Report: More than 3,400 airspace violations since 9/11

On Sun, 24 Jul 2005 20:25:44 -0400, Bob Noel
wrote in
::

In article ,
Larry Dighera wrote:

Hey, I'm just quoting Governor Fletcher:

ok.


http://www.avweb.com/eletter/archive...printable.html
As AVweb told you two weeks ago, a civilian
contractor failed to notice the manual tracking tags attached to
the radar image of Fletcher's transponder-less airplane and that
triggered the evacuation of the Capitol building and the
scrambling of F-16s. According to the Post, an F-16 was looking
for the King Air but the pilot couldn't visually identify it
because of cloud cover. Moments later, the plane began a normal
approach to DCA and the military called off the attack. Fletcher
told the Lexington Herald that he was originally told he was
"milliseconds" from being shot down.

Can you cite a reference for your refutation of his words?

Actually, look at your reference. Do you see anywhere in it that the
F-16's were actually authorized to shootdown the aircraft?



Absent such
an authorization, there is no way that Fletcher could have been
milliseconds from being shot down. (Never mind that even if such
a shoot down order was given - which wasn't, the F-16's still would
have had to acquire the target.)

Also, Fletcher was "originally told ..." by who? Was that person in
the room where the weapons and surveillance operators were? Or was
that person on the conference call? Did that person see or hear
any authorization to shoot? Lacking that, there isn't anything to refute.



In any event, the pilot wasn't at fault for this ADIZ violation, but
under Mica's proposed bill, only pilots will be fined $100,000.00 for
DC ADIZ violations. That is unjust.

Agreed.

On Sun, 24 Jul 2005 20:25:44 -0400, Bob Noel
wrote in
::

In article ,
Larry Dighera wrote:

Hey, I'm just quoting Governor Fletcher:

ok.


http://www.avweb.com/eletter/archive...printable.html
As AVweb told you two weeks ago, a civilian
contractor failed to notice the manual tracking tags attached to
the radar image of Fletcher's transponder-less airplane and that
triggered the evacuation of the Capitol building and the
scrambling of F-16s. According to the Post, an F-16 was looking
for the King Air but the pilot couldn't visually identify it
because of cloud cover. Moments later, the plane began a normal
approach to DCA and the military called off the attack. Fletcher
told the Lexington Herald that he was originally told he was
"milliseconds" from being shot down.

Can you cite a reference for your refutation of his words?

Actually, look at your reference. Do you see anywhere in it that the
F-16's were actually authorized to shootdown the aircraft?

Not only that, the word 'originally' is telling. Apparently the
milliseconds advice was later revised.

Absent such
an authorization, there is no way that Fletcher could have been
milliseconds from being shot down. (Never mind that even if such
a shoot down order was given - which wasn't, the F-16's still would
have had to acquire the target.)

Right. But visual acquisition wasn't possible. That points out
another flaw in trying to make DC secure by putting airmen in our
military's cross hairs. Targeting our citizens is the wrong response
to terrorist activity in my opinion.

Also, Fletcher was "originally told ..." by who? Was that person in
the room where the weapons and surveillance operators were? Or was
that person on the conference call? Did that person see or hear
any authorization to shoot? Lacking that, there isn't anything to refute.


Who is responsible for issuing such an authorization?


In any event, the pilot wasn't at fault for this ADIZ violation, but
under Mica's proposed bill, only pilots will be fined $100,000.00 for
DC ADIZ violations. That is unjust.

Agreed.

I'm sure there are other possible scenarios for ADIZ violation where
the pilot isn't the cause. Given enough time we'll probably be
hearing about them.

Skywise wrote:
wrote in news:1122332057.792562.282220
@g44g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:

Skywise wrote:

Snipola

I'm reminded of a couple quotes;

"Locks only keep honest people honest."

So I take it you don't lock your doors, right?

I agree that the ADIZ will not serve as the primary defense against all
aircraft-based terror attacks. It will however help some portion of the
time.

In any case, the argument that the ADIZ is not capable in its current
form of stopping all or most attacks is not an argument against an ADIZ
per se. Again, the Schumer and Daley crowd would take your point and
say, "Indeed, if the ADIZ went out to 100NM, then we could have time to
scramble jets to stop a renegade Lear. QED."

Of course, maintaining a 100NM FRZ would have an enormous economic
cost, just as restricting trucks over 5000# curb weight into DC would
cause immense economic problems. So all of these things are a balancing
act. It seems to me that the security bureaucrats have decided that the
current ADIZ is large enough to buy some time to stop the simpler
attacks while not causing significant economic dislocations.

And, bottom line, I still maintain that the vast majority of these
incursions are unambiguously the fault of pilot screwups that are
utterly preventable. The best chance we have to loosen the chains is to
prove that we're not a bunch of nincompoops and the numbers right now
don't appear to make us look too good.

-cwk.

"Skywise" wrote in message
...
[...]
I'm envisioning a scenario where the sleeper cell terrorist sets the
flight up to look like any other flight, originating from within the US
border, no less. They may even have proper clearance into the ADIZ on
their way to landing. Perhaps loading the plane with explosives wouldn't
even be necessary, just topped off tanks and energy of momentum.

A half-way intelligent terrorist wouldn't even bother with that. That is,
using the airplane for the actual attack.

It has already been demonstrated, at least twice, that you can easily empty
the large buildings protecting portions of our government, simply by flying
an airplane into the ADIZ and near DC. So, you just park a Ryder truck
around the corner and wait. Have an accomplice fly the plane, get everyone
out near the street, and then blow them up.

Alternatively, skip the truck and fly the plane into all the people. It
won't be nearly as gruesome or effective, but it would certainly still have
an impact, so to speak.

[...]
I'm arguing that the ADIZ and fighter jets and SAM's would not stop
a plane in such a scenario as it would happen too quickly. How close
is the closest airport to the Capitol Building? How long would it take
a business jet at 250-300 kts to get there after declaring a go-around.

You are probably correct. But even assuming they could shoot the plane
down, a) the wreckage is sure to create some havok somewhere, and b) the
Ryder-truck-around-the-corner option works just fine even if the plane is
shot down (and as an added bonus, the accomplice in the plane gets his free
ride to wherever it is suicide terrorists think they're going, and no messy
FAA enforcement action to worry about).

Even more reason to believe that the ADIZ itself and the current responses
to violations are senseless.

Pete

wrote in news:1122389222.466068.228830
@g44g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:

Skywise wrote:
wrote in news:1122332057.792562.282220
@g44g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:

Skywise wrote:

Snipola

I'm reminded of a couple quotes;

"Locks only keep honest people honest."

So I take it you don't lock your doors, right?

Of course I do. But if a criminal _really_ wanted in those locks
wouldn't stop them.

There's a lot of security around the Hope Diamond, and it certainly
stops the scumbag criminals from simply walking up to the thing
and stuffing it in their pocket. But that doesn't mean there haven't
been attempts or plans at stealing it. If a group is determined
enough and wants it bad enough, they'll find a way to grab it.

The ADIZ may stop the low level wanna-be terrorists, but Al Queda
is a determined group and is willing to go to great lengths to
accomplish their goals.

That is not to say that I don't think there needs to be some sort
of security measures. I am saying that the security measures that
are in place are innefective. Don't ask me. I don't have a solution.
I don't know enough to be a security expert, but I do know enough
to realize that what's in place isn't going to work.

Snipola of rest

Brian
--
http://www.skywise711.com - Lasers, Seismology, Astronomy, Skepticism

Seismic FAQ: http://www.skywise711.com/SeismicFAQ/SeismicFAQ.html
Blog: http://www.skywise711.com/Blog

Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?

"Skywise" wrote in message
...
Of course I do. But if a criminal _really_ wanted in those locks
wouldn't stop them.

And of course, the point there is that locking the locks is an
inconsequential inconvenience.

It's well and good to make reasonable efforts to secure persons, places, and
property. But IMHO "reasonable" means the security measure is a tiny
fraction of the cost and/or inconvenience of whatever loss might occur (with
or without the security measure...it goes without saying no security measure
is 100% effective).

[...]
That is not to say that I don't think there needs to be some sort
of security measures. I am saying that the security measures that
are in place are innefective. Don't ask me. I don't have a solution.
I don't know enough to be a security expert, but I do know enough
to realize that what's in place isn't going to work.

I agree what's in place isn't going to work. I may disagree on whether it's
worth trying to make *anything* that is "going to work". That is, it's my
opinion that security measures required to ensure no terrorist attacks on DC
by airplanes are too draconian to be worthwhile. Heck, it's my opinion that
the CURRENT security measures are too draconian to be worthwhile, even if
they did do what they're supposed to.

Pete

On Mon, 25 Jul 2005 21:41:59 -0000, Skywise
wrote in
::

I wonder if anyone has thought about _not_ evacuating the bureaucrats
and politicians at the approach of every unidentified light aircraft.
It might be safer given the fact that the aircraft will likely be shot
down _before_ it reaches its target, and it would certainly be less
intrusive.

Interesting proposal. It might certainly reduce the number of accidental
incursions on the part of intelligent thinking pilots. But as you have
been harping on there is still the possibility of error not due to the
pilot, and this idea does not seem to address that either.

And you're right about the foolishness of making 10,000+ people run
through the streets in panic. Makes it much easier to dust them with
chem or bio weapons.

Not only that, but if the buildings are being defended by Stinger
missiles, they should be safer than the surrounding areas. Or am I
missing something?

Of course, all of this, including the existence of the ADIZ in general,
does nothing to stop a terrorist.

Right. The DC ADIZ only provides a means of possibly identifying
friendly aircraft before our government shoots them down. That
inconveniences only those citizens whom we've put in our military's
cross hairs: our nation's airmen.

Do they seriously think that a group
of terrorists could fill a learjet with explosives, file a perfectly
legal and normal flight plan to land at a local airport, then at the
last minute divert at high speed to the capitol building? I think it
would be all over before anyone realized there was a plane in the wrong
airspace.

If *I* can think of it, I'm sure the terrorists already have.

Unfortunately, those responsible for the security of the DC area,
don't seem to have a defense for such an attack as you hypothesize,
other than the batteries of Stinger SAMs.

On 26 Jul 2005 07:47:02 -0700, wrote in
.com::

I agree that the ADIZ will not serve as the primary defense against all
aircraft-based terror attacks. It will however help some portion of the
time.

Please explain how the DC ADIZ will effectively deflect any
hypothetical attack. In my opinion, the DC ADIZ only provides an
identification buffer so friendly flights are not accidentally shot
down by the SAMs surrounding DC.

In any case, the argument that the ADIZ is not capable in its current
form of stopping all or most attacks is not an argument against an ADIZ
per se. Again, the Schumer and Daley crowd would take your point and
say, "Indeed, if the ADIZ went out to 100NM, then we could have time to
scramble jets to stop a renegade Lear. QED."

If the flight of the hypothetical Lear attack proposed by Brian
originated _within_ the existing DC ADIZ, anyone who proposed
increasing the size of the ADIZ would be seen as irrational.

Schumer is a Bonanza pilot. What makes you think he's unfriendly
toward GA?

It seems to me that the security bureaucrats have decided that the
current ADIZ is large enough to buy some time to stop the simpler
attacks while not causing significant economic dislocations.

Again, please explain how the current DC ADIZ provides any means of
stopping a hypothetical aerial attack. It's just there so our
military doesn't accidentally shoot down innocent civilians before
they enter the FRZ.

And, bottom line, I still maintain that the vast majority of these
incursions are unambiguously the fault of pilot screwups that are
utterly preventable.

Perhaps that's true, but such an attitude fails to address the
outrageousness of restricting flight in some of the world's busiest
airspace with the expectation of said restriction effectively
preventing incursions into it. There are no visible points on the
surface to identify the ADIZ boundaries. The DC ADIZ is simply a trap
for airmen, that is ineffective in accomplishing its purpose.

The best chance we have to loosen the chains is to
prove that we're not a bunch of nincompoops and the numbers right now
don't appear to make us look too good.

And the numbers aren't likely to get any better, unless you know of
something that will cause them to change. The threat of large fines
pales in comparison to the threat of being shot down by our military.
Laws written on paper do nothing to warn pilots before they enter the
unmarked DC ADIZ boundary. The DC ADIZ is a poorly designed,
ineffectual band-aid that should not be tolerated, but exposed for the
ill conceived imposition it is. Expecting the rate of DC ADIZ
incursions to decrease is an unrealistic expectation at best. It
smacks of the same imbecilic mentality that created the DC ADIZ in the
first place.

Larry Dighera wrote:

Not only that, but if the buildings are being defended by Stinger
missiles, they should be safer than the surrounding areas. Or am I
missing something?

From the photos I've seen published, the missile batteries seem to be located
well away from buildings such as the Capitol, and so don't provide direct
protection. I would also bet that they don't form a perfect screen around the
Mall area. In addition, one of the articles I read (I posted the link in another
thread) strongly implied that the batteries are moved in only during periods in
which the security level is heightened (IIRC, "orange" or higher), so evacuation
would've made sense during most of the last year.

In addition, it's certain that the buildings themselves are the targets for a
group like Al Quaida; killing the occupants would be simply icing on the cake.
Evacuating a building moves people away from the bullseye.

Evacuation strategy is also imperfect. If the evacuees are told to scatter, you
reduce the possibility of large numbers of people being killed while increasing
the chance that some people will be killed if the plane hits off-target. Having
everyone move in the same direction decreases the chance that the plane will hit
anyone while increasing the chance of large numbers of casualties if it does hit
them.

You pays yer money and you takes yer chances.

George Patterson
Give a person a fish and you feed him for a day; teach a person to
use the Internet and he won't bother you for weeks.

On Wed, 27 Jul 2005 16:11:38 GMT, George Patterson
wrote in _mOFe.25$PX4.1@trndny08::

Larry Dighera wrote:

Not only that, but if the buildings are being defended by Stinger
missiles, they should be safer than the surrounding areas. Or am I
missing something?

In addition, one of the articles I read (I posted the link in another
thread) strongly implied that the batteries are moved in only during periods in
which the security level is heightened (IIRC, "orange" or higher), so evacuation
would've made sense during most of the last year.

So it would seem that the best way to prevent evacuations would be to
have the missile batteries in place all the time.

Evacuation strategy is also imperfect. If the evacuees are told to scatter, you
reduce the possibility of large numbers of people being killed while increasing
the chance that some people will be killed if the plane hits off-target. Having
everyone move in the same direction decreases the chance that the plane will hit
anyone while increasing the chance of large numbers of casualties if it does hit
them.

That's a reasonable analysis, but it says nothing of the loss of
dignity the evacuation policy imposes on the leaders of our noble
nation, nor the loss of productive work accomplished. There's got to
be a better strategy.