TA

As others have mentioned, TA had given us an excellent account of his accident and rescue. In particular, his actions after the crash should be studied by all of us who fly in similar terrain and could be subject to the same situation. I, for example, need to rethink my SPOT installation and my survival gear, neither of which would have provided nearly the same level of help that TA's did.

But what I immediately noticed in TA's account of the flight up to the crash was his apparent "comfort" at altitudes above the terrain that those of us who fly out west would consider really scary. I flew the same task on the same day as TA and it was a weak day - I didn't even try to go down to the last turn area (having started late) and barely avoided a landout on the way back to Moriarty - digging out from 1300 agl over Estancia - a nice little airstrip which already had a glider on it). Looking at my trace, I worked really hard to stay at least 3000' agl, and below that went into survival mode - because in my experience in Arizona, if you are that low you are just about to land somewhere unless you get really serious about digging out, and better have a good place to land within easy reach.

Having also flown a bit in eastern and midwest conditions, I understand how one can get used to working a lower lift band - often you have to work down to 2000 agl or lower to get anywhere, and with fields available and thermals weaker but more frequent, can afford to push lower with the expectation of finding something. That just isn't going to work out west!

Thank-you to TA for sharing his experiences with us, and I hope he gets back into the game again soon - after all, isn't walking away from a broken glider the first step to getting a better one?

Kirk
66

On Sunday, June 23, 2013 5:31:13 PM UTC-7, waremark wrote:
Frank was amazingly well equipped for such an eventuality and his management of the situation after the crash was excellent. However, there are a couple of aspects not present in his analysis which I might have expected to see, and discussion of which may help keep others of us safer in future.



In preparation for a flight over unfamiliar territory, I would have expected to ask for a local briefing, of which there is no mention. If the flight was over hostile territory, I might have looked at marked landout options on Google Earth. Either of these just might have told him something relevant about the airstrip which he failed to find.



Then there is no discussion about the handling which resulted in the crash. He could have been in comfortable glide of a safe airfield and still have crashed in the same way. I think this is about the caution with which it is appropriate to make an initial approach to an unfamiliar ridge - speed, angle of approach, degree of closeness all come into this. Pilots with more experience than me in mountain flying will be more competent to comment here.

My thoughts exactly. His writeup is excellent and very helpful and cover all aspects of what happened *except* the crash itself. There is only one line describing it. Surely we cant blame the 20 knots wind for the crash, nor did he apparently tried to circle in it or turned into the ridge, from what he described he did the right thing by initiating S turns so I am puzzled what cause the actual crash? This is important to understand since there were quiet a few fatal accidents when experienced pilots flew into the mountain, at least this time thankfully we can learn some valuable lesson. From the write up it sounds like he believes being over unlandable terrain contributed to the accident, but I dont see the connection unless he believes the stress impaired his judgment.

Ramy

On Monday, June 24, 2013 2:26:16 AM UTC-4, Ramy wrote:
from what he described he did the right thing by initiating S turns so I am puzzled what cause the actual crash?

From TA's article:
" ...Unfortunately, as I completed the turn with my right wing *****parallel***** to the mountain, I discovered that I was being pushed right into the mountain, and almost immediately hit two very tall pine trees..."

By my understanding of a correctly executed S-turn, the right wing would never be PARALLEL to the face of the mountain (the ridge). If I understand what Frank is trying to say, he intended to turn 225 degrees to execute the first half of a classic S-turn, but the glider turned 270 degrees and thus lost the advantages of a classic S-turn (whereby the glider approaches the ridge 45 degrees from perpendicular thus allowing more time, and requiring less time, to turn away from the ridge.)