Boeing Niner Zero Niner AwwwYEAH!

Granted, I'm no WWII historian, so I don't know how the analysis comes out,
but...

wrote in message
...
Inhuman? Yes. Ineffective? No.

If it was effective, why did Germany manage to produce the greatest
amount of war related materials late in the war when the Allied
bombing was at it's greatest effectiveness? Shouldn't things have
been the other way around?

You cannot simply look at the German production numbers and claim that
because they were higher at one point in time than an earlier point in time,
the bombing was ineffective. It's entirely possible that their production
would have been even higher than it was, if not for the bombing.

If you use the reasoning that production would be constant, and you can
judge the effectiveness of the bombing by the production change over time,
then the conclusion one must arrive at is that the bombing actually *helped*
Germany's production. Obviously that's not the case.

So, given that Germany took steps to increase production in spite of the
bombing, it's not possible to say just by looking at the total production
numbers that the bombing wasn't effective. You need to look at what
Germany's production would have been without the bombing.

That's where someone like you, with your obviously greater interest and time
spent researching the events of WWII comes in. I don't know what Germany's
production would have been without the bombing. That said, assuming the
bombs did manage to hit any component of Germany's production stream, it
seems to me it should be taken as obvious that the bombs hurt the production
stream, and that production would have been even higher had the bombing not
occurred.

Pete

If it was effective, why did Germany manage to produce the greatest
amount of war related materials late in the war when the Allied
bombing was at it's greatest effectiveness? Shouldn't things have
been the other way around?

Corky Scott

What is your source for German production in the above statement?

wrote:

On Tue, 22 Jun 2004 16:28:07 +0100, "Paul Sengupta"
wrote:

Inhuman? Yes. Ineffective? No.

If it was effective, why did Germany manage to produce the greatest
amount of war related materials late in the war when the Allied
bombing was at it's greatest effectiveness? Shouldn't things have
been the other way around?

Well, for one thing, the bombing didn't reach it's peak until '44 either. Most
British bombing prior to the adoption of the area bombing strategy in early 1942 was
woefully ineffective. In addition, Bomber Command had only a little over 300 bombers
by early '42, most of which were twins. 1942 saw a gradual buildup of squadrons in
Bomber Command, the introduction of navaids such as "Gee", and the gradual shift to
heavies such as the Lancaster and Stirling. The U.S. wasn't even in the picture in
'42 - we were still building bases and running training missions. Early '43 saw
Bomber Command really beginning to work seriously on the area bombing campaign. The
USAAF started bombing targets in France. By second quarter '43, the USAAF was
seriously working on the problem of fighter escort, starting out with Spitfires
borrowed from the RAF, but the worst losses ever suffered were taken in October of
that year going after targets which were outside fighter range. The P-51 was brought
into the theater in November, but it was not until 1944 that enough squadrons were
available to be effective.

One can almost say that German production fell just as soon as we were able to
regularly put several hundred to a thousand plus bombers over their cities, but, of
course, both the buildup of force and the damage increases were gradual.

George Patterson
None of us is as dumb as all of us.

On Wed, 23 Jun 2004 17:37:23 GMT, "Casey Wilson"
wrote:


If it was effective, why did Germany manage to produce the greatest
amount of war related materials late in the war when the Allied
bombing was at it's greatest effectiveness? Shouldn't things have
been the other way around?

Corky Scott

What is your source for German production in the above statement?

The postwar strategic bombing assesement survey. It basically
shredded the hallowed tenents that founded the US strategic bombing
campaign.

Here is the main conclusion:

Aviation: "In 1944 the German air force is reported to have accepted a
total of 39,807 aircraft of all types -- compared with 8,295 in 1939,
or 15,596 in 1942 before the plants suffered any attack." According to
the report, almost none of the aircraft produced in 1944 were used in
combat and some may have been imaginary.
Armor production "reached its wartime peak in December 1944, when
1,854 tanks and armored vehicles were produced. This industry
continued to have relatively high production through February 1945."
Ball bearings: "There is no evidence that the attacks on the
ball-bearing industry had any measurable effect on essential war
production."
Steel: The bombing greatly reduced production, but the resulting
shortage had no contribution to the defeat.
Consumer goods: "In the early years of the war -- the soft war period
for Germany -- civilian consumption remained high. Germans continued
to try for both guns and butter. The German people entered the period
of the air war well stocked with clothing and other consumer goods.
Although most consumer goods became increasingly difficult to obtain,
Survey studies show that fairly adequate supplies of clothing were
available for those who had been bombed out until the last stages of
disorganization. Food, though strictly rationed, was in nutritionally
adequate supply throughout the war. The Germans' diet had about the
same calories as the British."
The survey concluded that one reason German production rose in so many
areas was in part that the German economy did not go on a complete war
footing until late 1942 and 1943. Up until then, factories had been on
a single shift in many industries and the German economy was generally
inefficient and not operating at full capacity.

Please note, some aspects of the bombing were very effective. The Oil
production bombing, more so than any other aspect, hugely curtailed
the ability of the German military forces to fight or train to fight.
Oil was not originally the top priority of the bomber forces.

Primarily the problem with Strategic Bombing, as visualized by the
leaders of the Army Air Forces, was that it was an untried concept.
Hundreds of thousands of airmen, in both British forces and US forces
died trying to accomplish something that turned out to be
unattainable, at least in terms of 1940 to 45 technology.

Of course, the bombing campaign affected the outcome of the war. It's
just that the manner of the affect wasn't how the leaders designed it.
They thought that if they could destroy the war making industries,
Germany would loose it's ability to wage war. That part did not
happen. But Germany spent so much time and effort attempting to stop
the bombing campaign, that their ground forces suffered. The skies
over Germany became a charnel house for the German aviators and
without an effective air force, the German army lost a lot of
effectiveness. Germany withdrew enormous numbers of flack guns from
the Russian front to ring their cities for protection. This proved
dire for the bombers, but also reduced the effectiveness of the German
army to counter the hundreds of thousands of tanks the Russians now
sent against their forces.

In the end, hard as this is to swallow, the huge Russian armies likely
would have ground out a victory which would have been even more costly
for them than it was, were it not for the air war against Germany.

Against the Japanese, any likeness to precision bombing was abandoned
when the concept broke against the realities of weather and B-29
maladies.

The Strategic Bombing Survey, as you can imagine, became as
politicized a document and process as is humanly possible. The Army
Air Force was already planning to become an independent military force
at that time and made all kinds of interpretations from the survey
that they felt justified their existance and the concept of an
independent air force.

George Ball and John Kenneth Galbreath were members of the bombing
survey. Galbreath in particular adamantly argued that the strategic
bombing of Germany was far less effective than trumpeted by the
leaders of the Army Air Corps. The Air Corps members, of course,
disagreed.

Corky Scott

"Peter Duniho" wrote in message

You cannot simply look at the German production numbers and claim that
because they were higher at one point in time than an earlier point in
time,
the bombing was ineffective. It's entirely possible that their production
would have been even higher than it was, if not for the bombing.

That's what I think. The Germans used disposable slave labor so bombing
railyards just caused delays while they rounded up more prisoners to do the
repairs, BUT, it can be argued, every factory that was built was X-number of
fighter planes, tanks, bullets, ball bearings, rifles, submarines or other
equipment that didn't make it to the front line to reenforce the German
forces. If the bombing campaign did nothing but curtail the growth or
resupply of the German infantry and Panzer divisions, it saved American
lives on the ground.

I have photographs of bf109s destroyed in the factories by allied bombing
raids. Those 109s never left the ground to shoot down folks like my
grandfather, so calling the air campaign a complete failure is a disservice
to not only the guys who endured the flak guns and FW-190s and Me262s in the
air war, but the guys on the ground who didn't have to face those Tigers,
artillery, etc.
-c

wrote in message
...

The postwar strategic bombing assesement survey. It basically
shredded the hallowed tenents that founded the US strategic bombing
campaign.

Here is the main conclusion:

Aviation: "In 1944 the German air force is reported to have accepted a
total of 39,807 aircraft of all types -- compared with 8,295 in 1939,
or 15,596 in 1942 before the plants suffered any attack." According to
the report, almost none of the aircraft produced in 1944 were used in
combat and some may have been imaginary.
Armor production "reached its wartime peak in December 1944, when
1,854 tanks and armored vehicles were produced. This industry
continued to have relatively high production through February 1945."

Big Snip


Please note, some aspects of the bombing were very effective. The Oil
production bombing, more so than any other aspect, hugely curtailed
the ability of the German military forces to fight or train to fight.
Oil was not originally the top priority of the bomber forces.

Primarily the problem with Strategic Bombing, as visualized by the
leaders of the Army Air Forces, was that it was an untried concept.
Hundreds of thousands of airmen, in both British forces and US forces
died trying to accomplish something that turned out to be
unattainable, at least in terms of 1940 to 45 technology.

Of course, the bombing campaign affected the outcome of the war. It's
just that the manner of the affect wasn't how the leaders designed it.
They thought that if they could destroy the war making industries,
Germany would loose it's ability to wage war. That part did not
happen. But Germany spent so much time and effort attempting to stop
the bombing campaign, that their ground forces suffered.

More Big Snip

Corky Scott

I did some checking at http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/ and
found data that conflicts with the armor production figures you put in at
the top. Interestingly, the site I found almost triples the numbers in
favor of your argument for 1944. The disparity may be that the site I found
goes all the way from Panzer I through V and includes the Ferdinand. It also
includes the figures for armor manufactured in Czechoslovakia and other
plants outside Germany. Those latter numbers must be tallied into the
overall picture, I think.
Good argument, Corky. You made me look at a whole new perspective. The
real nut is in the latter paragraphs you included.

gatt wrote:

If the bombing campaign did nothing but curtail the growth or
resupply of the German infantry and Panzer divisions, it saved American
lives on the ground.

And it did much more than that. Hundreds of the best pilots and aircraft were
withdrawn from the Russian front during Operation Barbarossa to attempt to counter
the growing daylight bombing campaign in the west. Hundreds of thousands of artillery
pieces were devoted to anti-aircraft batteries instead of being sent to the front
lines as anti-tank guns (the difference between an 88mm FLAK and 88mm PAK was
negligible). One week of the daylight bombing campaign was devoted simply to drawing
the Luftwaffe up for our fighters to ensure that none of them could interfere with
D-day. Without that effort, it's quite possible that we could not have remained in
France for long.

George Patterson
None of us is as dumb as all of us.

"Paul Sengupta" wrote in message
...
One of the aircraft under development allegedly went to
South America (or the plans did) after the war only to be copied
(allegedly)
by the Soviets. This became the Mig 15.

Replying to myself, I've found a reference for this:
http://www.luft46.com/fw/ta183-i.html

The whole site lists other planes which may have come on-line
had the war gone on for another year.

http://www.luft46.com/


Paul

On Wed, 23 Jun 2004 13:13:26 -0700, "gatt"
wrote:

I have photographs of bf109s destroyed in the factories by allied bombing
raids. Those 109s never left the ground to shoot down folks like my
grandfather, so calling the air campaign a complete failure is a disservice
to not only the guys who endured the flak guns and FW-190s and Me262s in the
air war, but the guys on the ground who didn't have to face those Tigers,
artillery, etc.

Please, no one called the bombing a complete failure. What was a
failure was the concept of strategic bombing, as conceptualized by
people like Billy Mitchell and Giulio Douhet and fully believed by Hap
Arnold and Ira Eaker. They believed that strategic bombing would
cause such terror and destruction in the enemy camp, that they would
surrender. That bombing their vital war making industries would cause
the Wermacht to shrivel on the vine for lack of supplies. That idea
proved a failure in the crucible of war, except for the oil campaign
and the destruction of the transportation system (which was carried
out most effectively by marauding fighter bombers, not strategic
bombers), and the oil campaign wasn't actually part of the original
plan.

What also was a failure was the fanciful idea that bombers could
protect themselves against intercepters. In 1943, the AAF even
developed a purely defensive version of the B-17 called the YB-40. It
had an extra power turret where the radio operator normally stood, a
power chin turret and each waist position sported dual 50 caliber
machine guns rather than singles. That gave it 14 heavy machine guns.
Plus, it had added armor around the engines and to protect the gunners
and pilots, and a LOT more ammunition, but no bombs. The idea was for
this flying pillbox to accompany the squadrons and lend it's massive
firepower to their protection. Didn't work. The bomber was as heavy
as the normally loaded B-17F's with their bombloads. When the normal
bombers dropped their loads over the target, they suddenly became 4 to
5 thousand pounds lighter, but the YB-40's didn't. The normal bombers
turned off the target and opened up their throttles to get the hell
out of there, and the YB-40's couldn't keep up. They were quietly
retired after a few months of evaluation. The chin turret, however,
was deemed a success and was installed in the next model of B-17, the
G.

A little talked about problem with the massive formations of bombers
was the apparently frequent collateral damage from friendly fire as
the gunners hosed bullets all over the sky in a desperate effort to
protect themselves from the German fighters which often passed by
missing by mere feet occasionally. With so many airplanes occupying
airspace in so narrow an area and the speed with which the fighters
approached and flashed by, it's not surprising that the counter fire
would hit neighboring bombers accidentally. I know of no statistics
covering this situation, but it was apparently so serious a problem
that by the middle of 1944, the waist gunners were reduced from two to
one, and eventually to none. The bombardier, unless he was the lead
or deputy bombardier, really did not need to be trained to aim bombs
because only the lead bomber in each group actually did the aiming,
all the rest of the bombers dropped on his signal, or when they
sighted the bombs dropping from the lead bomber. So he became a
gunner/toggler. By that time as we all know, the bombers were being
protected all the way to the target by P-51's so high command may have
decided to kill two birds with one stone: eliminate the now
unnecessary gunners/ammo and save weight while adding to the bomb
load.

In the end, it was Allied soldiers capturing German territory that
forced the German surrender. Bombing them from afar was literally all
the Allies could do to claim they were taking the war to the Germans
during the first part of the war because they did not have the
infantry assets to confront them after their initial defeats.

Corky Scott

wrote:
On Wed, 23 Jun 2004 13:13:26 -0700, "gatt"
wrote:

I have photographs of bf109s destroyed in the factories by allied
bombing raids. Those 109s never left the ground to shoot down folks
like my grandfather, so calling the air campaign a complete failure
is a disservice to not only the guys who endured the flak guns and
FW-190s and Me262s in the air war, but the guys on the ground who
didn't have to face those Tigers, artillery, etc.

Please, no one called the bombing a complete failure. What was a
failure was the concept of strategic bombing, as conceptualized by
people like Billy Mitchell and Giulio Douhet and fully believed by Hap
Arnold and Ira Eaker. They believed that strategic bombing would
cause such terror and destruction in the enemy camp, that they would
surrender. That bombing their vital war making industries would cause
the Wermacht to shrivel on the vine for lack of supplies. That idea
proved a failure in the crucible of war, except for the oil campaign
and the destruction of the transportation system (which was carried
out most effectively by marauding fighter bombers, not strategic
bombers), and the oil campaign wasn't actually part of the original
plan.

What also was a failure was the fanciful idea that bombers could
protect themselves against intercepters. In 1943, the AAF even
developed a purely defensive version of the B-17 called the YB-40. It
had an extra power turret where the radio operator normally stood, a
power chin turret and each waist position sported dual 50 caliber
machine guns rather than singles. That gave it 14 heavy machine guns.
Plus, it had added armor around the engines and to protect the gunners
and pilots, and a LOT more ammunition, but no bombs. The idea was for
this flying pillbox to accompany the squadrons and lend it's massive
firepower to their protection. Didn't work. The bomber was as heavy
as the normally loaded B-17F's with their bombloads. When the normal
bombers dropped their loads over the target, they suddenly became 4 to
5 thousand pounds lighter, but the YB-40's didn't. The normal bombers
turned off the target and opened up their throttles to get the hell
out of there, and the YB-40's couldn't keep up. They were quietly
retired after a few months of evaluation. The chin turret, however,
was deemed a success and was installed in the next model of B-17, the
G.

A little talked about problem with the massive formations of bombers
was the apparently frequent collateral damage from friendly fire as
the gunners hosed bullets all over the sky in a desperate effort to
protect themselves from the German fighters which often passed by
missing by mere feet occasionally. With so many airplanes occupying
airspace in so narrow an area and the speed with which the fighters
approached and flashed by, it's not surprising that the counter fire
would hit neighboring bombers accidentally. I know of no statistics
covering this situation, but it was apparently so serious a problem
that by the middle of 1944, the waist gunners were reduced from two to
one, and eventually to none. The bombardier, unless he was the lead
or deputy bombardier, really did not need to be trained to aim bombs
because only the lead bomber in each group actually did the aiming,
all the rest of the bombers dropped on his signal, or when they
sighted the bombs dropping from the lead bomber. So he became a
gunner/toggler. By that time as we all know, the bombers were being
protected all the way to the target by P-51's so high command may have
decided to kill two birds with one stone: eliminate the now
unnecessary gunners/ammo and save weight while adding to the bomb
load.

In the end, it was Allied soldiers capturing German territory that
forced the German surrender. Bombing them from afar was literally all
the Allies could do to claim they were taking the war to the Germans
during the first part of the war because they did not have the
infantry assets to confront them after their initial defeats.

Corky Scott

A book by Mierjewski (Air University) that asserts WW II was won because of
the strategic bombing of the railroads. This cut off the coal supply that
powered the underground munitions factories, crippling the war effort. This
illustrates "Effects Based Operations" and "cascading effects" which are hot
topics these days.