Critique of: Crash Risk in General Aviation

Larry Dighera writes:

On Sat, 14 Apr 2007 01:14:57 +0200, Mxsmanic
wrote in :

Do you have a source for the report itself?


On Wed, 11 Apr 2007 20:09:27 -0500, "Dan Luke"
wrote in
:

Wait 'til Scary Mary gets on TV with this:

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N10403256.htm


That's just a review of the report, not the report itself.

I don't much like what I read even in the review, but I'd still like to see
the report. Apparently you must be a JAMA member to see it, which is a bit
odd, since it was apparently produced with public funds.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

On 4/13/2007 5:36:14 PM, Larry Dighera wrote:

Below is a first draft of my critique of this report. Any
suggestions, error corrections, or other critique is welcome.
snip

Sometimes it is good to have you in our corner, Larry. I applaud your effort.

--
Peter

On Fri, 13 Apr 2007 17:55:09 -0400, "Peter R."
wrote in :

On 4/13/2007 5:36:14 PM, Larry Dighera wrote:

Below is a first draft of my critique of this report. Any
suggestions, error corrections, or other critique is welcome.
snip

Sometimes it is good to have you in our corner, Larry. I applaud your effort.

Thank you.

Some things are worth the effort. General Aviation is one of them.

"Peter R." wrote in message
...
On 4/13/2007 5:36:14 PM, Larry Dighera wrote:

Below is a first draft of my critique of this report. Any
suggestions, error corrections, or other critique is welcome.
snip

Sometimes it is good to have you in our corner, Larry. I applaud your
effort.


Same here Larry, thanks for having the ability and taking the time.

On 2007-04-13 14:36:11 -0700, Larry Dighera said:

A fine, well thought out article, Larry. However, I maintain (and
always have) that we do not have an image problem. We have a safety
problem. We always have had a safety problem. If we can clean up the
safety problem the image problem will go away.

--
Waddling Eagle
World Famous Flight Instructor

On Fri, 13 Apr 2007 15:22:56 -0700, C J Campbell
wrote in
2007041315225616807-christophercampbell@hotmailcom:

On 2007-04-13 14:36:11 -0700, Larry Dighera said:

A fine, well thought out article, Larry.

That is indeed a complement coming from "The World's Greatest Flight
Instructor." :-) Thanks.

However, I maintain (and always have) that we do not have an image problem.

When the main stream news media, like Time magazine, prints a
full-page promotional advertisement showing small aircraft juxtaposed
against nuclear generating plant condensation towers with the caption,
"Remember when only environmentalists would have been alarmed by this
photograph?", GA has an obvious image problem. GA is being used by
the news media as a scapegoat to capture readers/viewers through
sensational yellow journalism. The lay public is exposed to such
slurs continually, and their attitude toward GA is made unnecessarily
fearful and resentful as a result.

It's time GA realized it is being targeted unfairly in the news media,
and hold them accountable for their libelous marketing ploy. What's
it going to take to rouse the ire of GA stakeholders?

We have a safety
problem. We always have had a safety problem. If we can clean up the
safety problem the image problem will go away.

I disagree with your conclusion.

Aviation is dangerous. There is no question of that. And it's more
dangerous the closer to the ground you fly, and in the more weather
you traverse, and the closer to the boundaries of the aircraft's
flight performance envelope you operate. Those, and many of the other
causes of fatal accidents mentioned in the JAMA article, contribute to
GA's rather consistent fatality rate over the decades.

The reason for the consistency is, because until now, the government
has recognized the citizens' right to aerial navigation, and has not
attempted to encroach on it. That may be changing.

Now that the airline transport manufacturers have realized that there
is finite capacity for air traffic within the NAS, they are
aggressively looking for ways to manage the entire aviation circus
from construction and maintenance of the vehicles, to control and
ultimately, regulation of airspace and aircraft certification. It's
time we started asking, "What is a reasonable limit for air traffic
density over the CONUS?" Otherwise, GA will be crowded out of the
skies by airline traffic as aircraft manufacturers have to put their
products someplace.

So the GA fatality rate is largely a result of the kinds of flying
that GA does. With a few exceptions, the logical way to reduce the
"public safety concern" is to restrict some of the more hazardous (non
airline) aircraft operations. Consider this bit of "information":

Besides being a public safety concern, general aviation intersects
with medicine directly in at least 2 ways. First, transporting
patients from crash sites and between medical facilities is more
hazardous than generally recognized, and EMS flight crew members
have an occupational injury death rate that is 15 times the
average for all occupations.20 Despite 1 EMS helicopter in 3 being
likely to crash during a life span of 15 years, few EMS
helicopters have crash-resistant fuel systems.20 Second, physician
pilots crash at a higher rate per flight hour than other pilots.25
It is possible that physicians are more likely than other pilots
to buy high-performance aircraft that require more time for
mastery than their schedules may allow. In addition, physicians
may take risks (eg, fly when fatigued or in bad weather) in order
to meet the demands of a busy medical practice. From 1986 through
2005, a total of 816 physician and dentist pilots were involved in
general aviation crashes; of them, 270 (33%) were fatally injured.
Physician and dentist pilots accounted for 1.6% of all general
aviation crashes and 3.0% of pilot fatalities (Carol Floyd, BS,
National Transportation Safety Board, written communication,
February 2, 2007).

GA is a public safety concern only to those who exercise their right
to risk their personal wellbeing of their own free volition, much as
today's volunteer soldier does. If the good doctor is able to suggest
_viable_ solutions to the fatal accident causes he cites, I fully
support and applaud his contribution. But I am skeptical. It would
seem, that if no further safety enhancements have been
discovered/implemented to reduce the GA fatality rate in decades, it
is unlikely that they can be found and implemented.

:
: GA is a public safety concern only to those who exercise their right
: to risk their personal wellbeing of their own free volition, much as
: today's volunteer soldier does. If the good doctor is able to suggest
: _viable_ solutions to the fatal accident causes he cites, I fully
: support and applaud his contribution. But I am skeptical. It would
: seem, that if no further safety enhancements have been
: discovered/implemented to reduce the GA fatality rate in decades, it
: is unlikely that they can be found and implemented.
:

I just went through the FITS program intro yesterday (http://www.faa.gov/education_research/training/fits/). It
describes a scenario based flight instruction syllabus as opposed to a maneuver based syllabus. Most accidents in
aviation, especially GA, are the result of pilot error. This FITS approach attempts to modify decision making to steer
the pilot towards a less risky outcome. It was a good program, but the data are tentative,,,

On Sun, 15 Apr 2007 09:16:00 -0400, "Blueskies"
wrote in
:


I just went through the FITS program intro yesterday (http://www.faa.gov/education_research/training/fits/). It
describes a scenario based flight instruction syllabus as opposed to a maneuver based syllabus.

FAA-Industry Training Standards (FITS)
All FITS products are non-regulatory and incentive driven. FITS is
focused on the redesign of general aviation training. Instead of
training pilots to pass practical test, FITS focuses on expertly
manage real-world challenges. Scenario based training is used to
enhance the GA pilots’ aeronautical decision making, risk
management, and single pilot resource management skills. We do
this without compromising basic stick and rudder skills.


Presenting maneuvers in context sounds like a step in the right
direction. I've often thought, that there needs to be more emphasis
on the pilot's role in various situations, particularly with regard to
social pressure's influence on the PIC's decision making process.

Most accidents in aviation, especially GA, are the result of pilot error.
This FITS approach attempts to modify decision making to steer
the pilot towards a less risky outcome. It was a good program, but the data are tentative,,,


It's always good to see improvement of age-old techniques.

Thanks for the information. I'll work it into my critique.

On 2007-04-16 10:21:19 -0700, Larry Dighera said:

On Sun, 15 Apr 2007 09:16:00 -0400, "Blueskies"
wrote in
:


I just went through the FITS program intro yesterday
(http://www.faa.gov/education_research/training/fits/). It
describes a scenario based flight instruction syllabus as opposed to a
maneuver based syllabus.

FAA-Industry Training Standards (FITS)
All FITS products are non-regulatory and incentive driven. FITS is
focused on the redesign of general aviation training. Instead of
training pilots to pass practical test, FITS focuses on expertly
manage real-world challenges. Scenario based training is used to
enhance the GA pilots’ aeronautical decision making, risk
management, and single pilot resource management skills. We do
this without compromising basic stick and rudder skills.


Presenting maneuvers in context sounds like a step in the right
direction. I've often thought, that there needs to be more emphasis
on the pilot's role in various situations, particularly with regard to
social pressure's influence on the PIC's decision making process.

Most accidents in aviation, especially GA, are the result of pilot error.
This FITS approach attempts to modify decision making to steer
the pilot towards a less risky outcome. It was a good program, but the
data are tentative,,,


It's always good to see improvement of age-old techniques.

Thanks for the information. I'll work it into my critique.

I like the FITS program. It does take more effort, but it should teach
far better decision making skills.
--
Waddling Eagle
World Famous Flight Instructor

For what it is worth, my feedback on your proposed response:

Larry Dighera wrote:
For pilots without instrument training, flying from visual flight
rules into instrument meteorological conditions is a perilous
scenario.

[There are a miniscule number of airmen who hold FAA certificates,
that have not received any instrument training; instrument training is
not required to obtain a Glider certificate. The phrase the
researchers probably meant to use was 'instrument rating' not
'instrument training.'

Regardless, it is true that the average life expectancy of a pilot who
is not instrument rated and qualified (recent experience) is a bit
over a minute when unintentionally finding himself in a cloud that
totally obscures his outside reference.]

I think a more appropriate rebuttal here is that other sources, such as
the annual Nall Report, find that in 2005 weather related accidents
accounted for only about 11% of all fatal GA accidents. By comparison,
Nall claims 27% of fatal GA accidents in 2005 are due to pilot control
errors during what it calls "maneuvering flight." Therefore the emphasis
on VFR into VMC and lack of mention of "maneuvering flight" by the
researchers as a causal factor is an improper inversion of priorities.

In 1990, the FAA amended regulations regarding background checks
on pilots for alcohol-related motor vehicle convictions, requiring
pilots to provide a written report of each alcohol-related traffic
offense within 60 days of the conviction. Flying privileges can be
suspended or revoked if a pilot has had 2 or more convictions for
driving under the influence in the past 3 years. A recent cohort
study indicated that a history of driving while intoxicated is a
valid risk marker for general aviation pilots. After adjusting for
age, sex, and flight experience, the study showed that a history
of driving while intoxicated was associated with a 43% increased
risk of aviation crash involvement.12 Following intensive research
and interventions, the proportion of alcohol involvement in fatal
general aviation crashes has decreased progressively from more
than 30% in the early 1960s to about 8% today.13

I think a rebuttal may be approprihere might be:
[The 2006 Nall Report found that alcohol and drugs account for only about
1.1% of all accidents in the past few years. This is again an inversion
of causal priorities and places an improper emphasis on a minor causative
factor. Further efforts and analysis on reducing alcohol and drug related
aviation accidents is misguided effort that is better spent elsewhere.]

[A pilot who flies without the use of shoulder restraint belts is a
fool.

It is curious that the researchers failed to mention ballistic
parachute recovery systems like those currently mandated for the
recently FAA certified Cirrus aircraft.]

I don't think you can properly claim the FAA mandated the Cirrus BRS.


The general aviation crash fatality rate has remained at about 19%
for the past 20 years while the overall airline crash fatality
rate has declined from 16% from 1986 through 1995 to 6% from 1996
through 2005.4,24

[Due to the reduction in airline operations due to the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks, increased airport security, and general
decline in airline ticket sales, that statistic may be misleading.]

Their statistics look okay to me, though I'm not sure where they get the
6%. From their two NTSB references, out of 34 accidents listed for CFR
121 carriers, 3 had fatalities (~9%) and out of 1669 GA accidents, 321
had fatalities (~19%). Averaging over the last several N years may yield
~6%. Maybe they did that.

The higher fatality rate for general aviation crashes may be
because such aircraft are not as able to withstand impact forces
and protect occupants from death and severe injury as commercial
aircraft are.

[A more robust airframe requires increased weight. There is a
tradeoff of safety for performance.]

Another objection would be that the difference in rates may be due to the
nature of the accidents the two classes of flights encounter. Having two
experienced pilots on board would almost certainly skew where and when
accidents take place such that the impacts on the airframes are not
comparable.


In recent decades, while major airlines have improved seat
strength, revised exit row configurations, and used more fire
retardant materials, few improvements have been made in general
aviation aircraft, in part, because federal regulations only
require safety improvements for entirely new aircraft models. A
corresponding policy for automobiles would have meant that
Volkswagen Beetles could have been sold without seatbelts for
decades after federal regulation required them in all new cars.

[The Volkswagen analogy is flawed. The ubiquitous Cessna 172 aircraft
have had should restraints for decades despite their first being FAA
certified in the 1950s.]

Typo: "shoulder restraints" not "should restraints".

To improve the safety of general aviation, interventions are
needed to improve fuel system integrity and restraint systems,
enhance general crashworthiness of small aircraft,

Those are only viable measures if their added weight and cost do not
so negatively impact aircraft performance and affordability so as to
render General Aviation operations impractical.]

Furthermore, restraints systems in many small aircraft are already
superior to those found on airlines.