Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
Not having enough aviation fuel was a big problem late in 1944.
Earlier,
the
Germans had a pretty good handle on it, as the 3/30/44 raid to
Nuremburg
showed.

They nightfighters whacked at least 80 Brit bombers, total lost that
night
94-96.

The British had to suspend their night ops over Germany. That's not
well
known
because they were put onto invasion targets in the same time frame.

Probably because its untrue

The simple fact is that during March 1944 bomber command flew a total
of 9031 sorties with a loss rate of under 4%. Nuremburg was indeed a
disaster
but an isolated one.

The RAF definitely was defeated over Germany by the Luftwaffe in the
Spring of
1944. Being put onto invasion targets has obscured this fact.

"Bomber Command had lost 4,160 aircraft missing and crashed in England.
Harris's failure to bring Germany to her knees, and the cost of his
failure,
had become embarrassingly evident to every man but himself.


Bull**** - losses in the first 4 months of 1944 were as follows

Month Lost Crashed %Loss
January 314 38 5.6
Febuary 199 21 5.2
March 283 39 3.6
April 214 25 2.4


During this period the B-17's of US 8th AF were suffering very
similar loss rates. For example on the 19th Jan 1944 the USAAF
dispatched 675 B-17's and 188 B-24's to Frankfurt with an escort
of 89 P-38's, 503 P-47's and 40 P-51's

34 B-17's and B-24's were lost , a loss rate of 3.94 %




And in a letter to
the Air Ministry on April 7, 1944, he came as close as ever in his life to
conceding that he was in deep trouble:

'The strength of the German defenses [he wrote] would in time reach a
point at
which night-bombing attacks by existing methods and types of heavy bombers
would involve percentage casualty rates which in the long run could not be
sustained...we have not yet reached that point, but tactical innovations
which
have so far postponed it are now practically exhausted....'


So in fact in the spring of 1944 he is saying he has NOT been defeated,

This was a preamble to a demand for ten suadrons of night fighters to
support
his bombers. It was the final admission of defeat for the Trenchard
doctrine....Now Bomber Command had discovered that even night operations
against Germany could no longer be continued on their existing basis
unless the
enemy's night-fighter force could be crippled of destroyed."



On the contrary it was a way of ensuring that he got his night fighters,
and it worked.

--Bomber Command, p. 308 by Max Hastings

The Americans also had to stop deep penetrations inot Germany (they had
made
precious few) until they got Mustangs and longer-legged P47's and also
some
P-38's.

It's a tragedy that the USAAF had a long range escort within its grasp
even in
1942, and didn't see it. That was the P-38. A P-38 group was sent to
England
in 1942 but wound up in Africa after Torch. The VIIIth fighter CG,
Hunter,
wanted to concentrate on the P-47. This was a big mistake. It was shown
that
even a few dozen P-38's could break up the massed attacks by the Germans.
But
they weren't supported, nor was the idea pushed. Eaker seemed to think
that
some magic number of B-17's could be self-defending. That ultimately cost
him
his job.

To get back on target, so to speak, the Americans got back over Germany by
adding the long range fighter (and new commanders) to the mix. The RAF
had no
such solution.


Horsefeathers.

The RAF returned to bombing German targets after D-Day as
did the US 8th AF. Ask any surviving German night fighter pilot
about the RAF response, the Mosquito intruders caused them
terrible losses.

Keith

Probably because its untrue

The simple fact is that during March 1944 bomber command flew a total
of 9031 sorties with a loss rate of under 4%. Nuremburg was indeed a
disaster
but an isolated one.

The RAF definitely was defeated over Germany by the Luftwaffe in the
Spring of
1944. Being put onto invasion targets has obscured this fact.

"Bomber Command had lost 4,160 aircraft missing and crashed in England.
Harris's failure to bring Germany to her knees, and the cost of his
failure,
had become embarrassingly evident to every man but himself.


Bull**** - losses in the first 4 months of 1944 were as follows

Month Lost Crashed %Loss
January 314 38 5.6
Febuary 199 21 5.2
March 283 39 3.6
April 214 25 2.4


During this period the B-17's of US 8th AF were suffering very
similar loss rates.

So what? What has that got to do with the RAF?

And during the first 4 months of 1944, the USAAF was seriously attriting the
Luftwaffe. The RAF was not. The Spitfires didn't have the range to help out
over Germany. That's where the Luftwaffe was.


And in a letter to
the Air Ministry on April 7, 1944, he came as close as ever in his life to
conceding that he was in deep trouble:

'The strength of the German defenses [he wrote] would in time reach a
point at
which night-bombing attacks by existing methods and types of heavy bombers
would involve percentage casualty rates which in the long run could not be
sustained...we have not yet reached that point, but tactical innovations
which
have so far postponed it are now practically exhausted....'


So in fact in the spring of 1944 he is saying he has NOT been defeated,

Harris was in denial. As Hastings points out, he was the only one not saying
that.

If you watch the World At War episode, "Whirlwind", you'll hear Harris say that
the Battle of Berlin was not a defeat. But it was, and a bad one.



This was a preamble to a demand for ten suadrons of night fighters to
support
his bombers. It was the final admission of defeat for the Trenchard
doctrine....Now Bomber Command had discovered that even night operations
against Germany could no longer be continued on their existing basis
unless the
enemy's night-fighter force could be crippled of destroyed."



On the contrary it was a way of ensuring that he got his night fighters,
and it worked.

"In January the British losses rose to 6.15 percent of all sorties against
Berlin and to 7.2 per cent against Stettin, Brunswick and Madgeburg. But the
effectiveness of the German defenses was not confined to destruction. Harrassed
all the way to their distant targets with bombs on board, many of the bombers
were forced to turn back in a damaged condition. Combat and evasive action
scattered the remainder over the sky so that they no longer arrived on the
target as a coherent force. Much as Berlin and the other cities suffered from
the bombing terror of the winter of 1943/44, they were spared the total
extinction that had been the enemy's prognosis.

To quote from the British
official history, "The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany":

"Bomber Command was compelled, largely by the German night-fighter force, to
draw away from its primary target, Berlin, to disperse its effort and to persue
its operations by apparently less efficient means than hitherto. ... The Battle
of Berlin was more than a failure. It was a defeat."

Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.339 by Cajus Bekker

And consider this text from "The Berlin Raids" by Martin
Middlebrook:

"Fauquier [the master bomber] devoted most of his efforts to encouraging
the Main Force to press right on into the target and not to release their bombs
prematurely. It was not easy. He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews
harrassed by fighter attack were not always inclined to listen."

-- "The Berlin Raids p.65 by Martin Middlebrooks


"The raid proceded in no better, no worse, manner than so many raids beyond
the range of oboe. Enough of the 49 pathfinder
backers-up and re-centerers arrived to produce a steady supply
of green TIs. The planned route from the south east was never
achieved. It is clear from the evidence of bombing photographs, that once
the early raid markers and bombs were seen to go down, both the pathfinders
backers-up and the main force swung in from due south, neither being
prepared to spend the extra time in
the target area flying to a theoretical turning point futher on."

They were not prepared to fly further to the briefed point because they
were being heavily engaged by night fighters. Middlebrook makes that plain.

"Many of the Main Force crews were bombing the first markers they saw, instead
of the centre of the markers as ordered, or were dropping short of the markers;
a long 'creepback' developed. The night was clear. Bomber Command's
Operational Research Section later examined 468 bombing photgraphs and
concluded that only five aircraft had bombed within three miles of the correct
Aiming Point, that only a quarter of the force bombed the vulnerable area of
Berlin, and that most of the remainer bombed lightly built up suburban areas."

Ibid p. 66


The RAF was not only getting shot to pieces, they were ineffective.


snip

To get back on target, so to speak, the Americans got back over Germany by
adding the long range fighter (and new commanders) to the mix. The RAF
had no
such solution.


Horsefeathers.

What allowed Bomber Command to continue sending German cities to Harris'
bonfires was the favorable situation brought on by the Americans. That's what
Portal said.


Walt

WalterM140 wrote in message ...

(snip)

The RAF definitely was defeated over Germany by the Luftwaffe in the Spring of
1944. Being put onto invasion targets has obscured this fact.

Strange as it may seem the histories make it clear the Luftwaffe
managed to defeat Bomber Command in early 1944.

"Bomber Command had lost 4,160 aircraft missing and crashed in England.
Harris's failure to bring Germany to her knees, and the cost of his failure,
had become embarrassingly evident to every man but himself.

The losses for the last three months of 1943 and the first 3 months
of 1944 are, according to Hastings, 1,287 missing in action and
another 217 crashed in England, Harris says 1,328 bombers were lost.

To obtain something around the 4,160 figure mentioned you need to
sum the losses from March 1942, when Harris took command to the
end of 1943, then Hastings' loss figures 3,619 MIA plus 626 crashes,
total 4,245.

In the same period according to the USAAF the 8th Air Force lost some
1,615 heavy bombers in combat and crashes, 1,078 considered lost
on combat missions.

And in a letter to
the Air Ministry on April 7, 1944, he came as close as ever in his life to
conceding that he was in deep trouble:

'The strength of the German defenses [he wrote] would in time reach a point at
which night-bombing attacks by existing methods and types of heavy bombers
would involve percentage casualty rates which in the long run could not be
sustained...we have not yet reached that point, but tactical innovations which
have so far postponed it are now practically exhausted....'

This was a preamble to a demand for ten suadrons of night fighters to support
his bombers. It was the final admission of defeat for the Trenchard
doctrine....Now Bomber Command had discovered that even night operations
against Germany could no longer be continued on their existing basis unless the
enemy's night-fighter force could be crippled of destroyed."

--Bomber Command, p. 308 by Max Hastings

This sort of ignores the fact the RAF had been steadily building up the
bomber support system, and the loss rates had peaked in earlier times,
with new tactics helping to drop the losses back into the acceptable
category. For example late 1941, and mid 1943.

It comes down to whatever Hastings defines as the Trenchard doctrine,
the unescorted bomber devastating the target had long been disproved
before March 1944.

The Americans also had to stop deep penetrations inot Germany (they had
made precious few) until they got Mustangs and longer-legged P47's and
also some P-38's.

It's a tragedy that the USAAF had a long range escort within its grasp even in
1942, and didn't see it. That was the P-38. A P-38 group was sent to England
in 1942 but wound up in Africa after Torch. The VIIIth fighter CG, Hunter,
wanted to concentrate on the P-47. This was a big mistake. It was shown that
even a few dozen P-38's could break up the massed attacks by the Germans.

There is a slight problem with this, the combat record of the P-38 over
North Africa in 1942/43 and then again over Europe on 1943/44. Then
add the long range P-38 versions came about when the cooling system
was redesigned and the J-15 version allowed 410 gallons of internal fuel
versus the 300 gallons in previous models. The first J models were
built in August 1943 without the wing tanks, with 10 J-1, 210 J-5 and
790 J-10 models built before the J-15 model was introduced, then add
the time to ramp up the line and send the aircraft overseas. In September
1943 the P-38s in the Mediterranean were classified as having a combat
radius of 350 miles, well short of that needed to escort bombers deep
into Germany.

It would have been quite easy to stop P-38 escorts in 1943, just attack
them early, and force them to jettison their external tanks, they were
carrying about as much or more fuel externally than internally.

Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in
May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly
expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF
deployed against Germany and include reserves etc.

But
they weren't supported, nor was the idea pushed. Eaker seemed to think that
some magic number of B-17's could be self-defending. That ultimately cost him
his job.

Eaker was not the only one and he did ask for long range tanks on
his fighters. It is not a simple good guy/bad guy situation.

To get back on target, so to speak, the Americans got back over Germany by
adding the long range fighter (and new commanders) to the mix. The RAF had
no such solution.

Of course this simply ignores the long range night fighter support and
better jamming systems for a start.


Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

It would have been quite easy to stop P-38 escorts in 1943, just attack
them early, and force them to jettison their external tanks, they were
carrying about as much or more fuel externally than internally.

It was -shown- that even a few dozen P-38's had a very delerious effect on the
tactics of the German day fighters.

There's no "it would have been quite easy to..." to it. What you suggest was
not a factor.

Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in
May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly
expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF
deployed against Germany and include reserves etc.

Thanks for the minutia.

The point is that Eaker and Hunter, 8th BC and 8th FC CGs respectively could
have stressed long range escorts and pushed P-38 enhancements, stressed
solving the technical problems, and so forth in 1942. P-38's were available in
England in 1942.

Eaker and Hunter didn't do that.

Eaker was not the only one and he did ask for long range tanks on
his fighters. It is not a simple good guy/bad guy situation.

Eaker dawdled on it. It wasn't important to him.

Eaker thought the B-17's could defend themselves until very late in the game.

He -was- sacked, after all.

Eaker even suggested that the first Mustang groups go to the 9th AF. He didn't
understand the problem. He didn't allow for improvements and reinforcments of
the German AF. P-38's of longer range and better reliability could have been
provided well before they were. An all P-38 force could have done what a mixed
P-47, P-51 and P-38 force DID do-- wreck the German day fighter force. -- if
it had been stressed earlier. But it was not.

Now, you'll dispute this of course. But the problems the long range escorts
gave the Germans rested on this:

The Germans had to up-armor and up-arm their single engine fighters and add
twin engine bomber destroyers to the mix, in order to kill B-17's in large
numbers. -Any- of the three main US fighters on the scene (P-38, P-47,
P-51)could have made that up-armoring and use of the twin engine bomber
destroyers impractical.

Walt

In article 40f8ceaa$0$1306$5a62ac22@per-qv1-newsreader-
01.iinet.net.au, says...

This sort of ignores the fact the RAF had been steadily building up the
bomber support system, and the loss rates had peaked in earlier times,
with new tactics helping to drop the losses back into the acceptable
category. For example late 1941, and mid 1943.

What sort of tactics were used?


It comes down to whatever Hastings defines as the Trenchard doctrine,
the unescorted bomber devastating the target had long been disproved
before March 1944.

What do these escort fighters do?



--
Logically we attempt to devise reasons for our irrational behaviour.

Observations of Bernard - No 62

Bernardz wrote:

What sort of problems faced a defender in attempting to intercept and
shoot down night bombers in 1944?

I am interested both over Germany and Britain.

--

Get a copy of the book "NightFighter" by Rawlings.
Excellent read....

I am interested both over Germany and Britain.

--

Get a copy of the book "NightFighter" by Rawlings.
Excellent read....


Before he died at a relatively early age, Jimmy Rawnsley sat down and had a
beer with many nightfighter airmen - several guys featured in his classic book
remarked that they didn't realize that they were being "interviewed" for it.
His former squadronmates report that they felt he told their story accurately.
There are several books with the title "Nightfighter" - John Rawlings did a
good one, but Jimmy Rawnsley's is better.

v/r
Gordon
====(A+C====
USN SAR

Its always better to lose -an- engine, not -the- engine.

"Krztalizer" wrote in message
...

I am interested both over Germany and Britain.

--

Get a copy of the book "NightFighter" by Rawlings.
Excellent read....


Before he died at a relatively early age, Jimmy Rawnsley sat down and had
a
beer with many nightfighter airmen - several guys featured in his classic
book
remarked that they didn't realize that they were being "interviewed" for
it.
His former squadronmates report that they felt he told their story
accurately.
There are several books with the title "Nightfighter" - John Rawlings did
a
good one, but Jimmy Rawnsley's is better.

v/r
Gordon
====(A+C====
USN SAR

Its always better to lose -an- engine, not -the- engine.

Sir, My father flew nightfighters during WW2 in the European theater,
(Beaufighters, then P-61's) though I'm not familiar with either of those
books,I wonder if they could shed some light on his service to our country.
I've got a few medals but have no idea what he did to deserve them. I'm not
even sure what they are, one says DFC or something like that on the back,
the other is a silver star and two purple hearts. (I know what the Hearts
are for, duh!) Is there any way that you know of where I could "actually"
find out. He's been gone for over thirty years and I always wondered what he
did to get them. Sorry if this comes off a little lame but I saw the
nightfighter thread and got interested...

TIA,

Tom

BTW- As an xPanAm crew chief, you're completely correct, not the engine is
"way better", though I've seen a few that did just that......

Hi, Tom.

Sir, My father flew nightfighters during WW2 in the European theater,
(Beaufighters, then P-61's)

Soo, he was in the 415th or 422nd NFS, stationed in the Med and later
England/Belgium...? There is a small organization for P-61 crews that he may
already know about. If not, I can put you/him in touch with the guys.

though I'm not familiar with either of those
books,I wonder if they could shed some light on his service to our country.

You have to buy a book called "Queen of the Midnight Skies", about early US
nightfighter efforts, particularly in the theater of war that your dad
experienced. Although the book is skewed toward the P-61 (*Badly*), the
authors interviewed dozens of survivors and give a great insider's view of the
US entry into this new field of combat.

I've got a few medals but have no idea what he did to deserve them.

We can find out - sure about that.

I'm not
even sure what they are, one says DFC or something like that on the back,
the other is a silver star and two purple hearts. (I know what the Hearts
are for, duh!) Is there any way that you know of where I could "actually"
find out. He's been gone for over thirty years and I always wondered what he
did to get them. Sorry if this comes off a little lame but I saw the
nightfighter thread and got interested...

Not lame at all - this is what most of us are "here" for.

BTW- As an xPanAm crew chief, you're completely correct, not the engine is
"way better", though I've seen a few that did just that.

As a sidelight to the other thread (Extremis Intercomm), the worst thing I
heard on the radio out at sea was an A-7 gent announcing to the world, "I'm
passing through 3,000 feet and I'm in a #$^$#ing GLIDER!"

My advice is to ALWAYS bring a second engine - you never know when it will
become your *only* engine.

Pleasure to meet you, Tom. Hope we can help you.

v/r
Gordon
====(A+C====
USN SAR

Its always better to lose -an- engine, not -the- engine.

"Krztalizer" wrote in message
...
Hi, Tom.

Sir, My father flew nightfighters during WW2 in the European theater,
(Beaufighters, then P-61's)

Soo, he was in the 415th or 422nd NFS, stationed in the Med and later
England/Belgium...? There is a small organization for P-61 crews that he
may
already know about. If not, I can put you/him in touch with the guys.

though I'm not familiar with either of those
books,I wonder if they could shed some light on his service to our
country.

You have to buy a book called "Queen of the Midnight Skies", about early
US
nightfighter efforts, particularly in the theater of war that your dad
experienced. Although the book is skewed toward the P-61 (*Badly*), the
authors interviewed dozens of survivors and give a great insider's view of
the
US entry into this new field of combat.

I've got a few medals but have no idea what he did to deserve them.

We can find out - sure about that.

I'm not
even sure what they are, one says DFC or something like that on the back,
the other is a silver star and two purple hearts. (I know what the Hearts
are for, duh!) Is there any way that you know of where I could "actually"
find out. He's been gone for over thirty years and I always wondered what
he
did to get them. Sorry if this comes off a little lame but I saw the
nightfighter thread and got interested...

Not lame at all - this is what most of us are "here" for.

BTW- As an xPanAm crew chief, you're completely correct, not the engine
is
"way better", though I've seen a few that did just that.

As a sidelight to the other thread (Extremis Intercomm), the worst thing I
heard on the radio out at sea was an A-7 gent announcing to the world,
"I'm
passing through 3,000 feet and I'm in a #$^$#ing GLIDER!"

My advice is to ALWAYS bring a second engine - you never know when it will
become your *only* engine.

Pleasure to meet you, Tom. Hope we can help you.

v/r
Gordon
====(A+C====
USN SAR

Its always better to lose -an- engine, not -the- engine.

Thanks, I really appreciate your help. IIRC, my Dad flew Beaufighters for 6
or 7 months then was switched to P-61's. I do remember him telling me he was
shot down once returning to base by allied AAA! and he was in Belgium. The
415th sounds really familiar,if my Mom ever gets off the web I'll call her
and find out the particulars. ( I should have never given her that
computer!!) Oh, one thing else I remember, his flight jacket had an emblem
of an owl(bird of some kind) holding a tommygun looking around in the dark
with a flashlight or a candle. I know I still have it packed away somewhere,
I'll look and see if I can find it. Once again, Thanks.

Tom

BTW- doing an Amazon on the book right now...