about assertion and anecdote.

If you want to find that out, find it yourself. *You're* the one who
wants that data. Let us know how it goes. Until you do, that other
comparison is still pretty useless.

In other words, "don't confuse me with facts, my mind is made up".

Funny, that's what I just said about *you*. *You* are the guy who's
going against the last half-century of experience in jet fighter combat.
You're the one who has to prove sommething, and you're not doing it very
well so far.

When was the last air-to-air combat fratricide (by which I mean a shot
taken at an enemy aircraft diverted and destroyed a friendly)?

When's the last time we had a major air combat situation? All we've had
were "shoot down the one or two idiots dumb enough to get into the air"
since about 1991... although I read something recently about a Japanese
fighter lost to a Sidewinder in an exercise a year or so back.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 22:36:54 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:

In message , Chad Irby
writes
In article ,
"Paul J. Adam" wrote:
...and you're quoting the same sort of logic they used back then.
You're comparing planes and equipment, but not *missions*.

Okay, so let's get to the bottom line: how many F-4 sorties were *not*
intended to kill the enemy and break his stuff or directly support that
aim?

(Or to photograph it before and after being broken, or to keep fighters
off the breakers, or to stop his SAMs and AAA interfering, or...)

Or to strafe or nape his troops in contact. When all you have is a
Phantom, every problem has a Phantom solution.

Part of the problem with F-4 sorties is that F-4s were RFBA-4s. In
"One Day In A Long War" this was really obvious. The USN launched
F-4s to protect the A-7s, while the USAF launched fighter F-4s to
protect the bomber F-4s, and the USAF RF-4s and USN RA-5As took happy
snaps.

Because of this, you can't lump all F-4 sorties together. Ethel and
Price don't, for example. They differentiate by role, which is how it
has to be done. Bomber and attack and recce F-4s aren't fighter F-4s,
any more than A-7s are. The F/A-18, that could fight its way to the
target, wasn't invented yet.

If your chosen tactic hauls sixty aircraft in rigid formation along a
predictable course and is vulnerable to a slashing attack by one or two
MiGs on a vulnerable element, then that's bad... unless it gets two
dozen strikers on-target and stops you losing half-a-dozen aircraft to
SAMs.

Shades of Bomber Command? Remember that the Vietnam War was only a
little more than twenty years after WW II and there were pilots flying
in SEA who had flown in WW II. When you talk about strategy and
tactics, you have to keep that in mind.

Trouble is, all the guns you like won't stop #4 of one of the escort
sections getting an unseen Atoll up the tailpipe and won't help you
chase that MiG-21 down and kill him.

Guns on fighters didn't stop the Luftwaffe from picking off B-17s,
either. Or the escorts. So what's new?

For example, the Navy planes flew sorties against coastal areas, which
meant that they were flying over relatively undefended airspace on the
run in, as compared to the large number of SAMs that the Air Force
fighters and bombers went over.

So produce some numbers. Relative SAM losses per sortie, for instance?
I'm open to data, I just get wary about assertion and anecdote.

The data is there, but it's so often lumped into aggregate numbers
that it's hard to tease the real answers out. You have to ask how
many AAM kills per aircraft that sortied with AAMs or how many SAM
kills per SEAD aircraft or how many enemy infantry deaths per aircraft
with guns and nape and willy pete or how much materiel destroyed per
bomb truck. If you don't, you get very deceptive numbers.

One other note: of the 21 MiG kills by the F-4E during Vietnam, five
were gun kills... pretty good for something so useless.

This aircraft has Sparrow and Sidewinder, and by the time the F-4E is
flying they're demonstrating performance (the Sidewinder was up to 50%
Pk in its AIM-9G form). Yet it's making a quarter of its kills with
guns? Where did that battery of AAMs go in those engagements?

They were back at base. Bomber and attack and SEAD F-4Es only have
guns to defend themselves. They left the AAM at home to carry bombs.
Fewer than half the USAF F-4 were fighters with AAM. Since the
non-fighter F-4s would have been carrying their ordnance during the
inbound half of the flight and only been able to get into the fur ball
outgoing, I'd say guns were under-represented in kills. This probably
proves that the escort F-4s had more chances at MiGs than the
home-going non-fighters.

Betcha didn't think of that, did you? I didn't think of it until
about the third time I read One Day and actually studied the tables.
It's like adding in B-17 guns kills to the escort kills to pronounce
on the effectiveness of the escort fighters guns, I suppose.

Mary

--
Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 08:15:44 -0800, Mary Shafer
wrote:

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 22:36:54 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:

In message , Chad Irby
writes

Mary adds some info and makes some big errors:

Okay, so let's get to the bottom line: how many F-4 sorties were *not*
intended to kill the enemy and break his stuff or directly support that
aim?

(Or to photograph it before and after being broken, or to keep fighters
off the breakers, or to stop his SAMs and AAA interfering, or...)

Or to strafe or nape his troops in contact. When all you have is a
Phantom, every problem has a Phantom solution.

But USAF and USN didn't only have Phantoms. Regardless of whether you
are talking about Rolling Thunder or Linebacker, both services fielded
an array of aircraft including F-105, F-100, F-5, F-8, A-4, A-7, A-6,
A-37, A-1, B-57, etc. etc. etc.


Because of this, you can't lump all F-4 sorties together. Ethel and
Price don't, for example. They differentiate by role, which is how it
has to be done. Bomber and attack and recce F-4s aren't fighter F-4s,
any more than A-7s are. The F/A-18, that could fight its way to the
target, wasn't invented yet.

Sorry, but the F-105 could fight its way to the target and so could
the F-4. The F/A-18 isn't going to engage any current generation
fighter enroute to the target successfully with retained iron. In
fact, the current generation of interdiction aircraft doesn't even go
to the target. That's the big advantage of stand-off PGMs.

If your chosen tactic hauls sixty aircraft in rigid formation along a
predictable course and is vulnerable to a slashing attack by one or two
MiGs on a vulnerable element, then that's bad... unless it gets two
dozen strikers on-target and stops you losing half-a-dozen aircraft to
SAMs.

Shades of Bomber Command? Remember that the Vietnam War was only a
little more than twenty years after WW II and there were pilots flying
in SEA who had flown in WW II. When you talk about strategy and
tactics, you have to keep that in mind.

There weren't many, although there were a few. Robin Olds being a
primary example. But you certainly wouldn't hang the charge of
stereotyped or obsolete tactical thinking on Robin. There were a few
more Korean era vets, but in large numbers the Vietnam War, even
during Rolling Thunder was folks on their first combat.

The weapons and tactics were developing and being fielded as quickly
as possible. In '65, at Nellis, the instructor cadre in F-105s got
trained in pop-up ground attack tactics while we were in the course
and trained us the following week. The syllabus changed almost daily
to incorporate new formation, new concepts, new weapons, etc.

One other note: of the 21 MiG kills by the F-4E during Vietnam, five
were gun kills... pretty good for something so useless.

This aircraft has Sparrow and Sidewinder, and by the time the F-4E is
flying they're demonstrating performance (the Sidewinder was up to 50%
Pk in its AIM-9G form). Yet it's making a quarter of its kills with
guns? Where did that battery of AAMs go in those engagements?

They were back at base. Bomber and attack and SEAD F-4Es only have
guns to defend themselves.

Absolutely incorrect! All, repeat ALL F-4s always carried Sparrows. We
didn't always have room for AIM-9s, but I never saw a combat sortie
flown by an F-4 when I was there without Sparrows.

They left the AAM at home to carry bombs.

Sparrow wells don't hold bombs.

Fewer than half the USAF F-4 were fighters with AAM. Since the
non-fighter F-4s would have been carrying their ordnance during the
inbound half of the flight and only been able to get into the fur ball
outgoing, I'd say guns were under-represented in kills. This probably
proves that the escort F-4s had more chances at MiGs than the
home-going non-fighters.

The reason that A/A loaded F-4s got more kills is more subtle. It has
to do with the politics of "ace-building" between the USN and USAF and
the mis-guided over-classification of TEABALL. See Michel's Clashes or
Thompson's "To Hanoi and Back".

Escorts didn't even get many shots as they were often used to provide
blocking or herding of MiGs to direct them to a kill zone where the
555th was being vectored on a discrete frequency to do the shooting.

The reason that A/A loaded F-4s got more kills is more subtle. It has
to do with the politics of "ace-building" between the USN and USAF and
the mis-guided over-classification of TEABALL. See Michel's Clashes or
Thompson's "To Hanoi and Back".
Escorts didn't even get many shots as they were often used to provide
blocking or herding of MiGs to direct them to a kill zone where the
555th was being vectored on a discrete frequency to do the shooting.

Hi Ed. Interesting comments. Was it just the Wolfpack who practiced
herding Migs? (ironic, given their name!). "Wolfpack" (by Jerry Scutts)
lists the 433rd as getting just about as many kills as the Triple Nickel.
Were they part of the elite ace-building group too? The Wolfpack group
doesn't go into much detail about any herding tactics (IIRC), so I'd love to
hear more about them. And with the performance of a few key squadrons in GW
I (e.g., 58th), it seems that such tactics might again be the case. Are
there tactical advantages that justify committing aircraft to "herding"
duty, or is it primarily PR-related in trying to make an ace? Thanks,

Tony