Fly tight for tight bomb patterns on the ground.

In article , Guy Alcala
writes
Dave Eadsforth wrote:

In article , Guy Alcala
writes

SNIP

That's a huge thumbnail, Guy - thanks very much for devoting the time to
writing it. Archived and backed up already...

You're welcome. Oh, I forgot to mention the single most important factors that
made
these Bomber Command missions possible - the targets had to be in Oboe range for
accurate marking, and the bombers had to be able to bomb visually on ground
markers.
With an properly marked target and adequate visibility, accuracy could be quite
high. Of course, ocasionally the Luftwaffe would put up a decent defense in
France
-- prior to the mission to Mailly-Le-Camp, tactical targets in France only
counted
for partial mission credit (I think it was 1/3rd), like minelaying missions
which
didn't go east of a certain longitude.

That must have gone down well with the crews - like a bomb, in fact...

The bombers suffered heavy casualties on
that
raid owing to delayed marking,

http://www.raf.mod.uk/dday/timeline_may.html

Just checked it out - very interesting page.

See May 3-4, and that was the end of only part mission credit for French
targets.
Oh, for an example of an RAF heavy bomber bombing "formation", see the first
photo on
the same page. I'd like to know what the target was; with that kind of spread
and
that amount of undercast it pretty much had to be a German city, with the drop
made
by radar.

Hmm - probably an archive picture of a drop over a range in the Scottish
highlands - only sheep around to criticise the accuracy...

Guy



Cheers,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth

Dave Eadsforth wrote:

In article , Guy Alcala
writes
Dave Eadsforth wrote:

In article , Guy Alcala
writes

SNIP

That's a huge thumbnail, Guy - thanks very much for devoting the time to
writing it. Archived and backed up already...

You're welcome. Oh, I forgot to mention the single most important factors that
made
these Bomber Command missions possible - the targets had to be in Oboe range for
accurate marking, and the bombers had to be able to bomb visually on ground
markers.
With an properly marked target and adequate visibility, accuracy could be quite
high. Of course, ocasionally the Luftwaffe would put up a decent defense in
France
-- prior to the mission to Mailly-Le-Camp, tactical targets in France only
counted
for partial mission credit (I think it was 1/3rd), like minelaying missions
which
didn't go east of a certain longitude.

That must have gone down well with the crews - like a bomb, in fact...

As far as the "gardening" (mining) missions went, it fairly accurately reflected the
relative risks, and the same was generally true for shallow French targets, once the
Reich's defenses had been strengthened. I think the dividing line between part and
full credit for mining missions was either 4 or 6 deg. E. longitude -- pretty much
were you just nipping over to the French/Belgian/Dutch coasts, or were you dropping
in German waters (including the Baltic). ISTR either Middlebrook's "The Nuremburg
Raid" or Max Hastings' "Bomber Command" has the details; probably the former. Many
of the crews were apparently happy to get mining missions as they were considered
milk runs, although IIRR by late 1943 or early 1944 they tended to be given to a/c
which were no longer considered capable of first-line service; first the Wellington
squadrons and then the Stirling units. Early model Halifax units may also have drawn
these assignments from 1944 on. It does show that the nominal heavy bomber main
force crew's first combat tour of 30 missions might well involve considerably more
than that.

Guy