Some good news

On another day a couple gliders were in wave when a slug of moisture closed the windows trapping them on top. One turned down wind and rode the undulations to drier air in Maine and landed.

If the weather situation described is a possibility (which in this case it was) and one possible outcome is to be left with no option but to bail out (which in this it was), then why are pilots engaging in the activity?

On another day a couple gliders were in wave when a slug of moisture
closed the windows trapping them on top. One turned down wind and rode
the undulations to drier air in Maine and landed.

If the weather situation described is a possibility (which in this case it
was) and one possible outcome is to be left with no option but to bail out
(which in this it was), then why are pilots engaging in the activity?

Presuming this is a serious question (and not a rhetorical snark), a short
answer (no snark intended) is: because the personal rewards are worth the
apparent-to-Joe-Pilot risks.

A slightly longer and to-be-hoped more informative reply is noting that
sky/cloud conditions rarely change instantaneously over a sky volume in which
your averagely-informed soaring pilot ought to be (is?) paying attention to.
Thoughtful, comprehensive reading of earlier posts in this thread in which
atmospheric aspects of this day/incident are touched upon, make it apparent
that was (or seemed to me, anyway, from a wave-flying, glider-pilot-informed
self-interested distance) the case. I consider "overall atmospheric awareness"
(beyond merely staying up, I mean) a huge component of "general situational
awareness."

That said, there's no doubt in my mind - having been raised and become a
soaring pilot adjacent the mid-Appalachians and then done the bulk of my
subsequent (including considerable) wave soaring in the intermountain west -
that "eastern waves" tend to be "wetter" than "western waves," though some of
my most memorable western wave flights were "wet" buy local standards. In that
sense, for the moisture reason as well as additional secondary ones {e.g.
local geography and surface conditions) I tend to believe that eastern wave
soaring "generally requires" more incoming weather vigilance than western U.S.
wave soaring.

YMMV.
Bob W.

On Wednesday, January 6, 2016 at 9:19:46 AM UTC-5, wrote:

On another day a couple gliders were in wave when a slug of moisture closed the windows trapping them on top. One turned down wind and rode the undulations to drier air in Maine and landed.

If the weather situation described is a possibility (which in this case it was) and one possible outcome is to be left with no option but to bail out (which in this it was), then why are pilots engaging in the activity?

The only thing that is certain in life, is death. If you want to guarantee risk free flying, stay on the ground at all times.

Please read your post again.

One pilot turned down wind and landed safely in Maine, therefore it was
not a case of no option but to bail out.

The pilot who ultimately bailed made a bad decision for that particular
set of circumstances, and he's publicly discussed that.

Why do you drive a car when there's a possibility of a crash?
Practically anything you do in this life involves some sort of risk. We
glider pilots evaluate the risks of our sport and enthusiastically press on!

On 1/6/2016 7:19 AM, wrote:
On another day a couple gliders were in wave when a slug of moisture closed the windows trapping them on top. One turned down wind and rode the undulations to drier air in Maine and landed.

If the weather situation described is a possibility (which in this case it was) and one possible outcome is to be left with no option but to bail out (which in this it was), then why are pilots engaging in the activity?

--
Dan, 5J

On Wednesday, January 6, 2016 at 9:19:46 AM UTC-5, wrote:

If the weather situation described is a possibility (which in this case it was) and one possible outcome is to be left with no option but to bail out (which in this it was), then why are pilots engaging in the activity?

Richard, on that day, there was other options that could have been taken earlier on in the flight that would (in 20/20 hindsight) been safer and more conservative. From my vantage point when beginning the descent, I was unable to see to the east as I was still riding along the front edge of the lenticular. As that time I assumed the safest option to be an emergency descent down through the last closing foehn gap, which turned out to be a critical mistake.

With the length of this discussion now, I understand that the event details may be vague, so I invite you to read though the files posted earlier to examine the event for yourself.

"that pilot"