Greatest Strategic Air Missions

Venik wrote;

They knew that if the Emperor is not allowed to stay, no
amount of nukes will solve the problem.

Actually they *thought* even if Japan capitulated that many in the Army (and
there were well over 2 million soldiers still in uniform) would continue to
fight unless the Emporer was still in power and commanded them to surrender.

"On July 24 I casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a new weapon of
unusual destructive force.

Which hardy means he briefed Stalin on the results of the Mahatten Project as
you insinuated.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

"Venik" wrote in message
...
BUFDRVR wrote:

Wrong. The U.S. chose to allow the Emporer to stay because they felt
it would
allow for a more secure occupation.

Of course they did, that why the US changed its policy of unconditional
surrender. They knew that if the Emperor is not allowed to stay, no
amount of nukes will solve the problem. In the end the Japanese got what
they wanted in a surrender deal.


Incorrect, the militarists in charge wanted to hold out for a
deal that would leave them in control of Korea, Taiwan
and Manchuria.

Keith




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From: (BUFDRVR)

snip


Truman even
attributed Stalin's lack of response to the news of the A-bomb test to
his failure to grasp the significance of the event.

What history books are you reading? Truman never briefed Stalin on the
results.
He briefed Churchill, but never told Stalin a thing.


BUFDRVR


Actually Truman told Stalin at Potsdam we had the bomb. Stalin's reply was he
hoped we would use it wisely. He already knew about the bomb through spies in
the Manhattan Project.

Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired

Dan wrote:

Actually Truman told Stalin at Potsdam we had the bomb.

Well...not really. He told Stalin (who already knew about the Manhatten
project) that we had a new weapon that could end the war. That was about as
specific as it got. Meanwhile Truman briefed Churchill in detail.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

Venik wrote in message ...
BUFDRVR wrote:

Not according to interviews conducted with Japanese civilian and military
leaders following WW II. Take a look at the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.

...

As you know, during the Yalta conference Stalin promised to attack Japan
ninety days from the surrender of Germany. In return the USSR got the
Allied blessing to grab some territory back from Japan. It's hard to
imagine that the Japanese were not aware of the details of this deal.

Not hard for me. Like, who was going to tell them?

The Japanese had something like a million troops on the Asian Mainland,
yet less than 100,000 were positioned to resist the Soviet attack.


Even before the Germany's surrender, the Japanese sent a diplomatic
delegation to the USSR to work out some sort of a surrender deal that
would allow Japan to keep the Emperor. By that time the US diplomats
have already got themselves into a bottle by pronouncing the policy of
Unconditional Surrender. The Soviets, on the other hand, had no
particular problem with the Emperor.

Conventional wisdom has it that the Soviets were happy to receive the
delegation to help mislead the Japanese into thinking that a Soviet
attack was NOT imminent


Germans surrendered on May 8, which meant that Stalin was obligated to
attack Japan no later than August 8. US plans called for a limited
invasion of the Ryuku Islands in November and the invasion of the
mainland Japan was to take place in January of 1946 at the earliest. So
there definitely was a big gap between the timing of the Soviet invasion
of Japan and the US invasion. If the negotiations between Japan and the
USSR produced results (and there was no reason why they shouldn't have,
since both countries were not even at war with each other), the Soviet
"attack" on Japan could have been a very brief and victorious affair for
Stalin.

The reason they "shouldn't have" produced results was that Stalin had
made a prior comitment to enter the war against Japan.


The US delayed the Potsdam conference for two weeks, during which the
first nuke was tested. And Truman authorized the bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki just two days before the Soviet attack against Japan.
Truman's decision to use the A-bombs was opposed by most of his military
advisers, including Le May, Eisenhower and MacArthur.

I am very interested in your source of information here. It is hard
to imagine Le May not wanting to use any weapon against Japan and
MacArthur (according to a biographical piece I saw recently on PBS)
wanted to use nuclear weapons in Korea.

So this seems to me to be unlikely, but I'm open to evidence.

And the public
reaction in the US to the use of the A-bomb was split close to the
middle.

Again, I'd like to know the source.

At the time, the significance of timing of these events was
quite obvious to anyone reading newspapers.

Japanese negotiated with both the US and the USSR and in both cases
their primary and only real condition was to retain the Emperor. They
would have preferred to surrender to the Americans for obvious reasons:
USSR had territorial claims against Japan and nobody in Japan was
looking forward to living under Kremlin's control. On the other hand,
negotiating with the USSR was less problematic because the two countries
were not at war and because the Soviets, unlike the US, did not demand
unconditional surrender.

In the end, the US changed its policy of Unconditional Surrender and
that's what prompted the Japanese surrender. And the use of the nukes
allowed the US to obscure this rather embarrassing policy change from
public scrutiny, as well as to give Stalin something to think about.

Again, can you show that the US gave Japan any guarantees as to the
Emperor's safety befor they agreed to surender? Such a guarantee
may have been in the formal terms of surrender, but the question
is, was such a guarantee communicated to the Japanese befor
the actual surrender negotiations?

It's also important to remember that Truman counted on a much bigger
impact of the A-bomb on the Soviets, because, of course, he had no idea
that the Soviets have already taken from Los Alamos everything they
needed for their own bomb. During the Potsdam conference Truman even
attributed Stalin's lack of response to the news of the A-bomb test to
his failure to grasp the significance of the event., since Truman,
obviously, expected some sort of an emotional response from uncle Joe.
If Truman knew how quickly the USSR would build its own A-bomb, perhaps
he would have listened to his military commanders on this matter.

Nonsense. While Truman may have given some consideration to what
territory the Soviets might have gained had the war continued for
another year or more there is no reason to believe he did not give
more consideration to American, Chinese, and even Ja[panese casualties
to be expected from a continuation of the war.

--

FF

Fred the Red Shirt wrote:

Truman's decision to use the A-bombs was opposed by most of his military
advisers, including Le May, Eisenhower and MacArthur.

I am very interested in your source of information here.

LeMay is ridiculous, Eisenhower (in his memoirs) claimed he opposed the
decision when asked for his advice and MacArthur (also in his memoirs)
confessed to being upset (sick to his stomach) when informed of the decision,
but made no protest.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

From: (BUFDRVR)
Date: 8/23/2004 6:29 PM Central Daylight Time
Message-id:

Fred the Red Shirt wrote:

Truman's decision to use the A-bombs was opposed by most of his military
advisers, including Le May, Eisenhower and MacArthur.

I am very interested in your source of information here.

LeMay is ridiculous, Eisenhower (in his memoirs) claimed he opposed the
decision when asked for his advice and MacArthur (also in his memoirs)
confessed to being upset (sick to his stomach) when informed of the decision,
but made no protest.


BUFDRVR


Based on what I have read over the years I think MacArthur was upset he
wouldn't get to invade.

Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired

Fred the Red Shirt wrote:

Not hard for me. Like, who was going to tell them?

I am sure the Japanese high command was waiting by the phone all day
Immediately following the Yalta conference, the Soviets initiated a
massive mobilization of military and industrial capabilities in the Far
East. The Soviet Pacific Fleet was reinforced with additional landing
craft, fast attack boats and other ships - preparations that the
Japanese could not have missed even if every last one of them was
looking south. So, unless the Japanese thought that the massive Soviet
military preparations in the Far East that immediately followed the
Yalta conference were to throw he biggest May Day parade Vladivostok has
ever seen, I am certain they had a fairly good chance of putting one and
one together. Really, there've been volumes written on the subject, so,
like, read a book, man, or something.

Conventional wisdom has it that the Soviets were happy to receive the
delegation to help mislead the Japanese into thinking that a Soviet
attack was NOT imminent

And it was not imminent. The declaration of war, however, was. By
letting the Japanese know that the declaration of war was inevitable,
the USSR would have gained leverage to force a negotiated surrender from
Japan. Stalin had much to gain from such a deal as opposed to a
full-scale invasion, which was planned by Vasilevsky on August 26-31 and
was to be led by the 87th Infantry Corps.

The reason they "shouldn't have" produced results was that Stalin had
made a prior comitment to enter the war against Japan.

Once again, you are confusing the declaration of war with the actual
war. The Soviet preparations for a war with Japan were obvious and there
was an obvious chronological link between these preparations and the
Yalta conference. The fact that the USSR was going to attack Japan
following the defeat of Germany was well-known since the Tehran
conference, when Stalin said that the Soviet attack against Japan would
be possible by increasing the Soviet forces in the Far East threefold,
which can happen after the defeat of Germany. So, yes, Stalin's promise
to attack Japan made at the Yalta conference was definitely the secret
of Polichinelle.

I am very interested in your source of information here. It is hard
to imagine Le May not wanting to use any weapon against Japan

It's a well-known fact that Arnold and LeMay did not favor using the
A-bomb against Japan, believing that the war can be won by conventional
bombing. It is also a well-known fact that LeMay actively opposed the
use of the A-bomb, but carried out the orders imposed on him. LeMay
himself wrote about this in his memoirs. He believed in 1945 as he
believed in Do you people read or just watch PBS? Naturally, not all for
the same reasons, but a number of other US commanders did not support
the use of the A-bomb against Japan: Bradley, Strauss, King, Leahy,
Arnold. And unlike most of them, Le May maintained his position even
after the A-bomb was used, saying during a press conference on September
20, 1945: "The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at
all."

They hide this information in books, which you should try to read from
time to time to supplement your PBS education.

and
MacArthur (according to a biographical piece I saw recently on PBS)
wanted to use nuclear weapons in Korea.

I don't think we are talking about the same war...

Again, can you show that the US gave Japan any guarantees as to the
Emperor's safety befor they agreed to surender? Such a guarantee
may have been in the formal terms of surrender, but the question
is, was such a guarantee communicated to the Japanese befor
the actual surrender negotiations?

You must be joking. The question of the Emperor was the cornerstone of
this whole diplomatic spectacle. I can imagine the scene on board the
USS Missouri: Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and General Umezu are
glancing over the surrender deal before signing. Shigemitsu: "I'll be
damned, Yoshijiro, look: it says we can keep His Imperial Majesty after
all." MacArthur: "Didn't you two clowns get the memo I sent out this
morning?"

Nonsense. While Truman may have given some consideration to what
territory the Soviets might have gained had the war continued for
another year or more there is no reason to believe he did not give
more consideration to American, Chinese, and even Ja[panese casualties
to be expected from a continuation of the war.

Yes, he was a gentle and caring person this Truman. They say he even
lost his appetite for a few days after nuking tens of thousands of
civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

--
Regards,

Venik

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Venik wrote in message ...
so,
like, read a book, man, or something.

Please feel free to suggest one or more specific titles where we
can read that:


Arnold and LeMay did not favor using the A-bomb against Japan.
A number of other US commanders did not support
the use of the A-bomb against Japan: Bradley, Strauss, King, Leahy,
Arnold.




Again, can you show that the US gave Japan any guarantees as to the
Emperor's safety befor they agreed to surender? Such a guarantee
may have been in the formal terms of surrender, but the question
is, was such a guarantee communicated to the Japanese befor
the actual surrender negotiations?

You must be joking.

No, I refer to the negotiations that took place after the Japanese
announced their surrender and befor the signing of the formal
surrender document onboard the USS MIssouri.

MacArthur: "Didn't you two clowns get the memo I sent out this
morning?"

Seems I didn't get it either.


Nonsense. While Truman may have given some consideration to what
territory the Soviets might have gained had the war continued for
another year or more there is no reason to believe he did not give
more consideration to American, Chinese, and even Japanese casualties
to be expected from a continuation of the war.

Yes, he was a gentle and caring person this Truman. They say he even
lost his appetite for a few days after nuking tens of thousands of
civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

They also say that he was dead set against using Nuclear weapons in
Korea and that was at the heart of his disagreement with MacArthur
who had requested '20 or 30' atomic bombs to be used gainst major
Chinese cities.

--

FF

(BUFDRVR) wrote:
Venik wrote:

Thus, for every Japanese
soldier killed in the Hiroshima bombing there
was 97% of "collateral
damage." So, no, it was not the greatest strategic
air mission.

The judgement on whether a mission was a strategic
success is not based on
collateral damage. In *most* circumstances high
collateral damage will usually
translate to a strategic failure....but not
in this case.

The Soviet advances were the primary reason
for the fact that the Japs
were even considering a surrender.

Not according to interviews conducted with Japanese
civilian and military
leaders following WW II. Take a look at the
U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.

Same situation as with the Germans trying to
surrender
to the Americans and nobody nuked them.

Uhh..the first successful nuclear bomb testing
wasn't done until 16 July
1945....two months after Germany was defeated.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those
bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"
Remember Venik: The bomb was meant to be delivered on Germany. While it
was used against Japan, Germany was considered the first target up until
early '45.

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