787 Story by Dan Rather

Mxsmanic wrote in
:

writes:

Don't worry, I fully expect Boeing to be able to defend their design
with test data. If they couldn't, they wouldn't be able to get it
certified.

Unfortunately, test data do not always accurately predict real life.



Like you'd know anything about real life.


Boeing would be slitting its own throat by cooking the books on this
one, but time will tell. The lure of the almighty dollar can be very
strong, especially over the short term (one fiscal quarter to the
next).

You know nothing about it, fjukkwit


Bertie

Airbus didn't have to pay a dime. An internal Boeing engineer wrote a 16???
page whistleblower report to the FAA with a lot of stuff that Boeing's top
brass wasn't all that pleased about.

Something about not testing the crashworthiness of the 787 to the same
standards that were required on the 737. A simple drop test of a fuselage
section, with the overhead bins full, with instrumented crash dummies,
dropped from 14 feet onto a concrete floor. And how you can see damage on
metal (dent) while the same damage on glass is generally internal and
invisible. And how metal elongates during a crash absorbing a tremendous
amount of the energy of the crash while glass tears and absorbs little. And
how metal is pretty much fireproof (it melts) while the epoxy in the glass
burns fairly hot and fast.

Anybody got a link to that article's website for Jay?

Jim

--
"If you think you can, or think you can't, you're right."
--Henry Ford



"Jay Honeck" wrote in message
oups.com...

I wonder how much Airbus is paying this guy?
--
Jay Honeck
Iowa City, IA
Pathfinder N56993
www.AlexisParkInn.com
"Your Aviation Destination"

On Wed, 19 Sep 2007 09:02:07 -0700, "RST Engineering"
wrote in
:

Airbus didn't have to pay a dime. An internal Boeing engineer wrote a 16???
page whistleblower report to the FAA with a lot of stuff that Boeing's top
brass wasn't all that pleased about.

Something about not testing the crashworthiness of the 787 to the same
standards that were required on the 737. A simple drop test of a fuselage
section, with the overhead bins full, with instrumented crash dummies,
dropped from 14 feet onto a concrete floor. And how you can see damage on
metal (dent) while the same damage on glass is generally internal and
invisible. And how metal elongates during a crash absorbing a tremendous
amount of the energy of the crash while glass tears and absorbs little. And
how metal is pretty much fireproof (it melts) while the epoxy in the glass
burns fairly hot and fast.

Anybody got a link to that article's website for Jay?

Jim

That would be this link:
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/ABP...2003889769.pdf

The docket number is in that document, but I wasn't able to find it
he http://dms.dot.gov/search/searchFormAdvanced.cfm

While it is evident that Mr. Vincent A. Weldon is qualified to issue
his concerns in his comment on this issue, I fail to see how the
carbon-fiber composite construction of the Boeing 787-8 is
significantly different from that used in many military aircraft. He
raises some points about Boeing's cost cutting to reduce assembly time
and weight, but those should be easily addressed.

I don't see this issue as having significant potential to impact B-787
production given the points raised, and Boeing's history of having
influence over government employees in the right positions to further
their agenda.

More information:

http://www.thefederalregister.com/d....06-11-E7-11153
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
CFR Citation: 14 CFR Part 25
Docket ID: [Docket No. NM368 Special Conditions No. 25-07-05-SC]

NOTICE: PROPOSED RULES
ACTION: Airworthiness standards:
DOCUMENT ACTION: Notice of proposed special conditions.
SUBJECT CATEGORY: Special Conditions: Boeing Model 787-8 Airplane;
Crashworthiness

DATES: Comments must be received on or before July 26, 2007.
DOCUMENT SUMMARY: This notice proposes special conditions for the
Boeing Model 7878 airplane. This airplane will have novel or
unusual design features when compared to the state of technology
envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport category
airplanes. These novel or unusual design features are associated
with carbon fiber reinforced plastic used in the construction of
the fuselage. For these design features, the applicable
airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate
safety standards for impact response characteristics to ensure
survivable crashworthiness. These proposed special conditions
contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator
considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to
that established by the existing airworthiness standards.
Additional special conditions will be issued for other novel or
unusual design features of the Boeing 7878 airplanes.

SUMMARY: Special conditions—; Boeing Model 787-8 airplane,

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Comments Invited

The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this
rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. The
most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the special
conditions, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include supporting data. We ask that you send us two copies of
written comments.

We will file in the docket all comments we receive as well as a
report summarizing each substantive public
[[Page 32022]]
contact with FAA personnel concerning these proposed special
conditions. The docket is available for public inspection before
and after the comment closing date. If you wish to review the
docket in person, go to the address in the ADDRESSES section of
this notice between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.

We will consider all comments we receive on or before the closing
date for comments. We will consider comments filed late if it is
possible to do so without incurring expense or delay. We may
change the proposed special conditions based on comments we
receive.

If you want the FAA to acknowledge receipt of your comments on
this proposal, include with your comments a preaddressed, stamped
postcard on which the docket number appears. We will stamp the
date on the postcard and mail it back to you.

Background
On March 28, 2003, Boeing applied for an FAA type certificate for
its new Boeing Model 7878 passenger airplane. The Model 7878
airplane will be an allnew, twoengine jet transport airplane with
a twoaisle cabin. The maximum takeoff weight will be 476,000
pounds, with a maximum passenger count of 381 passengers.

Type Certification Basis
Under provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, Boeing must show that Model 7878
airplanes (hereafter referred to as ``the 787'') meet the
applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as amended by Amendments
251 through 25 117, except Sec. Sec. 25.809(a) and 25.812, which
will remain at Amendment 25115. If the Administrator finds that
the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate
or appropriate safety standards for the 787 airplane because of a
novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed
under provisions of 14 CFR 21.16.

In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and
special conditions, the 787 airplane must comply with the fuel
vent and exhaust emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the
noise certification requirements of part 36. In addition, the FAA
must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy pursuant to section
611 of Public Law 92574, the ``Noise Control Act of 1972.''

Special conditions, as defined in Sec. 11.19, are issued in
accordance with Sec. 11.38 and become part of the type
certification basis in accordance with Sec. 21.17(a)(2).

Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which
they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be
amended later to include any other model that incorporates the
same or similar novel or unusual design feature, the special
conditions would also apply to the other model under the
provisions of Sec. 21.101. Novel or Unusual Design Features

The 787 airplane will incorporate a number of novel or unusual
design features. Because of rapid improvements in airplane
technology, the applicable airworthiness regulations do not
contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for these design
features. These proposed special conditions for the 787 contain
the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers
necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that
established by the existing airworthiness standards.

The 787 fuselage will be fabricated with carbon fiber reinforced
plastic (CFRP) semimonocoque construction, consisting of skins
with cocured longitudinal stringers and mechanically fastened
circumferential frames. This is a novel and unusual design feature
for a large transport category airplane certificated under 14 CFR
part 25. Structure fabricated from CFRP may behave differently
than metallic structure because of differences in material
ductility, stiffness, failure modes, and energy absorption
characteristics. Therefore, impact response characteristics of the
787 must be evaluated to ensure that its survivable
crashworthiness characteristics provide approximately the same
level of safety as those of a similarly sized airplane fabricated
from traditionally used metallic materials.

The FAA and industry have been working together for many years to
understand how transport airplane occupant safety can be improved
for what are considered survivable accidents. This work has
involved examining airplane accidents, conducting tests to
simulate crash conditions, and performing analytical modeling of a
range of crash conditions, all with the purpose of providing
further insight into factors that can influence occupant safety.
Results of this ongoing effort have enabled specific changes to
regulatory standards and design practices to improve occupant
safety. This evolution is reflected in changes to the part 25
Emergency Landing Conditions regulations. For example, airplane
emergency load factors in Sec. 25.561, General, have been
increased. Passenger seat dynamic load conditions have been added
(Sec. 25.562, Emergency Landing Dynamic Conditions).

The seat dynamic conditions were added to the regulations based on
FAA and industry tests and a review of accidents. These seat
dynamic conditions reflect the environment for passengers and the
airframe during a crash event. They are based on data gathered
from accidents of previously certificated airplanes given
conditions that were survivable. Tests of previously certificated
airplanes demonstrated that performance of the airframe was
acceptable in a survivable crash event. We continually update our
requirements as such new information becomes available. In the
context of this evolution of the regulations, there is at present
no specific dynamic regulatory requirement for airplanelevel
crashworthiness. However, the FAA reviews the design of each new
airplane model to determine if it incorporates novel or unusual
design features that may have a significant influence on the crash
dynamics of the airframe. The Administrator prescribes special
conditions for the airplane model if the applicable airworthiness
regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety
standards because of the novel or unusual design feature. Because
of the novel design features of the 787, the FAA intends to
require Boeing to conduct an assessment to ensure that the 787
will not have dynamic characteristics that differ significantly
from those found in previously certificated designs.

The nature of this proposed design assessment is largely dependent
on the similarities and differences between the new type design
and previously certificated airplanes. Such an assessment ensures
that the level of safety of the new type design is commensurate
with that implicitly assumed in the existing regulations, and
achieved by airplane designs previously certificated. If
significant trends in industry warrant change to the existing
regulations, the FAA may use its rulemaking process in
collaboration with industry to develop an appropriate dynamic
regulatory requirement for airplane level crashworthiness.

The FAA and industry have collected a significant amount of
experimental data as well as data from crashes of transport
category airplanes that demonstrates a high occupant survival rate
at vertical descent velocities up to 30 ft/sec. The majority of
this data was collected on narrowbody (single aisle) transport
category airplanes. Based on this information, the FAA finds it
appropriate and necessary for an assessment of the 787 to span a
range of
[[Page 32023]]

airplane vertical descent velocities up to 30 ft/sec.
The FAA is proposing this special condition to maintain the level
of safety envisioned in the existing airworthiness standards under
foreseeable survivable impact events.

Discussion of Proposed Special Condition
In order to provide the same level of safety as exists with
conventional airplane construction, Boeing must demonstrate that
the 787 has sufficient crashworthiness capabilities under
foreseeable survivable impact events. To demonstrate this, Boeing
would have to evaluate the impact response characteristics of the
787 to ensure that its crashworthiness characteristics are not
significantly different from those of a similarly sized airplane
fabricated from traditionally used metals. If the evaluation shows
that the 787 impact response characteristics are significantly
different, Boeing would have to make design changes to bring the
different impact response characteristics in line with those of a
similarly sized metal construction airplane, or incorporate
mitigating design features.

Factors in crash survivability are retention of items of mass,
maintenance of occupant emergency egress paths, maintenance of
acceptable acceleration and loads experienced by the occupants,
and maintenance of a survivable volume. In reviewing available
data from accidents, tests simulating crash conditions, and
analytical modeling of a range of crash conditions, the FAA has
concluded that the airplane performance should be evaluated over a
range of airplane level vertical impact velocities up to 30
ft/sec.

If the 787 impact characteristics differ significantly from those
of a previously certificated wide body transport, this would
result in a need to meet load factors higher than those defined in
14 CFR 25.561 in order to maintain the same level of safety for
the occupants, in terms of retention of items of mass. In the
cases of acceleration and loads experienced by the occupants,
means would have to be incorporated to reduce load levels
experienced by those occupants to the injury criteria levels of
Sec. 25.562, or load levels of a previously certificated
comparable airplane, in order to maintain the same level of safety
for the occupants.

Applicability
As discussed above, these proposed special conditions are
applicable to the 787 airplane. Should Boeing apply at a later
date for a change to the type certificate to include another model
incorporating the same novel or unusual design features, these
proposed special conditions would apply to that model as well
under the provisions of Sec. 21.101.

Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features
of the 787 airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.

The authority citation for these Special Conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704. The
Proposed Special Conditions

Accordingly, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) proposes the following special conditions as
part of the type certification basis for the Boeing Model 7878
airplane.

The Boeing Model 7878 must provide an equivalent level of occupant
safety and survivability to that provided by previously
certificated widebody transports of similar size under foreseeable
survivable impact events for the following four criteria. In order
to demonstrate an equivalent level of occupant safety and
survivability, the applicant must demonstrate that the Model 7878
meets the following criteria for a range of airplane vertical
descent velocities up to 30 ft/sec.

1. Retention of items of mass. The occupants, i.e., passengers,
flight attendants and flightcrew, must be protected during the
impact event from release of seats, overhead bins, and other items
of mass due to the impact loads and resultant structural
deformation of the supporting airframe and floor structures. The
applicant must show that loads due to the impact event and
resultant structural deformation of the supporting airframe and
floor structure at the interface of the airplane structure to
seats, overhead bins, and other items of mass are comparable to
those of previously certificated widebody transports of similar
size for the range of descent velocities stated above. The
attachments of these items need not be designed for static
emergency landing loads in excess of those defined in Sec. 25.561
if impact response characteristics of the Boeing Model 7878 yield
load factors at the attach points that are comparable to those for
a previously certificated widebody transport category airplane.

2. Maintenance of acceptable acceleration and loads experienced by
the occupants. The applicant must show that the impact response
characteristics of the 787, specifically the vertical acceleration
levels experienced at the seat/floor interface and loads
experienced by the occupants during the impact events, are
consistent with those found in Sec. 25.562(b) or with levels
expected for a previously certificated widebody transport category
airplane for the conditions stated above.

3. Maintenance of a survivable volume. For the conditions stated
above, the applicant must show that all areas of the airplane
occupied for takeoff and landing provide a survivable volume
comparable to that of previously certificated widebody transports
of similar size during and after the impact event. This means that
structural deformation will not result in infringement of the
occupants' normal living space so that passenger survivability
will not be significantly affected.

4. Maintenance of occupant emergency egress paths. The evacuation
of occupants must be comparable to that from a previously
certificated widebody transport of similar size. To show this, the
applicant must show that the suitability of the egress paths, as
determined following the vertical impact events, is comparable to
the suitability of the egress paths of a comparable, certificated
widebody transport, as determined following the same vertical
impact events.


Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 31, 2007.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E711153 Filed 6807; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 491013P

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT Ian Won, FAA, Airframe/Cabin
Safety, ANM115, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft
Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington
980573356; telephone (425) 2272145; facsimile



http://www.louisdb.org/documents/fr/...11jn07-18.html
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2007/pdf/07-2884.pdf

Larry Dighera writes:

While it is evident that Mr. Vincent A. Weldon is qualified to issue
his concerns in his comment on this issue, I fail to see how the
carbon-fiber composite construction of the Boeing 787-8 is
significantly different from that used in many military aircraft.

It's not ... but military aircraft and personnel are considered much more
expendable than civilian aircraft and personnel, so the threshold of
acceptable risk is much higher. Hmm.

He raises some points about Boeing's cost cutting to reduce assembly time
and weight, but those should be easily addressed.

My major concern about the 787 is that so little of it is actually produced by
Boeing, and is actually farmed out to all sorts of foreign contractors of
questionable reliability, either to increase profit margins or for political
reasons.

My major concern about the 787 is that so little of it is actually produced by
Boeing, and is actually farmed out to all sorts of foreign contractors of
questionable reliability, either to increase profit margins or for political
reasons.

Which is different from the 777 how? Most of the 777 is made by
external suppliers.

Mxsmanic wrote in
:

Larry Dighera writes:

While it is evident that Mr. Vincent A. Weldon is qualified to issue
his concerns in his comment on this issue, I fail to see how the
carbon-fiber composite construction of the Boeing 787-8 is
significantly different from that used in many military aircraft.

It's not ... but military aircraft and personnel are considered much
more expendable than civilian aircraft and personnel, so the threshold
of acceptable risk is much higher. Hmm.

He raises some points about Boeing's cost cutting to reduce assembly
time and weight, but those should be easily addressed.

My major concern about the 787 is that so little of it is actually
produced by Boeing, and is actually farmed out to all sorts of foreign
contractors of questionable reliability, either to increase profit
margins or for political reasons.


You are an idiot


Bertie

On Sep 20, 11:59 am, Mxsmanic wrote:

My major concern about the 787 is that so little of it is actually produced by
Boeing, and is actually farmed out to all sorts of foreign contractors of
questionable reliability....

How could you possibly know this?

F--

On 19 Sep, 16:17, Jay Honeck wrote:
On Sep 19, 10:09 am, FredGarvinMaleProstitute

wrote:
NEW YORK - Boeing Co's (BA) new carbon-composite 787
Dreamliner plane may turn out to be unsafe and could lead to
more deaths in crashes, according to a report by veteran
journalist Dan Rather to be broadcast in the United States
on Tuesday.

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,297248,00.html

Oooooo.... This is gonna get ugly.

Interesting. Plastic is not necessarily less robust than
aluminium. Racing cars for example are much safer
now that they are made from Carbon fiber than they
ever were when they were mostly made from aluminiun.

I though suspect that the safety improvement may have largely
come as a consequence of needing to make
the car stiffer for performance reasons. Modern F1 cars are
unbelievably robust. Toxic fumes in the event of fire
are another matter.

Here ya go...

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/ABP...2003889769.pdf

Jim

--
"If you think you can, or think you can't, you're right."
--Henry Ford

RST Engineering wrote:
Here ya go...

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/ABP...2003889769.pdf

Jim

Dang, I thought that was going to be a link to the flight of the monkeys.

--
Message posted via AviationKB.com
http://www.aviationkb.com/Uwe/Forums...ation/200709/1