AIM-54 Phoenix missile

Ed,

(As an aside, how does size of the radar or "paletts" for the Phoenix
result in a larger cockpit? Gotta say the F-105 cockpit was the
biggest single-seat office I ever saw and the F-15 operator station
isn't cramped, either.)

I don't think I said that paletts for AIM-54s made the cockpit "large". But,
OK.

Then, let us not forget that the AWG-9 is not only a radar: I'm sure you
know better than me that it's actually a whole weapons system, _including_
the AWG-9 radar.

So, while the cockpits of F-105s and F-15s are certainly not as cramped as
that of the MiG-21 (quite on the contrary: that of the F-15 was definitely
the largest in a one-seat fighter until the appearance of the Su-27), they
are still neither as long nor as wide as that of the F-14. One of the
reasons was the need to squeeze all the 30+ "black boxes" (and these also
include no less but four large displays put into the cockpit) of the AWG-9A
into the airframe: these were distributed ahead, around, and - of course -
inside the cockpit. The AWG-9A simply had a much more volumen (and
capabillities) than the APG-63, and it needed the second crew-member to
operate it.

Don't get me wrong, but if these are not the reasons for the huge size of
the cockpit on the F-14, then I don't know what else should have been?

Doing anything similar with any other type would not function for several
reasons. When designing the F-15, the USAF actually wanted to have an
aircraft like the F/A-18 later became, a dogfighter and a one-seater.

That is precisely what General Bellis and the F-15 design team created
in the F-15A, a world-class maneuverability dog-fighter and a single
seater. There was never anything else under consideration.

Nobody said anything else about the final F-15. I was talking about the size
as devised by the original FX request.

Only
the shock from the appearance of the MiG-25 caused them to let the F-15
become as large as fast as it become, in order to be able to intercept
Foxbats.

Hardly. The Eagle planform was heavily governed by the size of TabVee
shelters. The footprint of the aircraft fits very closely over the
footprint of the F-4. Intercept of the Foxbat was clearly a missile
matter and not one of aircraft performance. Early detection, long
range weapons and good intercept geometry were paramount. The speed of
the F-15 both initially and in the end product closely parallels the
top speed of the existing front-line fighters--just a bit over M-2.

The footprint was of course to fit that of the F-4. But from what I read
about the history of F-15's the original idea was rather to get something
about the size of the later F-18, and certainly not planned to fly Mach 2.5.
These requirements were not the specifications that can be found in the
original FX. They were added after the Demodedovo '67, when at some stage
calls became known for the FX to become capable of Mach 3, in order to
directly match the Foxbat. Only resistance from the group that was running
the project kept the dogfighting capability as one of main requirements.

Ed, hell, you've been the you know better than anybody here how much
attention was the USAF paying to air-combat being a part of the syllabus for
its pilots in the late 1960s - and also most of the early 1970s. The
interest was actually 0. Even such immensely important projects like
"dogfight Sparrow", Combat Tree and the AIM-9J were only half-heartedly
done....

Also, if you don't mind, but if the long-range weapons were one of the
matters considered "paramount", then the F-15 armed with AIM-7Es (F was
still a distant future at the time) was definitely an underdog compared to
both, the YF-12 and the F-14. Actually, until the APG-63 was improved the
F-14 could fire even AIM-9s from a longer range than the F-15...

Clearly, the F-14 with its "long claws" would have been even better
for this task, but there was no way the USAF would buy a USN fighter
(again,
like it did in the case of the F-4).

The F-14 was optimized for fleet air defense. It was designed for the
interceptor role. The F-15 was designed as a tactical fighter for air
superiority. There is a considerable difference in the detail of the
two missions. It shouldn't be construed as a question of service
rivalry.

Well, theoretically not. But, in fact it was so. For example, the USAF FX
DCP (Development Concept Paper) from 1969 concluded that the "VFX is not
able to meet this requirement" (the requirement for the FX). Given that
neither the FX or VFX flew at the time they not only couldn't possibly know,
but then - if I we bring back the "paramount" aspect of long-range weapons -
the FX could've been dropped straight away.

Besides, while the final result of the F-14 became a plane "optimized for
fleet air defense" - this was foremost so by purpose, i.e. how the USN
intended to use it and how it trained its Tomcat crews, not by design.
Originally, the F-14 was designed as a dogfighter, and - despite all the
explanations around - even the F-14A with its nifty TF-30s was superior in
maneuver to the F-15 at anything but high-subsonic speeds.

(From discussions with pilots that flew both planes, however, it appears
that the F-14 was not as easy to fly successfully in the dogfight as the
F-15 (even if the weapons system of the original F-15A had quite some
problems with the man-machine interface, when compared to the F-14), and
this, as well as different subsequent upgrades in the Eagle cockpit is what
then "made" the F-15 being "accepted as a better dogfighter".)

The F-16, on the contrary, was designed as a simple dogfighter,
day-fighter
armed with the gun and Sidewinders only. Only after it entered service
was
any separation testing for the use of Mk.82783/84 bombs done. All the
complex avionics was added to it even at a later stage.

Sorry, but no. The F-16 (actually the lightweight fighter competition)
was to build a replacement for the F-4 fleet. The F-15 air superiority
fighter did the air/air mission and from its inception the F-16/F-17
programs were designed for ground attack. The "complex avionics" of
the CCIP conventional weapons release system were incorporated in the
first production A models.

The CCIP was included in the original weapons system, no dispute. But that
was not what I was talking about. As first, eiher the USAF never completed
separation testing for the Mk.82/83/84s on F-16s, or it never revealed the
results of this to quite a few of its foreign customers. Don't know what was
the reason, but I've heard several Israelis and the Dutch complaining they
had to complete the job (and this as late as the late-1980s). As second,
what I meant with "complex avionics" was certainly not the CCIP-mode: that's
something even the F-14A has got almost 20 years before any kind of
"Bombcat" thinking became known within the USN. "Complex avionics", IMHO, is
such stuff like APG-66-modes enabling the support of AIM-7s, and then
especially the LANTRIN, HARM-compatibility etc...

Bear in mind, Ed, that most of the youngsters today run around thinking the
F-16 was originally designed as what such versions like Block 40/50/60 are
today - which was definitely not something ever dreamed about in the early
1970s.

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/t...hp/title=S6585

On Sat, 25 Oct 2003 21:31:25 GMT, "Tom Cooper" wrote:

Great comments Tom (damn, if we keep this up, RAM might become a
military aviation newsgroup again instead of a he-said/she-said troll
roost!) Some snipping (hopefully without losing context) and responses
below:

Ed,

(As an aside, how does size of the radar or "paletts" for the Phoenix
result in a larger cockpit? Gotta say the F-105 cockpit was the
biggest single-seat office I ever saw and the F-15 operator station
isn't cramped, either.)

Then, let us not forget that the AWG-9 is not only a radar: I'm sure you
know better than me that it's actually a whole weapons system, _including_
the AWG-9 radar.

So, while the cockpits of F-105s and F-15s are certainly not as cramped as
that of the MiG-21 (quite on the contrary: that of the F-15 was definitely
the largest in a one-seat fighter until the appearance of the Su-27), they
are still neither as long nor as wide as that of the F-14. One of the
reasons was the need to squeeze all the 30+ "black boxes" (and these also
include no less but four large displays put into the cockpit) of the AWG-9A
into the airframe: these were distributed ahead, around, and - of course -
inside the cockpit. The AWG-9A simply had a much more volumen (and
capabillities) than the APG-63, and it needed the second crew-member to
operate it.

There is the rub, the second crew-man. The Navy had a dedicated RIO
cadre and seemed to have a lot less difficulty with the two-man
concept than the USAF. The abortive attempt to put pilots in the
stick-equipped back seat of F-4s had left a terrible taste in the
figurative mouth of the AF and the orientation was strictly for a
single seat airplane.

Now, given that, I'll have to argue that the state of the ergonomic
art at the time was that an effective single seat cockpit could be
designed to manage the sensor/weapons suite. Certainly the success of
both the Eagle and the Viper seem to confirm this.


Only
the shock from the appearance of the MiG-25 caused them to let the F-15
become as large as fast as it become, in order to be able to intercept
Foxbats.

Hardly. The Eagle planform was heavily governed by the size of TabVee
shelters. The footprint of the aircraft fits very closely over the
footprint of the F-4. Intercept of the Foxbat was clearly a missile
matter and not one of aircraft performance. Early detection, long
range weapons and good intercept geometry were paramount. The speed of
the F-15 both initially and in the end product closely parallels the
top speed of the existing front-line fighters--just a bit over M-2.

The footprint was of course to fit that of the F-4. But from what I read
about the history of F-15's the original idea was rather to get something
about the size of the later F-18, and certainly not planned to fly Mach 2.5.
These requirements were not the specifications that can be found in the
original FX. They were added after the Demodedovo '67, when at some stage
calls became known for the FX to become capable of Mach 3, in order to
directly match the Foxbat. Only resistance from the group that was running
the project kept the dogfighting capability as one of main requirements.

Certainly there were mods to the specs and a capability like Foxbat
would cause some concern. But, there was also the "high/low" mix
debate going on in the bowels of the Pentagon. Some were arguing for
high tech sophistication in small "force multiplier" numbers while
others were supporting the F-5 simple, agile, low cost, deploy in
large numbers concept. Clearly the Eagle went high tech and the
results over the ensuing years support that position. While the F-5 is
everyman's sports car, if you want to go to war for real, take the
F-15.

Ed, hell, you've been the you know better than anybody here how much
attention was the USAF paying to air-combat being a part of the syllabus for
its pilots in the late 1960s - and also most of the early 1970s. The
interest was actually 0. Even such immensely important projects like
"dogfight Sparrow", Combat Tree and the AIM-9J were only half-heartedly
done....

I'd have to debate the priorities a bit. The speed with which the AF
brought ECM pods, ARMs, RWR and Weasels to the table makes me think
that a lot of stuff was on the front burner. Ditto for PGM
development. The air/air stuff was coming quickly, but arguably might
have taken a back seat to the air/mud because (despite the losses to
MiGs) there was less of a threat from aircraft than SAMs and flak.

AIM-7E-2, the "dogfight Sparrow" was available in '72 when I checked
out in the F-4 and guys had been flying the AIM-7E with interlocks out
for several years already. Tree was deployed for Linebacker and
J-birds were on most of the air/air tasked F-4s. Also, first
production run TCTO-566 LES/TISEO airplanes were showing up in the
summer of '72, so there was some emphasis.

Also, if you don't mind, but if the long-range weapons were one of the
matters considered "paramount", then the F-15 armed with AIM-7Es (F was
still a distant future at the time) was definitely an underdog compared to
both, the YF-12 and the F-14. Actually, until the APG-63 was improved the
F-14 could fire even AIM-9s from a longer range than the F-15...

But, of course, the YF-12 and F-14 were both interceptors and
certainly no one will consider the -12 to be a dog-fighter.

The F-14 was optimized for fleet air defense. It was designed for the
interceptor role. The F-15 was designed as a tactical fighter for air
superiority. There is a considerable difference in the detail of the
two missions. It shouldn't be construed as a question of service
rivalry.

Besides, while the final result of the F-14 became a plane "optimized for
fleet air defense" - this was foremost so by purpose, i.e. how the USN
intended to use it and how it trained its Tomcat crews, not by design.
Originally, the F-14 was designed as a dogfighter, and - despite all the
explanations around - even the F-14A with its nifty TF-30s was superior in
maneuver to the F-15 at anything but high-subsonic speeds.

"anything but high-subsonic speeds" is ruling out where all reasonable
dog-fighting is done! If you aren't doing it at "high-subsonic" speed,
you're going to die in short order. The Tom, just like the F-4B and J
before was typically tasked to take off, proceed to a CAP and orbit
120 miles from the boat waiting to be directed by an E-2C to a threat
inbound. With the Phoenix added to the weapons suite, the air defense
gained the capability to defend against anti-shipping missiles like
Kelt and Kitchen.

Certainly the Tom had a good close in combat capability. I remember
the first encounter I had with one in the Med. I was running against
America at very low altitude and watched the Tom come in against me
from eleven o'clock. As always I was fast and had just told my WSO
that he was no threat and was going to overshoot big-time when the
wings came forward, went all white with condensation and the
bat-turned into my six. I was impressed!

Over the years while I was running exercises for the NATO Southern
Region at USAFE Hq, I handled a lot of USAF/USN exercises and the
outcome of Eagle-vs-Toms was always the same. The Toms got the
long-range intercept credits and the Eagles got lots of video of Toms
with pipper-burns.

(From discussions with pilots that flew both planes, however, it appears
that the F-14 was not as easy to fly successfully in the dogfight as the
F-15 (even if the weapons system of the original F-15A had quite some
problems with the man-machine interface, when compared to the F-14), and
this, as well as different subsequent upgrades in the Eagle cockpit is what
then "made" the F-15 being "accepted as a better dogfighter".)

Tactics were esssential to getting the F-15 success rate up. I was
aware of a distinct difference during the period I was in USAFE Hq
between the Bitburg and Soesterburg units. Bit was very tentative in
their employment while the 32nd TFS was aggressive and creative in
their tactics.

Ditto a couple of years later when I got quite a bit of DACT with the
Eagles while I was flogging an AT-38 at Holloman. While an Eagle 1-v-1
would always best the Talon (or for that matter, an Aggressor F-5E),
when we went 2-v-2, the 49th Wing's restrictive tactics made it easy
for an experienced pair of Talons to get regular kills. (Barring, of
course, BVR Sparrow credits.)

Sorry, but no. The F-16 (actually the lightweight fighter competition)
was to build a replacement for the F-4 fleet. The F-15 air superiority
fighter did the air/air mission and from its inception the F-16/F-17
programs were designed for ground attack. The "complex avionics" of
the CCIP conventional weapons release system were incorporated in the
first production A models.

The CCIP was included in the original weapons system, no dispute. But that
was not what I was talking about. As first, eiher the USAF never completed
separation testing for the Mk.82/83/84s on F-16s, or it never revealed the
results of this to quite a few of its foreign customers. Don't know what was
the reason, but I've heard several Israelis and the Dutch complaining they
had to complete the job (and this as late as the late-1980s).

Don't know what their problem was, but with the Mk 80 series LD/GP
bombs being the primary conventional munition and with the expressed
preference in the period for "smart system/dumb bomb" technology, I
can't see that being possible. In fact, Osirik was 1981 and the
Israeli seemed to do OK with Mk-84 dumb bombs coming off cleanly!

As second,
what I meant with "complex avionics" was certainly not the CCIP-mode: that's
something even the F-14A has got almost 20 years before any kind of
"Bombcat" thinking became known within the USN. "Complex avionics", IMHO, is
such stuff like APG-66-modes enabling the support of AIM-7s, and then
especially the LANTRIN, HARM-compatibility etc...

No question there, that AIM-7 capability and the LANTIRN suite were
complex capability enhancements.

Bear in mind, Ed, that most of the youngsters today run around thinking the
F-16 was originally designed as what such versions like Block 40/50/60 are
today - which was definitely not something ever dreamed about in the early
1970s.

Gotta agree 100%. Of course, I also can't imagine running around with
everything you say and do being recorded on video from start to
shutdown....coulda been embarrassing!

Over the years while I was running exercises for the NATO Southern
Region at USAFE Hq, I handled a lot of USAF/USN exercises and the
outcome of Eagle-vs-Toms was always the same. The Toms got the
long-range intercept credits and the Eagles got lots of video of Toms
with pipper-burns.

Any idea how it went when the F-14 got F110s?

Now, given that, I'll have to argue that the state of the ergonomic
art at the time was that an effective single seat cockpit could be
designed to manage the sensor/weapons suite. Certainly the success of
both the Eagle and the Viper seem to confirm this.

If a complex weapons system like the B-2 can be very effectively employed by
just 2 crew members, I have little doubt that the fighter mission can be
very well flown by a single seater with today's technology. And that always
prompts me to scratch my head in disbelief at the F/A-18F Super-Hornet. The
Navy is replacing the Tomcat squadrons with like numbers of squadrons with
the single-seater (E) and twin-seater (F). And the expected enhanced rear
crew station for the Super-Bug is somewhere in the future... meaning that
double-seater Super-Bugs, at this date, basically carry a passenger on the
back. It might be a highly qualified and capable passenger, but the added
value over the single-seater is minimal and doesn't compensate the fuel it
looses. Maybe wiser heads can correct me...

_____________
José Herculano

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Sat, 25 Oct 2003 21:31:25 GMT, "Tom Cooper" wrote:

Great comments Tom (damn, if we keep this up, RAM might become a
military aviation newsgroup again instead of a he-said/she-said troll
roost!)

It's very much my pleasure, Ed!

I'll do also some snips, as I see we agree on quite a few things.

There is the rub, the second crew-man. The Navy had a dedicated RIO
cadre and seemed to have a lot less difficulty with the two-man
concept than the USAF. The abortive attempt to put pilots in the
stick-equipped back seat of F-4s had left a terrible taste in the
figurative mouth of the AF and the orientation was strictly for a
single seat airplane.

Now, given that, I'll have to argue that the state of the ergonomic
art at the time was that an effective single seat cockpit could be
designed to manage the sensor/weapons suite. Certainly the success of
both the Eagle and the Viper seem to confirm this.

Actually, in the case of the Eagle, the ergonomics was not really "perfect"
straight away. Rembember that after the AIMVAL/ACEVAL the McD has got a
(pretty long) list of what needs to be improved in the cockpit, including -
between others - the radar and fire-control-system controls. At the time,
these were all considered as poorer and more complex than on the F-14.

And, by the time the USAF F-15s were usually beaten in dogfights with USN
F-14s hands down.

The footprint was of course to fit that of the F-4. But from what I read
about the history of F-15's the original idea was rather to get something
about the size of the later F-18, and certainly not planned to fly Mach
2.5.
These requirements were not the specifications that can be found in the
original FX. They were added after the Demodedovo '67, when at some stage
calls became known for the FX to become capable of Mach 3, in order to
directly match the Foxbat. Only resistance from the group that was
running
the project kept the dogfighting capability as one of main requirements.

Certainly there were mods to the specs and a capability like Foxbat
would cause some concern. But, there was also the "high/low" mix
debate going on in the bowels of the Pentagon. Some were arguing for
high tech sophistication in small "force multiplier" numbers while
others were supporting the F-5 simple, agile, low cost, deploy in
large numbers concept. Clearly the Eagle went high tech and the
results over the ensuing years support that position. While the F-5 is
everyman's sports car, if you want to go to war for real, take the
F-15.

Somewhere around 1968, there was indeed the first trace of the "high/low"
mix, with the FX being "widened" to become a swing-wing monster with a t/o
weight of something like 27.000kg and Mach 3 capability. Simultaneously the
idea of the LWF (Light-Weight Fighter" was born. Then the whole stuff was
mixed into the F-15: the LWF came back in the early 1970s, after the
cost-explosion caused by the inflation.

Originally, however, the FX was always to jump into the footsteps of the
P-51 and F-86.

I'd have to debate the priorities a bit. The speed with which the AF
brought ECM pods, ARMs, RWR and Weasels to the table makes me think
that a lot of stuff was on the front burner. Ditto for PGM
development. The air/air stuff was coming quickly, but arguably might
have taken a back seat to the air/mud because (despite the losses to
MiGs) there was less of a threat from aircraft than SAMs and flak.

Agreed: based on Vietnam experienes, the priority was air-to-ground, and
organizing and equipping strike packages that could "safely" penetrate areas
defended by a dense concentration of the SAM/radar-guided-AAA.

AIM-7E-2, the "dogfight Sparrow" was available in '72 when I checked
out in the F-4 and guys had been flying the AIM-7E with interlocks out
for several years already. Tree was deployed for Linebacker and
J-birds were on most of the air/air tasked F-4s. Also, first
production run TCTO-566 LES/TISEO airplanes were showing up in the
summer of '72, so there was some emphasis.

That's all right too. However, the "dogfight Sparrow" was - just like the
AIM-9J - only half-hearteldy tested. I.e., while the generals were talking
about them as "dogfight weapons", they were tested only at medium or high
altitudes and against non-maneuvering targets. So, both weapons were sent to
SEA without all being known about them. Later, much later, after all the
experiences from SEA were seriously studied, and much more testing of both
weapons being done, then the AIM-7E-2/4 and AIM-9J-1 as well as the AIM-9Ps
became really excellent dogfighting weapons, and so, you'll not hear any of
the Iranians (just for example) who used them in the 1980s complaining at
all.

Re. Tree: surely, they introduced it in the SEA actually already in 1971,
but only in very small numbers (eight F-4Ds with the Tripple Nickel). The
system became widespread in SEA only during the summer of 1972, by the time
the MiGs were really scarce in the skies even over the RP.6, not to talk
about whole North Vietnam. So, there was not much use of it any more (also
due to the fact that the remaining MiGs were not using their IFF as much as
before), and the planes were involved mainly in air-to-ground again. By 1973
the APX-80 was hardly known even to the Israelis - which could have badly
needed it especially when in October of the same year the Arabs came in in
huge - but very tight - formations, which were causing quite some problems
to Israeli GCI-stations.

Besides, the matter seems to have been almost forgotten within the USAF
already by 1976: remember the F-15-pilots starting to use telescopes in
their cockpits instead. Obviously, by 1979 the NCTR became the topic of the
day (despite the fact that it wasn't functioning 100% even in 1999). Others,
however, remain absolutely convinced about the Tree until today. Being
specialized in the topic of the IPGW (1980-1988), I couldn't avoid learning
a lot about projects like CT/Clear Horizont/Second View on F-4s and F-14s
sold to Iran, for example, and I must say they used them with immense
success (especially as the Iraqis were flying around with their
IFF-transponders lightning like Chrismas Trees all the times).

So, while the USAF was doing something on the topic of the air-to-air,
that's not at dispute he in fact the USAF put together many tremendous
systems. It is just so that the stuff was either slowly introduced, or
dropped soon after, or not tested-out. This, because the priority was
somewhere else. Given all of this, it's actually a wonder that anything like
F-15 could've been fielded at the time...

"anything but high-subsonic speeds" is ruling out where all reasonable
dog-fighting is done! If you aren't doing it at "high-subsonic" speed,
you're going to die in short order.

Sorry Ed, by all respoect, I'm not so sure about this. Certainly, it is a
very good method in peace-time exercises. But I don't think that more than
5-10% of war-time dogfighting done in the last 20 years would confirm this.

As a matter of fact, I talked with quite a few folks who were dogfighting in
different wars of the 1980s, and these do not think that dogfighting at high
subsonic speeds (or dogfighting at all), makes much sence. In fact, most of
them preferred the efficiency of the initial "slash attack". If there was
anything left after this one, they'd then use low-speed/high AoA turns to
point their weapons at another target and the superior acceleration to start
another attack. So, while the opponents were turning around them at high
subsonic speeds, they were swiftly repositioning and shooting down one after
the other... The tactics proved superior even against numerically superior
opponents - and this dozens of times.

But then, to the best of my knowledge, the USAF fought only one dogfight
ever since 1972, and that ended with the MiG-29 flying into the ground...

The Tom, just like the F-4B and J
before was typically tasked to take off, proceed to a CAP and orbit
120 miles from the boat waiting to be directed by an E-2C to a threat
inbound. With the Phoenix added to the weapons suite, the air defense
gained the capability to defend against anti-shipping missiles like
Kelt and Kitchen.

Yes, and that - as well as the following few paragraphs of your post
actually explain why: after a series of mishaps caused by the combo of
engine problems/pilots mistakes etc. the high AoA/low speed maneuvering was
pretty much restricted in the USN's F-14s community from late 1970s-early
1980s. Safety became paramount, and so the gents there haven't trained
flying in regimes where their planes excelled. I.e. they started dogfighting
at high subsonic speeds, where the F-15 is superior. As said above, the F-14
was nowhere as easy to fly successfully in the dogfight as the F-15: the
pilot really needs to know his stuff, and take immense care about each and
every throttle movement all the time, or the plane will either stall or the
engine explode. That caused problems to many of the less-experienced fliers,
and was frequently ending in accidents. Pilots with (far) more experience
(and quite some guts) on the type, however, haven't had problems pulling the
plane into 70° AoA, doing "bat turns" at nothing more but 70kts and turning
180° in few seconds only, just for example, in order to reposition and point
their weapons at the enemy.

Tactics were esssential to getting the F-15 success rate up. I was
aware of a distinct difference during the period I was in USAFE Hq
between the Bitburg and Soesterburg units. Bit was very tentative in
their employment while the 32nd TFS was aggressive and creative in
their tactics.

Truth: after the Vietnam War the USAF was permanently improving its
air-combat tactics, while that of the USN actually degenerated to a degree.

It must be mentioned here, however, that many exercises involving USN
F-14-units had pretty strange RoEs, to say at least. In more than 50% of the
cases the Tomcats were not permitted to use AIM-54s at all, so even this
advantage was removed right away, and their opponents were not acting the
way they would act in the case of the war and if having to expect to get
under a threat of long-range shots. I know about several specific cases
where trully stupid things were done: in one a single F-14 was sent against
a pair of F-15s that were in a climb to 30.000ft and more, because somebody
aboard the carrier wanted to see "if the Tomcat can split the Eagles". What
should have been the purpose of that "exercise" I don't know, but surely as
hell the Tomcat was "shot down" before long.

So also in the IIPGW, in 1992: although equipped with the CT, the F-14s were
considered as "not suitable" of "safe" long-range engagements against an air
force that was flying with its IFF-transponders "on" all the time. Why?
Well, because the NCTR-equipped F-15C MSIP-IIs should have had the needed
long-range EID-capability even if it was known that this was far from
functioning perfectly... Strange, to say at least...

Don't know what their problem was, but with the Mk 80 series LD/GP
bombs being the primary conventional munition and with the expressed
preference in the period for "smart system/dumb bomb" technology, I
can't see that being possible. In fact, Osirik was 1981 and the
Israeli seemed to do OK with Mk-84 dumb bombs coming off cleanly!

Indeed: the Israelis completed the separation testing for the Mk.84s in
order to be able to hit Osirak with these weapons!

The Mk.83 separation testing was completed by the Dutch after one of their
"Lawn Darts" got a better part of one of his ventral fin clipped away by a
(live) bomb that went astry.

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/t...hp/title=S6585

On Sat, 25 Oct 2003 18:01:25 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

On Sat, 25 Oct 2003 16:44:49 GMT, "Tom Cooper" wrote:

Why were the AWG-9 and the AIM-54 not put into any other plane?

The answer is simple: needs at the time and the aircraft construction.

The AWG-9 was a huge system when designed for the F-111B, which was
developed for service aboard the USN carriers through the 1960s. Although
considerably updated and thus made lighter by almost 500kg, it remained a
huge system when it was put into the F-14, in 1969. And still, the F-14 was
not designed "around" the AWG-9 and the AIM-54, but first as a dogfighter,
armed with a gun, Sparrows and Sidewinders, to fight MiG-17s and MiG-21s.
Once this capability was developed, the designers went to find out how to
fit the AWG-9 and the AIM-54s on it. One of the results of this work became
the "paletts" on which the AIM-54s are mounted. Another was the largest
cockpit of any fighter aircraft ever.

While I bow to your knowledge of the radar and AIM-54, as well as
history of the Iranian applications of the aircraft, I've got to
question some of your other assertions here.

Clearly by the time of production of the F-14, the anticipated threat
had migrated forward beyond MiG-17 and focussed more closely on 21,
23, 27 and future developments from the Soviet block. Additionally,
there was concern with free world designs used by swing
nations--aircraft like Mirage III and F-1, for example.

(As an aside, how does size of the radar or "paletts" for the Phoenix
result in a larger cockpit? Gotta say the F-105 cockpit was the
biggest single-seat office I ever saw and the F-15 operator station
isn't cramped, either.)


The cockpit of the Crusader III looked pretty big too.

Sorry, but no. The F-16 (actually the lightweight fighter competition)
was to build a replacement for the F-4 fleet. The F-15 air superiority
fighter did the air/air mission and from its inception the F-16/F-17
programs were designed for ground attack. The "complex avionics" of
the CCIP conventional weapons release system were incorporated in the
first production A models.

I'll disagree on this point. The F-16/17 were designed to provide a cheaper
alternative and augment the expensive F-14/15 (Remember this buzz phrase:
"hi lo mix?"). They were originally designed as less complex air
superiority aircraft ... simple dogfighters ... with lesser radar and
(any?) BVR capability. The mud missions were designed in later.

R / John

On Sun, 26 Oct 2003 06:15:34 -0600, "John Carrier"
wrote:

Sorry, but no. The F-16 (actually the lightweight fighter competition)
was to build a replacement for the F-4 fleet. The F-15 air superiority
fighter did the air/air mission and from its inception the F-16/F-17
programs were designed for ground attack. The "complex avionics" of
the CCIP conventional weapons release system were incorporated in the
first production A models.

I'll disagree on this point. The F-16/17 were designed to provide a cheaper
alternative and augment the expensive F-14/15 (Remember this buzz phrase:
"hi lo mix?"). They were originally designed as less complex air
superiority aircraft ... simple dogfighters ... with lesser radar and
(any?) BVR capability. The mud missions were designed in later.


Was suppose to have Sidewinders and gun only. I remember somebody
wanted a BVR missile on it so they tested one of the early ones with
two Sparrows mounted between the main gear IIRC (It was SOMEWHERE on
the belly and there aren't that many places they'd fit :-) )

Scott Ferrin wrote in
:

(It was SOMEWHERE on
the belly and there aren't that many places they'd fit :-) )


They were actually mounted *on* the main undercarriage doors! Must've been
excellent fun loading them. . .

--
Regards
Drewe
"Better the pride that resides
In a citizen of the world
Than the pride that divides
When a colourful rag is unfurled"

Ed posted
The F-16 (actually the lightweight fighter competition)
was to build a replacement for the F-4 fleet. The F-15 air superiority
fighter did the air/air mission and from its inception the F-16/F-17
programs were designed for ground attack. The "complex avionics" of
the CCIP conventional weapons release system were incorporated in the
first production A models.

John Carrier elaborated:

I'll disagree on this point. The F-16/17 were designed to provide a cheaper
alternative and augment the expensive F-14/15 (Remember this buzz phrase:
"hi lo mix?"). They were originally designed as less complex air
superiority aircraft ... simple dogfighters ... with lesser radar and
(any?) BVR capability. The mud missions were designed in later.

I give the nod to John's post in strict terms of how John Boyd
proposed the LWF...*no* radar, heaters and gun...then limted radar,
heaters, gun.

But as Ed says, by the time the USAF had the funding for the winner of
the F-16/F-17 competition the *program* was for an F-4 replacement. GD
publicity photos of Full Scale Development (FSD) aircraft show the
array of surface attack weapons planned. And from the gitgo (Jan 1979)
the 16th TFTS at Hill was doing the air-to-mud thing. And the primary
DOC of all the F-4 units (in 1980) re-equipping to the Viper was
air-to-mud.

Juvat