US Army Cancels Comanche Helo

"Howard Berkowitz" wrote in message
...
In article , "Paul F
Austin" wrote:

"Kevin Brooks" wrote

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message



Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion that
I
or
anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those
blockheads
at
the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
Although
why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.

Can we say "Key West Agreement"?

No ****? It's time to ****can the Key West Agreement. This business of
half-fast CAS for the Army and fast CAS for the Air Force is absurd. It's
past time to look at the mission requirements, decide who does the scope and
provide the right platform. The idea that the Air Force has the franchise on
fixed wing combat aircraft was an artifact of yesteryear. Right now, the Air
Force is doing it's patented "we'll do the CAS mission with very fast movers
that can also be used for other missions" by planning on replacing the
A-10 with the F-35.

In article , "Paul F
Austin" wrote:

"Howard Berkowitz" wrote in message
...
In article , "Paul F
Austin" wrote:

"Kevin Brooks" wrote

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message



Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion
that
I
or
anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those
blockheads
at
the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
Although
why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.

Can we say "Key West Agreement"?

No ****? It's time to ****can the Key West Agreement. This business of
half-fast CAS for the Army and fast CAS for the Air Force is absurd. It's
past time to look at the mission requirements, decide who does the scope
and
provide the right platform. The idea that the Air Force has the franchise
on
fixed wing combat aircraft was an artifact of yesteryear. Right now, the
Air
Force is doing it's patented "we'll do the CAS mission with very fast
movers
that can also be used for other missions" by planning on replacing the
A-10 with the F-35.



Please don't assume I'm defending the thing! But it probably is the
reason for the rotorcraft emphasis.

If we look at roles and missions, there are cases where operational and
routine control could very reasonably differ. For example, long-range
air defense assets like Patriot and SM-2 could go, operationally, to the
service component with the best battlespace management capability. Might
be Air Force, might be Navy.

But logistic and maintenance support for the Patriot vehicles, given
commonality with other platforms, belongs in the Army.

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
. ..

"Howard Berkowitz" wrote in message
...
In article , "Paul F
Austin" wrote:

"Kevin Brooks" wrote

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message



Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion
that
I
or
anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those
blockheads
at
the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
Although
why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.

Can we say "Key West Agreement"?

No ****? It's time to ****can the Key West Agreement. This business of
half-fast CAS for the Army and fast CAS for the Air Force is absurd. It's
past time to look at the mission requirements, decide who does the scope
and
provide the right platform. The idea that the Air Force has the franchise
on
fixed wing combat aircraft was an artifact of yesteryear. Right now, the
Air
Force is doing it's patented "we'll do the CAS mission with very fast
movers
that can also be used for other missions" by planning on replacing the
A-10 with the F-35.

I once thought similarly to you on this issue, but not anymore. The concept
of jointness is much more palapable today than it was even five years ago,
for one thing. Second, the advent of economical and reliable PGM's means
that those fast movers (or for that matter the heavy movers like the Buff),
given decent info from the ground, can acheive darned good effects in the
CAS role. The Army does not need to compete for, or takeover from, the USAF
the CAS mission. What it *can* do is complement the USAF capabilities such
that the ground commander has the widest range of options available to him
to handle any contingencies he may face--which is why including the attack
helo in the mix for the foreseeable future is a wise move. Apparently the
Army agrees with that sentiment--they have no designs on taking over the
A-10 mission (which those nasty USAF types have the *audacity* to announce
now that they are enhancing by upgrading the A-10's which will remain in the
force until the F-35's can replace them, sometime in the next ten to fifteen
years), and have announced that they will indeed incorporate some of the
Commanche sensor and UAV control capabilites into the Block III Longbow
program. face it, paul--those attack helos are gonna be around for a
while..along with the new scout aircraft they are also going to buy.

Brooks

On Wed, 25 Feb 2004 15:36:51 -0500, Howard Berkowitz
wrote:

In article , "Paul F
Austin" wrote:

"Kevin Brooks" wrote

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message



Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion that I
or
anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those blockheads
at
the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
Although
why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.

Can we say "Key West Agreement"?


Which one? The US Army-USAF relationship is actually derived from
multiple agreements, the earliest dating to the '40s. The latest
agreement didn't fully override all of the previous ones.

John Hairell )

In article , John Hairell
wrote:

On Wed, 25 Feb 2004 15:36:51 -0500, Howard Berkowitz
wrote:

In article , "Paul F
Austin" wrote:

"Kevin Brooks" wrote

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message



Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion
that I
or
anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those
blockheads
at
the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
Although
why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.

Can we say "Key West Agreement"?


Which one? The US Army-USAF relationship is actually derived from
multiple agreements, the earliest dating to the '40s. The latest
agreement didn't fully override all of the previous ones.

I want to say 1947, but it would probably have to been a little after
that (or maybe late in the year) since the Air Force was represented as
a full service.

"Thomas Schoene" wrote in message
ink.net...
Kevin Brooks wrote:
"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
. ..

"robert arndt" wrote

Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.

This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2.
Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and
the demonstrated advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche
was last-war's weapon.

Eh? I think you are reading a bit more into it than is reasonable.

I'd put a different read on the same events, but with basically the same
conclusion.

What probably did in Comanche (IMO) was not the fact that the Apaches were
getting hit, but the realization that they were getting hit by weapons
that
didn't care at all about radar signature (i.e. optically pointed guns and
IR
MANPADS). If those non-radar-guided systems are really the major threats
to helos -- as the last couple of years of fighting in various places
certianly suggests they they are -- it makes no sense at all to spend
large
sums on a helicopter whose main claim to fame (and major cost driver) is
radar signature reduction.

I always thought the emphasis on radar stealth was off the mark. But be
careful drawing any hard and fast conclusions in regards to helo
survivability vis a vis the 11th AVN deep attack during OIF. About the best
you can do in that realm is to say that "Deep attack helo missions over open
terrain with good visibility afforded to the bad guys, and without the
benefit of the normal SEAD support from your own arty assets is extremely
risky." Not much beyond that.


If this logic is true, Comanche died not because it's a helicopter, but
because it's *the wrong kind* of helicopter.

I could generally agree with that, with the caveat that part of what was
wrong was a skyrocketing program and unit cost.


we have no UAV as yet, or in the
near term, that can do what an aircraft like the AH-64D can do;

Absolutely true. However, we may soon have UAVs that can do what the
RAH-66
could do, except for actual weapon delivery, which the Apache can handle
just fine. (Why the Comanche was bombed up to rival the Apache, I'll
never
understand.)

You have to understand the changes in the Army aviation missions over the
past few years. Dedicated attack helos were pulled from a number of units
(i.e., a portion of the divisional aviation battalions in airborne/air
assault divisions, cavalry units) some years back in favor of the AH-58D,
which was nothing more than the OH-58D with armament added. I did not like
Commanche, but I *can* see the wisdom of including a strike capability in
your cavalry scout birds--increased versatility for when things don't go as
planned, the ability to engage time sensitive targets of opportunity during
the scout mission, and ensuring that your *cavalry* units can perform their
cavalry roles, to include both guard and (even) covering force battle
operations.

That said, I am quite happy to see the demise of this program, and only wish
it had happened earlier when the resultant savings could have been applied
to other critical needs.

Brooks





--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

Kevin Brooks wrote:

I always thought the emphasis on radar stealth was off the mark. But
be careful drawing any hard and fast conclusions in regards to helo
survivability vis a vis the 11th AVN deep attack during OIF.

I'm not looking only at that attack. There are a bunch of incidents, from
Operation ANACONDA on, that suggest that attack helos are going to get hit
fairly often, and that those hits will come from optical or IR weapons.

I did not like Commanche, but I *can* see the wisdom
of including a strike capability in your cavalry scout
birds--increased versatility for when things don't go as planned, the

Sure, but I question the scale of the armament actually selected. With the
stub wings (which I think were deferred from the most recent production
plan), a Comanche could carry 14 Hellfires, almost 90% of the armament of an
Apache. That's a lot of targets of opportunity. And the requirement for
internal carriage for part of that load added both cost and complexity.

Personally, I think they should have started building a much less complex
scout sometime in the early 1990s, starting with AH-58 capabilities but
built in into a more combat-worthy airframe. It would look strikingly like
an early AH-1 or the Japanese OH-X in general outline. Sensors consist of
Londbow above the mast and Comanche optics above the cockpit but below the
rotor (the second-best spot,a fter the mast it taken by radar). Armament of
perhaps 4 Hellfire (or two rocket pods) and 4 Stinger (for UAV killing as
much as for self-defense) on stub wings plus maybe a GAU-19 .50-caliber
gatling in a chin mount for small arms suppression. Don't worry about radar
LO; concentrate on IR, front-aspect visual, and maybe acoustics.

With luck and planning, the same dynamic system can be adapted for that long
overdue Light Utility Helo requirement (shades of UH-1/AH-1 in reverse?).
--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

Kevin Brooks
I always thought the emphasis on radar stealth was off the mark.

Consider missions like the one at the start of Desert Storm, where
(iirc) Apaches sneaked in low at night and destroyed Iraqi early
warning radars. Obviously, radar stealth seems useful for such
missions.

So, a few stupid(?) questions: Am I wrong about radar
stealth being quite useful in addition to terrain masking?
Is using helos for such missions outdated? Are such deep
missions a marginal issue nowadays, or was it so already
back then? Or is it that the US is focusing its capability
on tackling third rate opponents with minimal own-losses,
rendering the issue of radar-based airdefences largely irrelevant?

without the benefit of the normal SEAD support from your own
arty assets is extremely risky."

More naive questions: Is artillery SEAD really seen as a
requirement for attack helo missions within the envelope
of enemy short-range airdefences? If so, what about operating
out of arty range? Or without having arty on theatre in the
first place (eg much of Afghanistan, esp early on)? And, finally,
if artillery is that effective for SEAD, wouldn't it also be
effective against the targets of the attack helos? Couldn't
smart AT-MP submunitions, or whatever, then do all the job
of the AH's, and more safely?

Moreover, while MLRS can saturate fairly large areas with
submunitions, and will probably ruin the day of any
manpad operator in the target area, one can't possibly
use arty to saturate all the potential locations of
air-defences. At least not with low-level ingress/eggress.
A guy with a manpad can hide easily - in the worst
case he'll be lurking just next to your base, like has
been the case in some Russian helo losses in Chechenya.

And what if the enemy has useful counter battery capability
that limits arty SEAD support? Use AH's to take it out, but...
g

"M" *@*.* wrote in message ...
Kevin Brooks
I always thought the emphasis on radar stealth was off the mark.

Consider missions like the one at the start of Desert Storm, where
(iirc) Apaches sneaked in low at night and destroyed Iraqi early
warning radars. Obviously, radar stealth seems useful for such
missions.

Actually, from what little I understand, that scenario is one where LO tech
would be of the least usefulness. Early warning radars work on the longer
end of the wavelength, and LO is least effective against EW systems; ISTR
reading that stealthy platforms can rather often pop up on such systems. But
the LO is better oriented towards the shorter wavelength acquisition and
tracking systems. If I have that all wrong, sombody else can feel free to
correct that view.


So, a few stupid(?) questions: Am I wrong about radar
stealth being quite useful in addition to terrain masking?
Is using helos for such missions outdated? Are such deep
missions a marginal issue nowadays, or was it so already
back then? Or is it that the US is focusing its capability
on tackling third rate opponents with minimal own-losses,
rendering the issue of radar-based airdefences largely irrelevant?

I don't think LO in the radar spectrum is nearly as important for a helo
that is able to use terrain masking as would be reducing the IR and sound
signatures. As to going deep, the aviators were quite enamored with that
philosophy ever since the Apache arrived on the scene; when we played mixed
force simulations, where our division had both Cobras and Apaches in hand,
we invariably dedicated the Apaches to going deep (where they often took
heavier losses) while we retained the Cobras for over-the-shoulder shooting
and as our last-ditch AT reserve. The experience during OIF with the 11th
AVN BDE deep attack does point out the dangers inherent in trying to use
rotary assets in that role, but beware drawing to great a conclusion, as
that mission may have had some planning problems, and it was executed
knowingly at greater risk without SEAD support.


without the benefit of the normal SEAD support from your own
arty assets is extremely risky."

More naive questions: Is artillery SEAD really seen as a
requirement for attack helo missions within the envelope
of enemy short-range airdefences?

In my expereince at the DIV level, and watching the corps planning cycle
up-close, yes it usually is included in the deep strike plan.

If so, what about operating
out of arty range?

Unlikely--MLRS is now reaching out to a bit over 70 klicks, and when firing
ATACMS it can go as deep as some 300 klicks. During exercises V Corps
usually kept a significant part of the ATACMS supply under its thumb for use
in both SEAD and against OPFOR deep attack (i.e., rocket) systems.

Or without having arty on theatre in the
first place (eg much of Afghanistan, esp early on)?

Which is why we are now fielding HIMARS, the HEMTT truck based "light MLRS",
with a six pack in the rack versus the two six packs available in the
tracked version. You can also do the JAAT routine, where the attack helos
work with fixed wing CAS.

And, finally,
if artillery is that effective for SEAD, wouldn't it also be
effective against the targets of the attack helos?

Nope. You are using the arty deep in the SEAD role against area targets. The
attack helos are going there because they can pick out and kill the specific
systems you are going after. If they are MBT's, then the current crop of
arty systems (other than Copperhead, which needs a designator and rather
good battlefield conditions) can't reliably kill them.

Couldn't
smart AT-MP submunitions, or whatever, then do all the job
of the AH's, and more safely?

How many smart AT packages have we fielded for the arty systems? None, other
than Copperhead, which has a mixed record. We have tested some, and gotten
to the almost-ready-to-field stage, but not actually fielded them. That
*may* change with the new GMLRS (guided MLRS)...there was some talk about
fielding a smart submunition package for it and for ATACMS.


Moreover, while MLRS can saturate fairly large areas with
submunitions, and will probably ruin the day of any
manpad operator in the target area, one can't possibly
use arty to saturate all the potential locations of
air-defences. At least not with low-level ingress/eggress.
A guy with a manpad can hide easily - in the worst
case he'll be lurking just next to your base, like has
been the case in some Russian helo losses in Chechenya.

So you do a good mission analysis using the currently available planning
software. Plot the ingress and egress in and check it against line-of-sight
and AD weapons ranges; a good GIS can then shde in the areas where your path
intersects the LOS from what terrain. You then either adjust your route, or
plan for SEAD fires on that terrain.


And what if the enemy has useful counter battery capability
that limits arty SEAD support? Use AH's to take it out, but...

I don't see us facing any bad guys who can overmatch our counterbattery, and
the ever important firefinder radars, capabilities.

Brooks

g

Kevin Brooks
How many smart AT packages have we fielded for the arty systems? None, other
than Copperhead, which has a mixed record. We have tested some, and gotten
to the almost-ready-to-field stage, but not actually fielded them. That
*may* change with the new GMLRS (guided MLRS)...there was some talk about
fielding a smart submunition package for it and for ATACMS.

But there are non-US systems, like the Swedish Strix, which
is a 120mm mortar fired guided AT round. At least on paper,
it seems very formidable with autonomous guidance, target
search and prioritization, and a decent-sized top-attack
warhead. The Brittish 80mm Merlin was rather similar, although
mm-wave radar rather than IR, but I recall that it was cancelled.

I find it surprizing that the US hasn't adopted any smart
artillery rounds, except the Copperhead, which really isn't
all that smart (non-autonomous). Especially considering the
hype that was there already in the 80's about cargo rockets
with autonomous AT-munitions that would render massed MBT usage
obsolete (again ... Eg plans of Lance carrying dozens of
such munitions.

Perhaps the fact that none was fielded has something to do
with the end of the cold war. Speculatively, if it was seen
that the AH's (etc) that they already had were sufficient to
deal with any armour threat out there? Otoh, it's interesting
that Sweden would come up with such a round. Do they perhaps
see it the other way around, as a substitute for the attack
helos they don't have?

I don't see us facing any bad guys who can overmatch our
counterbattery, and the ever important firefinder radars,
capabilities.

Unlikely yes, but I could think of rapidly deployed
light 'speed-bump' infantry getting into trouble lacking
sufficient arty. Mogadishu perhaps illustrates in a
small scale that even US troops can find themselves on the
ground without sufficient support.