Does the 3-1 rule apply to air combat?

Seems to me there's a lot of "apples vs oranges" so far in this
discussion. If you take a look at the air war in the Battle for France
or the air war over Europe from August 1944 on you see what numbers
can do for you. Numbers times quality gives you a down and dirty
measure of capability but it nevertheless means it's tough on the side
with the lower result.
Also, picking one encounter out of the stack can give misleading
results because of the large number of variables.
Lnachester's Rule applies - generally - but Saburo Sakai in his A6M5
Zero was jumped by 16 Hellcats - and got away . . . . OTH Clarence
Schomo in a P38 jumped a flight of Japanese fighters on a ferry hop
(forgot what they were - Zeros or Franks, ISTR - and got 7 of them . .
.. go figure. Or for real awesome technical superiority - the Bekaa
Valley Turkey Shoot.
Walt BJ

(BUFDRVR) wrote in message ...
A common rule of thumb is that the attacking force must have a 3x or
greater combination of quantity and quality to succeed in its attack.
Does this rule apply to air combat?


I believe I could argue it no longer applies to ground combat either.
Technology makes a good force multiplier, up to a point. I don't believe
coalition ground forces outnumbered Iraqi forces 3-1 in 1991 or 2003.

True. No US ground force trains under conditions where it enjoys a
3:1, or even 2:1, superiority in terms of raw numbers. This
discrepancy in mass is made up by two factors--first, use of superior
ISR and mobility (maneuver) to acheive a brief localized parity or
minor superiority at the decisive point (this is where BAI can help
tremendously, in isolating the decisive area from enemy reinforcement
or internal reorganization/maneuver), and second, use of additional
firepower, and more importantly precision fires (including CAS), to
give you a 3:1 advantage in *firepower* (number of crunchies, tanks,
etc., itself is meaningless--their combined firepower capability is
the key consideration) at that point.

Brooks


BUFDRVR

True. No US ground force trains under conditions where it enjoys a
3:1, or even 2:1, superiority in terms of raw numbers.

The original poster said "quality and quantity." Arguably, the U.S.
had a better than 3-1 superiority over the Iraqi army and the fedayeen
when the quality of American weaponry is considered.

all the best -- Dan Ford
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Cub Driver wrote in message . ..
True. No US ground force trains under conditions where it enjoys a
3:1, or even 2:1, superiority in terms of raw numbers.

The original poster said "quality and quantity." Arguably, the U.S.
had a better than 3-1 superiority over the Iraqi army and the fedayeen
when the quality of American weaponry is considered.

Quality *and* quantity? That can be taken in more than one way (i.e.,
a requirement that *both* be 3:1 margins).

When the US Army trains, it does not set up an OPFOR that is severely
lacking in terms of quality (we even saw the OPFOR, in an Iraqi
scenario fought by corps and division commanders and staffs in 1999,
credited with having a heck of a lot more precision guided weapons
capability, not to mention useable airpower, than existed in reality).
In actual modern operations, such as OIF, the preponderance of mass
has generally always been on the other guy's side--remember all those
cheap-seaters who were bleating about the lack of sufficient US combat
power on the ground (a week before the rush into Baghdad, that
is....they all got kind of quiet after that, except for ol' Wes, who
has tried to now claim that he was *really* griping about the entire
conflict in general...)? Again, the key was to pick out and isolate
the required areas (such as that BAI effort south of Baghdad) and
pinch off a more managable chunk in which we could apply our firepower
to compensate for the lack of sheer numbers. The Army, like the Air
Force, has trained to fight outnumbered and win for decades now.

Brooks


all the best -- Dan Ford

How about First generation technology vs third generation technology i.e if
numbers are equal being at least two generations ahead in technology is
required.


"Hobo" wrote in message
...

A common rule of thumb is that the attacking force must have a 3x or
greater combination of quantity and quality to succeed in its attack.
Does this rule apply to air combat?

"Leadfoot" wrote:

How about First generation technology vs third generation technology i.e if
numbers are equal being at least two generations ahead in technology is
required.

Now that is an interesting proposition. Apply it to infantry. If it is at
night, one generation seems plenty especially if it is a generation without
night vision and one with ;-)

By day, I think I'll take training over tech. If all my guys are riflemen who
can hit a body cavity at 600 yards and there is open ground, I'll take trained
riflemen with M14's or M1's. (And will somebody PLEASE make a good SAW and LMG
in something like 6.5mm? Enough with these .22's!)

For armor, I'll take tech. Fast target aquisition and first shot hits with fast
cycles are crucial. The USSR was pretty put out that the US M1 crews had a high
(90%?) first shot hit rate versus a USSR 30%, plus we could do from a moving
the tank with a traversing the tube and get off about three shots to their one
IIRC. Computers can really help. In this case, Warsaw looked like it would
absolutely HAVE to have a 3 or 4:1 numerical advantage in opperational armor
just to deal with opposing armor. This doesn't even count infantry and
hellicopter launched anti-tank weapons. And how many could an F-18 carry with
that cool ground vehicle motion detection RADAR mode? I forget the acronym.

-- Charlie Springer