Skyguide traffic controller killed

James Robinson wrote in message ...
Dean Wilkinson wrote:

The controller in this case clearly screwed up since he instructed the
Russian jet to descend when the Russian crew told him they had an RA
instructing them to climb.

You might like to wait for the accident report, since that isn't what
the initial review of the CVR and FDR indicated.

Really? I read the initial review, and the CVR transcripts. It
appeared to me that the contoller gave bad advice, and Russian captain
made the mistake of heeding it.

The TCAS system had warned the Russian crew to climb, but just as they
started to comply, the controller instructed the aircraft to descend.
The Russian crew did not first tell the controller that they had an RA
instructing them to climb, so the controller did not override that
alert.

The DHL crew got an instruction to descend from their TCAS, and
announced that they were doing so.

So, given that the DHL crew told the controller that they were
responding to a TCAS RA, the controller KNEW he had an RA on his hands
and that it applied to BOTH aircraft. Remember, the TCAS systems on
both planes communicate with each other over the transponder
frequency, if one had an RA, both had an RA.

The Russians don't appear to have given proper training to their
crews regarding the TCAS system because the crew didn't ignore the
controller like they should have and followed the RA.

Again, you don't know what their training is. The pilot didn't follow
the instructions, but he might have done that on his own, contrary to
his training. There has also been some argument that the controller's
instructions should have priority over those of the on-board system.

Actually, when I worked for Boeing it was pretty clear that the
Russians were installing TCAS to comply with the rules for flying in
European airspace, but that they weren't necessarily adopting the TCAS
philosophy...

Why not wait for the accident report instead of making rash, misinformed
accusations?

It is pretty rash of you to assume that I am misinformed...

Dean Wilkinson wrote:

James Robinson wrote:

Dean Wilkinson wrote:

The controller in this case clearly screwed up since he instructed the
Russian jet to descend when the Russian crew told him they had an RA
instructing them to climb.

You might like to wait for the accident report, since that isn't what
the initial review of the CVR and FDR indicated.

Really? I read the initial review, and the CVR transcripts. It
appeared to me that the contoller gave bad advice, and Russian captain
made the mistake of heeding it.

Not exactly. If the controller's advice had been followed in the
absence of TCAS, there likely wouldn't have been a collision, since the
Russian aircraft would have passed under the DHL. The problem was that
TCAS gave the initial RA to ascend just one second before the controller
urgently advised the aircraft to descend. After the controller made a
second urgent request to descend, the Russian crew chose to follow the
controller's instructions rather than TCAS. Meanwhile, the DHL started a
descent to comply with the TCAS RA on their aircraft. Hence both
aircraft descended into a collision.

That was only part of the overall problem, however, since there were
many procedural and technical problems at the control center, which
tends to turn the focus of the investigation on the controller's
employer. The controller was probably put into the position where he
couldn't adequately handle the traffic being offered, which led to his
mistakes.

Beyond that, the sequence of events in your initial post is wrong, based
on the transcripts that were released. The controller did not know the
Russian crew had an RA to climb, and issued his instruction based on the
information he had at hand. The Russian crew received the RA and
controller's instruction at practically the same time, and chose to
follow the controller. Here are a couple of interesting articles that
discuss this issue:

http://www.ainonline.com/issues/08_0...ncollpg16.html
http://www.ainonline.com/issues/09_0...rtcaspg12.html

The TCAS system had warned the Russian crew to climb, but just as they
started to comply, the controller instructed the aircraft to descend.
The Russian crew did not first tell the controller that they had an RA
instructing them to climb, so the controller did not override that
alert.

The DHL crew got an instruction to descend from their TCAS, and
announced that they were doing so.

So, given that the DHL crew told the controller that they were
responding to a TCAS RA, the controller KNEW he had an RA on his hands
and that it applied to BOTH aircraft.

Yes, but the controller only knew after he had issued the descend
instruction to the Russian aircraft. He did not know that either plane
had a TCAS RA up to that point.

I have not seen a report on exactly when the DHL crew supposedly
announced that they were descending to comply with their TCAS RA, but
there is the question of whether the controller heard or understood it.
By the time the DHL aircraft announced he was descending, it was
probably too late for the controller to do anything more. The initial
RA was about 45 seconds before impact, and the Russian plane started to
descend about 15 seconds later, after the controller made a second call.

The Russians don't appear to have given proper training to their
crews regarding the TCAS system because the crew didn't ignore the
controller like they should have and followed the RA.

Again, you don't know what their training is. The pilot didn't follow
the instructions, but he might have done that on his own, contrary to
his training. There has also been some argument that the controller's
instructions should have priority over those of the on-board system.

Actually, when I worked for Boeing it was pretty clear that the
Russians were installing TCAS to comply with the rules for flying in
European airspace, but that they weren't necessarily adopting the TCAS
philosophy...

If you read the second of the two articles cited above, you will see
that while the majority of pilots would follow TCAS, a substantial
percentage would still follow the controller's instructions, or ignore
both when they receive conflicting information. It therefore appears
that the TCAS philosophy was not universally accepted back then. I
wonder if the attitude has changed in the meantime?

Why not wait for the accident report instead of making rash, misinformed
accusations?

It is pretty rash of you to assume that I am misinformed...

You were clearly putting most of the blame on the controller, perhaps
based on an incorrect sequence of events. What other conclusion could I
come to?

There were other things the controller did wrong, such as not giving
separation advice early enough, only notifying one aircraft to take
evasive action, and not notifying the aircraft of where the conflicting
traffic was. As I understand it, he did not, however, knowingly give
instructions to the crews that conflicted with the RAs they each heard.

Given that the cause of the accident was a sequence of events, the
investigators are probably looking at how all of them came together, and
what needs to be done to avoid similar problems in the future. If any
one of the links in the chain of events had been broken, the accident
wouldn't have happened. The controller was not entirely to blame. I'm
not even sure he was mostly to blame. That is what the accident report
should address.

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James Robinson wrote:

That was only part of the overall problem, however, since there were
many procedural and technical problems at the control center, which
tends to turn the focus of the investigation on the controller's
employer. The controller was probably put into the position where he
couldn't adequately handle the traffic being offered, which led to his
mistakes.

It's funny that this came up now. I recently looked at the NTSB report on
the Nov, 2002 mid-air near KCDW. Since I was in that very same traffic
pattern shortly before this accident (and many times since), I was quite
interested.

The URL for this report is:

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...20X05496&key=2

As you can see, there were "errors" on the part of the controllers which,
loosely, mimic the errors at Skyguide. I write "loosely" because Skyguide
handles a different type of traffic and has more automation available.

But in both cases, there was a controller working alone which brought about
an overload condition.

Yet in the CDW case, you'll note, the pilots were listed as being at fault
(with the controller being a "factor"). Given that we're supposed to "see
& avoid", this is a reasonable conclusion in my opinion.

Now, "see & avoid" may not have applied in the Skyguide case. But if
pilot's are - by regulation - supposed to follow the RA instead of a
controller's instructions, then I can see a similar conclusion being drawn
there.

- Andrew

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Dean Wilkinson wrote:

My bet is that one of the fathers of the Russian children did it...

The controller in this case clearly screwed up since he instructed the
Russian jet to descend when the Russian crew told him they had an RA
instructing them to climb.

Did they really?

Controllers are required to instruct
flight crews to follow the RA when an RA occurs,

They are not.

and crews are
required to follow the RA.

Yes, they are.

The Russians don't appear to have given
proper training to their crews regarding the TCAS system because the
crew didn't ignore the controller like they should have and followed
the RA.

Yep.

Dean

Dima

Ok, who among you have never had the urge?

Pilots: tell me that you have NEVER, in your life, had the urge to make
a pylon
turn around the tower from a Spooky Gunship.

And Controllers: Who among you have NEVER had the urge to go out on the
tower
balcony with a shoulder fired SAM?

"Buff5200" wrote in message
...
Ok, who among you have never had the urge?

Pilots: tell me that you have NEVER, in your life, had the urge to make
a pylon turn around the tower from a Spooky Gunship.

Never. Not that the controller in question would have been sitting in the
tower cab anyway.

I've had controllers that I didn't care for, but life's too short to waste
time worrying about them. They will be out of my life soon enough, and it's
easy enough to humor them (or invoke my rights as pilot in command).

Pete

Buff5200 wrote:


Pilots: tell me that you have NEVER, in your life, had the urge to make
a pylon turn around the tower from a Spooky Gunship.

Well, I have not, though I've probably made a few of *them* wish they had a
FLAK.

George Patterson
A diplomat is a person who can tell you to go to hell in such a way that
you look forward to the trip.

On Tue, 24 Feb 2004 23:31:26 -0500, "HECTOP"
wrote in Message-Id: :

An assailant stabbed to death the air traffic controller who was on duty
when two planes collided over southern Germany in July 2002, killing 71
people, Swiss police said on Tuesday.

Did you hear what the survivors did to the pilots who crashed a
planeload of soccer players in the Andes in the '70s?

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
news
On Tue, 24 Feb 2004 23:31:26 -0500, "HECTOP"
wrote in Message-Id: :

An assailant stabbed to death the air traffic controller who was on duty
when two planes collided over southern Germany in July 2002, killing 71
people, Swiss police said on Tuesday.

Did you hear what the survivors did to the pilots who crashed a
planeload of soccer players in the Andes in the '70s?

Two all pilot patties, special sauce, lettuce, cheese, pickles on a sesame
seed bun.

Today, the police has arrested a suspect. Note: Until now, he's only a
suspect. He didn't confess nor has the police presented any "hard"
evidence.

This suspect is a 48 year old man who has lost his wife, a son and a
daughter in the crash. Very, very tragic. He must be desperate.

On the other hand, in Switzerland, self-justice has an extremely bad
reputation and is never accepted, on no account. If it turns out that he
has done it, he will have to stay the next couple of years in Switzerland.

Stefan