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#31
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Keith Willshaw wrote:
"Bernardz" wrote in message news:MPG.1a1cc45edfb975c29896ec@news... In article , jdupre5762 @aol.com says... I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would come anytime in the next 72 hours. It might well have been worse in some ways. I understand that part of the Navy's planning was to move the fleet out of the harbor to a different anchorage that was much deeper. So if some of the ships could have been torpedoed or sunk by bombs there they might well have been unrecoverable. The anchorage in question was off of Lahaina (Maui). Were any of the ships that were recovered worth much anyway? Hell yes, they were used throughout the later part of the war. Mostly for pre-invasion bombardment. Which had effects that were decidedly debatable. Did rattle the defenders' cages if nothing else. Most of the effort that went into recovery was done for national pride to deny the Japanese as much of a victory as possible. Perhaps but do recall that the ships in the USN line at the battle of the Surigao Strait, part of the largest naval battle of WW2 was made up of Battleships salvaged from Pearl Harbor. Well, two "salvaged" (West Virginia and California) and three repaired (Maryland and Tennessee were inboard of West Virginia & California, Pennsylvania was already in drydock on 7 December). Revenge was sweet that day. Damn straight, even though it was a bit one-sided - six battleships mounting a total of 58 large-caliber guns, vs. 1 battleship, 1 cruiser & 1 destroyer (the rest of the Southern Force had been taken out by torpedo attacks from PT boats and destroyers.). The Battle Line opened fire at 0353 and had pretty much obliterated the one Japanese battleship by 0408, when the Cease Fire was passed. The cruiser (the eternally battered Mogami) and destroyer retreated with heavy damage, only to be sunk by aircraft the following morning. (There, I got a military aviation reference in the last sentence.) -Marc -- Marc Reeve actual email address after removal of 4s & spaces is c4m4r4a4m4a4n a4t c4r4u4z4i4o d4o4t c4o4m |
#32
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![]() Most of the effort that went into recovery was done for national pride to deny the Japanese as much of a victory as possible. National pride was an important issue, but was the space needed to keep the harbor open to refit and provision other ships? If battleship row was unavailable, how many ships could Pearl Harbor support in a timely fashion? I doubt that they were worth the money. They were used apparently a lot of money was spent on California, West Virginia and Nevada. A lot was lost on the Oglala when she went down. Bit of the Cassin and the Downes were put into new ships just to taunt the Japanese. my 0.02 MAH -- People are not apathetic in a bookie shop. 13th saying of Bernard |
#33
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Paul J. Adam ) wrote:
: In message , : Mike1 writes : Carrier aircraft could have flown to land-based fields, refueled there, : then attacked the Jap carriers as they approached. : Consider how effective US aviation was against IJN forces in early 1942. : No chance of a Midway Moment (catching carriers in the midst of a : mission change), however bravely the USN crews try to press their : attacks. : Subs may have also have been able to intercept. : And if they get to fire, and hit, so what? They're at the start of the : learning curve of "why don't USN torpedoes work?" in December 1941. Not to mention that USN practice against fleet units was to fire on sonar indications. The realization that the IJN wasn't really good at ASW would come later. -- David Benjamin |
#34
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On Wed, 12 Nov 2003 10:09:50 -0500, "James Linn" wrote:
"Mike1" wrote in message ... (Resisting "But Roosevelt *did* know urge") Watched a documentary on Camp X, a place east of Toronto that trained British, Canadian and later US Intelligence types including SOE, OSS, FBI, USNMI etc. One of the functions of the Camp was also as a distant adjunct to Bletchley Park. They interviewed a female operator who claims that the information sent to the US officials in regards to Pearl Harbour was sent 8 days previous to Dec 7, and stated that hostile action imminent, within 8 days(from memory). There was also some prediction that it would have been on a Sunday. Take that for whatever its worth. There is no proof that the warning got to anyone in power. James Linn We knew that *something* was in the works, but everyone (including the Brits) thought that the attack would come in the PI, the Dutch East Indies, etc. No one foresaw the attack on Pearl. Al Minyard |
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#36
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On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 16:57:14 -0600, BOB URZ
wrote: I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would come anytime in the next 72 hours. If Japanese found out Americans were ready three days before the attack was scheduled, Nagumo was under order to abort the mission. Drax |
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