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![]() "Venik" wrote in message ... Keith Willshaw wrote: That just whacked a huge number of civilians. Well no. Are you saying that a large number of civilians was not killed in that bombing? Nope and a large number of civilians died in the Soviet capture of Berlin - war is hell. Hirsohima was not only the home port for much of the Japanese Navy it was also the home of 2nd Army Headquarters, which commanded the defense of all of southern Japan. There were large numbers of troops based there. At least 3 divisions IRC The bombing did not target any specific military facilities. Hiroshima was a major army and naval centre, like Kronstadt , Portsmouth or Konigsberg According to the Japanese figures, military casualties from the attack accounted for less than 3% of the overall casualties. Thus, for every Japanese soldier killed in the Hiroshima bombing there was 97% of "collateral damage." So, no, it was not the greatest strategic air mission. Getting the enemy to surrender unconditionally is about as strategic as it gets. The Soviet advances were the primary reason for the fact that the Japs were even considering a surrender. The Japanese cabinet stated otherwise. Indeed more than one of those in that body publically stated that only the use of the bomb allowed them to surrender. They figured maybe Stalin won't stop with the Kurils. Same situation as with the Germans trying to surrender to the Americans Hint the Americans refused to accept that surrender and held out for uncoditional surrender - as with Japan. The USSR lacked the amphibious capability to invade the Japanese home islands. Even the combined carrier forces of Britain and America were barely adequate at Okinawa. Lots of luck trying to invade Honshu without air cover. and nobody nuked them. Except that the Japanese werent prepared to surrender until after the second bomb and even the the Emperor had to intervene. Keith ----== Posted via Newsfeed.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure Usenet News==---- http://www.newsfeed.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 100,000 Newsgroups ---= 19 East/West-Coast Specialized Servers - Total Privacy via Encryption =--- |
#2
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![]() It took a double-whammy of the A-bomb and Ivan crossing into Manchuria and Korea to end the war. The A-bomb alone might not have been enough. Anything that prevents OLYMPIC and CORONET from having to be executed had to be done. Period. The Japanese Cabinet was meeting to discuss Hiroshima and the Soviet invasion when word reached them of the Nagasaki strike. Next day Hirohito decides that enough is enough. 14 Aug is the attempted putsch that fails and the Surrender announcement comes on the 15th. Next probable nuclear strike date was on 18 Aug with Kokura as the primary. Bomb #3 was about to leave Los Alamos on 10 Aug when a hold order arrived. Two bombs and a million and a half Russians in the space of four days forced Japan's surrender. End of story and of war. Venik wrote: Keith Willshaw wrote: That just whacked a huge number of civilians. Well no. Are you saying that a large number of civilians was not killed in that bombing? Hirsohima was not only the home port for much of the Japanese Navy it was also the home of 2nd Army Headquarters, which commanded the defense of all of southern Japan. There were large numbers of troops based there. At least 3 divisions IRC The bombing did not target any specific military facilities. According to the Japanese figures, military casualties from the attack accounted for less than 3% of the overall casualties. Thus, for every Japanese soldier killed in the Hiroshima bombing there was 97% of "collateral damage." So, no, it was not the greatest strategic air mission. Getting the enemy to surrender unconditionally is about as strategic as it gets. The Soviet advances were the primary reason for the fact that the Japs were even considering a surrender. They figured maybe Stalin won't stop with the Kurils. Same situation as with the Germans trying to surrender to the Americans and nobody nuked them. -- Regards, Venik Visit my site: http://www.aeronautics.ru If you need to e-mail me, please use the following subject line: ?Subject=Newsgr0ups_resp 0nse Posted via www.My-Newsgroups.com - web to news gateway for usenet access! |
#3
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![]() "Matt Wiser" wrote in message news:412a26b3$1@bg2.... It took a double-whammy of the A-bomb and Ivan crossing into Manchuria and Korea to end the war. The A-bomb alone might not have been enough. Anything that prevents OLYMPIC and CORONET from having to be executed had to be done. Period. The Japanese Cabinet was meeting to discuss Hiroshima and the Soviet invasion when word reached them of the Nagasaki strike. Next day Hirohito decides that enough is enough. 14 Aug is the attempted putsch that fails and the Surrender announcement comes on the 15th. Next probable nuclear strike date was on 18 Aug with Kokura as the primary. Bomb #3 was about to leave Los Alamos on 10 Aug when a hold order arrived. Two bombs and a million and a half Russians in the space of four days forced Japan's surrender. End of story and of war. Overly simplistic, at least those last two sentences. A hell of a lot more than that went into the Japanese surrender equation. The tightening sea blockade, effective inshore mining by B-29's, the creeping effects of the B-29 raids against industrial and urban areas, the gaining of bases at Iwo Jima and Okinawa that now moved even more landbased airpower into range of Kyushu and Honshu, the isolation of large troop garrisons in far-flung and by then bypassed areas, the fact that they no longer had any navy to speak of outside kamikaze attack light combatants being horded, along with their remaining aircraft, to counter the feared invasion of Kyushu, and of course that feared homeland invasion itself (and the fact that the more reasonable Japanese leaders by then realized that "Ketsu-Go" was invariably doomed to failure when that invasion did come)...all of these factors contributed to the Japanese surrender. The first atomic bomb was an attention getter, the Soviet invasion was the closure of their forlorn negotiated surrender hopes, and the second bomb was the final closer. Brooks snip |
#4
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![]() "Kevin Brooks" wrote: "Matt Wiser" wrote in message news:412a26b3$1@bg2.... It took a double-whammy of the A-bomb and Ivan crossing into Manchuria and Korea to end the war. The A-bomb alone might not have been enough. Anything that prevents OLYMPIC and CORONET from having to be executed had to be done. Period. The Japanese Cabinet was meeting to discuss Hiroshima and the Soviet invasion when word reached them of the Nagasaki strike. Next day Hirohito decides that enough is enough. 14 Aug is the attempted putsch that fails and the Surrender announcement comes on the 15th. Next probable nuclear strike date was on 18 Aug with Kokura as the primary. Bomb #3 was about to leave Los Alamos on 10 Aug when a hold order arrived. Two bombs and a million and a half Russians in the space of four days forced Japan's surrender. End of story and of war. Overly simplistic, at least those last two sentences. A hell of a lot more than that went into the Japanese surrender equation. The tightening sea blockade, effective inshore mining by B-29's, the creeping effects of the B-29 raids against industrial and urban areas, the gaining of bases at Iwo Jima and Okinawa that now moved even more landbased airpower into range of Kyushu and Honshu, the isolation of large troop garrisons in far-flung and by then bypassed areas, the fact that they no longer had any navy to speak of outside kamikaze attack light combatants being horded, along with their remaining aircraft, to counter the feared invasion of Kyushu, and of course that feared homeland invasion itself (and the fact that the more reasonable Japanese leaders by then realized that "Ketsu-Go" was invariably doomed to failure when that invasion did come)...all of these factors contributed to the Japanese surrender. The first atomic bomb was an attention getter, the Soviet invasion was the closure of their forlorn negotiated surrender hopes, and the second bomb was the final closer. Brooks snip And there was no way that the Kyushu invasion (OLYMPIC) could have been repelled: Most Japanese defenses were on the beaches and inland in range of NGFS, and a suggestion that the defense of Okinawa and Luzon be emulated was rejected-the plan was defend on the beaches and in strength inland, but once the beach defenses are broken, the Japanese coastal divisions have had it, and the attempts to move reserves from South-Central Kyushu to counterattack (Ariake Bay, where XI Corps with 1st Cav, 43rd and Americal Divisions would have landed was considered by the Japanese to be the main battle area in Kyushu) would have been exposed to air attack and have had very poor roads on which to move anyway. Mostly grunts with little heavy equipment anyhow and what armor they had would have suffered from air and naval gunfire before even getting to the battle. Best case for Kyushu is 30 days, more likely 45-50 days before Southern Kyushu is relatively secure and the base-building gets underway for to support CORONET. Posted via www.My-Newsgroups.com - web to news gateway for usenet access! |
#5
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![]() "Matt Wiser" wrote in message news:412b51f9$1@bg2.... "Kevin Brooks" wrote: "Matt Wiser" wrote in message news:412a26b3$1@bg2.... It took a double-whammy of the A-bomb and Ivan crossing into Manchuria and Korea to end the war. The A-bomb alone might not have been enough. Anything that prevents OLYMPIC and CORONET from having to be executed had to be done. Period. The Japanese Cabinet was meeting to discuss Hiroshima and the Soviet invasion when word reached them of the Nagasaki strike. Next day Hirohito decides that enough is enough. 14 Aug is the attempted putsch that fails and the Surrender announcement comes on the 15th. Next probable nuclear strike date was on 18 Aug with Kokura as the primary. Bomb #3 was about to leave Los Alamos on 10 Aug when a hold order arrived. Two bombs and a million and a half Russians in the space of four days forced Japan's surrender. End of story and of war. Overly simplistic, at least those last two sentences. A hell of a lot more than that went into the Japanese surrender equation. The tightening sea blockade, effective inshore mining by B-29's, the creeping effects of the B-29 raids against industrial and urban areas, the gaining of bases at Iwo Jima and Okinawa that now moved even more landbased airpower into range of Kyushu and Honshu, the isolation of large troop garrisons in far-flung and by then bypassed areas, the fact that they no longer had any navy to speak of outside kamikaze attack light combatants being horded, along with their remaining aircraft, to counter the feared invasion of Kyushu, and of course that feared homeland invasion itself (and the fact that the more reasonable Japanese leaders by then realized that "Ketsu-Go" was invariably doomed to failure when that invasion did come)...all of these factors contributed to the Japanese surrender. The first atomic bomb was an attention getter, the Soviet invasion was the closure of their forlorn negotiated surrender hopes, and the second bomb was the final closer. Brooks snip And there was no way that the Kyushu invasion (OLYMPIC) could have been repelled That is what I meant when I said that their more competent leaders realized that Ketsu-Go was not a winning option; Ketsu-Go was their defensive plan for the home islands that had succeeded the previous Sho-Go. : Most Japanese defenses were on the beaches and inland in range of NGFS, and a suggestion that the defense of Okinawa and Luzon be emulated was rejected-the plan was defend on the beaches and in strength inland, but True, but you must remember that their strategy was to try and neutralize the NGFS and CAS superiority the US would have enjoyed by making it a close-in "knife fight" that would have limited the usefullness of each of those fire support systems. They were hamstrung, though, by their lack of engineer units with which to prepare adequate defenses. once the beach defenses are broken, the Japanese coastal divisions have had it, The Japanese had already recognized that allowing the US to gain a beachhed *anywhere* typically resulted in a rapid buildup of combat power that their forces could not subsequently cope with, which is why they depended upon first trying to hammer the invasion fleet with kamikaze attacks from the air, the surface of the sea, and under the sea, and then engaging the spearhead forces in close combat. Their best hope was that they could make the cost so bloody to the allies that we would decide it was not worth the effort--not a very likely outcome. But it would have likely been plenty bloody for both sides. and the attempts to move reserves from South-Central Kyushu to counterattack (Ariake Bay, where XI Corps with 1st Cav, 43rd and Americal Divisions would have landed was considered by the Japanese to be the main battle area in Kyushu) would have been exposed to air attack and have had very poor roads on which to move anyway. The Japanese staff did a pretty good job in terms of identifying the likely invasion sites and arraying forces accordingly. And you are right, their CATK forces would have been hard pressed to do their job; their plans called for them to arrive and launch directly into battle from march order, so those that *did* survive the inevitable pounding from allied air interdiction efforts would have found themselves being fed into the gristmill in a piecemeal fashion, not a good thing (for them). Mostly grunts with little heavy equipment anyhow and what armor they had would have suffered from air and naval gunfire before even getting to the battle. Best case for Kyushu is 30 days, more likely 45-50 days before Southern Kyushu is relatively secure and the base-building gets underway for to support CORONET. I'd be careful about overestimating the value of WWII long range NGFS; history shows that it was often of limited value (the most valuable NGFS in numerous operations was that provided by the tin cans operating up-close-and-personal). Time and again we pounded the hell out of Japanese defenses with NGFS, only to have to tangle with them when they emerged from their bunkers and hidey-holes. Brooks Posted via www.My-Newsgroups.com - web to news gateway for usenet access! |
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