December 6,1941

"No Spam!" wrote in message
...
BOB URZ wrote:



More importantly, on a strategic level, if we had known about the attack
in advance, would the US have reacted as strongly and been as committed
to the war?

Hell Yes , an attack on its major bases could hardly be overlooked
and the losses in the Phillipines would have been just as great.
It would still have been a day of infamy.

Keith

Bernardz wrote:

Were any of the ships that were recovered worth much anyway?


If my brains cells aren't totally rotted away, I believe they were used
for pre-invasion bombardment in the island hopping campaigns. While big
gun cruisers were the norm in WW II, a battleship can throw a lot of
metal.


Most of the effort that went into recovery was done for national pride
to deny the Japanese as much of a victory as possible.


National pride was an important issue, but was the space needed to keep
the harbor open to refit and provision other ships? If battleship row
was unavailable, how many ships could Pearl Harbor support in a timely
fashion?

my 0.02

MAH

"BobMac" wrote in message
...
Keith Willshaw wrote:


There was no definite signals information pointing to
Pearl Harbor for the simple and adequate reason that
the Japanese never transmitted any. Not only did
the fleet maintain radio silence but fake messages
were transmitted from the region around Japan
to make people belive it was still in home waters.


Keith, IIRC, there was a German request to their Washington embassy for
some information on specific topics, which was intercepted several
months before Pearl Harbour (by the Brits, _I_ _think_ - it's been a
while.) About two thirds of the request concerned information about
American facilities and units in the Pacific theatre. It was obvious
that the original writer of the requests did not speak English, and
there was a strong likelihood (based on mistakes in nomenclature) that
the original writer was a native Japanese speaker.


It would be surprising if the Japanese had not been collecting
data on US fleet anchorages, I am sure the US Naval attache
in Tokyo was doing the same thing

(I saw this quoted in a general-audience book on Secret Intelligence.
They used it as an exercise in analysis of data.)

The obvious conclusion was that Somebody was going to do Something
pretty soon to American units or facilities in the Pacific. That
somebody would be an aggressive nation more or less allied with Germany,
and with the ability to mount some kind of an offensive in the Pacific,
where the common language was Japanese. (Hmm... who could it be, who
Could it be?)


That much was known, a war warning had been issued to all
US commands days before the attack, everyone KNEW
a war was coming, the question was where and when and the
smart money was on a joint attack on the Phillipines and
Malaya. Thats why Force Z had been dispatched after all.

As for Pearl I am sure the USN had detailed plans of the IJN bases
in the home islands and Truk, this could hardly be read as a
warning of an early intent to attack them without warning.

The document was dismissed as unimportant by, IIRC, the head of the FBI,
on the grounds that he didn't like the messenger who brought it. Now, I
don't believe in conspiracy theories, but stupid decisions for
irrelevant reasons, I don't just believe in - I've seen it done!


The FBI had no juridstiction in matters of naval policy and
would have been right not to be surprised IMHO. Naval
attaches are supposed to ask questions, its what they are
paid for. The real scandal was how little had been done to put
Pearl Harbor on a war footing even after the war warning
had been released.

Keith

In message ,
Mike1 writes
Carrier aircraft could have flown to land-based fields, refueled there,
then attacked the Jap carriers as they approached.

Consider how effective US aviation was against IJN forces in early 1942.
No chance of a Midway Moment (catching carriers in the midst of a
mission change), however bravely the USN crews try to press their
attacks.

Subs may have also have been able to intercept.

And if they get to fire, and hit, so what? They're at the start of the
learning curve of "why don't USN torpedoes work?" in December 1941.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

In message , John Keeney
writes
Catalinas for patrol, nobody was going to attack Pearl at night in '41:
that would have required night carrier ops.

Taranto was a night raid... it could be done, it _had_ been done.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

Good points. A sortie to safety might have been best, but if they had been
caught a lot of hardware and good men would have gone to the bottom. Any
attempt to engage with the battle line would have likely been disastrous.
Staying put, condition zebra set and GQ at 7:00 am with fighter cover may
well have proven best ... I doubt they would have imagined the need for
torpedo nets (a shame, had they been rigged, the damage would have been far
less).

OTOH, the devastating losses forced the US to abandon traditional thinking.
The battle line was obsolete. The cargru was the wave of the future. It
all came to fruition at Midway.

I still think the Pearl Harbor strike was one of the most brilliantly
planned and executed tactical air strikes of all time. Strategically, it
was wrong. Geopolitically, it was dead wrong.

R / John

"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message
...

"BOB URZ" wrote in message
...
I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
come anytime in the next 72 hours.

What could have been done differently to affect the outcome?

They could have issued ammunition for the army fixed AA guns
instead of keeping it in depots (the army didnt like its shells
getting dirty - no kidding)

The USAAF could have been alert with some fighters airbornes
and the rest properly dispersed instead of parked together in the
middle of the field lacking only a neon sign saying 'bomb here'

The fleet could have been on a higher state of readiness instead
of enjoying a sunday morning lie in

They could have taken some basic precautions like rigging torpedo
nets.


Granted at that point in the war, some of the hardware was not up
to snuff with the Japanese. With a 24 hour warning, how many fighter
aircraft could have been prepared, armed, and either flying or on
alert?

The army hearings estimated that if they had been alert between 70 and
80 fighters could have been in the air.

What (if any) could have been used for night operations?
What would have been the likely outcome of an even plane
dogfight scenario?

Given the 24 hour warning time, where would you position the
carriers that were out at sea and why? Offensive or defensive?


They were too far way to make an effective counterstrike or defense.

What about the surface ships in the harbor. In or out?
Was there better way to position them against air attack?


The BB's could have been sent back to the West Coast.

What combination of aircraft could have been marshalled for an
offensive strike against the carrier group at the range they
were at? Were there enough trained aviators to even attempt this
at this time? Were the Japanese aviators better trained and equipped
at this point in the war?


There really wasnt an effective strike force available.

Would the crude land based radar have been any major help with the
advanced warning and defensive attack ?


The land based radar detected the incoming attack very succesfully,
trouble is the information center couldnt handle the data and
simply assumed the aircraft were friendly, no IFF was available.

Would the US fleet have attempted to put to sea to go after the Japanese
task force, or stay close in for the defence against the possible
invasion of Hawaii? Was the fleet safer at sea knowing the
japs were coming, or safer in the harbor?


Safer halfway to San Francisco, sortieing against the carriers
was a hopeless task, they were too slow to catch them and
would likley have lost more men as ships were sunk in the
deep ocean and would not have been salvageable.

Keith

"John Carrier" wrote in message
...
Good points. A sortie to safety might have been best, but if they had
been
caught a lot of hardware and good men would have gone to the bottom. Any
attempt to engage with the battle line would have likely been disastrous.
Staying put, condition zebra set and GQ at 7:00 am with fighter cover may
well have proven best ... I doubt they would have imagined the need for
torpedo nets (a shame, had they been rigged, the damage would have been
far
less).


Thet didnt have to imagine the need, the FAA had shown at Taranto that
you COULD sir drop torpeddoes in shallow water.

OTOH, the devastating losses forced the US to abandon traditional
thinking.
The battle line was obsolete. The cargru was the wave of the future. It
all came to fruition at Midway.

I still think the Pearl Harbor strike was one of the most brilliantly
planned and executed tactical air strikes of all time. Strategically, it
was wrong. Geopolitically, it was dead wrong.


The whole decision to wage war on the USA was disastrous,
once that decision was made however the Japanese navy
had to make the most of the opportunity that they were
offered. Yamamoto knew he could not fight a long war
and the only possible chance, slim as it was, was to destroy
the US Pacific fleet as an offensive unit while other forces
seized the Phillipines and NEI.

Keith

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , John Keeney
writes
Catalinas for patrol, nobody was going to attack Pearl at night in '41:
that would have required night carrier ops.

Taranto was a night raid... it could be done, it _had_ been done.

But that wasn't Pearl. But I concede your point that I'm applying
my own prejudices in a tactically unsound way.

"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message
...

"Vicente Vazquez" wrote in message
...

"Keith Willshaw" escreveu na mensagem
...
Given the 24 hour warning time, where would you position the
carriers that were out at sea and why? Offensive or defensive?
They were too far way to make an effective counterstrike or defense.

Keith,

Sorry if this is a stupid question, but AFAIK, the Enterprise had some
of
its Dauntless (VS-6) on patrol while on her way to Pearl when they were
engaged by jap planes returning to the carriers. One of them (pilot was
Ensign McCarthy, IIRC) was shot down. Devastators from VT-6 were
launched
to
find and attack the jap force, but their search was fruitless. With a
24h
advanced warning, could the Enterprise be put in a "favorable" position
to
attack the jap force, if this could be located? Did she have enough
"firepower" to do face the jap fleet alone?


I think the likely outcome would have been the loss of the Enterprise
and her air crews, a far more valuable asset than the old battleships
that were lost.

I suspect the demonstrated Japanese inclination of the historic
event to withdraw and husband resources would have prevailed
and they would have declined a prolonged fleet battle. After
their attack, how were their av-gas and munitions supplies looking?

Alan Minyard wrote:
On 12 Nov 2003 00:16:58 GMT, (JDupre5762) wrote:

I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
come anytime in the next 72 hours.

It might well have been worse in some ways. I understand that part of the
Navy's planning was to move the fleet out of the harbor to a different
anchorage that was much deeper. So if some of the ships could have been
torpedoed or sunk by bombs there they might well have been unrecoverable.

John Dupre'

And what anchorage would that be?? The Hawaiian Island are rather remote.

On exercises, the Pacific Fleet frequently anchored off Lahaina (Maui)
rather than returning to Pearl Harbor. This is probably the "other
anchorage" that Dupre' is referencing. And the water is a lot deeper off
of Lahaina, for sure...

-Marc
--
Marc Reeve
actual email address after removal of 4s & spaces is
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