![]() |
If this is your first visit, be sure to check out the FAQ by clicking the link above. You may have to register before you can post: click the register link above to proceed. To start viewing messages, select the forum that you want to visit from the selection below. |
|
|
Thread Tools | Display Modes |
#11
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
Michael wrote:
But in order to trust the instructor, you have to believe the instructor really knows best. In other words, you have to believe that while you are operating outside your envelope, the instructor is well within his. This is made more difficult because there are many documented cases where this was not true. All I can say is, choose your instructor carefully. Just because the FAA gives a guy a piece of paper doesn't mean he's qualified. You're absolutely right about making the right instructor choice. But I still think that there's a line here that can be drawn, if not easily. Yes, we're trusting the intructor. But there's still a difference, at least as I see it, between (1) deliberately going past one's envelope with the backup of an instructor, and (2) letting one get out of one's envelope due to complacency. One is an intentional - and communicated, but I'm thinking this is merely a consequence of intent - act while the other occurs through a relaxation of one's attention/care/responsibility. However, this idea of the instructor as a safety mechanism can be taken too far with the pilot has in his mind, even if quietly, "if this was bad, he'd say something". Now you're changing the situation. Yes, poor communications can be deadly. Yes. But I'm thinking that this - communication - is more a symptom than cause in the "syndrome" I'm trying to define. It is indeed quite possible for the student to see something the instructor has missed. It is absolutely legitimate and proper for the student to bring this up. However, it is equally legitimate for the instructor to say "Yes, I'm aware of this, and it's not a problem because..." and you either trust the instructor and keep going or you get another instructor. But this is a perfect example of "trust" and not "complacency". To turn this into "complacency", the student would either (1) not notice because he's paying less attention or (2) not tell the instructor. Either could result from the student assuming that if there really were a problem, the instructor would say something. [...] The concerns of the copilot should be addressed, but the ultimate decisionmaking authority remains with the captain. Always. And yes, somtimes that means pressing on when the copilot is uncomfortable because the captain is comfortable. This is something on which I'm not yet clear. In my reading, some of the accident descriptions include the captain overriding the copilot's discomfort. In one example, the last words on the CVR were "I told you so". I think that what's being offered is that sometimes the more comfortable pilot *should* be overridden. However, an instructional flight is - as you note - obviously a different situation. There's the expectation of discomfort, if you will. As long as "envelope excursions" are made explicitly, this is "trust". It's the unawared excursion that's the problem. [...] I think you need to separate the two. Right. That's exactly what I'm doing grin. [...] When operating outside one's envelope, there is unavoidable risk. That is a good point. Justified, but there nevertheless. [...] This was a perfect example of poor communication. Yes. Thanks for sharing it. [...] Basically, I think you're invoking intent when what we're really dealing with is just communication. The intent was the same first and second time around; it's just that the first time around we botched the communication and nearly put a wing in the trees. Perhaps. In this example, you accepted going past your envelope explicitly, even though there was a communication failure. I still believe that there's "more room for error": performing a task outside the envelope w/o explicitly realizing/considering that fact. Of course, failure to realize something will cause that non-realization to not be communicated. - Andrew |
#12
|
|||
|
|||
![]() I think that what's being offered is that sometimes the more comfortable pilot *should* be overridden. But when? Jose -- (for Email, make the obvious changes in my address) |
#13
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
Teacherjh wrote:
I think that what's being offered is that sometimes the more comfortable pilot *should* be overridden. But when? Good question. I don't yet have an answer. It may be that the literature doesn't provide a clear answer, but I'm not yet ready to say that. - Andrew |
#14
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
Andrew Gideon wrote
Yes, we're trusting the intructor. But there's still a difference, at least as I see it, between (1) deliberately going past one's envelope with the backup of an instructor, and (2) letting one get out of one's envelope due to complacency. One is an intentional - and communicated, but I'm thinking this is merely a consequence of intent - act while the other occurs through a relaxation of one's attention/care/responsibility. So what you're postulating is the existence of a pilot who stops asessing risk just because the instructor is there, even though he's actually a pilot who is already able to fly on his own, and thus necessarily able to asess and manage risk? Are you sure this actually happens? Because from my point of view, that's like abdicating one's responsibility as a pilot, and dropping to the level of a passenger who is allowed to manipulate the controls or share some cockpit tasks. If that's what you mean, well, I admit there is a difference between that and simply poor communication - but are you sure this actually happens? But this is a perfect example of "trust" and not "complacency". To turn this into "complacency", the student would either (1) not notice because he's paying less attention But in training, it's fairly common and perfectly legitimate to force the student to operate at task saturation for extended periods. This will cause him not to notice things because he is paying less attention - but this is the unavoidable price of teaching the emergency survival skill of flying at task saturation. (2) not tell the instructor. Either could result from the student assuming that if there really were a problem, the instructor would say something. And that may be part of the ground rules of the flight. For example, a hooded pilot abdicates the responsibility for collision avoidance to the safety pilot. He can pretty much keep on trucking unless the safety pilot says something. This was a perfect example of poor communication. Yes. Thanks for sharing it. But do you see that there was no complacency involved? We both fully understood that we were undertaking envelope expansion - that we would be operating within his envelope but outside mine. Yet we still screwed it up. Perhaps. In this example, you accepted going past your envelope explicitly, even though there was a communication failure. I still believe that there's "more room for error": performing a task outside the envelope w/o explicitly realizing/considering that fact. I simply have a hard time imagining how it would happen. I mean, if what you're doing is within your envelope, why do you have the instructor there? You could simply do it yourself. Michael |
#15
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
Andrew Gideon wrote
I think that what's being offered is that sometimes the more comfortable pilot *should* be overridden. But when? Good question. I don't yet have an answer. I will suggest one for you - when more comfortable does not mean more capable. The problem is how to measure capability. I will also suggest that nothing is perfect, and that just because something bad happens after the less comfortable pilot predicted it would does not mean that his reasoning was not faulty. I offer for your consideration the famous warning, "Beware the Ides of March." Michael |
#16
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
So what you're postulating is the existence of a pilot who stops
asessing risk just because the instructor is there, even though he's actually a pilot who is already able to fly on his own, and thus necessarily able to asess and manage risk? Are you sure this actually happens? Because from my point of view, that's like abdicating one's responsibility as a pilot, and dropping to the level of a passenger who is allowed to manipulate the controls or share some cockpit tasks. Yes, I think that's exactly what is being postulated. I think there's a continuum between the extreme case of becoming a passenger, and the other extreme case of ignoring the instructor's existance. Jose -- (for Email, make the obvious changes in my address) |
#17
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
Michael wrote:
If that's what you mean, well, I admit there is a difference between that and simply poor communication - but are you sure this actually happens? No, I am absolutely *not* sure. [...] I simply have a hard time imagining how it would happen. I mean, if what you're doing is within your envelope, why do you have the instructor there? You could simply do it yourself. One possible example: landing after an instrument lesson. Normally, the landing would be well within a pilot's envelope. But if the wind is more gusty than comfortable to this instrument student, and he doesn't really evaluate this because he's depending upon the instructor... - Andrew |
#18
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
Michael wrote:
I offer for your consideration the famous warning, "Beware the Ides of March." You don't check with soothsayers as a part of your preflight? If only Caesar had received a full briefing... - Andrew |
#19
|
|||
|
|||
![]() Andrew Gideon wrote: You don't check with soothsayers as a part of your preflight? Well, the FARs *do* say "all available information". Lessee here ... where'd I put the horoscope page...... George Patterson In Idaho, tossing a rattlesnake into a crowded room is felony assault. In Tennessee, it's evangelism. |
#20
|
|||
|
|||
![]() |
Thread Tools | |
Display Modes | |
|
|
![]() |
||||
Thread | Thread Starter | Forum | Replies | Last Post |
Aviano welcomes new wing command | Otis Willie | Military Aviation | 0 | June 19th 04 09:18 PM |
This made me chuckle. . . | Scott Ferrin | Military Aviation | 21 | April 15th 04 07:12 AM |
Strategic Command Missions Rely on Space | Otis Willie | Military Aviation | 0 | September 30th 03 09:59 PM |
Long-range Spitfires and daylight Bomber Command raids (was: #1 Jet of World War II) | The Revolution Will Not Be Televised | Military Aviation | 20 | August 27th 03 09:14 AM |