AC-130 Replacement Contemplated

"John" wrote in message
...


John Keeney wrote:


is it just me, or does the ATT bear a strong resemblance to the
German Me 323 Gigant ?

I'ld have to come down on the "just you" side.

Oh Well, thats why I asked.

and JK isn't it nice to hear the C-130's again ? some but not all
of the local KYANG is back from deployment, and they are flying
over the homestead often, love to hear that hummmmmm. of the
turboprops when they fly in trail...

Yea, you see them flying three a-line every now and then again.
Saw a couple of them down to Knox shooting approaches there
a couple of weeks back.

Oh, send me your email address, there something you might
be interested in that can't go out over group.

wrote in news:2239-4025F6B3-65@storefull-
3171.bay.webtv.net:

Hmm, maybe it's just you. To me it bears a strong resemblence to a
C-130.

I'll add my two cents: looks like a prolapsed C-17.


Regards...

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
The fact that the USAF,USN, USA, etc., are not going to place those assets
in a situation of undue risk is patently obvious. The fact that your Russian
"super AAM" is nothing more than a concept at present does not change that.

Gee, I thought that the ISR assets were expected to assist in the
conduct of a war. Recent experiences aside, wars are slam full of
"undue risk".
Thats whole issue here, while SOF aircraft are thought of, and built
as, warplanes, the Boeings, Embraers, and Gulfstreams contemplated for
these roles have no such engineering.
Fact is they are very vulnerable platforms that are being considered
for vital missions and that potential adversaries are building weapons
to field against.
Yet these aircraft will be expected to take part in warfare. As few
platforms that the ISR force has or will have, and as important as
they are to the conduct of contemporary and contemplated US military
ops, a capable opponent will find them juicy targets and he can buy
the equipment to do something about it.
A commander may well be forced to put these aircraft into areas of
"undue risk" to get the job done (as was done with the OP-2Es), or
risk not getting the job done at all.

That some AF units seem to be exempt from the possibility of taking
enemy fire has been a long term inherent cultural issue apparently.
I'm not the only one to say it either:
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...jun/cahoon.htm
C-17 drivers just recently went through combat certification for the
first time. The question begs, why weren't they treated as warfighters
all along?

Sure, its not a real problem today, it won't be next year either, but
then again the ACS and E-10 won't be fielded until how many years down
the road? By the time they are operational, and S-400 s-300 equipped
opponent could well render them impotent.
This is not being planned for. Apparently you missed this part of this
"piece"?:
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/SIGINTWP.pdf
"ADA Susceptibility: GR/CS and ARL susceptibility to SA 10 and SA 12
threats was
the cornerstone of the argument to eliminate them from the system.
While it is true that they are susceptible to the threats, they are no
less so than many of the retained systems. Rivet Joint,EP3, ES3, all
retained by the study, fly at altitudes similar to Army systems. Their
survivability will require stand-off as well. GR/CS normally flies in
the same vicinity as JSTARS and AWACS, two targets an enemy would
likely pursue with more vigor than an RC12. Discussions
made it clear that the entire air campaign was not considered in the
analysis. In fact, constraints of the ADA threat were not uniformly
applied. Had it been so, many other platforms would have to become
HAPs as well (JSTARS, AWACS)."
As an FYI those SAM systems have advertised standoff ranges greater
than that of JSTARS and ACS.
I'm not the only one thinking of this either:
http://www.aiaa.org/aerospace/Articl...hiveIssueID=22

"For example, the standoff range for defending against SAMs
[surface-to-air missiles] is changing, and you will have to go to
space. Then you may want to move JSTARS [Joint Surveillance and Target
Attack Radar System] and AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System]
capabilities into space. So past elements that have given situational
awareness in the theater may involve trade-ups."

"In a risky bid to extend strike missions by making it easier for
planes to refuel, he ordered tanker aircraft -- which are relatively
vulnerable, because they lack their own warning radar and armaments --
to venture into Iraqi airspace, even though Iraq's dense air defense
network had not been eliminated."
Credible, yes. But what does he mean by "eliminated"? We know that they
continued to pop off MANPADS even as the troops and marines entered into the
city--but again, those MANPADS were no threat to the tankers.

So why were they concerned. Obviously the longer range threat had not
been rendered below the "undue threat" threshold.

What vulnerabilities? The supposed vulnerability to a missile that has yet
been built, guided by a system not yet developed, while engaging in
overflights through an IADS that just won't happen? Not much of a
"vulnerability" you have illustrated there.


You are wrong about this. Besides, you mean susceptability here??? My
beef is vulnerability issues, there is a difference.
But to the point, the S-300 and S-400 are entirely capapble of
countering our ISR assets. Thats a fact.:
http://www.house.gov/pitts/initiativ...ew-brief-9.htm
(the google cached version works)
"The Russians sold the SA-10 (Russian designation S-300, NATO:Grumble)
to China, and recently agreed to sell them to Iran. The Russians are
aggressively marketing these systems and China may also build versions
for export, just as they did with the single digit SAMs. Several more
countries may acquire and field these systems within the next 10
years. The major factor preventing proliferation is the high price
tag of these systems. However, the Russians are also developing and
selling improvement kits to the single digit SAMs to provide near
double-digit SAMs performance at a fraction of the cost.'
'In short, the battlefield 10 years from now may be a far more
dangerous place than today, and it will take a toll on our pilots if
we do not act to mitigate the increased threat."

As an FYI the Navy is moving the P-3s away from the
overland tactical support role.
What?

Yes. P-3s(Not talking about EP-3s) and MMA will not be used in the
overland role due to vulenrability issues.
Did you miss this as well?
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/111803ISR.pdf
"However, Navy leadership removing P-3 from overland missions in
hostile airspace due to survivability concerns."

Gee, the VP-26 vet who wrote up the description I read must have had all of
his facts wrong. He indicated that the engine was lost, and the fire was in
that vicinity--whether or not it also involved the fuel tankage is a moot
point.

Here's what it says. Note the "unclear" part:
"Several rounds ripped into the outer portion of their starboard wing,
knocking out #4 engine and starting a fire. They pulled the emergency
handle and succeeded in feathering the prop, but could not extinguish
the flames. It was unclear whether the fire originated from the engine
nacelle or from within the wing itself."
I will standby this statement.
The wing burned through as they were about to land.
Hydrodynamic ram killed that airplane and its crew.

FYI, *any* airplane with an uncontrolled fire in its engine/wing is
susceptable to subsequent structural failure. And you ignored the fact that
aircraft designed exclusively for military use have also been lost to .50
cal and below hits--so where is this much greater vulnerability of the P-3
in view of that fact?

Any civil transport, such as this one was (before being modified), is
terribly vulnerable:
http://www.concordesst.com/accident/...es/flames1.jpg
But much can be done to mitigate the effects. And is being done on
"War"planes:
http://jas.jcs.mil/news/pdf/2003_fall.pdf
"When it comes to providing aircraft fuel system ballis-tic tolerance
capability, it is necessary to understand that protecting from a
catastrophic explosion in a fuel tank ullage cannot be accomplished
solely with self-sealing fuel cells. To provide the desired level of
ballistic tolerance requires a hand-in-hand compli-mentary approach
which incorpo-rates both self-sealing fuel cells and OBIGGS.
Ultimately, it is necessary to incorporate the appropriate fuel system
requirements verbiage requir-ing a self-sealing capability and that
damage from certain high explosive incendiary and/or armor piercing
incendiary rounds must not cause catastrophic explosion. This will
drive a solution, which provides the proper level of survivability
protec-tion for both permanently mounted and auxiliary internal fuel
cells."

I also note that in the first few sentences the authors identify the
difference between "susceptability" and "vulnerability"--the latter does not
come into play if the former is controlled such that hits don't occur--which
will be the predominant environment that the ACS and E-10 will operate in.

Glad you found out the difference between the two. I think you fit
firmly in the camp described below. Its a very wrong and hubris filled
view, but I'll let some much more credible sources speak make the
case:
http://jas.jcs.mil/news/pdf/2003_fall.pdf

If you took a poll of operators in the fleet and asked them what they
wanted most on their aircraft, they would say—
1)advanced sensors,
2)range and speed,
3)long range and very accurate weapons,
4)low observable technology, and
50)vulnerability reduction.
Yes that was number 50, not number 5. There are two reasons for this.
First, vulnerability reduction technology is not very sexy. A cool new
radar that can identify a target at 500 miles is always preferable to
a fuel tank liner. And second, most operators just assume that basic
vulnerability reduction features such as fire protection and
redundancy are a given in aircraft design. If you asked an operator if
he would prefer target ID at only 400 miles while guaranteeing he
would not burn up in flight because of a fuel leak, you might get a
different answer.

http://jas.jcs.mil/news/pdf/2001_summer.pdf

"Vietnam and the experience of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war clearly
rattled the confidence of those who felt that high-performance
military aircraft were relatively invulnerable to enemy defenses
simply on the basis of high
transonic or supersonic dash speed, or because of perceived pilot
excellence. Both of these translated into technological and cultural
hubris and numerous aircrew paid the price for such delusions."
....But that fact hints at the survivability battles yet to come. The
history of military aviation has witnessed a seesaw battle between the
offensive
power of the airplane and the defensive snap of its victims.
In an era—
• When the size of deployed coalition air power
forces is likely to shrink,
• When future aircraft production runs may be measured
in dozens rather than several hundred or several
thousand,
• When potential opponents will have little difficulty
in acquiring advanced Flanker-equivalent threat aircraft
and the weapons systems for those aircraft to
hold air and surface targets hostage,
• When the SA-10 equivalent weapon will undoubtedly
become the common currency of air defense in
much the same fashion that the SA-2 was in the
'60's and the SA-6 in the '70's and onwards, and
The challenge for those having responsibility to
ensure the survivability of our joint service aerospace
forces is, if anything, even more demanding than it has
been in the past.

"sid" wrote in message
om...
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
The fact that the USAF,USN, USA, etc., are not going to place those
assets
in a situation of undue risk is patently obvious. The fact that your
Russian
"super AAM" is nothing more than a concept at present does not change
that.

Gee, I thought that the ISR assets were expected to assist in the
conduct of a war.

On our terms.

Recent experiences aside, wars are slam full of
"undue risk".

Undue risk is what you avoid. Which is why they won't be sending ACS and the
E-10 into IADS environments.

Thats whole issue here, while SOF aircraft are thought of, and built
as, warplanes, the Boeings, Embraers, and Gulfstreams contemplated for
these roles have no such engineering.

Please point to the "special engineering" that sets an AFSOC CN 235/295
apart from one of those Gulfstreams.

Fact is they are very vulnerable platforms that are being considered
for vital missions and that potential adversaries are building weapons
to field against.

Big jump from that Russian firm "slowly" pursuing a very long range AAM
program to "are building".


Yet these aircraft will be expected to take part in warfare. As few
platforms that the ISR force has or will have, and as important as
they are to the conduct of contemporary and contemplated US military
ops, a capable opponent will find them juicy targets and he can buy
the equipment to do something about it.

Look, we are NOT sending them into contested airspace, OK? Period. Now, tell
me which foe these systems will be used against that we will not acheive air
superiority/dominance over in very short order?

A commander may well be forced to put these aircraft into areas of
"undue risk" to get the job done (as was done with the OP-2Es), or
risk not getting the job done at all.

There is that strange "OP-2E's" you keep ranting about... And again, we are
not going to send these assets in against "undue risk".


That some AF units seem to be exempt from the possibility of taking
enemy fire has been a long term inherent cultural issue apparently.
I'm not the only one to say it either:

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...jun/cahoon.htm
C-17 drivers just recently went through combat certification for the
first time. The question begs, why weren't they treated as warfighters
all along?

Meaningless. ACS and E-10 are not airlifters. Airlifters may indeed have to
drop down into a MANPADS/AAA threat environment to perform their
mission--ACS and the E-10 do not.


Sure, its not a real problem today, it won't be next year either, but
then again the ACS and E-10 won't be fielded until how many years down
the road? By the time they are operational, and S-400 s-300 equipped
opponent could well render them impotent.

Quick! Call the Pentagon and tell them you have discovered the flaw in the
plans that so many professionals have been developing for decades now!

This is not being planned for. Apparently you missed this part of this
"piece"?:
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/SIGINTWP.pdf
"ADA Susceptibility: GR/CS and ARL susceptibility to SA 10 and SA 12
threats was
the cornerstone of the argument to eliminate them from the system.
While it is true that they are susceptible to the threats, they are no
less so than many of the retained systems. Rivet Joint,EP3, ES3, all
retained by the study, fly at altitudes similar to Army systems. Their
survivability will require stand-off as well. GR/CS normally flies in
the same vicinity as JSTARS and AWACS, two targets an enemy would
likely pursue with more vigor than an RC12. Discussions
made it clear that the entire air campaign was not considered in the
analysis. In fact, constraints of the ADA threat were not uniformly
applied. Had it been so, many other platforms would have to become
HAPs as well (JSTARS, AWACS)."
As an FYI those SAM systems have advertised standoff ranges greater
than that of JSTARS and ACS.
I'm not the only one thinking of this either:
http://www.aiaa.org/aerospace/Articl...hiveIssueID=22

"For example, the standoff range for defending against SAMs
[surface-to-air missiles] is changing, and you will have to go to
space. Then you may want to move JSTARS [Joint Surveillance and Target
Attack Radar System] and AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System]
capabilities into space. So past elements that have given situational
awareness in the theater may involve trade-ups."

I don't know where you get these ideas, but the E-8 JSTARS surveillance
range reportedly reaches out to around 250 km--SA-10/12 manage what, maybe
90 km?


"In a risky bid to extend strike missions by making it easier for
planes to refuel, he ordered tanker aircraft -- which are relatively
vulnerable, because they lack their own warning radar and armaments --
to venture into Iraqi airspace, even though Iraq's dense air defense
network had not been eliminated."
Credible, yes. But what does he mean by "eliminated"? We know that they
continued to pop off MANPADS even as the troops and marines entered into
the
city--but again, those MANPADS were no threat to the tankers.

So why were they concerned. Obviously the longer range threat had not
been rendered below the "undue threat" threshold.

That is not what the evidence indicates. In fact, were any longer range
systems used to engage the KC's? Nope--the threat was ameliorated.


What vulnerabilities? The supposed vulnerability to a missile that has
yet
been built, guided by a system not yet developed, while engaging in
overflights through an IADS that just won't happen? Not much of a
"vulnerability" you have illustrated there.


You are wrong about this. Besides, you mean susceptability here??? My
beef is vulnerability issues, there is a difference.

Hint--vulnerability is not an issue if susceptability is controlled.

But to the point, the S-300 and S-400 are entirely capapble of
countering our ISR assets. Thats a fact.:
http://www.house.gov/pitts/initiativ...ew-brief-9.htm
(the google cached version works)
"The Russians sold the SA-10 (Russian designation S-300, NATO:Grumble)
to China, and recently agreed to sell them to Iran. The Russians are
aggressively marketing these systems and China may also build versions
for export, just as they did with the single digit SAMs. Several more
countries may acquire and field these systems within the next 10
years. The major factor preventing proliferation is the high price
tag of these systems. However, the Russians are also developing and
selling improvement kits to the single digit SAMs to provide near
double-digit SAMs performance at a fraction of the cost.'
'In short, the battlefield 10 years from now may be a far more
dangerous place than today, and it will take a toll on our pilots if
we do not act to mitigate the increased threat."

Sorry, not a "fact". Fact--SA-10 has a reported max range around 90 km, and
the E-8 can stand off well beyond that and map the terrain well beyond that
out-of-range S-300.


As an FYI the Navy is moving the P-3s away from the
overland tactical support role.
What?

Yes. P-3s(Not talking about EP-3s) and MMA will not be used in the
overland role due to vulenrability issues.
Did you miss this as well?
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/111803ISR.pdf
"However, Navy leadership removing P-3 from overland missions in
hostile airspace due to survivability concerns."

Note the "in hostile airspace" bit. And BTW, we are not discussing P-3's or
MMA--we are discussing ACS and E-10, along with the K-767, right?


Gee, the VP-26 vet who wrote up the description I read must have had all
of
his facts wrong. He indicated that the engine was lost, and the fire was
in
that vicinity--whether or not it also involved the fuel tankage is a
moot
point.

Here's what it says. Note the "unclear" part:
"Several rounds ripped into the outer portion of their starboard wing,
knocking out #4 engine and starting a fire. They pulled the emergency
handle and succeeded in feathering the prop, but could not extinguish
the flames. It was unclear whether the fire originated from the engine
nacelle or from within the wing itself."
I will standby this statement.

Who cares what you are standing by? The guy who reported the incident did
not even know what the root cause (engine or wing/fuel tank fire) was, but
you do, huh?

The wing burned through as they were about to land.
Hydrodynamic ram killed that airplane and its crew.

FYI, *any* airplane with an uncontrolled fire in its engine/wing is
susceptable to subsequent structural failure. And you ignored the fact
that
aircraft designed exclusively for military use have also been lost to
..50
cal and below hits--so where is this much greater vulnerability of the
P-3
in view of that fact?

Any civil transport, such as this one was (before being modified), is
terribly vulnerable:
http://www.concordesst.com/accident/...es/flames1.jpg
But much can be done to mitigate the effects. And is being done on
"War"planes:
http://jas.jcs.mil/news/pdf/2003_fall.pdf
"When it comes to providing aircraft fuel system ballis-tic tolerance
capability, it is necessary to understand that protecting from a
catastrophic explosion in a fuel tank ullage cannot be accomplished
solely with self-sealing fuel cells. To provide the desired level of
ballistic tolerance requires a hand-in-hand compli-mentary approach
which incorpo-rates both self-sealing fuel cells and OBIGGS.
Ultimately, it is necessary to incorporate the appropriate fuel system
requirements verbiage requir-ing a self-sealing capability and that
damage from certain high explosive incendiary and/or armor piercing
incendiary rounds must not cause catastrophic explosion. This will
drive a solution, which provides the proper level of survivability
protec-tion for both permanently mounted and auxiliary internal fuel
cells."

Control the susceptability. I.e, the "L" in ARL-M...


I also note that in the first few sentences the authors identify the
difference between "susceptability" and "vulnerability"--the latter does
not
come into play if the former is controlled such that hits don't
occur--which
will be the predominant environment that the ACS and E-10 will operate
in.

Glad you found out the difference between the two. I think you fit
firmly in the camp described below. Its a very wrong and hubris filled
view, but I'll let some much more credible sources speak make the
case:
http://jas.jcs.mil/news/pdf/2003_fall.pdf

FYI, I stopped going to your sources shortly after determining that you were
twisting the position of the Lexington Institute in regards to the viability
of using commercial airframes in roles such as ACS and E-10.

snip

How can you be so verbose and still fail to answer the question regarding
what you think that "L" in ARL means?

Brooks

Yeah, after I looked at it on my PC at work, it definitely looks like a
C-17. In fact, I'd bet there's a good reason it does, 'cause it is!

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message ...
FYI, I stopped going to your sources shortly after determining that you were
twisting the position of the Lexington Institute in regards to the viability
of using commercial airframes in roles such as ACS and E-10.

Never, not once, have you cited any references, at least I've offered
up SOMETHING to supoort my case. You say I twisted what Lexington
Institute has to say. You are completely wrong.
In the ISR lessons learned, Dr. Thompson was addressing ISR as it
stood this summer in light of recent experiences. You've ignored the
"lessons unlearned" part quite well.
In the ACS paper, of the two platforms, he very much sided against the
EMB(and I couldn't agree with him more), but he figures cost will be
the driver in the program which means the EMB may well end up the
choice. He never stated an opinion one way or the other about using
civil airframes.
Ditto for the paper on the E-10. As a matter of fact, he is stressing
the importance of fielding the radar and not really even broaching
what airframe(more on theat later) it will be on. Those two papers had
a very narrow focus. You are putting more into them than they offer.
At least I've cited references, most of which are .mil. When are you
going to back up your "facts" with anything other than your derisive
retorts?

Please point to the "special engineering" that sets an AFSOC CN 235/295
apart from one of those Gulfstreams.

As one whose day job involves aviation safety and aircraft
engineering, I can say a whole lot about this....but I won't bore you.
In a nutshell, what the CN-235 has going for it is its very
simplicity. Also its relatively clandestine use-its not emitting, nor
loitering for long periods on station like the ACS and E-10
will-certainly helps in reducing its suceptability as well.
I knew some SOF types when I lived near Hurlburt some years ago, and
they hated that airplane by the way. In their words, "What a piece of
crap". IIRC there is talk of replacing them...but I won't twist
anything for you.
Not much is written about the AX yet, but I'll wager a bet that it
certainly will benefit from survivability analysis and engineering.
Wanna put some cash on it?

Fact is they are very vulnerable platforms that are being considered
for vital missions and that potential adversaries are building weapons
to field against.

Big jump from that Russian firm "slowly" pursuing a very long range AAM
program to "are building".

The Novator AAM is in slow development. The S-300 S-400 are no joke
systems. Its explicitly stated they are intended to be employed
against AWACS. No twisting from me here Kevin. Read it for yourself...
http://www.aeronautics.ru/s400triumph.htm
"While the Triumph[S-400] SAM system is capable of firing older 48N6E
missiles, it will use a brand new missile currently in final stages of
development. This new missile would feature a combination of
semi-active/active homing, an effective range of up to 400km and it
will be capable of hitting new-generation air-to-surface missiles and
AWACS aircraft."

Look, we are NOT sending them into contested airspace, OK? Period.
There is that strange "OP-2E's" you keep ranting about... And again, we are
not going to send these assets in against "undue risk".

Some guys whose remains finally made it home to Arlington recently
were certainly ordered into contested airspace in their ISR
assets...Even in the face of "undue risk". The job had to get done.
Thats what war-real war-is about Kevin.

You seem to be suffering from a fairly bad bout of "Victory Disease"
Kevin, this may help you get over it:
http://www.army.mil/prof_writing/vol...03/9_03_5.html

That some AF units seem to be exempt from the possibility of taking
enemy fire has been a long term inherent cultural issue apparently.
I'm not the only one to say it either:

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...jun/cahoon.htm

You didn't bother to read this I presume...Go ahead. Learn something
new Kevin. Its an old paper, but pertinent to the debate.

C-17 drivers just recently went through combat certification for the
first time. The question begs, why weren't they treated as warfighters
all along?

Meaningless. ACS and E-10 are not airlifters. Airlifters may indeed have to
drop down into a MANPADS/AAA threat environment to perform their
mission--ACS and the E-10 do not.

Whats not meaningless is the fact...yes Fact...the AF was caught off
guard about the need to consider the C-17 a warplane and its operators
warfighters. From AvWeek Jan.5'04:
"The C-130 community has had a weapons instructor course (WIC) for
many years. But no one expected the C-17 force to [come] under fire
very often...."

Judging from what was written in 1983 all the way to what was written
in 2004, the AF has a relatively poor track record at figuring out
which of their assets may be getting shot at down the road.

Quick! Call the Pentagon and tell them you have discovered the flaw in the
plans that so many professionals have been developing for decades now!

From whats written below its a topic of offical debate, but mostly
classified apparently...As it should be. My guess is that the
Budgeteering and Powerpointing Prowess is most important in
acquisitions right now. Suriviablity analysis is not getting the
attention it needs.
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/SIGINTWP.pdf
"ADA Susceptibility: GR/CS and ARL susceptibility to SA 10 and SA 12
threats was
the cornerstone of the argument to eliminate them from the system.
While it is true that they are susceptible to the threats, they are no
less so than many of the retained systems. Rivet Joint,EP3, ES3, all
retained by the study, fly at altitudes similar to Army systems. Their
survivability will require stand-off as well. GR/CS normally flies in
the same vicinity as JSTARS and AWACS, two targets an enemy would
likely pursue with more vigor than an RC12. Discussions
made it clear that the entire air campaign was not considered in the
analysis. In fact, constraints of the ADA threat were not uniformly
applied. Had it been so, many other platforms would have to become
HAPs as well (JSTARS, AWACS)."

I don't know where you get these ideas, but the E-8 JSTARS surveillance
range reportedly reaches out to around 250 km--SA-10/12 manage what, maybe
90 km?

Since I'm sure you didn't open up the link on the S-400 , here is what
it says:
http://www.aeronautics.ru/s300site.htm
KEY CHARACTERISTICS
S-300PMU1 S-300MU2 S-400
Range, km (max) 150 200 400
Altitude, km (max) 25-27 25+ 25+
Altitude, km (min) 10 10 10

So why were they concerned. Obviously the longer range threat had not
been rendered below the "undue threat" threshold.

That is not what the evidence indicates. In fact, were any longer range
systems used to engage the KC's? Nope--the threat was ameliorated.

We know that after the fact. With tankers going "forward". , maybe its
time they need some WICs as well. And why stop there include the ISR
folks as well.

As an FYI the whole point about the E-10 could well be moot:
http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/new...s/02094wna.xml

My beef is that these airframes represent easy kills and the COTS
culture is ignoring the problem. The threat to them while airborne
isn't there today, but some guys who mean us ill will are working hard
on that problem. Easy kills on the tarmac are another issue as well
and certainly possible today. A few bits of shrapnel and its Buh-Bye
shiny new 767-400. An airframe that can be expected to take a measured
amount of battle damage is a necessity for ALL military aircraft. The
problem is, in order to save costs, this analysis is not getting done.
It'll cost lives down the road too, just like past times when
vulnerability issues were ignored.
What the DOD and the manufacturers should do is subject these
airframes to some rigourous survivability analysis. To digress a bit,
the MMA is expected to retain the low level recce and sub attack
mission, so the MMA really needs the benefit of such analysis as well.
Modify FAR PART 125 and MIL-STD-1530A damage tolerance standards to
include the spectre of the MANPADS threat, and spread the total costs
over civil and military production alike.

I'm off the soapbox.

And, oh yes, I DO know what the "L" in ARL means...

sid

"sid" wrote in message
om...
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
...

rant snipped


Look, we are NOT sending them into contested airspace, OK? Period.
There is that strange "OP-2E's" you keep ranting about... And again, we
are
not going to send these assets in against "undue risk".

Some guys whose remains finally made it home to Arlington recently
were certainly ordered into contested airspace in their ISR
assets...Even in the face of "undue risk". The job had to get done.
Thats what war-real war-is about Kevin.

Are you talking about the DASH-7 ARL that punched into a freakin'
mountainside? Geeze, just what kind of damage tolerance are you demanding?

snip


I don't know where you get these ideas, but the E-8 JSTARS surveillance
range reportedly reaches out to around 250 km--SA-10/12 manage what,
maybe
90 km?

Since I'm sure you didn't open up the link on the S-400 , here is what
it says:
http://www.aeronautics.ru/s300site.htm
KEY CHARACTERISTICS
S-300PMU1 S-300MU2 S-400
Range, km (max) 150 200 400
Altitude, km (max) 25-27 25+ 25+
Altitude, km (min) 10 10 10

Uhmmm...isn't S-400 the ABM derivitive? Which explains it longer
range--against targets waaay upstairs in their radar horizon at that range?
As to the others....250 km is greater than either of them. Now, how often
are you going to see those systems up near the FLOT? That's right--pretty
much never. Talk about being an ATACMS magnet...

snip

My beef is that these airframes represent easy kills and the COTS
culture is ignoring the problem. The threat to them while airborne
isn't there today, but some guys who mean us ill will are working hard
on that problem. Easy kills on the tarmac are another issue as well
and certainly possible today. A few bits of shrapnel and its Buh-Bye
shiny new 767-400. An airframe that can be expected to take a measured
amount of battle damage is a necessity for ALL military aircraft.

Oh, gee whiz, what about those C-40's? And those aircraft specified to go
into low threat areas? I guess you would discount the future use of CRAF
assets as well, right? What with all of those nasty super long range
AAM's...oops, that's right, they are just ghostware.

snip


And, oh yes, I DO know what the "L" in ARL means...

I don't think you do, from the angle of your rants. It does NOT mean "low
altitude", nor does it mean "low chance of surviving its mission".

Brooks


sid

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
...


Look, we are NOT sending them into contested airspace, OK? Period.
There is that strange "OP-2E's" you keep ranting about... And again, we
are not going to send these assets in against "undue risk".

Some guys whose remains finally made it home to Arlington recently
were certainly ordered into contested airspace in their ISR
assets...Even in the face of "undue risk". The job had to get done.
Thats what war-real war-is about Kevin.

Are you talking about the DASH-7 ARL that punched into a freakin'
mountainside? Geeze, just what kind of damage tolerance are you demanding?

Hate to disappoint you but...No, I'm not talking about what happened
in Colombia at all. Laos actually. Since you are spouting all these
"facts", I thought you'd know all about it.

Uhmmm...isn't S-400 the ABM derivitive? Which explains it longer
range--against targets waaay upstairs in their radar horizon at that
range?
As to the others....250 km is greater than either of them. Now, how
often
are you going to see those systems up near the FLOT? That's
right--pretty
much never. Talk about being an ATACMS magnet...

On your last point, its a matter of active concern. The radars and
targeting systems for these systems are bit tougher to counter.
Be honest, did you ever think the Serbs were capable of shooting down
that F-117 before it happend Kevin? Paycheck says no.
Of course I don't expect you to open this:
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...pietrucha.html
Everyone seems to understand the S-400's threat against
aircraft...except you.

Oh yeah, have you checked out anything on "Three Attacks Three
Defenses?"

Oh, gee whiz, what about those C-40's? And those aircraft specified to go
into low threat areas? I guess you would discount the future use of CRAF
assets as well, right? What with all of those nasty super long range
AAM's...oops, that's right, they are just ghostware.

C-17s were expected to be in low threat areas...until recently. I
should have phrased my statement (which I'm sure you will misconstrue
as a rant) to say ALL aircraft involved in the active conduct of a
battle...even the ones that traditionally have operated on the
periphery.
For C-40s et all, thats where the changes to Part-25 (typo'd as 125
earlier)and MIL-STD-1530A come in. MANPADS is now a threat to ALL
transport category aircraft.
Speaking of CRAF(which isn't instituted right now BTW)... Even though
it wasn't a flight under DOD auspicies, DHL-and eventually LLoyds of
London-have paid dearly for operating in a hot war zone. By the Grace
of God only that crew and aircraft didn't end up in a smoking hole,
and Thank God too that it was empty and not carrying 300 or so of our
finest. Yes I know it was freight dog, so don't get all ****y about
that little "fact".
Did you see the size of the shrapnel hole where the fragment entered
the bottom of the wing and started that hydrodynamic ram created fire?
Its really small so look carefully.
http://gallery.colofinder.net/dhl-ai...le12042003a010
I wonder what a S-400 warhead would do to a similarly engineered
EMB-145?
Novator's product is a bit more than ghostware, but I don't want to
disturb any of your "facts".

And, oh yes, I DO know what the "L" in ARL means...

I don't think you do, from the angle of your rants. It does NOT mean "low
altitude", nor does it mean "low chance of surviving its mission".

LOL!! I worked for the operator that had the DASH-7s before the Army
got them(I've moved on since).
Regardless, the ACS won't have an "L" attached. Its expected to be"one
of the first to the fight".

"sid" wrote in message
om...
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
...


Look, we are NOT sending them into contested airspace, OK? Period.
There is that strange "OP-2E's" you keep ranting about... And again,
we
are not going to send these assets in against "undue risk".

Some guys whose remains finally made it home to Arlington recently
were certainly ordered into contested airspace in their ISR
assets...Even in the face of "undue risk". The job had to get done.
Thats what war-real war-is about Kevin.

Are you talking about the DASH-7 ARL that punched into a freakin'
mountainside? Geeze, just what kind of damage tolerance are you
demanding?

Hate to disappoint you but...No, I'm not talking about what happened
in Colombia at all. Laos actually. Since you are spouting all these
"facts", I thought you'd know all about it.

We have not lost an ARL in Laos.


Uhmmm...isn't S-400 the ABM derivitive? Which explains it longer
range--against targets waaay upstairs in their radar horizon at that
range?
As to the others....250 km is greater than either of them. Now, how
often
are you going to see those systems up near the FLOT? That's
right--pretty
much never. Talk about being an ATACMS magnet...

On your last point, its a matter of active concern. The radars and
targeting systems for these systems are bit tougher to counter.
Be honest, did you ever think the Serbs were capable of shooting down
that F-117 before it happend Kevin? Paycheck says no.

Hand it over. Anybody with have a brain knows that stealth is not completely
infallible, and that golden BB's do exist. The F-117 is a tough enough
target to acquire and hit--but it is not *impossible*.

Of course I don't expect you to open this:

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...pietrucha.html
Everyone seems to understand the S-400's threat against
aircraft...except you.

Uhmmm...note that scenario has them facing F-15E's, not E-10's or ARL's?
Gee, wonder why... As to the realism of that particular threat...a single
ATACMS battery sitting in that same UAE territory can drill your S-400 site
each time the radar gets flipped on. Joint operations is a wonderful thing,
isn't it?

snip


Oh, gee whiz, what about those C-40's? And those aircraft specified to
go
into low threat areas? I guess you would discount the future use of CRAF
assets as well, right? What with all of those nasty super long range
AAM's...oops, that's right, they are just ghostware.

C-17s were expected to be in low threat areas...until recently. I
should have phrased my statement (which I'm sure you will misconstrue
as a rant) to say ALL aircraft involved in the active conduct of a
battle...even the ones that traditionally have operated on the
periphery.
For C-40s et all, thats where the changes to Part-25 (typo'd as 125
earlier)and MIL-STD-1530A come in. MANPADS is now a threat to ALL
transport category aircraft.

Oh, no! We have to scrap all of our airliners NOW! Build new ones that meet
your lofty criteria for survivability, right?

Speaking of CRAF(which isn't instituted right now BTW)... Even though
it wasn't a flight under DOD auspicies, DHL-and eventually LLoyds of
London-have paid dearly for operating in a hot war zone. By the Grace
of God only that crew and aircraft didn't end up in a smoking hole,
and Thank God too that it was empty and not carrying 300 or so of our
finest. Yes I know it was freight dog, so don't get all ****y about
that little "fact".

No, the "fact" you conveniently ignore is that it WAS a civil aircraft, it
WAS hit by a MANPADS, and...it did not fall apart! It actually *survived*.
Not a good example to support your "commercial airframes can't handle
modern combat requirements" sermon, now is it?

snip

I wonder what a S-400 warhead would do to a similarly engineered
EMB-145?

Probably the same thing it would do if it hit any *military* aircraft--blow
it to hell and back. You are trying to compare the effects of a MANPADS
strike (which we now know is survivable on the part of a commercial
aircraft, thanks again for the example) to that of a big honking warhead
like what is carried on the S-300/400 class weapons?!

Novator's product is a bit more than ghostware, but I don't want to
disturb any of your "facts".

Then tell us where it is--when is the first testflight? What kind of
guidance system will it use? Come on now--give us the specifics on this new
uber-weapon.


And, oh yes, I DO know what the "L" in ARL means...

I don't think you do, from the angle of your rants. It does NOT mean
"low
altitude", nor does it mean "low chance of surviving its mission".

LOL!! I worked for the operator that had the DASH-7s before the Army
got them(I've moved on since).
Regardless, the ACS won't have an "L" attached. Its expected to be"one
of the first to the fight".

I hate to tell you this, but the ARL also serves in that role--or did you
think we deployed them to Korea for grins and giggles? The key is *where* it
conducts its "fight"...yep, somewhere well to the rear of the FLOT, with due
regard to any potential threat systems that *could* cause it problems if it
moved into their envelope.

This has been loads of fun, but in the end it sounds a bit like that
fellow's one-man crusade against those eee-vil oil companies who stole his
kool-aid/gas formula that gives him 100 miles to the gallon, and can't
understand *why* the mainstream tech world just can't seem to grasp the
importance of his discovery... So adios, and have a nice day--we can revisit
this the day we start trying to penetrate the bad guys' IADS with those
ERJ's....

Brooks

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
...
Hate to disappoint you but...No, I'm not talking about what happened
in Colombia at all. Laos actually. Since you are spouting all these
"facts", I thought you'd know all about it.

We have not lost an ARL in Laos.

Yeah. I know that. Apparently you are unaware of the ISR assets we DID
lose in Laos.


Hand it over. Anybody with have a brain knows that stealth is not completely
infallible, and that golden BB's do exist. The F-117 is a tough enough
target to acquire and hit--but it is not *impossible*.

I only have your word for it and so far your words have not been
substantiated or proven particularly reliable.
Do you think we are the only ones pursuing innovative networked
targeting systems? You are showing more signs of that "Voctory
Disease".


Of course I don't expect you to open this:

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...pietrucha.html
Everyone seems to understand the S-400's threat against
aircraft...except you.

Uhmmm...note that scenario has them facing F-15E's, not E-10's or ARL's?
Gee, wonder why... As to the realism of that particular threat...a single
ATACMS battery sitting in that same UAE territory can drill your S-400 site
each time the radar gets flipped on. Joint operations is a wonderful thing,
isn't it?

Excellent!! You did open a link. I urge you to open the others as
well...especially those dealing with surviviability. Whatever you
think of my points here, there is wealth of good stuff there. I'm
heartened that you now know the difference between "vulnerability" and
"susceptability"
Networked systems, that certainly wont be fielded by 2006, is what it
takes to defeat that kind of threat. What is expected to serve as the
nexus for the networked systems? Why our airborne ISR assets of
course. Neutralize them and we have a big problem.
Our potential adversaries are aware of this and have stated they want
to counter those assets in a big way.
Once you get done doing the research on ISR asset losses in Laos, read
up on Three Attacks Three Defenses


For C-40s et all, thats where the changes to Part-25 (typo'd as 125
earlier)and MIL-STD-1530A come in. MANPADS is now a threat to ALL
transport category aircraft.

Oh, no! We have to scrap all of our airliners NOW! Build new ones that meet
your lofty criteria for survivability, right?

Thats silly Kevin. What CAN be done is to harden those civil airframes
destined for military use to a measured level. Then leverage at least
some of those enhancements (whatever analysis shows to be the best)
into new construction aircraft.
On the civil side, all thats being proposed are pork riddled expensive
countermeasure sets. IF you were to read up on survivability, you
would see a balance between susceptability and vulnerability is what
it takes for sucess.
The big problem is the analysis is not getting done for aircraft that
will sorely need the protection one day.


No, the "fact" you conveniently ignore is that it WAS a civil aircraft, it
WAS hit by a MANPADS, and...it did not fall apart! It actually *survived*.
Not a good example to support your "commercial airframes can't handle
modern combat requirements" sermon, now is it?

Didn't ignore it one bit. It was a very small piece of shrapnel that
caused that winfg to burn almost all the way off. Because this
aircraft landed means little. It had no hydraulics (and no manual
reversion), and the left after spar was burned 85 to 90 pct through.
The fact that airplane landed really doesn't say much except that it
was a calm day, the aircraft was empty and light, and the captain had
just recently been reviewing the United DC-10 no hydraulics landing.
If it had been windy, or if the airplane had been heavier, or if the
captain had not thought about how to maneuver with engines only, the
story would have been different. They were really, really lucky.
An aircraft that had been built to take at least some damage which is
what these people are all about making sure happens:
http://jas.jcs.mil/main.htm
would have had a whole lot better chance at making it back alive.


I hate to tell you this, but the ARL also serves in that role--or did you
think we deployed them to Korea for grins and giggles? The key is *where* it
conducts its "fight"...yep, somewhere well to the rear of the FLOT, with due
regard to any potential threat systems that *could* cause it problems if it
moved into their envelope.

Essentially a cold war type deployment prior to the initiation of
hostilities. You are exhibiting more symptoms of the Victory Disease.
http://www.army.mil/prof_writing/vol...03/9_03_5.html
With a projected SAR/MTI range of 120 km (in flat terrain) ACS would
be well within range of S-300 S-400 threats.

On a parting note. Did you see where the E-10 isn't likely to be built
anytime soon anyway?