NW_Pilot's Trans-Atlantic Flight -- All the scary details...

Larry Dighera schrieb:

A more experienced pilot who had studied the aux tank system may have
been able to mentally diagnose the cause of the fuel venting.

He did everything by the book, but the book was wrong. A pilot is not
supposed to assume that an FAA approved book is wrong! In fact, I'm
scared of pilots who establish their own ad hoc procedures because they
think they know better than the book.

Stefan

On Sun, 01 Oct 2006 23:20:13 +0200, Stefan
wrote in :

Larry Dighera schrieb:

A more experienced pilot who had studied the aux tank system may have
been able to mentally diagnose the cause of the fuel venting.

He did everything by the book, but the book was wrong. A pilot is not
supposed to assume that an FAA approved book is wrong! In fact, I'm
scared of pilots who establish their own ad hoc procedures because they
think they know better than the book.

Stefan

What you say is true enough. And so is what I said.

Stefan wrote:
Larry Dighera schrieb:

A more experienced pilot who had studied the aux tank system may have
been able to mentally diagnose the cause of the fuel venting.

He did everything by the book, but the book was wrong. A pilot is not
supposed to assume that an FAA approved book is wrong! In fact, I'm
scared of pilots who establish their own ad hoc procedures because they
think they know better than the book.

You're completely right. I'm an A&P, but I'm not going to sit up there
in IMC miles from land and try to diagnose a fuel problem if the other
option is heading for land and landing ASAP.

Emily wrote:

Stefan wrote:

Larry Dighera schrieb:

A more experienced pilot who had studied the aux tank system may have
been able to mentally diagnose the cause of the fuel venting.


He did everything by the book, but the book was wrong. A pilot is not
supposed to assume that an FAA approved book is wrong! In fact, I'm
scared of pilots who establish their own ad hoc procedures because
they think they know better than the book.


You're completely right. I'm an A&P, but I'm not going to sit up there
in IMC miles from land and try to diagnose a fuel problem if the other
option is heading for land and landing ASAP.

As an engineer, I'd do both! :-)

Matt

On Sun, 01 Oct 2006 17:40:52 -0500, Emily
wrote in
:

I'm not going to sit up there in IMC miles from
land and try to diagnose a fuel problem

Right. You'd have studied the fuel system while you were on the
ground.

Stefan wrote:
Larry Dighera schrieb:

A more experienced pilot who had studied the aux tank system may have
been able to mentally diagnose the cause of the fuel venting.


He did everything by the book, but the book was wrong. A pilot is not
supposed to assume that an FAA approved book is wrong! In fact, I'm
scared of pilots who establish their own ad hoc procedures because they
think they know better than the book.

So you think Al Haynes and crew screwed with their DC-10 improvisation?
Personally, I think it is imperative that pilots create their own ad
hoc procedures when the book is wrong or nonexistent. I'm much more
afraid of pilots who keep doing what the book says and are afraid to
think and improvise.

Matt

Matt Whiting wrote:
Stefan wrote:
Larry Dighera schrieb:

A more experienced pilot who had studied the aux tank system may have
been able to mentally diagnose the cause of the fuel venting.


He did everything by the book, but the book was wrong. A pilot is not
supposed to assume that an FAA approved book is wrong! In fact, I'm
scared of pilots who establish their own ad hoc procedures because
they think they know better than the book.

So you think Al Haynes and crew screwed with their DC-10 improvisation?

Al Haynes' situation was a little different. He had multiple crew
members and a lot of backup on the ground. A single pilot doesn't
usually have the time to do troubleshooting like the United crew did.

In article ,
Matt Whiting wrote:

Stefan wrote:
Larry Dighera schrieb:

A more experienced pilot who had studied the aux tank system may have
been able to mentally diagnose the cause of the fuel venting.


He did everything by the book, but the book was wrong. A pilot is not
supposed to assume that an FAA approved book is wrong! In fact, I'm
scared of pilots who establish their own ad hoc procedures because they
think they know better than the book.

So you think Al Haynes and crew screwed with their DC-10 improvisation?
Personally, I think it is imperative that pilots create their own ad
hoc procedures when the book is wrong or nonexistent. I'm much more
afraid of pilots who keep doing what the book says and are afraid to
think and improvise.

The problem with that statement is that many GA pilots haven't even read
the book to know what it says.

john smith wrote:
The problem with that statement is that many GA pilots haven't even
read the book to know what it says.

What's the ISBN of this book?

Stefan wrote:
He did everything by the book, but the book was wrong. A pilot is not
supposed to assume that an FAA approved book is wrong!

On the contrary. When flying an aircraft that has just had major
modifications to critical componets and/or systems, one becomes a test
pilot. There is nothing wrong with this - SOMEONE has to be a test
pilot.

However, there is a difference between flying proven production
aircraft and being a test pilot. The pilot flying proven production
aircraft need only study the approved guidance and procedures (the
book!) and fly by the book - and usually all will be well. This is not
because the
book is FAA approved, but because it is time-tested. The FAA approval
is pretty much irrelevant.

When one becomes a test pilot, the world changes. Now the pilot must
study the system in detail (pulling off the cowls and tracing the lines
if necessary) and understand exactly how it works. He must consider
the normal operation and the failure modes. This will give him an edge
in troubleshooting if something should go wrong in flight, but that is
secondary. More importantly, it makes things going wrong in flight far
less likely.

Reading the book and flying by the book is not enough in this
situation. The fact that the book and the system are FAA-approved is
irrelevant. Neither the book nor the system are time-proven. Unless
you are prepared to trust a bunch of federal bureaucrats who couldn't
find better work with your life, you need to understand what it is they
approved.

In fact, I'm
scared of pilots who establish their own ad hoc procedures because they
think they know better than the book.

Being a test pilot is often all about coming up with an ad-hoc
procedure, because the book is wrong - because someone didn't think of
something.

Now for our adventurer:

Once the emergency developed, you did a good job flying the emergency.
I don't want to take anything away from you there.

Your preparation for the flight, though, was incomplete. You knew that
you had a highly modified fuel system which is rarely installed on this
sort of airplane. You also knew that you had an injected engine. The
FIRST question you should have asked is - is there a vapor return line
(not all fuel injected engines have them) and if there is, where does
it go? I'm guessing you didn't ask the question because you didn't
have experience with other airplanes where this was an issue. That's
the value of breadth of experience when it comes to being a test pilot.

I accept that your documentation did not answer that question. But the
problem is, you didn't even ask it. Had you asked, you could have
gotten some sort of answer - and in any case, even a cursory
examination of the plumbing would have told you that it wasn't going
back to the ferry tank (they never do, you know) and would have forced
you to consider the problem - and to develop an operating procedure a
lot more correct than the approved one.

In theory I suppose it could be possible to become a capable,
proficient, experienced pilot without making mistakes like this and
scaring yourself. I've never seen it happen. Every experienced,
capable, proficient pilot I know got there the same way - by going out
and doing stuff, amking mistakes, and scaring himself. The difference
between the ones who get there and the ones who drop out along the way
is basically this - the ones who get there learn from the experience,
and learn not to make the same class of mistake again. You see, while
you handled the emergency, that's not the sort of thing you can count
on handling 100 times out of 100.

I'm sure you won't make the exact same mistake again - not
understanding what your modified fuel system really does - but the
lesson to learn is broader. If you are flying something that has been
modified from the norm, make sure you understand the full extent of the
modifications and their implications before you launch.

Michael