FADEC = complex

Neil Gould writes:

And, you know this because...?

Because I've done the research, and because I've simmed these
situations as well.

The basis for this notion is...?

See my other post to Thomas for one of many examples of supporting
information for this point of view. It's the sort of thing that
pilots ignore at their peril. But pilots seem to ignore a lot of
things, especially the ones who fly tin cans.

--
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Recently, Mxsmanic posted:

Neil Gould writes:

(in response to your absurd statement of yours that one does not get
plenty of clues about something going awry prior to a critical situation
related to autopilots)
And, you know this because...?

Because I've done the research, and because I've simmed these
situations as well.

Then, you either don't understand your sim or don't understand the
relationship of your sim to the real world. In the real world, one *does*
get plenty of clues about such things as a change of flight parameters,
regardless of the cause. The reality of flying is that changes in trim or
a control setting results in a trade-off, and these trade-offs are easily
observable and we are trained from day one to do so.

But pilots seem to ignore a lot of
things, especially the ones who fly tin cans.

And, this, Jose, is an example of the kind of insults that come from this
person that doesn't even qualify as a "wannabe". It should not be
surprising that people respond to this kind of garbage with some disdain.

Neil

Neil Gould writes:

Then, you either don't understand your sim or don't understand the
relationship of your sim to the real world. In the real world, one *does*
get plenty of clues about such things as a change of flight parameters,
regardless of the cause.

No, one does not, as many accidents (real-world accidents, not sim
accidents) have proved.

The reality of flying is that changes in trim or
a control setting results in a trade-off, and these trade-offs are easily
observable and we are trained from day one to do so.

No, they are not. When the autopilot is in charge, lots of things can
gradually happen, and you won't know about it unless you _explicitly_
look for it. No magic sixth sense will tell you that anything is
wrong. And when the autopilot finally gives up and disconnects,
you're going to have to catch up and act fast if you don't want to
die.

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Mxsmanic wrote:
And when the autopilot finally gives up and disconnects,
you're going to have to catch up and act fast if you don't want to
die.

Pure crap, as usual. The autopilot can go to full nose up or down trim
and then let go and you still don't have to act fast. Some autopilots
do not manipulate the trim, they make you do it. There will be a little
light on the instrument telling you to trim up or down. Got any other
wisdom you'd like to pull out of your ass?

Mxsmanic,

See my other post to Thomas for one of many examples of supporting
information for this point of view.


Your post to me offers zero support for your POV.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

Neil,

This group takes pretty much
everyone to task for statements that they feel are inaccurate, and I see
no reason why Mxmanic should be treated differently.


Add to that the fact that he has never, ever, not even once, beginning
with his first question (on transponders, I believe) offered factual
support of his statements when asked for it.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

Mxsmanic,

that can be
directly attributed to problems with situational awareness linked to
the use of automated systems:


And it says that in the report where? Who exactly "can" and does
attribute it that way? You yourself don't count.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

In article ,
says...


Greg Farris writes:

That is demonstrably false!
There are several documented cases of mechanical failures of throttle
linkages in airplanes, and when it happens it is a genuine,
life-threatening emergency.

As I've said, failure modes are very limited for mechanical throttles,
and generally they are not catastrophic. A failure of a linkage, for
example, may deprive you of throttle control, but it is much less
likely to peg the throttle at idle or full power (although this
depends on design).

--



As I've said - as I've said - as I've said. . .
You are simply, demonstrably, completely WRONG!
It's easy to prove. Databases exist on these accidents, and they prove you
completely wrong.

"As I've said", is a meaningless phrase for someone who lives in complete
ignorance of the subject.

The USUAL failure mode for mechanical linkages results in complete, or
nearly complete power loss. There are dozens or accidents in the database
for this failure mode - several of them fatal.

I am not aware of accidents cause by software failure of Fadecs - perhaps
there have been - but these are certainly rare compared with mechanical
failures of linkages.

The databases contain thousands of accidents directly attributable to
mechanical failures in airplanes. I am not aware of ANY accident in which
software failure of a system was causal. There are plently of situations
where crew have misinterpreted situations, but I cannot think of any
accident in which a software failure has created an "unrecoverable"
situation, as has been the case in hundreds of mechanical failure
accidents.

In article ,
says...


Note the huge preponderance of Airbus in this list; Airbus likes to
add automation gadgets to their aircraft, and problems are common,
both because of defects in the systems, and because crews do not know
how to use and interact with the systems.




Fate plays such cruel tricks sometimes!
If only Airbus were aware that, as close as Paris, a few hundred miles away,
lives a leading world expert - perhaps even THE pre-eminent thinker on
aviation failure modes, who has at his fingertips the solution to their
massive accident rate. And at the same time this thinker is out of a job -
so destitute that he cannot afford any book, or even instruction to learn to
comprehend the few, dusty volumes he can get his hands on - he must while
away his days pretending to fly airplanes, wishing he could find practical
application for his advanced theories.

A simple phone call is all it would take for both sides of this cruel
non-equation to meet in triumphal success. Yet, we can be sure, the phone
call is not forthcoming - will never happen . . .

Greg Farris writes:

If only Airbus were aware that, as close as Paris, a few hundred miles away,
lives a leading world expert - perhaps even THE pre-eminent thinker on
aviation failure modes, who has at his fingertips the solution to their
massive accident rate.

There are plenty of experts available, and not just in Paris. Airbus
still chooses to go its own way. I suppose it needs something to
distinguish itself from Boeing, just as Canon needs to distinguish
itself from Nikon, and Apple from the Wintel OEMs.

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