F15E's trounced by Eurofighters

DAN wrote:

Hi Guy,

I love your description of the events. Not having half of the time it would take
to read the reference books myself, reading your excerpts is the next best thing


Glad you enjoy them, and I hope you find the time to do some reading yourself. I
tend to post long excerpts in hopes that people will find them so interesting that
they'll read the book.

On whether the Brit pilots had experience against the Mirage:
Not the pilots with the task force, but again Curtis had some experience in
the back seat of one.

IIRC the French helped out the Brats by specifically running a series of mock
attacks with Super Standards and Mirages against the task force when it departed
for the south.

I've read that, but not in any source (so far) that I'm willing to put a depend on.
Sharkey mentions ACM exercises between AdlA Mirages and UK-based SHARs while the
task force was on its way south, with the results forwarded to the task force.

Guy

Guy Alcala wrote:

snip

To cover the Mirage missions more quickly, on 1 May they dispatched either 10 or 12 sorties, each flight involving two a/c:
Fiera flight, Tablon, Limon, Dardo, Buitre* (Garcia-Cuerva/Perona, who'd also made up 'Limon'. *"F:TAW" says they were
Dardo, but also says that was one of the morning flights), and one other flight claimed but not identified in Mafe'
Huertas.

On further reading of Mafe' Huertas, the evidence for G-C and Perona being "Dardo" flight rather than "Buitre", as claimed in
"F:TAW", is stronger. On page 169, Huertas writes that Dardo launched at 1530, Buitre at 1553. He then says that "by 16:10
hrs, Buitre (Garcia-Cuerva and Perona -- their second sortie of the day) had reached the northern end of Pebble Island", which
is an impossiblity if Buitre's t/o time is correct, as Pebble Island is about 330-350nm from Rio Gallegos. No way they could
fly that distance in 17 minutes, but 40 minutes (which matches Dardo's t/o time) would work out nicely. On page 170, after
describing the shootdowns of G-C and Perona, he writes "Shortly after the dramatic end to 'Dardo' section, Buitre landed back at
Rio Gallegos without engaging the Sea Harriers", which also indicates that he switched the two a page earlier.

Guy

Evan Brennan wrote:

"Ian" wrote in message ...
"Evan Brennan" wrote in message
m...
Guy Alcala wrote in message
...
snip
British and Argentine writers said the same thing about Mirage
fighters, so your accusations are as poorly aimed as the British bombs
falling on Stanley airfield. : )


May have missed it somewhere else in the thread, (and I know it's got a
smiley after it) but wasn't the error on the Vulcan raid due to the
cartographer putting the wrong co-ordinates on the map?

The wisecracks from the Argentine pilots came because the British
mounted such a massive effort to cause such minor damage. The Vulcans
and Harriers attacked the runway with 1,000-pounders, but only one
bomb hit.

One bomb from the Vulcan. According to "F:TAW", two 1,000 lbers from a stick of three
dropped by Bertie Penfold in a lay-down delivery on 1 May also hit, but given the shallow
angle and lack of height and speed (they were para-retarded), they just scabbed the runway
and were a relatively minor problem. They would have needed to use something like Durandal
or BAT to have a chance of cratering the runway seriously form that profile. IIRR, the
Brits did have to repair the scabs after the war, though. IIRR the details of the damage
found on the runway and the repairs required are in "The Falklands aftermath: Picking up
the Pieces" by Lt. Gen (ret.) Edward Fursdon.

Guy

Guy Alcala wrote in message
...
Evan Brennan wrote:
The entire emotional palette of your pet beliefs is predicated
on the idea that the Sea Harrier, but not fuel consumption of
the Argentine jets, was the main influence on the tactics of
Argentine flights from the mainland to the Falklands.

I've never claimed anything of the kind, but feel free to point out
where you think I did.

But you said:
"they [Mirages] avoided the Sea harriers, but didn't on May 1st.
So what changed? The answer is, they got beat early, and decided to
throw in the A-A towel"

I said there wasnt' much ACM in the first place, for lack of fuel.
And, everyone but yourself agrees that the bombing by the Vulcan
influenced Argentina to reserve the Mirage for local air defense.


Fuel reserves played a part

The main part, where Argentine fast jets were concerned.

Then there's the huge advantage of the AIM-9L on the British side;
then the prewar ACM exercises that gave the British an important
edge. Then there was the matter of the Black Buck raid that caused
redeployment of the Mirage. The Harrier itself was a lesser factor,
in comparison.


weapons played a part, a/c capability played a part, tactics played
a part


The Argentine Mirage pilots felt they may have had a better chance
in a brief fight at high altitude, where their aircraft (but not
necessarily their missiles) had better performance. And better fuel
efficiency. But the Harrier pilots were unwilling to climb up there to
meet them.


You have
implied elsewhere that there was a significant amount of
manuevering, positioning and set-up by the Argentine jets on
May 1st, which is not true. In fact there was minimal ACM by
them, and even less later. More to follow.

I've never claimed that there was a significant amount of ACM
(I'd say a grand total of two occasions), but there was "maneuvering,
positioning and set up", on May 1st, albeit limited. If you think
I've claimed otherwise, please provide a cite.


Well you did say the Daggers and Mirages "forfeited the match and gave
the Brits a free ride after May 1st, because the Brits had achieved a
moral ascendancy over them" -- not because there was any question of
Argentine jets having enough fuel to carry out dogfights using their
inferior missiles.

To repeat, there wasn't much ACM anyhow but you seemed to be implying
that there was, and that it suddenly stopped mainly because of the
Harrier.


We know they rarely did so, the question is "why not, when
they had done so for a large number of sorties on May 1st?"

Oh? How many Daggers carried air-to-air missiles on May 1st?
We already know the Skyhawks did not.

According to "F:TAW", 12 A/A Dagger sorties were tasked on 1 May,
with 11 launched


Since when is '11' a "large number" of sorties?'. : )


and your conspiracy
theory that a few decoy flights somehow proves that the Mirages were
not held back because they anticipated bombings of the mainland.

Not a conspiracy theory, just an acknowledgement that there were other
reasons why they conceded the A/A battle to the Brits after 1 May


This another of your unsubstantiated pet beliefs. I can find no
authority, Argentine or British, who agrees. All say that the Vulcan
strike on Port Stanley convinced Argentina of possible attack and
that's what convinced them to reserve Group 8 for air defence of the
mainland.


If Moro is a propagandist -- Sharkey is Dr. Goebbels.


Hardly. At least Sharkey's got success on his side


I'm sure the French Mirage pilots would say just that to Sharkey
regarding their success against his beloved Sea Harrier. ; )

Evan Brennan wrote:

Guy Alcala wrote in message
...
Evan Brennan wrote:
The entire emotional palette of your pet beliefs is predicated
on the idea that the Sea Harrier, but not fuel consumption of
the Argentine jets, was the main influence on the tactics of
Argentine flights from the mainland to the Falklands.

I've never claimed anything of the kind, but feel free to point out
where you think I did.

But you said:
"they [Mirages] avoided the Sea harriers, but didn't on May 1st.
So what changed? The answer is, they got beat early, and decided to
throw in the A-A towel"

Yes, I did, and they did.

I said there wasnt' much ACM in the first place, for lack of fuel.

And I agree that was one of the issues. It still doesn't explain why the
fuel wasn't lacking on 1 May, but was subsequently.

And, everyone but yourself agrees that the bombing by the Vulcan
influenced Argentina to reserve the Mirage for local air defense.

I never said that it wasn't one of the factors (actually worries about Chile
seem to have been of equal if not greater significance). I question whether
such a decision would have been reached if they hadn't felt so totaly
outclassed by the Brits on 1 May. But again, even if they wished to hold
the Mirages back, the Daggers had the fuel to be effective. If they can
make it all the way to Port Stanley with 100nm on the deck carrying bombs
and 50 or so without on the way back, they sure as hell can get to the San
Carlos area using a high altitude cruise, with a reasonable amount of fuel
for CAP.

Fuel reserves played a part

The main part, where Argentine fast jets were concerned.

Certainly a significant part, especially with the Mirages.

Then there's the huge advantage of the AIM-9L on the British side;

Not a huge advantage, and one more psychological than practical, but it was
unquestionably there. As I've previously stated, the Brits would have won
just the same if they'd only had AIM-9Gs, with a slightly lower number of
kills and pK, and might even have lost a SHAR or two. Let's be clear he
Do you think Argentina would have won if that had been the case?

then the prewar ACM exercises that gave the British an important
edge.

As far as being much better trained in general than the argentine pilots,
and having the confidence of knowing that they had beaten far better
aircraft/weapon systems than Mirages, I'd agree. As far as the limited
tests against the Mirage, I doubt that was all that important. It was
obvious that the Mirage would want to take the fight towards the upper right
side of the envelope, while the Harriers wanted to be closer to the lower
left. Since neither side got into fully developed ACM, the fine points of
each a/c's performance advantages/disadvantages were essentially irrelevant
-- it was sight, turn, shoot, repeat or bug out as appropriate.

Then there was the matter of the Black Buck raid that caused
redeployment of the Mirage.

Aactually, it appears that the redeployment may have been even less than I
supposed. Huertas says they flew AD sorties from Rio Gallegos throughout,
mainly over the Andes and around Tierra del Fuego, and provides an account
by the Grupo 8 Ops officer, Major Sanchez, who did just that. He mentions
that he returned once to Rio Gallegos from a decoy mission over the
Falklands that had lasted "more than two hours [not exactly short on
endurance there, although obviously they were avoiding combat], and as my
a/c was being refueled on the ramp I received an urgent scramble order, so
the refueling was cut short and I launched with only internal fuel."

If they could fly missions to East Falkland on 1 May and then again much
later in the month, all the while maintaining an AD alert commitment, they
clearly could have done so during the critical 21-25 May period.
Personally, I'd have been tempted to launch escort missions with Magics only
and three tanks, or maybe mix the older and newer Mirages, giving the lead
just an R.530 and two tanks (no Magics or O/B pylons/racks), and the wingman
two Magics and 3 tanks, to boost endurance. Worth a try.

But let's assume that the reasons given for not flying Mirage escorts was
based purely on the perceived Vulcan threat. That doesn't explain why they
didn't use Daggers as escorts.

The Harrier itself was a lesser factor,
in comparison.

Except that it was the Harrier that was shooting them down, and which was
almost as fuel limited as they were.

weapons played a part, a/c capability played a part, tactics played
a part

The Argentine Mirage pilots felt they may have had a better chance
in a brief fight at high altitude, where their aircraft (but not
necessarily their missiles) had better performance. And better fuel
efficiency. But the Harrier pilots were unwilling to climb up there to
meet them.

Of course they were unwilling; you don't fight where your opponents fight
best, but make him fight where you fight best. Both sides adhered to that
philosophy, which is why most of the combats on 1 May were inconclusive --
it's just good tactics, and Sharkey covers all of this in his rules 1
through 4 of the Layman's Guide. Where the Argentine pilots fell down was
in not applying Rule 5, especially after 1 May: "The fifth rule is to
approach every fight in a _totally_ aggressive manner but without ignoring
Rules 1 to 4. Under-confidence and a half-hearted approach never won any
battle, either in the air or the ground. The pilot's motto should always be
'You can if you think you can!'"

It's clear from comments by Zini, Rotolo etc. that the AAF A-4 pilots
considered themselves as good as lost if a SHAR spotted them, and the
Mirage/Dagger pilots seem to be in just about the same mood post 1 May.

You have
implied elsewhere that there was a significant amount of
manuevering, positioning and set-up by the Argentine jets on
May 1st, which is not true. In fact there was minimal ACM by
them, and even less later. More to follow.

I've never claimed that there was a significant amount of ACM
(I'd say a grand total of two occasions), but there was "maneuvering,
positioning and set up", on May 1st, albeit limited. If you think
I've claimed otherwise, please provide a cite.

Well you did say the Daggers and Mirages "forfeited the match and gave
the Brits a free ride after May 1st, because the Brits had achieved a
moral ascendancy over them" -- not because there was any question of
Argentine jets having enough fuel to carry out dogfights using their
inferior missiles.

Yes, I did, which exactly describes the situation. The AAF Mirage/Daggers
had gone 0:3 on 1 May, and conceded the fight from that point on. The
Daggers at least had enough fuel to fight for a couple of minutes, although
they'd be dumb to do so if they could avoid it. Slashing attacks should be
the name of their game.

To repeat, there wasn't much ACM anyhow but you seemed to be implying
that there was, and that it suddenly stopped mainly because of the
Harrier.

And to repeat, at no point did I ever say there was much ACM, nor did I
imply it. I said they stopped flying CAP/escort missions after 1 May,
conceding the A/A battle to the Brits. They did, end of story.

We know they rarely did so, the question is "why not, when
they had done so for a large number of sorties on May 1st?"

Oh? How many Daggers carried air-to-air missiles on May 1st?
We already know the Skyhawks did not.

According to "F:TAW", 12 A/A Dagger sorties were tasked on 1 May,
with 11 launched

Since when is '11' a "large number" of sorties?'. : )

On 1 May, the AAF planned to launch 28 A-4 strike sorties, 6 Canberra strike
sorties, plus 10 Mirage and 12 Dagger escort sorties, a total of 56. The
actual totals were slightly different, as the Daggers launched some strike
sorties as well and the Mirages apparently put up a couple more. Only 35
sorties "reached targets"; apparently none of the A-4 sorties did, and only
three of the Dagger strikers. When you only launch 15 or so total Dagger
sorties on 1 May, 11 (12 planned) is a large number, especially when you add
in the Mirages. 21 or 23 out of perhaps 60 is a goodly total, and as a
percentage of sorties that did their jobs, it's far higher. Of course, if
you want to claim that 11 or 21/23 isn't "large" under any circumstances, I
suggest you check out how many SHAR sorties there were on 1 May, and then
remember that many of these would be sent up when no AAF a/c were present.

and your conspiracy
theory that a few decoy flights somehow proves that the Mirages were
not held back because they anticipated bombings of the mainland.

Not a conspiracy theory, just an acknowledgement that there were other
reasons why they conceded the A/A battle to the Brits after 1 May

This another of your unsubstantiated pet beliefs. I can find no
authority, Argentine or British, who agrees. All say that the Vulcan
strike on Port Stanley convinced Argentina of possible attack and
that's what convinced them to reserve Group 8 for air defence of the
mainland.


But they didn't reserve Grupo 8 for the mainland, they returned to flying
missions to East Falkland later (while still sitting AD alert) , they just
wouldn't put the Mirages in a position where they might come into contact
with SHARs. The Vulcans were still at Ascension, able to attack any point
in Argentina.

If Moro is a propagandist -- Sharkey is Dr. Goebbels.


Hardly. At least Sharkey's got success on his side

I'm sure the French Mirage pilots would say just that to Sharkey
regarding their success against his beloved Sea Harrier. ; )

And just what is the exchange ratio in actual combat between the SHAR and
Mirage/Dagger? 11:0. What's the exchange ratio of French Mirage pilots
against Sharkey's squadron? AFAIK, they never flew against them when he was
CO, but 801 flew against far better a/c, and more than held their own. Do I
think this means that the SHAR is the world's greatest fighter and can never
be beaten by Mirages (or any other a/c), no matter who's flying them, what
weapons they have or what the tactical situation is? Of course not. I'm on
record repeatedly over the years repeating the favorite saying of a friend
of mine: "The most important factor in A/A combat is the quality of the
ejection seat baggage." Operational and technical factors can also play a
large part, as they did here. The Harrier can be beaten, just as any a/c
can be. But if you listened to the conventional wisdom before the war, both
the usual clueless pundits as well as numerous professionals who should have
known better said that the SHAR didn't stand a chance against the Mirage.
Sharkey said Bull****! (in the same way that Adm. Leach said that Britain
could retake the Falklands, when the Army and Navy CoSs along with Nott were
doing their doom and gloom bit), and he was right in the only arena that
mattered, that of actual combat. That's success.

Guy

Guy Alcala wrote in message ...
This another of your unsubstantiated pet beliefs. I can find no
authority, Argentine or British, who agrees. All say that the Vulcan
strike on Port Stanley convinced Argentina of possible attack and
that's what convinced them to reserve Group 8 for air defence of the
mainland.


But they didn't reserve Grupo 8 for the mainland


The facts prove that they did.


they returned to flying missions to East Falkland later


Only a few.

Guy Alcala wrote in message ...
If Moro is a propagandist -- Sharkey is Dr. Goebbels.


Hardly. At least Sharkey's got success on his side

I'm sure the French Mirage pilots would say just that to Sharkey
regarding their success against his beloved Sea Harrier. ; )

And just what is the exchange ratio in actual combat between the SHAR and
Mirage/Dagger? 11:0.


Troll. 2:0 is closer to the truth.

The Sea Harriers shot down ONE Mirage; and only ONE of the Daggers
they shot down was carrying "actual missiles". ; )


What's the exchange ratio of French Mirage pilots against Sharkey's
squadron?


Maybe you should ask Sharkey.

Evan Brennan wrote:

Guy Alcala wrote in message ...
This another of your unsubstantiated pet beliefs. I can find no
authority, Argentine or British, who agrees. All say that the Vulcan
strike on Port Stanley convinced Argentina of possible attack and
that's what convinced them to reserve Group 8 for air defence of the
mainland.


But they didn't reserve Grupo 8 for the mainland

The facts prove that they did.

they returned to flying missions to East Falkland later

Only a few.

Nice to see you're now admitting that, in fact, they didn't reserve Grupo 8 for the mainland but did indeed continue to fly
missions over the Falklands, just as Grupo 8's Ops Officer Maj. Sanchez stated in the quote I provided. Just to drive the
point home, here's a quote from a source you seem to out a lot of credence in (which says a lot), Moro's "The History of the
South Atlantic Conflict", pp. 217-18, referring to the missions flown on D-Day, 21 May:

"The first diversionary mission [unclear if he's referring to Mirages or Lear Jets here] commenced at 0930 hours, and the
first attack squadron, code-named Nandu' (Ostrich) left the runway at 0944 hours [Guy Note: Apparently Southern Argentine
time, GMT-3, vs, the GMT-4 kept in Buenos Aires and the Falklands]. It comprised three Mirage-V Daggers. The mission:
attack naval targets in San Carlos Strait [Falkland Sound]. They were followed a minute later by the Perros (Dogs), backed
up, at 0953 and 0955 hours, by the Zorros (Foxes) and the Leones (Lions), flying identical formations on a mission with a
single objective. At 0956 and 100 hours, two flights of Mirage IIIs, _configured for air to air combat, screamed off to fly
top cover_."

Unfortunately, as a general rule these later escort/decoy missions were unproductive as they stayed up high, so the SHARs
ignored them and stayed low for the strikers. No combats resulted, but combat wasn't necessarily required, as long as they
could occupy the SHARs so that the strikers could get through. This didn't happen for the reasons stated above. The excuse
for the lack of aggressiveness from the Argentine side is that the Mirages couldn't come down low for lack of fuel. Let's
look at that claim again, delving once again into the technical minutiae you consider so unimportant.

The Mirages had an internal fuel capacity of 2,940l (777 USG), 470l (124 USG) less than the Daggers, so they were
undoubtedly more fuel limited. But they were even more fuel limited owing to decisions made by the Argentines themselves.
To start, with the strikers at low altitude and the SHARS likewise, there was absolutely no point in hauling around the
R.530. While it might provide some minimal threat at medium/high altitude, on the deck it was so much extra baggage,
especially when the Mirages had Magics available. Dumping the R.530s and replacing them with a 1,300l (343 USG) C/L drop
tank would have more than compensated (applying the rough rule of thumb for jets, that 1/2 of the fuel in a drop tank is
used to push the tank's extra drag, that provides 650l extra) for the Dagger's greater internal fuel load, and bought them
several minutes of endurance, even at low altitude.

But the even more basic point, which shows the whole Argentine claim about fuel limitations being the primary reason the
Mirages stopped challenging the SHARs as fallacious, is where the Mirages were based. Throughout the war, the Mirages
operated from a single southern airbase. The AAF fighter/strikers operated from 3 main bases during the war. From north to
south, they're San Julian, Rio Gallegos, and Rio Grande. Here are the distances from each base to Port Stanley, from three
different sources ("The Royal Navy and the Falklands War," "Falklands: the Air War" and the World Distance Calculator,

http://www.infoairports.com/freeserv...ddistance.html

using the base lat/long. as given in F:TAW):

San Julian - Port Stanley: 395nm / -- / 410nm

Rio Gallegos - Port Stanley: 420nm / 428nm / 430nm

Rio Grande - Port Stanley: 380nm / 381nm / 384nm

Guess which base the Mirages operated from throughout, despite the range/endurance limitations which became apparent on 1
May. That's right, the one furthest from the Falklands -- Rio Gallegos, along with Grupo 5's A-4Bs. At a minimum, moving
the Mirages from Rio Gallegos to Rio Grande would have eliminated 80nm from the round-trip distance, up to a maximum of
92nm. Put another way, assuming the Mirages would be cruising at 8 to 9 miles per minute (480-540kts), basing them at Rio
Grande saves them 9 to 10 minutes of fuel. Applying the rule of thumb that fuel burn at SL is triple that at the
tropopause, that still gives them 3+ minutes of extra endurance at SL, and this is without dumping the R.530 and replacing
it with a drop tank.

If they couldn't put them at Rio Grande for some reason, they could move them to San Julian (and move the Grupo 4 A-4Cs to
Rio Gallegos if necessary. That's where the KC-130s were based, so that would make sense), and still gain at least 40nm of
endurance. The Daggers were based at San Julian and Rio Grande throughout, so it made absolutely no sense to put the
shorter-ranged Mirages at Rio Gallegos, and then complain about how fuel-limited they were. BTW, San Carlos is between 38
and 52nm closer to the various bases than Port Stanley is. So, the idea that unsolvable fuel restrictions were the major
reason behind the Mirages being unable/unwilling to get into combat with the SHARs after 1 May is manifestly false.

However, even if you still believe the Mirages were too fuel-limited to be effective, that still doesn't explain why Daggers
weren't used for escort/cover on 21 May and subsequent, as the vast majority of Dagger sorties were so tasked on 1 May.
Some might say that it was because every sortie was needed for strike, but what mattered wasn't the number of strike sorties
launched, but how many made it to the target. Forfeiting the a/a battle had several negative effects for the AAF; it made
the strikers sitting ducks if the SHARs caught them, caused many sorties to be turned away by the controllers because SHARs
were in the area, and allowed the SHARs to operate against the strikers with ever increasing confidence, worrying less and
less about potential threats from escorts. These limitations were especially critical on 21-25 May, when the AoA was still
being established.

The escorts don't have to shoot down a single SHAR to be effective, they just have to keep them busy and/or looking over
their shoulder so the strikers can get through. It wouldn't have taken much; even a single two-ship escort/low-level CAP
per strike mission might have made a significant difference. And even if the escorts themselves get shot down, that's still
preferable to losing strikers, especially the Grupo 5 A-4Bs. At least the escorts would have a good chance of running away
from the SHARs, something the A-4s generally couldn't manage without a big head start, or the SHAR being at the end of its
CAP time.

Guy

Evan Brennan wrote:

Guy Alcala wrote in message ...
If Moro is a propagandist -- Sharkey is Dr. Goebbels.


Hardly. At least Sharkey's got success on his side

I'm sure the French Mirage pilots would say just that to Sharkey
regarding their success against his beloved Sea Harrier. ; )

And just what is the exchange ratio in actual combat between the SHAR and
Mirage/Dagger? 11:0.

Troll. 2:0 is closer to the truth.

No, 11:0 is the truth, 3:0 against A/A tasked Mirage/Daggers, with the other 8 being A/G tasked a/c. And one of the latter
was the only Dagger to take a gunshot at a SHAR (if you believe Moro, a SHAR was shot down in this attack, which undoubtedly
comes as a great surprise to Captain Donadille, who took the shots, and Sharkey (or maybe Steve Thomas), who was apparently
the target. Thomas was hit by what is claimed to be 20mm fire from Port Howard shortly afterwards, suffering minor damage,
but you could at least postulate that this was really 30mm fire from Donadille, even if the damage isn't comparable and
Donadille was apparently nowhere near Thomas at any point during the fight. What we do know is that Moro's account on pg.
225 is entirely wrong:

"But, in one of the aerial turns executed by the pilots in the course of their dogfight, a British plane presented its
underbelly to Dagger No. 1 (Captain Donadille), which lost no time in pumping in a heavy stream of cannon fire. Apparently
the British plane, its fuel tanks ruptured, went down in the sea short of its carrier. Nevertheless, the day went to his
mates, for in the course of this action, all three Daggers were knocked out of the skies."

I see I was overstating things -- the above account isn't entirely wrong -- he did get the part about all three Daggers
being shot down correct.


The Sea Harriers shot down ONE Mirage;

Plus one with an assist by the Argentine AAA at Port Stanley. That one was unlikely to be able to land safely, given holed
fuel tanks and damaged controls on a too short runway. After those two plus Ardiles' Dagger, the AAF forfeited the A/A
battle, leaving the SHARs nothing else to do but pick off the A/G-tasked Daggers and A-4s.

and only ONE of the Daggers
they shot down was carrying "actual missiles". ; )

Indeed, quite a change from 1 May, when 11 out of 14 Daggers were so armed. Oh, but that's right, they weren't tasked A/A
after that because they didn't have adequate range at low altitude. Apparently they had adequate range to make it all the
way to Port Stanley (not by the most direct route) from San Julian on 1 May, while carrying a pair of 500 lb. bombs and
flying the last 100nm or so inbound on the deck, plus a bit more during the return. But not sufficient range to carry a
pair of AAMs and the same external fuel load to the San Carlos area on 21 May and subsequent, a 50nm shorter radius, and
without having to make a 100+nm run at SL (after all, they want to attract the attention of the SHARs, so can hold off their
descent until arriving in the area). Yeah, who could possibly question that logic? Now maybe, just maybe, the drag of O/B
mounted missiles is so high compared to bombs mounted on the aft fuselage stations, that they really can't manage it despite
all the above. And pigs might fly, too.

What's the exchange ratio of French Mirage pilots against Sharkey's
squadron?

Maybe you should ask Sharkey.

Maybe you should, since you're the one who claimed that there had been such combats.

Guy

Guy Alcala wrote:

Evan Brennan wrote:

"Ian" wrote in message ...
"Evan Brennan" wrote in message
m...
Guy Alcala wrote in message
...
snip
British and Argentine writers said the same thing about Mirage
fighters, so your accusations are as poorly aimed as the British bombs
falling on Stanley airfield. : )


May have missed it somewhere else in the thread, (and I know it's got a
smiley after it) but wasn't the error on the Vulcan raid due to the
cartographer putting the wrong co-ordinates on the map?

The wisecracks from the Argentine pilots came because the British
mounted such a massive effort to cause such minor damage. The Vulcans
and Harriers attacked the runway with 1,000-pounders, but only one
bomb hit.

One bomb from the Vulcan. According to "F:TAW", two 1,000 lbers from a stick of three
dropped by Bertie Penfold in a lay-down delivery on 1 May also hit, but given the shallow
angle and lack of height and speed (they were para-retarded), they just scabbed the runway
and were a relatively minor problem. They would have needed to use something like Durandal
or BAT to have a chance of cratering the runway seriously form that profile. IIRR, the
Brits did have to repair the scabs after the war, though. IIRR the details of the damage
found on the runway and the repairs required are in "The Falklands aftermath: Picking up
the Pieces" by Lt. Gen (ret.) Edward Fursdon.

I've now retrieved Fursdon (btw, it's Maj. Gen. (ret.) not Lt. Gen. as I wrote) from a distant
library. He arrived via C-130 from Ascension in Stanley on 27 July 1982 -- here's the damage
the Royal Engineers told him they had to repair:

"The airfield at Stanley had been built by British contractors in the late Seventies to cater
for the short-haul Fokker a/c operated by Argentina, in fact by the [AAF], flying between the
Falklands and Argentina. Its runway was 4,100 feet long and 150 feet wide and designed to
Load Classification Number (LCN) 16 but was subsequently estimated, with an increased pavement
thickness, to be of LCN 30 standard.

"During the campaign the runway had been cratered by the Vulcan bomber and Harrier raids, and
had suffered over 1,000 'scabs' or shalow scuffs in its surface. The Argentinians had
temporarily back-filled the five large craters [Guy: 1 deep one by Vulcan, the other four
shallower, by retard bombs dropped by SHAR/GR.3], enabling them to continue to fly in C-130
Hercules transports right up to the end. They had also arranged rings of earth on the runway
to show up as craters on British air reconnaissance photos.

"By properly repairing three craters and dealing with about 500 'scabs', No. 1 Troop of 59
Commando Squadron Royal Engineers had the northern half of the runway ready to accept the
first British Hercules on 24 June [Guy: Obviously, risks worth taking in landing on a rough
runway during the war wouldn't be taken afterwards. One of the Argentine C-130s almost
crashed on takeoff during the war when a main gear wheel hit the corner of the
roughly-repaired Vulcan crater]. The craters had compacted 'fill' and were topped by sheets
of AM2 matting, secured by four-feet long steel pins, taken from a conveniently placed
abandoned stockpile brought to the Island in the early Seventies by Argentinians in connection
with a runway which was never completed*. The 'scabs' were effectively repaired with Bostik
276, which is a magnesium phosphate cement/fine aggregate mixture.

"The focus now turned on the southern part of the runway which included one huge crater made
by the RAF Vulcan's 1,000 lb. bomb. This alone took more than 1,000 square meters of the old
Argentine AM2 matting to repair. 'We were in fact really very relieved that only one Vulcan
bomb had actually hit the runway', said a weary Sapper.

"By 1 July No. 3 Troop of 11 Field Squadron had completed the repairs and the whole runway was
again usuable, but both the crater and the 'scab' repair areas called for constant monitoring
and maintenance. Nevertheless the reopened runway withstood a further 77 Hercules and several
hundred Harrier landings, operationally vital to the Garrison, before it was closed for
extension and complete re-surfacing on the evening of 15 August."

The upgrade was so that F-4s could operate from it, and involved using AM2 to cover the entire
runway and extend it to 6,100 feet, boosting the LCN to 45, adding five arrester gears,
increasing apron area five times, adding three dispersals with hangars, lights, power, fuel
etc. It was realised early in the war that this would need to be done, so materiel orders and
design had continued while it was still being fought. The runway itself was completed and
reopened for traffic on 27 August.

*Fursdon may be in error here. Argentina had built a short AM-2 matting runway at Hooker's
Point, to use while the hard surface runway was being debated and then built. However, during
1978 or 1979, high winds lifted the matting and essentially destroyed the runway. Ewen
Southby-Tailyour was in command of NP 8901 at the time the runway was destroyed, and describes
it in his book "Reasons in Writing." The 'stockpile' may have been matting etc. that was
salvaged, or it may have been left over from the original construction as Fursdon says.
Things tended to move slowly in the Falklands pre-war, so it's easy to believe that this stuff
could be sitting around for several years. Southby-Tailyour mentions that the Royal Marine
barracks at Moody Brook had been condemned as unfit for human occupancy, first in 1918 and
again in 1945, but was still in use with only minor repairs in 1982! The war finally
destroyed it.

Guy