Is the 787 a failure ?

On Tue, 29 Jan 2013 06:50:31 -0500, "Jim Wilkins"
wrote:

"Michael A. Terrell" wrote in message
om...

"Mr.B1ack" wrote:
And Boeing didn't spin fast enough to prevent the
perception of the 787 becoming that of a flaming
deathtrap.

Who has died aboard a 787?

Has Airbus fixed the faults that allowed a functional A330 to stall
and fall out of the sky without informing its crew?
jsw

Like the nut holding the wheel of the 350z, the pilots of that plane
were awfully close to brain dead to allow that to happen. They were
just playing a video game - NOT FLYING THE PLANE. All the warnings
were there except for the indicators on the instrument panel.

wrote in message
...
On Tue, 29 Jan 2013 06:50:31 -0500, "Jim Wilkins"
wrote:

"Michael A. Terrell" wrote in message
news:4ZqdnVrwRseNoZrMnZ2dnUVZ_vqdnZ2d@earthlink. com...

"Mr.B1ack" wrote:
And Boeing didn't spin fast enough to prevent the
perception of the 787 becoming that of a flaming
deathtrap.

Who has died aboard a 787?

Has Airbus fixed the faults that allowed a functional A330 to stall
and fall out of the sky without informing its crew?
jsw

Like the nut holding the wheel of the 350z, the pilots of that plane
were awfully close to brain dead to allow that to happen. They were
just playing a video game - NOT FLYING THE PLANE. All the warnings
were there except for the indicators on the instrument panel.

All the warnings were NOT there, and the ones they had were
misleading. The stall indicator shut off below a minimum airspeed and
came on when they correctly put the nose down and gained speed. The
stalled plane remained fairly level and controllable in pitch as it
fell at a very low forward airspeed, a condition the FCS apparently
didn't understand. Roll control was harder and kept them occupied.
They advanced the throttles to TakeOff/Go-Around power and kept the
nose slightly high, which SHOULD have been the proper procedure if
they'd had more airspeed. At night in a storm they were purely on IFR,
with no visual cues and airspeed indicators that had been and could
still be(?) reading low only because they had iced up.

"Jim Wilkins" wrote in message
...
wrote in message
... All the warnings
were there except for the indicators on the instrument panel.

All the warnings were NOT there, and the ones they had were
misleading. The stall indicator shut off below a minimum airspeed
and came on when they correctly put the nose down and gained speed.

I finally found it on page 44 of the main body of the BEA inquest:
"............If the CAS measurements for
the three ADR are lower than 60 kt, the angle of attack values of the
three ADR are
invalid and the stall warning is then inoperative. This results from a
logic stating that
the airflow must be sufficient to ensure a valid measurement by the
angle of attack
sensors, especially to prevent spurious warnings."

The stall warning and pitch attitude graphs are on page 6 of appendix
3.

jsw

|
| The lithium ion batteries installed on the Boeing 787 are
| inherently unsafe, says Elon Musk, founder of SpaceX and
| owner of electric car maker Tesla.
|
| "Unfortunately, the pack architecture supplied to Boeing is
| inherently unsafe," writes Musk in an email to Flightglobal.
| ...
| Musk's assessments of battery cells were confirmed by
| Donald Sadoway, a professor of electrical engineering at
| the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
|
| "I would have used the same words," says Sadoway. "I would
| have used the same words. I'm glad someone with such a big
| reputation put it on the line."
| ...
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/elon-musk-boeing-787-battery-fundamentally-unsafe-381627/

--bks

On Tue, 29 Jan 2013 18:31:09 -0500, "Jim Wilkins"
wrote:

"Jim Wilkins" wrote in message
...
wrote in message
... All the warnings
were there except for the indicators on the instrument panel.

All the warnings were NOT there, and the ones they had were
misleading. The stall indicator shut off below a minimum airspeed
and came on when they correctly put the nose down and gained speed.

I finally found it on page 44 of the main body of the BEA inquest:
"............If the CAS measurements for
the three ADR are lower than 60 kt, the angle of attack values of the
three ADR are
invalid and the stall warning is then inoperative. This results from a
logic stating that
the airflow must be sufficient to ensure a valid measurement by the
angle of attack
sensors, especially to prevent spurious warnings."

The stall warning and pitch attitude graphs are on page 6 of appendix
3.

jsw

And there was no reason under the sun (or stars) for an A3 to be
flying anywhere CLOSE to 60 kt. Minimum landing soeed is over twice
that speed EMPTY. And it goes up the heavier the plane is.

It is virtually impossible to "stall" a functioning A3X plane - it
will just descend like an elevator, under full control. The GPS will
show a rapid rate of descent even when the static port is totally
blocked.

On Tue, 29 Jan 2013 13:18:26 -0500, "Jim Wilkins"
wrote:

wrote in message
.. .
On Tue, 29 Jan 2013 06:50:31 -0500, "Jim Wilkins"
wrote:

"Michael A. Terrell" wrote in message
news:4ZqdnVrwRseNoZrMnZ2dnUVZ_vqdnZ2d@earthlink .com...

"Mr.B1ack" wrote:
And Boeing didn't spin fast enough to prevent the
perception of the 787 becoming that of a flaming
deathtrap.

Who has died aboard a 787?

Has Airbus fixed the faults that allowed a functional A330 to stall
and fall out of the sky without informing its crew?
jsw

Like the nut holding the wheel of the 350z, the pilots of that plane
were awfully close to brain dead to allow that to happen. They were
just playing a video game - NOT FLYING THE PLANE. All the warnings
were there except for the indicators on the instrument panel.

All the warnings were NOT there, and the ones they had were
misleading. The stall indicator shut off below a minimum airspeed and
came on when they correctly put the nose down and gained speed. The
stalled plane remained fairly level and controllable in pitch as it
fell at a very low forward airspeed, a condition the FCS apparently
didn't understand. Roll control was harder and kept them occupied.
They advanced the throttles to TakeOff/Go-Around power and kept the
nose slightly high, which SHOULD have been the proper procedure if
they'd had more airspeed. At night in a storm they were purely on IFR,
with no visual cues and airspeed indicators that had been and could
still be(?) reading low only because they had iced up.

A friend of mine was a 300 series training officer for a major airline
and said if the pilot had a pulse and a brain there was no reason for
the plane to crash. The GPS was still functioning, giving them an
indication of ground speed and altitude. Ground speed and air speed
are not the same - obviously, but they could still figure out they
were flying too slow. Stormscope told them what kind of storm
conditions they were getting into as well - no excuse for it.