Federal Aviation Administration to cut more air traffic controllers

"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote in message
link.net...

"John Mazor" wrote in message
...

Up until tonight, no, but McNicoll's increasingly blatant attempts to do
so now make it clear that that in fact is happening here.

McNicoll made no attempt to cover any controller asses here, there's no
controller's ass to cover because the controller made no error.

I rest my case.

Let's see... my repeated statements here, in clear, blunt, unmistakable
language that "the crew screwed" up" are part of a clever attempt to
deflect
attention away from the crew. Wow, I never woulda known that if you
hadn't
pointed it out to me. I thought they were a clear, blunt, unmistakable
admission that the principal initiating event was pilot error.

No, it was your implication that the controller failed to prevent this
accident that was a not-so-clever attempt to deflect attention away from
the crew.

The controller was otherwise occupied, and I never stated or implied that if
he had not been otherwise occupied, the controller *would* have prevented
the accident. Furthermore, I have made clear that even if there had been
the two controllers there and the lone controller had not been responsible
for working both positions, he would not have committed any error if he had
failed to notice the pilot error and warn them.

He *might* have, yes, but that goes to redundancy, one of the safety
concepts that I have contributed to these discussions and which you have
ignored in your determined but unneccesary obsession with ensuring that no
one attributes any controller error to this accident.

To the extent that other factors such as airport layout and markings,
etc.
are shown to have contributed a link in the accident chain, every one of
those links is a failure point in the complex, interlocking array of
safety
protections that have been built into the system. Each and every one of
them has to be identified and fixed if we want to avoid a repeat of a
similar accident scenario.

So if you think that my calling attention to this aspect of the
investigation is some attempt to cover up or absolve any human error by
the
crew, you still don't understand how aviation safety works.

Jon, do you have any background at all in aviation? What makes you think
you have any understanding of how aviation safety works?

My many explanations here of how the investigation process and safety system
work, none of which you have acknowledged, let alone refuted.

"Sam Spade" wrote in message
news
John Mazor wrote:

So the crew "deliberately" acted in a way that represented a "failure to
use even the slightest amount of care" in an issue that had a reasonable
expection that it would result in a fatal accident? Really? First of
all, if they really were failing to exercise the least amount of care,
then why did they properly perform so many other safety checks and
procedures as required? Second, since this recklessness and disregard
for safety included the reasonable expectation that they, or at least the
other pilot ("others"), would die in the predictable outcome, please cite
evidence that they both were indifferent to the likely prospect that one
or both of them also would die as a result of their actions.

"Willful disregard"? Again, if they performed the other numerous safety
checks and procedures as required, why would they choose to "willfully
disregard" the ones related to taking the proper runway?

If, in fact, they correctly completed all required company check lists and
other procedures, then the company has a systemic problem in not requiring
that runway heading be set on the heading bug.

Each airline has its own FAA-approved procedures and lists, and none of them
is exactly the same. (And it's not uncommon for the airline to change a
procedure after an accident.) The fact that it all is approved by the FAA is
a good starting point in a defense against charges of gross negligence and
willful disregard. It's not an absolute defense, but it can help.

And, in fact, if they correctly completed all required checks, then went
on to commit a terribily illegal and irresonsible act; i.e., to takeoff on
an unlighted runway (that HAD to be willful, John), then their prior
conduct of preflight is irrelevant and not in any sense mitigating of that
willfully terrible act.

"Willful" has many definitions. The only one that matters is the legal one,
when it is coupled with "disregard".

Of course they didn't think they were going to die. They nonetheless
willfully took on an unlighted runway, which is contrary to any modicum of
professional flight crew conduct.

That's not always an absolute rule.

The NTSB probably won't go there, although they should. So should the
FAA and the local D.A.

Horse puckey.

I'll call your "horse puckey" and raise you. "Horse puckey" is a good
indicator you've run out of ideas to keep these jerks from having acted in
a grossly negligent manner.

If I had just stopped at "horse puckey" and not elucidated with the examples
of what "gross negligence" in the cockpit might really look like, and then
go on to make a comparison, you'd be right. But since I didn't, I wasn't
out of ideas, so you're wrong.

Examples of "willful disregard" by pilots do exist. Take the situation
of the two pilots who were discovered nearly naked in the cockpit in
flight. If an accident had occurred while they were in that condition,
any attorney could make a good case for willful disregard. Or the
Russian airliner crash where the captain allowed his son (IIRC) to sit in
his seat and operate the aircraft.

From what we know so far, this accident doesn't come even close to
crossing that line.

I couldn't disagree more. Your cites are different types of idiotic
conduct.

So what does that mean? That they don't rise to the level of "willful
disregard"?

Your self-appointed task here is to show that the Comair crew's behavior
rises to the legal definitions of gross negligence and willful disregard.
I'm not a lawyer, so I'm just musing here, but I would think that a key
factor has to be examining the patterns of behavior both during and
surrounding the alleged acts of willful disregard. Many accidents involve
similar patterns: crew performs flawlessly up until the action in question,
which leaves everyone shaking their head and asking "How did they miss
that?" or "Why did they do that?" To my knowledge, these don't normally
result in successful claims of "gross negligence" or "willful disregard".
Furthermore, the absence of demonstrable gross negligence or willful
disregard doesn't prevent anyone from making a successful tort claim (or
negotiating a settlement), it just sweetens the pot if you can prove it. I
may be wrong, since I don't follow the ensuing liability suits as closely,
but that's my take on it.

Here's the real bottom line: gross negligence and willful disregard are
whatever a judge or jury find them to be. Just as the armchair
quarterbacking here on the accident is meaningless until the NTSB report
comes out, the real proof will come when the liability suits are tried.

As to the unauthorized son in the captain's seat I can assure you I have
personally witnessed more than a few ALPA members do about the same thing,
admittedly more in the 1960s and early 1970s than later years.

It certainly was a different era then, eh? I remember when I was about 8,
being put alone on a Connie for a trip. About halfway into the flight, the
FA asked if I wanted to see the cockpit and escorted me there, where I
chatted with the crew (standing, not sitting!) for a good five minutes, with
the cockpit door wide open all the time.

But that doesn't excuse parental seat-swapping, even then. If it happened
now, the odds are pretty good that the crew would be hearing from the chief
pilot real soon, and there'd be at least one ASRS report filed. Anyone
familiar with airline ops probably can write a book on "stupid pilot
tricks".

"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote in message
ink.net...

"John Mazor" wrote in message
...

So you do get it.

Of course I get it. I've been trying to help you get it.

How? By your incessant mantra that there was no controller error - which I
already have stated repeatedly here, just as I have repeatedly noted that
there is demonstrable crew error. So what is it that you're trying to make
me "get"?

And here must lie McNicoll's agenda. He is obsessed with ensuring that
no
one give even the slightest hint of controller *error* in this accident.

There is no hint of controller error in this accident.

I rest my case.

Of course, no one has done that here -

You have done that here.

And I repeat my request that you show even one example of me accusing the
controller of any error. You haven't, because you can't.

the controller broke no rules in
his actions - but he still thinks that someone is out to spread the
"blame" to the controller by suggesting that he, too, "screwed up".
Since
McNicoll has accused me of acting as an agent for the pilots,

You have no connection to ALPA?

Irrelevant. You just blew right past my umpteenth confirmation that the
controller broke no rules - when are you going to admit that and stop
accusing me of something I never said?

I now feel
free to wonder if he is actually a controller, whose only goal is to
protect his own kind at all costs.

I am a controller, frequent users of these forums are aware of that. I
have no goal of protecting controllers at all costs, the controller's
union does that. Just as the pilot's union does it for pilots.

Then why are you trying to protect the controller at all costs? I've
admitted numerous times that there is crew error involved.

Stephen, you sound more and more like you are a controller.

Not that it's relevant to the worthiness of your arguments, which like
mine, must stand on their own merits. So to the extent that it matters
here (which isn't much), that means that it's up to our readers to judge
the merits of the case we present. And, as I have said before, that's
not
even an important goal for me here. I'm trying to explain that any
accident investigation, if it is to do any good at all, must extend well
beyond any obvious finding of human or mechanical failure.

And, as it would now appear, a minor secondary goal for me is to point
out
that instead of educating others on the much wider framework of how
accident investigation and the interlocking system of safety checks and
balances work (as I have done), virtually all of his arguments have been
aimed at the extremely limited goal of protecting the controller at all
costs.

Jon, you may be in a position to educate others on unionism, you are not
in a position to educate others on aviation matters. Your true goal here
is quite clear.

A comparison of the body of information that the two of us have contributed
to the discussion of this accident will show that I have provided far more
information to educate readers than you have.

So do tell us, what is my "true goal" here? To exonerate the crew? "The
crew screwed up" - how many times have I said that?

"The controller committed an error" - how many times have I said that?
(Never.)

"The controller committed no error" - how many times have you said that?
(I've lost count.)

I never killfile anyone, but unless you have something new to contribute
beyond your hollow mantras and UseNet dodges, I see no point in responding
to any more of your "nanner, nanner, are so!" whining. Let us know if and
when you want to contribute anything substantive.

"John Mazor" wrote in message
...

I have. Show us one instance where I've stated or even intimated that the
controller made any error.


I didn't say you stated it, I said you implied it. Do you want me to post
quotes of you implying it, or should I just post the definition of "imply"?



All I've ever said is that because the FAA
violated its own staffing rules, he had to work two positions and
therefore, the possibility that he might have seen the crew take the wrong
runway and warn them was mooted.


Actually, he was probably working about six positions at the time.
Clearance delivery, ground control, local control, all normal tower
positions, plus probably two radar positions and perhaps a flight data
position normally found in the TRACON. FAA policy was not to have all tower
and TRACON positions combined, that's what was violated. Had the policy
been adhered to then all tower positions would have been worked by one
controller in the tower, and all TRACON positions would have been worked by
a second controller physically in the TRACON or in the tower. Jon and most
other laymen have concluded that the policy required two controllers to be
in the tower, that was not the case. The second controller could have been
in the windowless TRACON and thus not able to see the Comair at any point.

The staffing situation is much like that in a 24-hour supermarket. At 2 PM
all checkout aisles may be needed to handle the customer traffic. At 2 AM
one checkout is enough, so staffing is appropriately reduced and all
checkout positions are combined at one aisle with no reduction in service to
the customer.

Reports on the LEX accident do not mention any other aircraft being worked
by the lone controller, either on the field or in the airspace delegated to
the TRACON. So regardless what hat the controller was wearing at the time,
clearance delivery, ground control, local control, etc., the controller
still had only one customer at any moment.



You're sucking wind at this point, McNicoll, running like hell to try to
evade my points.


If you review the thread, you'll see that I've addressed all of your
relevant "points" at least once.



We've apparently reached the point where all you can do is delete my
points and toss out some feeble UseNet dodges in lieu of offering
constructive rebuttals or information.


You still don't get it.

"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote in message
link.net...

"John Mazor" wrote in message
...

I have. Show us one instance where I've stated or even intimated that
the
controller made any error.

I didn't say you stated it, I said you implied it. Do you want me to post
quotes of you implying it, or should I just post the definition of
"imply"?

All I've ever said is that because the FAA
violated its own staffing rules, he had to work two positions and
therefore, the possibility that he might have seen the crew take the
wrong
runway and warn them was mooted.

Actually, he was probably working about six positions at the time.
Clearance delivery, ground control, local control, all normal tower
positions, plus probably two radar positions and perhaps a flight data
position normally found in the TRACON. FAA policy was not to have all
tower and TRACON positions combined, that's what was violated. Had the
policy been adhered to then all tower positions would have been worked by
one controller in the tower, and all TRACON positions would have been
worked by a second controller physically in the TRACON or in the tower.
Jon and most other laymen have concluded that the policy required two
controllers to be in the tower, that was not the case. The second
controller could have been in the windowless TRACON and thus not able to
see the Comair at any point.

The staffing situation is much like that in a 24-hour supermarket. At 2
PM all checkout aisles may be needed to handle the customer traffic. At 2
AM one checkout is enough, so staffing is appropriately reduced and all
checkout positions are combined at one aisle with no reduction in service
to the customer.

I don't have the airport's flight schedule, but I'm under the understanding
that around 6 a.m. is when the departure activity picks up.

That's not a criticism, just an observation that 6 a.m. may not be as dead
as 2 a.m. there.

Reports on the LEX accident do not mention any other aircraft being worked
by the lone controller, either on the field or in the airspace delegated
to the TRACON. So regardless what hat the controller was wearing at the
time, clearance delivery, ground control, local control, etc., the
controller still had only one customer at any moment.

You're sucking wind at this point, McNicoll, running like hell to try to
evade my points.

If you review the thread, you'll see that I've addressed all of your
relevant "points" at least once.

We've apparently reached the point where all you can do is delete my
points and toss out some feeble UseNet dodges in lieu of offering
constructive rebuttals or information.

Thank you for the constructive information. I read it with great interest.
(Really.)

As to what you think I implied, not only did I never intend to imply
controller error, but nothing I said could reasonably be interpreted as
such. You are being overly sensitive on that. However, neither of us is
going to change our opinion on that point so there is no point continuing
it. We (the newsgroup collectively) have beaten certain issues to death
here, but additional information is always wecome for discussion.

You still don't get it.

We all get it, let's move on.

John Mazor wrote:



Of course they didn't think they were going to die. They nonetheless
willfully took on an unlighted runway, which is contrary to any modicum of
professional flight crew conduct.


That's not always an absolute rule.


What is that? Taking an unlighted runway or professional flight crew
conduct?

John Mazor wrote:



Don't you get it? Yes, in any accident there will be some big, fat smoking
gun that anyone can see - usually a human or mechanical failure. But
before, during, and after the main event, there are other links in the
chain, all of which are not only sufficient, but *necessary* for this chain
to continue unbroken until the accident actually occurs.

Every one of those links is a failure point in the complex, interlocking
array of safety protections that have been built into the system. Each and
every one of those failures contributed to the accident. Each and every one
of them has to be identified and fixed if we want to avoid a repeat of a
similar accident scenario. If you think that this part of the investigation
is some attempt to cover up or absolve any human error by anyone, you just
don't understand the principles of aviation safety.



I understand the chain of events principle quite well. I will readily
concede that a series of events could cause an aircraft to get lined up
on the wrong runway. But, I simply cannot and will not accept that,
once lined up on the incorrect runway, a Part 121 flight crew would
disregard the lack of runway lights. Unless some hard evidence sufraces
to explain how that could happen short of willful disregard of
safety/legal operating requirements, the conclusions I have formed in my
mind will remain unchanged.

Having said that, I would be happy to be shown the error of my
conclusions to date.

I understand they did a "rolling takeoff." Well, okay, but once lined
up and rolling it should have become quite apparent, early on in the
roll, "Hey, this runway is dark!" That would have been enough for me to
have "broken the chain" by immediately performing an abort.

Sam Spade wrote:
But, I simply cannot and will not accept that,
once lined up on the incorrect runway, a Part 121 flight crew would
disregard the lack of runway lights. Unless some hard evidence sufraces
to explain how that could happen short of willful disregard of
safety/legal operating requirements, the conclusions I have formed in my
mind will remain unchanged.


On the day of the accident, there was a NOTAM that the centerline
lights on the long runway were OTS. A misinterpretation of the NOTAM
could have led the crew not to question the absence of lights. Just a
thought. It could have been another possible link in the chain.

John Galban=====N4BQ (PA28-180)

wrote:
Sam Spade wrote:

But, I simply cannot and will not accept that,
once lined up on the incorrect runway, a Part 121 flight crew would
disregard the lack of runway lights. Unless some hard evidence sufraces
to explain how that could happen short of willful disregard of
safety/legal operating requirements, the conclusions I have formed in my
mind will remain unchanged.



On the day of the accident, there was a NOTAM that the centerline
lights on the long runway were OTS. A misinterpretation of the NOTAM
could have led the crew not to question the absence of lights. Just a
thought. It could have been another possible link in the chain.

John Galban=====N4BQ (PA28-180)


If the crew was sharp enough to understand that a runway equipped with
centerline lights will have them on when the runway edge lights are on
would also be sharp enough to not accept lack of CL lights as an
acceptble reason to have no runway edge lights. In fact, if they were
that sharp, the lack of Cl and edge lights should have invoked a
cautious reflection, not, "Oh the CL lights aren't supposed to be on
tonight so let's rock and roll.

wrote:

Sam Spade wrote:

On the day of the accident, there was a NOTAM that the centerline
lights on the long runway were OTS. A misinterpretation of the NOTAM
could have led the crew not to question the absence of lights. Just a
thought. It could have been another possible link in the chain.

Runway edge lights, unlike CL lights, are mandatory for a night takeoff
under Part 121.