Wide-ranging Safety Discussion...?

Why do high time pilots have accidents?

Some would say this proves the sport itself is dangerous. Some might
say it's arrogance.

I would disagree with both. I think it's a subtle, unconscious
reduction in safety margins as experience is gained. If it were a
conscious decision to cut margins, it could be addressed with
counseling and additional training. If the pilot doesn't realize his
safety margins are thinning, it can be hard to deal with.

The key starting point for all of us is to realize experience itself
is not a safety margin. Safety margins are things like speed,
altitude and options in hand - in other words, they're quantifiable.

An example might be consistent low and slow approaches perhaps because
the pilot wants to stop in front of his trailer. Having been
successful for a season or two, this has become the new normal
approach. As long as he doesn't encounter unexpected severe sink, it
will continue to work - but there's no safety margin, no Plan B, no
self-questioning, "What if this doesn't work?"

If you always fly with generous safety margins, you control your own
destiny. The thinner the safety margins get, the more you gamble.
"It's like playing Russian Roulette" a friend said over lunch, "Note
there are no world class Russian Roulette players."


On Jun 27, 2:18*pm, Bob Whelan wrote:
On 6/26/2012 5:39 PM, Brad wrote:









On Jun 26, 4:05 pm, son_of_flubber wrote:
On Tuesday, June 26, 2012 12:54:09 PM UTC-4, soartech wrote:
So the next issue of Soaring magazine will come off the press without a
single word about this horrible accident... like it never happened!!

The way it works over time is this: 1)you get hooked on the sport, 2)you
become vaguely aware that it's dangerous and that you need to be careful,
3)you come to terms with the fact that it can kill you. *4)A friend or
acquaintance gets killed or maimed.

Think about it. *If the first thing you learned about soaring was that it
can kill you, what would happen? *You'd probably plow your thousands of
dollars into some really nifty RC model gliders. *My copy of Soaring goes
to my local library. *Maybe somebody will pick it up and take up soaring.
Don't list the departed souls.

Soaring Magazine has a lot in it every month about the hazards of
soaring, but it's almost always hypothetical. *A simple tally sheet of
crashes and injuries would drive the point home without anyone getting
sued. *But the SSA chooses to not do that. *Why? It's a glaring omission.
THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES. *When you suggest that there is something
wrong with this picture, you get a knee-jerk reaction. Wierd.

Someone tell me why there is never a tally of accidents in Soaring
Magazine.

When we had 2 of our club members collided in a mid-air the result was
finger pointing at the pilots (non-CFIG) who mentored them. It was
intimated that they were not ready for this kind of activity and that those
of us that actively flew in the mountains were somehow responsible for
encouraging them to do something they were not "ready" for. Ironically some
of those who criticized the most were the ones who never left the vicinity
of the airport, unless they were flying a motorglider.

Another club member spun his motorglider into an unfamiliar field. He was a
low time pilot in a brand new ship with less than 20 hours on
it............he felt the need to try flying a "new" site, took a check
ride in that clubs Blanik (a sailplane he was very familiar with) and did a
great job. After soaring his TST-Atlas for several hours he came back, did
a Blanik approach in a 40:1 ship, realized at mid-field he was to high and
tried to do either a 360 or a 180, we'll never know because he spun it in
and killed himself.

Last year one of our CFIG's died during the filming of the "Cadillac"
commercial. There was a "list" of incidents that took place that made it
out thru the gossip channels that raised some eyebrows. None of that was
shared publicly (as far as I know) and none was shared within the clubs
official channels.

I'm pretty sure that some open, honest and heartfelt discussions about all
these accidents could have really benefited our club. Instead all that was
mentioned was how great these pilots all were, how careful they were and
how they had tons of experience....................which was seen as
somewhat ironic by those of us that personally knew them.

This is the culture we need to change.

Brad

"What Brad said!!!" Certain micro-cultures are "obviously sub-optimum."

I've been a member of the same soaring club for 20+ years, and varyingly
intimately familiar with it for over 36 years. In that time I've watched its
"personality" (culture, if you will) evolve. Historically, my club's
personality change has occurred slowly over time...except when
(safety-related) issues arose which simply could not be ignored. I can recall
at least twice when (poor/ugly) safety-related issues "forced
introspection/change". Actually, all it "forced" was "cheap talk", but a
topical part of the cheap talk quickly became the need (or not) for cultural
change.

In neither case was the club seriously at risk of folding...but in both cases
it was a painful, protracted (in the pain sense) yet brief (in the objective
passage of time sense), process that resulted in years' long "cultural change"
that benefited the club and arguably prevented it from continuing to add
incidents/accidents to national stats. In any event, the club's stats clearly
reflected a before-change/after-change effect, when measured over multi-year
periods.

The second instance's effects still appear to be part of the club's normal
culture more than a decade after the need for change became unignorable....and
(IMHO) that's a good thing!

Perfection? Not a chance. Improvement (stats and culture)? Darn tootin'!
- - - - - -

While making no claims for having a guaranteed recipe for "change success,"
the analytical part of me thinks it saw in both instances some things that may
have been crucial in overcoming varied and obvious obstacles to change, e..g.:
personalities; hurt feelings; inertia; denial; personality-based cliques; etc.

These include: persistence; discussionally remaining (as in relentlessly
returning to being) "on topic"; patience (letting people speak, willingness to
not settle everything in a single meeting or night or session); mutual respect
(agreeing to disagree; calling out/cutting off ad-hominem arguments the
instant they appeared).

But perhaps THE crucial element in both instances was having at least one
"club leader" (officer, board member, etc.) sufficiently motivated to
"oversee"/push the process forward until the consensus was a consensus had
been reached. None of this "fizzling out" nonsense allowed.

I've also some first hand experience with a club which could benefit itself,
the sport of soaring, and probably its safety record if "it effected some sort
of internal cultural change(s?)" but which has been "board resistant" to such
change over decades. Terribly unfortunate. IMO.

Bob W.

At 20:18 27 June 2012, Bob Whelan wrote:
On 6/26/2012 5:39 PM, Brad wrote:
On Jun 26, 4:05 pm, son_of_flubber wrote:
On Tuesday, June 26, 2012 12:54:09 PM UTC-4, soartech wrote:
So the next issue of Soaring magazine will come off the press without

a
single word about this horrible accident... like it never happened!!

The way it works over time is this: 1)you get hooked on the sport,
2)you
become vaguely aware that it's dangerous and that you need to be
careful,
3)you come to terms with the fact that it can kill you. 4)A friend or
acquaintance gets killed or maimed.

Think about it. If the first thing you learned about soaring was that
it
can kill you, what would happen? You'd probably plow your thousands
of
dollars into some really nifty RC model gliders. My copy of Soaring
goes
to my local library. Maybe somebody will pick it up and take up
soaring.
Don't list the departed souls.

Soaring Magazine has a lot in it every month about the hazards of
soaring, but it's almost always hypothetical. A simple tally sheet of
crashes and injuries would drive the point home without anyone getting
sued. But the SSA chooses to not do that. Why? It's a glaring
omission.
THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES. When you suggest that there is
something
wrong with this picture, you get a knee-jerk reaction. Wierd.

Someone tell me why there is never a tally of accidents in Soaring
Magazine.

When we had 2 of our club members collided in a mid-air the result was
finger pointing at the pilots (non-CFIG) who mentored them. It was
intimated that they were not ready for this kind of activity and that
those
of us that actively flew in the mountains were somehow responsible for
encouraging them to do something they were not "ready" for. Ironically
some
of those who criticized the most were the ones who never left the
vicinity
of the airport, unless they were flying a motorglider.

Another club member spun his motorglider into an unfamiliar field. He
was
a
low time pilot in a brand new ship with less than 20 hours on
it............he felt the need to try flying a "new" site, took a check
ride in that clubs Blanik (a sailplane he was very familiar with) and
did
a
great job. After soaring his TST-Atlas for several hours he came back,
did
a Blanik approach in a 40:1 ship, realized at mid-field he was to high
and
tried to do either a 360 or a 180, we'll never know because he spun it
in
and killed himself.

Last year one of our CFIG's died during the filming of the "Cadillac"
commercial. There was a "list" of incidents that took place that made
it
out thru the gossip channels that raised some eyebrows. None of that
was
shared publicly (as far as I know) and none was shared within the clubs
official channels.

I'm pretty sure that some open, honest and heartfelt discussions about
all
these accidents could have really benefited our club. Instead all that
was
mentioned was how great these pilots all were, how careful they were
and
how they had tons of experience....................which was seen as
somewhat ironic by those of us that personally knew them.

This is the culture we need to change.

Brad

"What Brad said!!!" Certain micro-cultures are "obviously sub-optimum."

I've been a member of the same soaring club for 20+ years, and varyingly
intimately familiar with it for over 36 years. In that time I've watched
its
"personality" (culture, if you will) evolve. Historically, my club's
personality change has occurred slowly over time...except when
(safety-related) issues arose which simply could not be ignored. I can
recall
at least twice when (poor/ugly) safety-related issues "forced
introspection/change". Actually, all it "forced" was "cheap talk", but a
topical part of the cheap talk quickly became the need (or not) for
cultural
change.

In neither case was the club seriously at risk of folding...but in both
cases
it was a painful, protracted (in the pain sense) yet brief (in the
objective
passage of time sense), process that resulted in years' long "cultural
change"
that benefited the club and arguably prevented it from continuing to add
incidents/accidents to national stats. In any event, the club's stats
clearly
reflected a before-change/after-change effect, when measured over
multi-year
periods.

The second instance's effects still appear to be part of the club's normal

culture more than a decade after the need for change became
unignorable...and
(IMHO) that's a good thing!

Perfection? Not a chance. Improvement (stats and culture)? Darn tootin'!
- - - - - -

While making no claims for having a guaranteed recipe for "change
success,"

the analytical part of me thinks it saw in both instances some things
that
may
have been crucial in overcoming varied and obvious obstacles to change,
e.g.:
personalities; hurt feelings; inertia; denial; personality-based cliques;
etc.

These include: persistence; discussionally remaining (as in relentlessly
returning to being) "on topic"; patience (letting people speak,
willingness
to
not settle everything in a single meeting or night or session); mutual
respect
(agreeing to disagree; calling out/cutting off ad-hominem arguments the
instant they appeared).

But perhaps THE crucial element in both instances was having at least one

"club leader" (officer, board member, etc.) sufficiently motivated to
"oversee"/push the process forward until the consensus was a consensus
had
been reached. None of this "fizzling out" nonsense allowed.

I've also some first hand experience with a club which could benefit
itself,
the sport of soaring, and probably its safety record if "it effected some
sort
of internal cultural change(s?)" but which has been "board resistant" to
such
change over decades. Terribly unfortunate. IMO.

Bob W.


A lot is down to personal commitment if you see something that is dangerous

,either stop them doing it or if it you just don't fly.To elaborate ,I once

refused to launch a far better qualified instructor than me because he had
a
child on his wife's knee ,it did not make me popular but he wasn't doing
that
on my watch.I have ,and am sure so have many other,refused
launches,because I thought the child was to young,or they had a drink first
or
there was a storm too close lots of reasons but just say NO if you think
it's
not safe.It won't make you popular but that's not what safety is about.
You asked for it and that's my 2 pence worth

Culture change works by means of advocacy. Often times a single
individual can make the difference. It can be an effective way of
dealing with procedural issues and establishing best (or at least
better) practices. Towing, signals, checklists (multiple), oxygen
systems, electrical systems, parachutes, radio procedures, patterns
and suchlike are examples of areas in which best practices and
advocacy of same can be a huge benefit to safe operation. All of
these areas have all been the subject of articles in Soaring Mag,
etc. Plenty of resources. Add will power and advocacy, stir well.

I picked out an issue with my club last year that was so appalling I
can't bear to repeat it here. I mentioned it to a couple of "wheels"
and got zero traction, so I appointed myself the advocate and charged
ahead. People whined: I was asking them to spend money on stuff they
didn't think they needed. Less than $200 a head, I might add. But
mostly they gave in and bought the stuff they needed and those that
did later commented along the lines of "you know, that was smart, it
worked". So this year, I have some help and I expect the advocacy to
become self perpetuating.

I've got my next issue picked out. I'm not going to act on that one
until I am certain that the first is well and truly fixed. Only so
much "political capital" to spend, y'know.

But at best, this is a partial solution. As Kirk points out, we have
a pretty serious safety culture in contest soaring, and it mostly
works at preventing what can be prevented by good procedures. It's
been a long time since we had a take off crash due to improper
rigging. We've fiddled the rules semi-endlessly to try to reduce
hazards associated with starts, finishes and turnpoints and it's
pretty much worked as expected. We still have way too many crashes,
but they seem related to judgement, not to crappy procedure. Can my
supposed good judgement keep me safe? I'm not as certain as I used to
be. I have two dead friends *this month* that seemed to me to have
been serious, safety conscious, conservative pilots, arguably better
examples of safety mindedness than myself. One spins in from pattern
altitude over the airport, the other hits trees on final to what
should have been a routine off field landing in what looks (from
satellite pics and terrain map) to be the friendliest, easiest, most
landable task area in North America. The only semi-unusual factor in
both cases happens to be high wind (25 - 30 kts). These are serious
WTF moments for me. And my family. I'd really like to figure this
out.

-Evan Ludeman / T8