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#161
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http://www.p-38online.com/p38j.html
In spite of all the advances and improvements, the P-38 J would suffer in the European Theater of Operations. Lockheed did all the testing in the United States, and were never tested in conditions similar to those in Britain. Once the P-38 J arrived in Britain, problems were encountered immediately. In addition to the new problems, many new, inexperienced pilots were beginning to fly. The problems would take time to work out, but the 8th Air Force was not able or willing to wait. At this time, P-51 D Mustangs and new versions of the P-47 Thunderbolt were available to perform long-range escort and strike missions. This was the beginning of the end of the P-38 in the ETO. -HJC |
#162
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No, the reason they weren't there is because there weren't enough to go
around, owing to the need to redesign the a/c for mass production, and a delayed development due to the crash of the prototype. "The production in mid-1940 of 30 P-38's saw signifcant design changes instituted to help mass production. For the first time, the fuselage was split into left and right halves, and the nose section was built up independently. The aft booms also were divided into two pieces with the skins adjusted to accomodate this....The XP-38A was a converted P-38 with pressurization; next production variant was the P38D of late summer 1940. The ever indeasing orders for Lightnings prompted more design changes, both to improve performance and to faciliate mass production." --Warbird Tech Series vol 2, Lockheed P-38 Lightning pp. 22-26 by Frederick A Johnsen Sounds to me like the needed changes were in hand well before 1941, let alone 1942. Sure they were in hand, but they also caused a lot of delay, which is why the a/c was so slow in getting into mass production and why the numbers remained so low relatively late. If someone had said, "hey, we are going to need long range escorts, and the only aircraft even remotely capable is the P-38," then these problems might have been overcome. The P-38F, the first full-up combat-capable version was available for combat in August 1942; the first flight was made in January 1939, so roughly 3.5 years elapsed. Even allowing for a fairly leisurely development prior to the war, the P-38's development was unusually prolonged, especially when compared with its single-engined stablemates. And then in 1943 the wing leading edges, turbos, radiators etc. all had to undergo a major redesign to fit leading edge tanks in, then they had to re-tool before they could produce them. snip 3 months maybe six months possibly, but a year? I think not. Production was still ramping up, and the P-38 was still suffering from many of the same problems in August 1944 as it had in October '43, 10 months after the 55th achieved IOC in the ETO. That might have been alleviated earlier the generals in England had pushed it. But they did not. Can't push what you don't know you need, They could have known they were going to need a lot more P-38's. The kernal of this whole issue is that Eaker and Hunter didn't divine that they needed a long range escort, and remained blind to this fact after pretty much everyone else had tumbled onto it. and since they didn't have ANY P-38s in the late fall of 1942, winter, spring or summer of 1943, there was no opportunity for them to work out the bugs. Now that doesn't seem fair, because a P-38 group WAS in England in December 1942. That was the 78th FG. According to Freeman in "The Mighty Eighth", most of the aircraft and pilots were sent to North Africa. Also, at the start of 1943, the B-17 groups were dealing fairly well with the German fighters. By the summer the Germans would modfy the equation in their favor. Freeman does note that the P-38 was "a complicated aircraft to build and production was unable to meet the demands both the demands of attrition and equipment of new units." Perhaps what it comes down to is this: Even if Eaker and Hunter had been strongly seeking P-38's for escort, could those demands have been met by say, "Blitz Week" in 1943, when the GAF really started to hurt the Fortresses? You're suggesting that production could not possibly have met the need. I'll grant that possibility. It's a what-if, and we'll never know. The 1st, 14th and 82nd FGs had all been sent to the MTO, while the 78th had been stripped of a/c to replace losses, and transitioned to the P-47. Sending all the P-38s to the MTO was a decision made well above Eaker's pay grade, and there wasnt anything he could do about it. As I say above, the B-17's at the start of 1943 were seen to be coping with the Luftwaffe defense. But it's also true that the 8th AF was the premier force in the world as far as Arnold was concerned. If the 8th had been seen as needing long range escorts, surely they could have been provided. It's also true that some of the B-17 group commanders didn't care much about escorts in the early part of the campaign. All that rendesvouzing made things more complicated, don't you know. But as the Germans realized the threat and acted to meet that threat, the B-17 bomber boxes met their match and were overborne. Certainly, and after Aug. 17th 1943 you can make a good case for accusing Eaker of remaining wedded to doctrine over experience. You might even make that case by June 1943 - Arnold had already reached that conclusion. But not in the Fall/Winter of 1942/43. They should have. Why? Because they got their asses handed to them. The Luftwaffe was still working out tactics, had barely started to attack the heavies, hadn't yet begun to augment their fighter defenses in the west, and were inflicting only light to moderate casualties. That's right. It's all a big what if. All I am saying is, "what if Eaker and Hunter had seen the need for a long range escort?" But they didn't. And they didn't see the need either of them, until after it was plain to everyone else that the bombers needed help. It's tragic, but there it is. We were still flying shallow penetrations, and didnt even hit a coastal target in Germany (Wilhelmshaven) until January 30th, 1943. We were flying few missions every month owing to the poor weather, and we only had four heavy bomb groups available (none with Tokyo tanks that allowed us to go really deep), so no conclusive test of doctrine was possible. Production was very limited at the time. Yes, I am providing a what-if. If the guys in England had been screaming for P-38's the production could have been ramped up. Everyone in every theater other than the ETO (where there were no P-38s because they were all sent to the MTO) was screaming for more, and yet production was what it was. Yes, production was what it was. I find it hard to believe it couldn't have been increased. And yet it wasn't, despite screams from the MTO and PTO asking for every single P-38 they could get. Do you know that? Maybe they were straining every sinew to turn out P-38's. I've gotten the impression that no particular stress was put on. They were surely working as dilligently as anyone in war production, but did anyone say, this is the most important fighter we have? The USAAF was sold on the Thunderbolt. Development of the Merlin Mustangs lagged also. If someone had said, "yes we are handling the GAF now but they might produce new tactics, new equipment and strongly reinforce," then it might have been a different story beginning in the summer of '43. You make some very good points and I appreciate them. Walt |
#163
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There is an interesting thing about post-war bombing
and that is that, on the whole, it was based on British WWII tactics more than anything else. The debate about which force used the better tactics during WWII, the RAF or the USAAF, is fairly pointless. As far as tactics go, perhaps. The RAF was attacking targets that couldn't help bring Germay closer to defeat, certainly not in relation to the losses the RAF suffered. At the time, both did the best they could, and in the end they were both reasonably successful. The RAF was -not- successful. If not for the USAAF, they couldn't have appeared over Germany at all after D-day. Walt |
#164
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The P-38 was the least effective of the USAAF fighters over Germany,
thanks to a combination of factors. Once the USAAF could deploy escorts in numbers to the required targets then yes the Luftwaffe day fighter force was in trouble. The engineering to provide the escorts in numbers took most of 1943. Then the long range escorts appeared. I would like to point out that the "least effective fighter" may not be taking an overall view. Most of the problems with P-38 operations were the result of early doctrine and poor training of aircrew in multi-engine operations. They suffered through comparatively high loss rates in early operations where their writ was not to pursue the enemy, but to provide close escort, much as the Luftwaffe fighter force was in the Battle of Britain. Being unable to pursue an enemy limits your kill potential, but they DID cause a significant drop in bomber losses. In 1945, P-38s which were still flying escort missions under the later doctrine (and in equal or superior numbers to the defenders) had about the same results as their brethren in -47s and -51s. MNr. Sinclair's preferred method is not to disagree with what you say 90% of the time. It is to nitpick over the other 10% so he can parade his pedantry. Walt |
#165
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Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in
May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF deployed against Germany and include reserves etc. Thanks for the minutia. Not minutia in this case, but very germane, as the lack of P-38 numbers was a factor. Gee, that is -my- point. And the reason they were not there is because Eaker and Hunter didn't stress it. Yes folks, Eaker and Hunter are the designated Black Hat wearers of the moment, all evil comes from them. I have said that it might have been beyond anyone to make such a determination. But for whatever reason, they didn't make it, didn't tumble onto it after many others had, and were sacked in large part because of it. snip pedantic rant I'll look in later notes in the thread, but you seem to not responded to this piece of text: Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air to push for a long range fighter. Source? I find no corroboration for such a supposed statement. "Eaker as late as October 1943 still believed the key was in the size of the bomber formations... Eaker stuck to this belief while high-ranking officers such as Chief of the Air Staff Barney Giles and commanmder of the VIII Bomber Command Fred Anderson had determined that escort was the key to victory." -- "To Command the Sky, p. 112, by McFarland and Newton "During June 1943 Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert Lovett visited England to observe Eighth Air Force operations. He spent considerable time inspecting the VIII Fighter Command and especially the problems of escort. At an Eighth Air Force comanders' mmeeting immediately after Lovett's visit, Hunter told Eaker that he feared Lovett would insist on the use of P-38's for escort. Hunter identified the P-38 as a "wonderful ship," but preferrred to give the P-47 a "complete trial." In doing so Hunter reavealed his misunderstanding of the basic issue confronting the Eighth Ar Force in the summer and fall of 1943. The bombers needed escorts with range, bot superior fighters. The P-47 was a better dogfighter, but it did not have the legs to fly long escort missions." ibid, p. 114 I find no evidence that Eaker thought it imperitive to provide escort or that he communicated such with Lovett. You seem to have just made it up. Walt |
#166
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In reality neither was, the combined effect was a 24 hour
7 day a week assault on Germany that devastated that nations economy and infrastructure. For at least the last year, the RAF was attacking targets that added little to the final destruction of Germany when it could have done better. Walt |
#167
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WaltBJ wrote:
I have read inan RAF history that some Canadian Halifax squadrons installed a single flexible 50 cal in a ventral mount - and were pretty suucessful at countering Schrage Musik attacks. We talked about this a few months ago - thread was called "Has there ever been an off-center gun?" As far as I can tell, all ventral mountings, apart from the Sperry ball turret, suffered from either an enormous amount of drag (dustbins), or a restricted field of view (periscopes, little windows etc). Good visibility seems like a prerequisite for locating night fighters, but the added weight and drag of the dustbin turrets was deemed a liability by the crews, who were instrumental in their removal (apparantly). The Canadian Halifax "Preston Green" mountings were installed in place of the missing H2S scanner, when radar production was running behind bomber production. When the radar became available it was fitted in the place of the gun. |
#168
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"WalterM140" wrote in message ... In reality neither was, the combined effect was a 24 hour 7 day a week assault on Germany that devastated that nations economy and infrastructure. For at least the last year, the RAF was attacking targets that added little to the final destruction of Germany when it could have done better. Walt The RAF layed a major part in the oil war in that period. Which targets do you think were more important ? Keith |
#169
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"ArtKramr" wrote in message ... ubject: Night bombers interception.... From: "Keith Willshaw" hat single aircraft ended up over targets was a result of the extremely poor reliability of the aircraft, it was not uncommon for half the dispatched aircraft to have to return to base. Indeed the USAAC described the B-17C as being unsuitable for combat use. Why do you think we gave them to the Brits? You didnt 'give' then to us, we bought them. This was before lend lease. Keith |
#170
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"WaltBJ" wrote in message om... I have read inan RAF history that some Canadian Halifax squadrons installed a single flexible 50 cal in a ventral mount - and were pretty suucessful at countering Schrage Musik attacks. I can well believe that - looking up through the top of a canopy at a firing 50M2 at say 100 feet would probably be the last thing an LW Nachtjaeger pilot saw. Walt BJ Trouble is a fight between an aircraft armed with 30mm cannon and one armed with a single 0.5 will mostly favour the fighter. The most successful defensive tactic was to perform an immediate evasion by flying a violent corkscrew manoeuvre Keith |
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