Alien Attack Described By Werner Von Braun's CoWorker

On Oct 13, 9:36 am, "Keith Willshaw" wrote:


The allies had the possibillity to develop technical means but it
seems the dehousing and area bombardment policy meant disinterest.

Which rather ignores the fact that they DID develop the technical
means in the form of Oboe, Gee, H2S, Loran etc while the
Germans kept right on area bombing.

The Germans had the technical means to blind bomb as well,
Sonnenschein a hyperbolic navigation system, Bernhard-Bernhardine
(virtually unjammable),
EGON and the Oboe like EGON-II as well as "Zyklops" a late war beam
riding system. All saw considerable use.

EGON was to be replaced by FuG 226 Neuling since EGON was simply a
beefed up version of the Luftwaffe's standard IFF and by the end of
the war compromised.

H2S was mostly useless untill post war 1.5cm versions incorporating
more advanced signal processing.

Where the allies failed was in the development of an accurate system
that works "over the horrison".

Such a system used Oboe like contollers in orbiting aircraft but was
never pushed: area bombardment was apparently to desirable.

For the Germans over the horison blind attacks would have used a
missile like the A4b with an postion update to an inertial guidance
system a minute before impact when the missile was still not below
line of sight.






The bulk of Bomber commands night time raids were conducted by H2S at
night, irrespective of whether it was the 9cm version or
the 3cm version the system had Circular Error probables of 5 miles.

Worse than the early V2.

Well no , 5 miles was BEFORE the technical aids were developed.


5 miles was what H2X achieved. 9cm H2S was worse.

Read the results of the oxford experiment

The Oxford experiment showed that H2X bombing:


"Forty-two percent of the
bombs had fallen more than
five miles from this point."


http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/rad...ing-26720.html

The Combat Accuracy of H2X Bombing
By the time the Oxford experiment was
completed, the momentum of the war was
such that the Eighth Air Force sent missions
against Germany using Gee-H, Micro-
H, or H2X blind bombing equipment,
as appropriate and necessary, on every day
on which it could fly its airplanes. The last
big report prepared by the bombing accuracy
subsection covered all bombing from
the period September 1 to December 31,
1944; it showed that 58 percent of all
Eighth Air Force bombing for this period
was done with the aid of H2X, and that 35
percent was through 10/10 cloud cover.
Thus, H2X had in fact become the dominant
mode of bombing.

Furthermore, the report showed that,
when the cloud cover was reported as 10/
10, only 0.2 of one percent of the bombs
had fallen within 1,000 feet of the assigned
aiming point, and that 42 percent
had fallen more than five miles from this
point. The 58 percent of the bombs that
fell less than five miles from the aiming
point were distributed uniformly over a
circle of radius five miles [McArthur 1990,
pp. 287-298].

When Lt. Col. Scott and I were invited
to present the findings of this report at a
meeting of the staff officers at the headquarters
of the Second Division, Scott
asked me to do the talking. It was not an
easy assignment to present a report of such
poor accuracy, and Scott was glad to hand
it over to a civilian. Four generals sat in
the front row. I summarized the accuracy
figures in the report; they showed that the
accuracy of visual bombing had shown a
threefold improvement since the beginning
of the war, but that H2X bombing had not
improved during its use by the Eighth Air
Force.

When I had finished, two of the generals
insisted that the Eighth Air Force had
wasted planes, bombs, and men on its
campaign of inaccurate blind bombing, but
the other two supported the policy because
it kept the pressure on the enemy throughout
the period. While they argued, Scott
and I went home. It was not our business
to tell them how to operate the air force


SNIP

The spectactular accuracies selectively quoted from the USSBS are for
ideal conditions.

The V2 on the other hand was technically CLOSE to achieving a
consistant 1km CEP: 5-7 times more accurate than H2S/H2X
in darkness and 100% cloud cover, creating 25-49 times less collateral
damage area.

It actually achieved 12 km

The dispersion in systematic test shots was 4.5km using inertial boost
phase only guidance.

If the Viktoria-Hawaii beam system was used the cross range dispersion
was halved; one could the CEP went from a 4.5km radious circle to a
4.5km long and 2.25km wide ellipse. (though in reality the CEP was
already elliptical)

The effect of the double cross system (fales impact feedback) degraded
this by 12km.

However if the effect of the double cross system was excluded the CEP
was 6km.

The difference between practice and reality likely amounts to
manufacturing variation control in early missiles.

The CEP of H2X in daylight USAAF usage under cloud cover was 5 miles
(8km)

Worse

The standard way of measuring V2 impacts was with an Ar 234 with
sideways motion picture cameras synchronised to the impact or simply
post stricke 'carter analyssis' An radar and optical based system
based on the V2 telemetry system was being worked upon.

Jet flights over Britain were banned, in order to protect the secret
of the Jumo engines (obviously pointless given autonomous British
advances in this area)





The V-2 was intended to cause collateral damage, its aiming point
was the city centre, the German government boasted that it was
intended to cause terror.

So was the earlier 'dehousing' and 'area bombardment' campaign
intended to inflect terror which had been promoted to Churchill by
pathalogical racial hater of Germans, the Jew (Lord Cherwell)
Frederick Lindemann. Analysis of Luftwaffe bombing of British towns
subsequently showed that Lindemann;s 'demoralisation' simply wasn't
there.

The V2 was put in production about 9 months before von Brauns team
could sort out the the guidance issues.

A full system would have used either the SG-66 (productionised as the
SG-70 stablised inertial guidance platform instead of the LEV-3 or a
beam riding system capable of 0.05 degree accurcy for a re-entry
accuracy of
better than 500m.

If more accuracy was needed the winged version of the A4b could be
guided to impact or if it was over the horizon guided to within
minutes of impact.

The V1 was also getting a midcourse 'course corrector' guidance system
that worked by trilateration of a single pulse.