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#141
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Since this bit of the thread has drifted into whether or not a gun
should be fitted at all, these are my thoughts on the matter, from 'Flying Guns: the Modern Era' by Emmanuel Gustin and myself, due to be published in March next year. First, in air-to-air use: "Modern short-range missiles have minimum ranges as low as 300 m, well within gun range, and are highly agile, with wide engagement envelopes, which make them able to hit targets well off to one side of the firing aircraft, especially when cued by a helmet-mounted sight: in fact, the capabilities of most recent models are such that the aircraft carrying them barely need to manoeuvre. This does not mean that guns are useless for air-to-air work. They have a particular value in modern 'policing' applications, as they enable warning shots to be fired in front of suspect aircraft. They also provide an economical way of engaging low-value targets such as unmanned reconnaissance drones, transport and liaison aircraft, or drug-smugglers. In a 'hot' war they still have certain advantages in close-quarter fighting, for example in 'picking off' an enemy attacking a wingman, who may be too close for a safe missile shot. The ability of modern fighters to adopt extreme attitudes, pointing well away from the line of flight, significantly assists gun aiming in dogfights. Cannon projectiles have a shorter flight time than a missile, a significant advantage in a dogfight. Finally, the gun provides a last-ditch capability if the missiles run out, or are defeated by advanced countermeasures or simply by circumstances. The 1991 Gulf War revealed the deficiencies of modern IR-homing missiles when faced with trying to pick up a low-flying target against a hot desert background (helicopters being in any case difficult for IR seekers to lock on to from above). USAF A-10 aircraft achieved two helicopter kills with the GAU-8/A (using 275 and 550 rounds respectively) in one case when the IR missiles failed to lock on. Furthermore, the performance of even the best missiles cannot always be guaranteed, for various reasons. In Kosovo, a US fighter engaging a Serbian plane needed to fire three AMRAAMs to bring it down. In other engagements in the late 1990s, USAF and USN fighters fired a total of seven Sparrows, AMRAAMs, and Phoenix missiles against Iraqi MiG-25s without scoring a single hit (although the Phoenix shots were taken at extreme range). In part, the low success rates are due to tactical considerations, in that missiles may deliberately be launched outside the normal engagement envelope to distract or scare off the enemy, and sometimes two missiles are launched at one target to increase the hit probability. Whatever the reason, this results in missiles being used up at a high rate, making it more likely that they will run out during a sortie. A cannon will typically carry enough ammunition for several engagements, usefully increasing combat persistence at a minimal cost in weight and performance. One curious aspect to the use of AAMs in combat is that of the approximately 1,000 kills achieved between 1958 and 1991, only a handful were scored beyond visual range, which does raise questions about the significance of the very long ranges of which some missiles are capable. It is sometimes argued that modern short-range missiles are so good that any aircraft with the benefit of long-range sensors and missiles should use them to try to stay outside the envelope of the enemy's short-range AAMs. However, it is not always possible to dictate the terms of an engagement. The Iranians made good use of the long-range AIM-54 in the war with Iraq, but the F-14s which carried it still found themselves engaged in gunfights from time to time. There is a continual battle between missile sensor and countermeasure technology. In the future, stealth technology applied to aircraft may considerably shorten target acquisition and combat ranges, putting into question the worth of modern BVR (beyond visual range) AAMs. The possible future use of anti-radar missile guidance as a way of overcoming stealth characteristics may force fighters to make minimal use of their own radars, further reducing acquisition and combat distances. It may also prove increasingly difficult for either IR or radar-homing missiles to lock on to their stealthy targets, additionally protected by extensive electronic jamming and IR countermeasures. Of course, modern guns are usually aimed by the plane's radar which could also be jammed (although less easily than the much smaller and less powerful missile seekers) but laser rangefinders could make an acceptable alternative in providing fire control data. If planes eventually become 'laser-proof' as well, the possibility presumably exists of linking variable magnification optical sights to a computer which would be able to analyse the image, identify the plane, calculate its distance, speed and heading and provide gunsight aiming information accordingly, all without emitting any signals." And in ground attack: "The emphasis in the use of aircraft guns has now shifted more to air-to-ground work, although even this is becoming increasingly hazardous in a 'hot' war. With the proliferation of anti-aircraft gun and missile systems, including MANPADS, even the specialist ground-attack aircraft, fitted with powerful cannon, have found it to be safer to rely on the long range of their air-to-ground guided weapons rather than close to gun range, although as we have seen the USAF's A-10s still made good use of their cannon against Iraqi targets in 1991. This trend is aided by the continued development of air-to-surface missiles, with the latest ones having autonomous homing systems to provide "fire and forget" capability over long ranges. Another current development is the GD Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System, which aims to achieve low-cost accuracy by fitted a laser homer to the little 2.75 inch (70 mm) rocket. The target is to achieve a CEP of 1 – 2 m at ranges of up to 5 – 6 km at a price of US$ 8 – 10,000; one-sixth the cost of a Hellfire anti-tank missile. However, not all conflicts involve front-line opposition; in fact, armed forces are now commonly engaged on police work, frequently dealing with guerrilla forces. In these circumstances, rockets and missiles may represent an inappropriate degree of destruction, with a high risk of collateral damage. The RAF was embarrassed during operations against insurgents in Sierra Leone in 2000 to find that they had no suitable weapon for their gunless Harrier GR.7 aircraft to attack small groups of rebels operating close to innocent civilians. Another advantage of using cannon was demonstrated in the invasion of Afghanistan in 2002. During an intense infantry battle at Takur Ghar in late May, in which US forces were ambushed and in considerable danger, air support was called for. The AC-130 was not permitted to intervene in daylight due to its vulnerability, so USAF fighters were sent to help. For a part of the battle the Afghan combatants were too close to the Americans for rockets or bombs to be used, so the fighters – F-16s and even F-15s – went in strafing with their 20 mm cannon, as did the Navy's F-14s and F/A-18s on other occasions. Even RAF Tornadoes were reported to have carried out gun strafing runs on at least one occasion. It may logically be argued that it is foolish to risk an extremely expensive aircraft, with its expensively trained pilot, to being lost due to very low-tech ground fire, but sometimes the risk needs to be taken to save friendly lives." The case rests... Tony Williams Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk Military gun and ammunition discussion forum: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/ |
#142
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"Tony Williams" wrote:
... | USAF A-10 | aircraft achieved two helicopter kills with the GAU-8/A (using 275 and | 550 rounds respectively) in one case when the IR missiles failed to | lock on. How many rounds of 25mm or 27mm are they proposing to fit inside of USAF JSF? |
#143
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"Chad Irby" wrote .. "Paul F Austin" wrote: Nope, I just used weight as an example of the "cost" paid for a gun. And my question stands: At the initial design stage of an aircraft when you're making choices, is a gun worth more than a couple of SRAAMs? Yes. For flexibility, and for having a system independnt of the missile system. But you aren't buying "a missile system". Because you're building in the interfaces (structural and electronic) for any missile that meets the stowage and attachment envelope and interface specification, in fact the gun is "less flexible" since over the life of the platform you can roll in a new AAM every few years. With the gun, aside from changing ammunition natures, you're stuck with the original decision for the life of the platform. Yes, the "no-guns" fighter was 'way premature in 1955, the year the F4H configuration was frozen. It's_really_not clear that's still the case now. Funny, the fighter pilots keep telling us differently. Corporate experience is valuable but can sometimes lead us astray. As another example, just about every fast mover pilot I've ever talked to_thoroughly_believes "speed is life" when it comes to CAS/BAI. If that advice had been heeded in the late sixties, there would be no A-10s. Experience has shown that the original analysis, that using an airframe that's tough enough and slow enough that the pilot can get lined up and nail a CAS or BAI target first time is lots better than a Speed O'Heat pass that minimizes the exposure to ground fire but which misses the target and means you have to make another run. Now of course, since we have ubiquitous PGMs, "speed is life" looks better and medium altitude weapons release looks better still. The point of that interminable one sentence analysis of a complex subject is that technology really does work better now than it did in 1970 and because it does work better, the answers to key questions changes with time. High utility of an internal gun in air combat isn't what's reflected in recent air combat experience nor in systems evaluations of latest-generation platforms, sensors and missile systems. In fact, some reports I've read from Air Force evaluations of off-platform sensor fusion and intraflight datalink operation seem to say that even SRAAMs are rarely be used. That's one of the reasons the Europeans bought Meteor. AAMs really have improved tremendously in thirty years. The minimum range of SRAAMs has moved in, squeezing out the place where guns clearly had utility and the effectiveness of current seekers combined with helmet-mounted sights is clearly much higher than a fixed gun. The 0.15 Pk days for AIM-7Es is 'way distant So you really do need to justify a gun's place on the airframe on more than "it might be useful and you never know".. It's not just weapons fit either. The vibration from gun firing costs significantly higher failure rates in electronics near the gun. That's a nice theory, but not proven anywhere, and it certainly didn't show up on the F-4Es I used to work on. That's a good point and one I didn't know. From an analysis standpoint, an F-4E's RADAR system should have experienced higher failure rates, especially since that generation of avionics had much higher base failure rates than do current systems. Reliability "analysis" as opposed to failure analysis and "lessons learned" incorporation has always had a high bogosity index. |
#144
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"Kevin Brooks" wrote "Paul F Austin" wrote "Chad Irby" wrote "Paul F Austin" wrote: Now, here's a question: for the 200Kg or so weight budget (I have no idea about volume) of an internal gun and ammo tank, would you rather have 1, 2 or 3 more AIM-9Xs/ASRAAMs? It's not a question of "just weight," or we'd just build C-5s with a big automated missile launcher in them. Nope, I just used weight as an example of the "cost" paid for a gun. And my question stands: At the initial design stage of an aircraft when you're making choices, is a gun worth more than a couple of SRAAMs? Or some of the other goods that you snipped. Those are real choices and a gun has to earn its place on the airframe just like every other piece of gear. You (the customer and systems designers) make choices that affect the aircraft thoughout its life. Yes, the "no-guns" fighter was 'way premature in 1955, the year the F4H configuration was frozen. It's_really_not clear that's still the case now. Minimum range engagement? ASRAAM claim 300m minimum range and with "looks can kill" helmet sights, it's really not clear that a gun brings much to the table.. Strafing? Having 6 SDBs tucked away seems more useful. Minimum safe distance (to friendly troops) for surface targets using the 20mm is 25 meters (according to a USAF chart included in the 1996 edition of CGSC ST 100-3). The same chart indicates minimum distance for bombs under 500 pounds is 145 meters (for protected friendlies, ie., bunkers, trenches, fighting positions) or 500 meters (if friendlies are in the open). Even given a significant reduction in the latter figures for the smaller SDB, it is going to be substantially more than 25 meters. So what do you use to engage bad guys located in the 25 meter to something-under-500 meter gap if you have no gun? This is not a purely hypothetical--it happened during Anaconda. That's a good point and one I can't answer. If it was me though, I'd expect that the answer would lie with more organic fires available at the battalion level rather than depending on CAS for "men in the wire". |
#145
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Hi!
"Paul F Austin" writes: So you really do need to justify a gun's place on the airframe on more than "it might be useful and you never know".. A gun is probably the cheapest way of killing low-performace targets like UAV:s, cheap targets that an enemy can produce in large numbers forcing you to deplete your stock of expensive AA-misiles. The gun system reuse all the expensive parts, radar, electronics for aiming the aeroplane and the gun while the ammunition can be dumb and is easy to mass produce. It is of course possible to develop a fairly cheap and small low performance AA-missile but it is hard to get it as cheap as a gun system. This gun competitor might be developed if someone decides to arm small UAV:s with AA-missiles for killing other UAV:s and helicopters. And I realy like the idea of a backup weapon if the enemy has superior countermeasures for your AA-missiles. But you can have that with a pod filled with unguided rockets. Best regards, --- Titta gärna på http://www.lysator.liu.se/~redin och kommentera min politiska sida. Magnus Redin, Klockaregården 6, 586 44 LINKöPING, SWEDEN Phone: Sweden (0)70 5160046 |
#146
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"Paul F Austin" wrote in message ... "Kevin Brooks" wrote "Paul F Austin" wrote "Chad Irby" wrote "Paul F Austin" wrote: Now, here's a question: for the 200Kg or so weight budget (I have no idea about volume) of an internal gun and ammo tank, would you rather have 1, 2 or 3 more AIM-9Xs/ASRAAMs? It's not a question of "just weight," or we'd just build C-5s with a big automated missile launcher in them. Nope, I just used weight as an example of the "cost" paid for a gun. And my question stands: At the initial design stage of an aircraft when you're making choices, is a gun worth more than a couple of SRAAMs? Or some of the other goods that you snipped. Those are real choices and a gun has to earn its place on the airframe just like every other piece of gear. You (the customer and systems designers) make choices that affect the aircraft thoughout its life. Yes, the "no-guns" fighter was 'way premature in 1955, the year the F4H configuration was frozen. It's_really_not clear that's still the case now. Minimum range engagement? ASRAAM claim 300m minimum range and with "looks can kill" helmet sights, it's really not clear that a gun brings much to the table.. Strafing? Having 6 SDBs tucked away seems more useful. Minimum safe distance (to friendly troops) for surface targets using the 20mm is 25 meters (according to a USAF chart included in the 1996 edition of CGSC ST 100-3). The same chart indicates minimum distance for bombs under 500 pounds is 145 meters (for protected friendlies, ie., bunkers, trenches, fighting positions) or 500 meters (if friendlies are in the open). Even given a significant reduction in the latter figures for the smaller SDB, it is going to be substantially more than 25 meters. So what do you use to engage bad guys located in the 25 meter to something-under-500 meter gap if you have no gun? This is not a purely hypothetical--it happened during Anaconda. That's a good point and one I can't answer. If it was me though, I'd expect that the answer would lie with more organic fires available at the battalion level rather than depending on CAS for "men in the wire". There is not a soldier around who would disagree with your objective, since groundpounders generally prefer having "their own" support completely in-pocket. But that does not change the fact that there will be situations, like during Anaconda, where the organic support assets are either not available (i.e., no arty tubes were within range) or unable to handle the scope of the mission (i.e., the mortars that the Anaconda troops did have were over-tasked due to the unexpected number of concurrent targets, and ammo resupply was problematic being fully dependent upon helos in what had already become a less-than-helo-friendly environment). That is where the internal gun on the CAS aircraft becomes a means for the commander to remain flexible in how he responds to these "knife fight" situations. Brooks |
#147
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"Tony Williams" wrote in message m... Since this bit of the thread has drifted into whether or not a gun should be fitted at all, these are my thoughts on the matter, from 'Flying Guns: the Modern Era' by Emmanuel Gustin and myself, due to be published in March next year. First, in air-to-air use: snip good analysis and summary This trend is aided by the continued development of air-to-surface missiles, with the latest ones having autonomous homing systems to provide "fire and forget" capability over long ranges. Another current development is the GD Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System, which aims to achieve low-cost accuracy by fitted a laser homer to the little 2.75 inch (70 mm) rocket. The target is to achieve a CEP of 1 - 2 m at ranges of up to 5 - 6 km at a price of US$ 8 - 10,000; one-sixth the cost of a Hellfire anti-tank missile. To nitpick, APKWS is not currently slated for use on fixed wing assets--it is an Army program intended for use on helos only. Even if it were adopted for fixed wing use, it still leaves the problem of having to identify the need for its load-out ahead of time (i.e., pre-ATO cycle). The beauty of the internal gun on these airframes is that it is an asset that is always available, regardless of the external loadout, so the grunts who are forced to make an immediate (or "Oh, ****...") CAS request can count on at least having that strafe support available if/when things go to hell in a handbasket. That (immediate missions as opposed to pre-planned) is the kind of mission that this capability will be critical to--if we are *planning* to get into a "knife-fight" on the ground, other than in the urban fight, then we have probably already screwed up big-time. However, not all conflicts involve front-line opposition; in fact, armed forces are now commonly engaged on police work, frequently dealing with guerrilla forces. In these circumstances, rockets and missiles may represent an inappropriate degree of destruction, with a high risk of collateral damage. The RAF was embarrassed during operations against insurgents in Sierra Leone in 2000 to find that they had no suitable weapon for their gunless Harrier GR.7 aircraft to attack small groups of rebels operating close to innocent civilians. Another advantage of using cannon was demonstrated in the invasion of Afghanistan in 2002. During an intense infantry battle at Takur Ghar in late May, in which US forces were ambushed and in considerable danger, air support was called for. The AC-130 was not permitted to intervene in daylight due to its vulnerability, so USAF fighters were sent to help. For a part of the battle the Afghan combatants were too close to the Americans for rockets or bombs to be used, so the fighters - F-16s and even F-15s - went in strafing with their 20 mm cannon, as did the Navy's F-14s and F/A-18s on other occasions. Even RAF Tornadoes were reported to have carried out gun strafing runs on at least one occasion. It may logically be argued that it is foolish to risk an extremely expensive aircraft, with its expensively trained pilot, to being lost due to very low-tech ground fire, but sometimes the risk needs to be taken to save friendly lives." Exactly. Brooks The case rests... Tony Williams Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk Military gun and ammunition discussion forum: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/ |
#148
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#149
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On Thu, 11 Dec 2003 20:39:51 +0000, Greg Hennessy wrote:
On Thu, 11 Dec 2003 13:21:39 -0600, Alan Minyard wrote: Tony Williams Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk Military gun and ammunition discussion forum: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/ You have no idea. The Mauser was an inferior weapon. Al Minyard ROFLMAO! How did you draw that stunning conclusion. greg Well, if you signature is and indication, you are involved in the use of serious drugs, not someone that I would assume could make rational judgements. The fact that the US chose a different system pretty much tells me that the Mauser was (and is) an inferior system. Al Minyard |
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